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Abstract
What does anyone know after a trial, after a witness gives testimony, or even after seeking
the counsel of a lawyer? Hopefully, the answer to these questions has something to do with the
truth. Legal systems claim to have truth-seeking functions. Lawyers have specific roles in the
procedures by which legal systems seek the truth and these roles are informed by the norms of
legal practice. Yet, lawyers’ relationship to truth and knowledge remains underexplored in the
philosophy of lawyering. I argue that the philosophy of lawyering needs to develop the epistemic
branch of inquiry. The epistemic study of the legal profession offers both enrichment of this
applied field of philosophy itself and the opportunity for the philosophy of lawyering to link up
with a nexus of emerging scholarship about cognition in legal systems and legal services—
especially metacognition in legal pedagogy and behavioural legal ethics (which explores the
psychology of lawyers).
Advancing an epistemic approach to the philosophy of lawyering, I study the way in which
the lawyer is involved in the adversarial system’s truth-seeking function. My theory of lawyering
is informed by recent scholarship in social epistemology and virtue epistemology. I propose a
normative epistemology of lawyering, meaning specifically that my approach speaks to the
professional character development of the lawyer. In the adversarial system of adjudication,
lawyers can support the truth-seeking function of the system by developing the intellectual virtues
of an epistemic partisan. I put my proposal to the test against Monroe Freedman’s Client Perjury
Trilemma, reaching new conclusions about the responses to the famous problem.
Ultimately, I call for a commitment to professional character formation in service of the
legal system’s search for truth.
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Introduction
Ethics has been fruitful in the philosophical study of the legal profession and should still
occupy a central place therein. However, it is time for the philosophical study of lawyering to
develop other strong branches. Reaching beyond comfortable topics in ethics, the philosophical
study of lawyering can benefit from pursuing other philosophical branches of inquiry, especially
metaphysics and epistemology.
Metaphysical and epistemological issues have already been raised on the ethics branch of
the philosophy of lawyering. Metaphysical questions about the nature of morality and law (e.g.,
whether justice has an objective metaphysical grounding and about the nature of law) have largely
existed as unaddressed assumptions of the moral and legal philosophies that have been the basis
of various theories of lawyering. Epistemology has been more explicitly present in these
discussions, including in questions about truth-seeking in trials, honesty and candour in the
behaviour of lawyers, the reliability of types of evidence, the treatment of witnesses, etc. Thanks
to recent developments in epistemology, as well as developments in adjacent fields of study, the
epistemological branch of the philosophy of lawyering—much more so than the metaphysical
branch—is ready for a growth spurt.
I will study both the practice of law, and the training of lawyers, from a philosophical
perspective that focuses on cognition as a vital part of developing the professional character of
lawyers. In doing so, I can draw upon consonant contributions from emerging fields of research
that coalesce around the cognitive processes of participants in legal processes. A network of
scholarship about cognition and law is ready to emerge, informed by: (1) philosophy, in the social
and virtue-inspired turns in epistemology (including legal epistemology); (2) education theory, in
the development of metacognition as a theory of education and learning (including in law schools);
and (3) science, through the rise of behavioural legal ethics as a scientific study of cognition in the
1

legal field.1 These domains look at the cognitive processes of people who are participants in legal
processes. Epistemology, metacognition, and behavioural legal ethics provide a broad spectrum of
resources and modes of discourse to the topic that unifies them: the cognition of participants in
legal processes. My project of developing an epistemology of lawyering thus exists at a nexus
between exciting theories that appreciate what can be gained by studying the mind of participants
in legal processes. As a work in the philosophy of lawyering, most of the attention in this
dissertation is given to lawyers’ cognition.
While this dissertation expands the philosophy of lawyering beyond the ethical study of
lawyering, this is not to say that I intend to cast off ethics. Questions, examples, modes of thinking,
and sources in ethics (including legal sources and ethical codes of conduct) will inspire much of
this dissertation. In fact, thinking in moral philosophy (virtue ethics, in particular) has inspired the
developments in epistemology of which I make the greatest use. However, scholarship—especially
philosophical scholarship—about lawyering is ready to achieve new kinds of insights that can
recast the knowledge and norms already propounded. By staying so comfortably within the domain
of ethics, scholarship on the legal profession has even overlooked the broader influence that ethical
modes of thought are having beyond ethics itself. Missing these contributions thus limits the
appreciation of the influence that ethical thinking has had on other domains.
One place in which epistemology and ethics meet is in virtue theory. A prominent recent
use of virtue theory in legal ethics comes from Andrew B Ayers’ application of the normative
ethical theory of virtue ethics to legal ethics. Ayers challenges the prevailing pattern of thinking
in legal ethics, which is focused on identifying an abstract principle (or set of abstract principles)

1

This is not to say that these different domains of cognition-centred scholarship about lawyering have interacted
deeply or have even found one another. I aim to give one of the first calls, if not the first call, to these domains to
make the connections between their new and insightful approaches to studying the legal profession.
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and applying that (or those) principle(s) to discrete problems in legal ethics. As Ayers explains,
“Most theories [of legal ethics] focus on an abstract value, like justice, autonomy, or political

legitimacy, and argue that it is what matters most. In many cases, the theory then endorses a maxim
that tells lawyers how to promote the abstract value in their daily practice”.2 Differing
substantially, Ayers proposes an account of legal ethics that centralizes the character of lawyers,
rather than lawyer’s adherence to abstract norms. Ayers’ thinking is based on the pattern of thought
in virtue theory, which is most famously developed in the ethics of Aristotle.3 Lawyers are
exhorted to enact appropriate virtues, rather than merely satisfy a set of maxims, or master maxim.4
I am starting a new flow of thought that can eventually join Ayers’, but from a point of
origin that is largely unheard of in legal ethics. My research in legal ethics is primarily based on a
relatively recent development in the field of epistemology5: the rise of virtue epistemology as a
normative approach to the study of knowledge.6 In line with the spirit of Ayers’ alternative to
models of legal ethics that emphasize abstract values, virtue epistemology brings the insights of
Aristotle’s virtue ethics into the field of epistemology by treating knowledge as a matter of

Andrew B Ayers, “What if Legal Ethics Can’t be Reduced to a Maxim?” (2013) 26:1 Geo J Legal Ethics 1 at 2.
See Aristotle, The Nicomachean Ethics, reissued ed, translated by David Ross, JL Ackrill & JO Urmson, eds, (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1998) (for the most famous articulation of Aristotle’s ethics). Even earlier than Ayers,
Allan Hutchinson, Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility, 2nd ed (Toronto: Irwin Law, 2006) articulated his
contextual and pragmatic approach to legal ethics, which emphasized many ideas that are also central in this
dissertation, such as lawyers taking responsibility, ibid at 45–50, and “develop[ing] a professional modus vivendi”,
ibid at 210.
4
See Ayers, supra note 2 at parts iii–iv.
5
As is often the case in the field of epistemology, and certainly in virtue epistemology, I will use the terms “epistemic”/
“intellectual” and “epistemic virtue”/“intellectual virtue” interchangeably. Of course, there are scholars who would,
in some instances, distinguish between epistemic virtues and intellectual virtues because, for example, there may be
intellectual virtues that do not have the acquisition of knowledge as their focus. See Jason Kawall, “Other-Regarding
Epistemic Virtues” (2002) 15:3 Ratio 257 at 259, n 8. However, Kawall uses the terms “intellectual virtue” and
“epistemic virtue” interchangeably in the article that was just cited and describes this interchangeable use as “common
practice”.
6
A “normative approach” to virtue epistemology attempts to make prescriptions about—rather than merely describe
the acquisition of—knowledge. See generally John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco, “Virtue Epistemology”, The
Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall 2019), Edward N Zalta, ed, online: Center for the Study of Language and
Information, Stanford University <plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/> [perma.cc/JJ3T-4YUJ], s 1
(explaining varying approaches to treating virtue epistemology as a normative discipline).
2
3
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epistemic character. This still young theory develops accounts of dispositions and behaviours that
lead individuals and communities to knowledge. An intellectual agent or community is judged by
whether he/she/it has/have these intellectual virtues, rather than by whether the agent or
community meets a set of abstract conditions for possessing knowledge (as in more traditional
approaches to epistemology).
Epistemology provides a fresh set of resources that legal scholars can bring to their thinking
about the behaviour of members of the legal profession. I am presenting a new vantagepoint to the
philosophy of lawyering, a complement, an enrichment, not a replacement of existing theories in
the philosophy of lawyering (the overwhelming majority of which are philosophies of ethics). My
research herein is presented from the perspective that there is a fundamental relationship between
knowledge and ethics, as well as their associated fields of study. This relationship is seen vividly
when turning normative analysis in epistemology and ethics towards the behaviour and
dispositions of agents who participate in fields that are especially assessable by epistemic and
ethical criteria. We see this foundational relationship and its theoretical fruitfulness illustrated in
depth in the legal community and the roles of its various actors (both professionals and nonprofessionals). Increased attention to the cognition of lawyers creates an opportunity to approach
the philosophy of lawyering in a way that deals more deeply with the professional life of the lawyer
and the development of the professional character of the lawyer within the social institutions and
practices of law. My epistemology of lawyering contributes to this.
One particular benefit of discussing epistemology in relation to legal ethics and models of
lawyering is that epistemology provides additional richness to our understanding of the lawyer’s
knowledge-producing role. Too often, ethics and professionalism are discussed as being
constraints on what seems to be the dominant understanding of what the “real job of a lawyer” is,

4

i.e., securing a favourable result for the client.7 Ethics is treated as telling a lawyer what s/he cannot
do in service of the client (what s/he cannot do in service of what s/he must do). Epistemic analysis
has the advantage of being more readily seen as more than a constraint on the behaviour. Virtually
all lawyering behaviour (including especially technical and procedural behavior) is assessable on
epistemic grounds. With the paradigm that I develop, questions about character (both
epistemological and ethical) are built into all assessments of a lawyer’s professional
efficaciousness. Thus, rather than merely thinking of the lawyer’s knowledge-producing role in
functional terms, discussing the epistemology of lawyering will allow me to understand even
technical tasks as coming down to matters of character (epistemic character). This way of thinking
about the epistemology of lawyering is largely thanks to the responsibilist line of thought in virtue
epistemology.
This dissertation is primarily intended to be about lawyers, not for lawyers. I will discuss
and propose an epistemic model of lawyering here, but I am not presently writing with the aim of
giving advice to lawyers. To the extent that practicing lawyers can draw insight from this work
(especially insight that they can take into their practice), that is a welcome secondary benefit. I do
not say this to remain aloof of the practical realities of lawyering. Indeed, it is my hope that my
interest in the practicalities of lawyering will become abundantly apparent throughout this
dissertation, especially during my articulation of the virtue epistemology of lawyering. Rather, I
am establishing my aims in this way because I am introducing a way of philosophizing about
lawyers that is so new, and so different, from what exists now, that my focus must remain on laying
out the conceptual groundwork of this branch of the philosophy of lawyering. Most accurately, I

7

One of the more famous and strongly-given statements of the view that emphasizes client service to the exclusion of
all else can be found in Lord Brougham’s words, where he says that, for lawyers, “To save that client by all means
and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself, is his first and only duty”,
Trial of Queen Caroline, vol 2, (New York: James Cockcroft & Co, 1874) at 3.

5

am not merely suggesting that scholars who study the legal profession should turn in a different
direction in terms of studying lawyering philosophically. Rather, I am suggesting that legal
scholars recognize, and better integrate, new and different modes of transportation.

Outline
Part I of this dissertation gives an account of the philosophy of lawyering as it has
developed thus far. This includes discussions of traditional and alternative models of lawyering
and waves of philosophical legal ethics. Additionally, I discuss what I hope to bring forward with
my epistemological approach to lawyering. Finally, I will explain the type of knowledge that I plan
to discuss in relation to lawyers and some key premises about knowledge that inform the particular
way in which I make use of epistemic theories.8 This will require briefly explaining the theory of
truth that motivates this dissertation.
Subsequently, Part II sets out the epistemological theories that are the basis for the research
undertaken, and position endorsed, in this dissertation. Section (2) and Section (3), will be surveys
of the developments of social epistemology and virtue epistemology, respectively. Providing these
surveys will put a spotlight on the exciting theoretical resources that I am bringing to the
philosophy of lawyering. Throughout my surveys, I will, as often as possible, illustrate
developments in the field of epistemology by using examples that apply to the field of law. I can
do this so readily because some of the major contributions to these developments have been made
by scholars who work on the epistemology of law, especially the social epistemology of law.
In Part III, Section (4), I will develop the main idea of this dissertation, namely that the
application of virtue epistemology to law and legal knowledge can provide a number of insights

8

One could challenge and propose different underlying premises about knowledge than the ones presented here. I
leave such work for the future, dealing with more basic questions in epistemology and perhaps even in metaepistemology. That work is beyond the scope of this dissertation, which is meant to give a normative understanding
of epistemology and—more so—to apply that understanding to a practical field: legal practice.

6

into the functions of legal systems and the roles of lawyers in legal systems. I will develop a virtue
epistemic account of lawyering that deals with the lawyer’s role-differentiation, putting forward
epistemic partisanship as an epistemic virtue.
Part IV of this dissertation brings forward the importance of understanding the relationship
of this dissertation to an emerging network of cognition-focused approaches to studying
participants in legal systems, including lawyers. In Section (5), I will discuss the way in which the
study of metacognition in education provides vital resources for the development of the
epistemically virtuous lawyer; developments in metacognition support virtuous dispositions and
metacognition is seeing similar turns as the broader field of epistemology. A key feature of the
lawyer-client relationship involves an offloading of metacognitive work from the client to the
lawyer. In Section (6), I will explore developments in behavioural legal ethics, an approach to legal
ethics that uses scientific literature, especially psychology, to explore the ethics of lawyering.
Part V contains the central case study of this dissertation: Monroe Freedman’s Client
Perjury Trilemma. In Section (7), I will explain the Client Perjury Trilemma, discuss various
responses to the Client Perjury Trilemma, and analyze the Client Perjury Trilemma from the
perspective of the theory of virtue epistemology that I develop in this dissertation. Finally, in
Section (8), I will undertake a detailed epistemic evaluation of Monroe Freedman’s controversial
answer to the Client Perjury Trilemma. I do not propose a new solution to the Client Perjury
Trilemma, but I bring fresh resources to bear in dealing with it.
Throughout this dissertation, as I discuss professional rules of conduct, I will refer to the
American Bar Association’s Model Rules of Professional Conduct (the “ABA Model Rules”) 9 and

9

American Bar Association, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA, 2019, online: ABA
<www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/mod
el_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents/> [perma.cc/5WED-59ZP] [ABA Model Rules].
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the Federation of Law Societies of Canada’s Model Code of Professional Conduct (the “FLSC
Model Code”)10. These sources are cited to raise the relevant professional norms that connect to
the epistemic and ethical ideas being discussed and the cases to which the norms and ideas are
being applied. However, a deep comparative study of relevant provisions in these documents does
not fall within the scope of this dissertation. Moreover, no set of rules can exhaustively cover the
work of a lawyer or exhaustively cover any social interaction. Professional codes of conduct will,
ideally, set out a number of requirements and permissions that are well grounded in the justification
for the lawyer’s role-differentiation, and that may form part of a deposit of knowledge that the
lawyer can use in guiding his/her behaviour as a professional. On this topic, Hutchinson says,
“[A]n ethical code is not an exhaustive compendium of right answers and settled guidelines. While
it often recommends bounds on acceptable conduct and seeks to distinguish good from bad
behavior, it will operate more as a set of resources through which to think about and decide what
to do than a corpus of pat answers to moral dilemmas”.11 Accordingly, I will treat codes of
professional conduct as resources for reasoning through challenges in the philosophy of
lawyering—especially in my philosophy of lawyering—and as guardrails for epistemic character
development.

10

Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct, FLSC 2019, online (pdf): FLSC
<flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Model-Code-October-2019.pdf> [perma.cc/U4WA-H2T7] [FLSC Model
Code]. Before the FLSC Model Code, the document that played the role of national model code in Canada was the
Canadian Bar Association Code of Professional Conduct. See Canadian Bar Association, “Codes of Professional
Conduct” (last modified 26 April 2020), online: Canadian Bar Association <www.cba.org/PublicationsResources/Practice-Tools/Ethics-and-Professional-Responsibility-(1)/Codes-of-Professional-Conduct>
[perma.cc/3EDN-GJM6] (a brief history of the code); Canadian Bar Association, CBA Code of Professional Conduct,
Ottawa: CBA, 2009, online (pdf): CBA <www.cba.org/getattachment/Publications-Resources/Resources/Ethics-andProfessional-Responsibility/Code-of-Conduct/Code-of-Professional-Conduct-(2009)/codeOfConduct2009Eng.pdf>.
11
Allan C Hutchinson, Fighting Fair: Legal Ethics for an Adversarial Age (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2015) at 8.
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Part I – History & Turns in the Philosophy of Lawyering
As this dissertation aims to bring forward new ways of philosophizing about lawyers, the
arguments in Part I connect with major ideas developed thus far in the philosophy of lawyering.
Appreciating themes in the historical development will be more helpful for the purposes of this
dissertation than having a chronological account of the development of the philosophy of
lawyering.

(1) Ethical Models, Ethical Waves, and Epistemic Ripples
As stated already, the primary developments in the philosophy of lawyering have been on
the ethics branch of philosophy. The existing lines of thought have developed models and
connected them to theories of ethics, political philosophy, and legal philosophy. I explore these
existing waves and feed the epistemic ripples that I hope will develop into an epistemic wave of
the philosophy of lawyering.
(1.1) Traditional & Alternative Models of Lawyering
Underlying various moral and philosophical approaches to lawyering constructed by
theorists over multiple decades is the debate between (1) traditional models of lawyering 1—
sometimes called the standard conception, standard model, or zealous advocate model of
lawyering—and (2) alternative models of lawyering. Traditional models of lawyering, also called
zealous advocate models, have three key aspects2: the principle of neutrality which says that,

I have deliberately used the plural form “traditional models” throughout this dissertation. It is true that there is more
unity among advocates of traditional lawyering than there is among advocates of alternative models of lawyering,
whose advocates often differ from one another beyond of their basic agreement that traditional lawyering cannot be
all that there is to the practice of law. However, the comparative unity among advocates of traditional lawyering is not
reason enough to miss the nuance within traditional lawyering. The history of legal ethics scholarship has included a
wide variety of proposals about traditional lawyering and the reasons that justify traditional lawyering. The time has
come to use language that recognizes, rather than elides, the diversity within traditional lawyering.
2
See generally Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues?: A Defence of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role
(Farnham, UK: Ashgate Publishing, 2009) [Dare, Counsel of Rogues] at 74–76 (Dare discussing the three key aspects
of traditional models). See also David Luban & W Bradley Wendel, “Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate
History” (2017) 30:3 Geo J Legal Ethics 337 at 343, n 17 and accompanying text (citing accounts of traditional models
that divide up the aspects of traditional models in slightly different ways).
1

9

“[T]he lawyer must not allow their own view of the moral merits of the client’s objective or
character to affect the diligence or zealousness with which they pursue the client’s lawful
objectives”;3 the principle of lawyer non-accountability, “according to which lawyers are not to be
judged by the moral status of the client’s projects”;4 and the principle of partisanship, which
stipulates that, “A lawyer must, within the established constraints on professional behavior,
maximize the likelihood that the client’s objectives will be attained”.5 The overarching idea is that
lawyers must focus their attention (almost exclusively) on zealous promotion of the client’s legal
interests. Tim Dare, a philosopher of legal ethics whose ideas are discussed in more depth in
Section (1.2), advocates a traditional model of lawyering.
In contrast to traditional models, alternative models of lawyering generally advocate for
the lawyer to take moral accountability (or more moral accountability) for his/her own legal
practice and for the legal services that s/he provides to the client.6 The major theme that unites
many alternative models of lawyering is the idea that a lawyer’s duties go beyond the duty to
pursue the client’s interests and also beyond certain minimal duties to the court (such as the duty
to not present false evidence to the court). In particular, alternative models of lawyering often
advocate that, in addition to resolutely serving the client, lawyers should take into account the
interests of third parties to the case, or even the interests of the opposing party in the case. These

3

Dare, Counsel of Rogues, supra note 2 at 74.
Ibid at 75. See also David Luban, “Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply
to Stephen Ellmann” (1990) 90:4 Colum L Rev 1004 [Luban, “Partisanship”] at 1004 (Luban’s definition of nonaccountability). Luban’s definition of non-accountability additionally specifies that lawyers are not to be held “legally,
professionally, or morally accountable” for their service of the client (ibid).
5
Luban, “Partisanship”, supra note 4 at 1004 (Luban’s definition of partisanship). See also Dare, Counsel of Rogues,
supra note 2 at 75–76 (Dare responding to some of Luban’s arguments about partisanship) [footnote omitted].
6
See generally Trevor CW Farrow, “Sustainable professionalism” (2008) 46:1 Osgoode Hall LJ 51 at 71–83 (Farrow’s
account of alternative models of lawyering). For an example of another alternative model of lawyering, see Robert K
Vischer, “Legal Advice as Moral Perspective” (2006) 19:1 Geo J Legal Ethics 225.
4

10

additional duties are often justified in terms of the legal profession’s wider duties to the public.
Explaining this point, Farrow says:
[L]awyers, as self-regulated professionals, have been given the opportunity and
responsibility to act not just in the interests of their clients but, more fundamentally,
in furtherance of the ‘public interest.’ Therefore, in addition to the interests of the
client, the advocate must take into consideration a number of other interests (as
required by his or her status as a member of the legal profession) including those
of other clients, himself or herself, opposing lawyers, the court, and other sectors
of society included in the overall administration of justice.7
This consideration of the interests of other parties will usually involve some boundaries
that the lawyer will not cross to pursue the client’s interests. These boundaries, of course, involve
more than simply not breaking the law to pursue the client’s interests; traditional models would
agree with that as well. Instead, some moral standards (conceived of in diverse ways) provide a
limit on the actions that alternative models allow for the lawyer to take. Farrow suggest that, “In
the ‘extreme’ form, the lawyer should ‘avoid doing harm’ by refusing to act if the lawyer thinks
that the outcome of ‘winning’ would be on balance a ‘bad thing’ or ‘socially unfortunate,’ in spite
of the fact that ‘the client will pay’ and that the lawyer ‘wouldn’t be doing anything that came
close to violating the canons of professional ethics’”.8 The lawyer who follows an alternative
model of lawyering thus places limits—to greater or lesser degrees—on the extent to which s/he
will go in order to serve the client.
As an example of alternative models of lawyering, Allan Hutchinson has drawn insights
from military ethics, arguing that lawyers should consider concepts such as collateral damage and
proportionality to avoid causing undue harm to third parties and even to adversaries. 9 Going
beyond considerations related to the immediate conduct of litigation, Hutchinson has also

7
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expanded his application of his alternative model of lawyering to just cessations of legal disputes—
a just peace.10 A prominent strand of support for alternative models of lawyering has been put
forward by scholars who approach legal ethics from positions inspired by critical legal theory and
progressive political positions aimed at promoting social justice.11
The extent to which various models of lawyering are supported by codes of professional
conduct differs. Even so, both the of the major schools of thought—traditional models and
alternative models—are codified to some extent in the leading model codes of conduct in Canada
and in the United States of America. Codes contain provisions supporting aspects of traditional
models and aspects supporting alternative models. The following examples are given not to
compare which model of lawyering is better supported by various codes of professional conduct,
but rather to show that both models have been codified to some extent.
Beginning with support for traditional models of lawyering, the principle of partisanship is
likely the best supported aspect of traditional models of lawyering, as partisanship can be
understood as a necessary aspect of the adversarial system of adjudication. The principle of
neutrality does not have such explicit support in rules of professional conduct, though the principle
appears to follow from rules supporting partisanship. The FLSC Model Code has the following
key provisions on partisanship. Under Rule 5.1-1, which defines the role of the lawyer as an
advocate, including within litigation as well as other contexts, the commentary in FLSC Model
Code stipulates that:
Comment 1: “In adversarial proceedings, the lawyer has a duty to the client to raise
fearlessly every issue, advance every argument and ask every question, however

10

See ibid at 110–114.
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distasteful, that the lawyer thinks will help the client’s case and to endeavour to
obtain for the client the benefit of every remedy and defence authorized by law”.12
Comment 3: “The lawyer’s function as advocate is openly and necessarily partisan.
Accordingly, the lawyer is not obliged (except as required by law or under these
rules and subject to the duties of a prosecutor set out below) to assist an adversary
or advance matters harmful to the client’s case”.13
Matching the stipulation given in the principle of partisanship that the lawyer must “maximize the
likelihood that the client’s objectives will be attained”,14 Comment 1 requires the lawyer to use a
variety of lawyering skills to their fullest extent (even when doing so is distasteful) to gain every
possible benefit that the law offers to the client. Comment 3 makes clear the exclusivity with which
the lawyer’s duties belong to the client.
The reasoning underlying the principle of non-accountability is supported by the ABA
Model Rules. First the ABA Model Rules explicitly identify the client’s control over the services
of the law, stating in Rule 1.2 (a) that “a lawyer shall abide by a client’s decisions concerning the
objectives of representation and, as required by Rule 1.4, shall consult with the client as to the
means by which they are to be pursued”.15 The commentary to Rule 1.2 specifies that, “Paragraph
(a) confers upon the client the ultimate authority to determine the purposes to be served by legal
representation, within the limits imposed by law and the lawyer’s professional obligations”.16
Second, and explicitly, the ABA Model Rules give the principle of non-accountability and its
underlying reasoning, declaring that, “A lawyer’s representation of a client, including
representation by appointment, does not constitute an endorsement of the client’s political,
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economic, social or moral views or activities”.17 The portion of the commentary to Rule 1.2 titled
“Independence from Client’s Views or Activities” further specifies the reasoning underlying this
rule, which is to remove a disincentive that would discourage lawyers from taking on controversial
cases,18 matching Tim Dare’s reasoning for the principle of non-accountability.19
Alternative models of lawyering too have support in codes of professional conduct. More
interpretation is sometimes (though not always) needed to draw out the support. The FLSC Model
Code has some permissive language on discussing non-legal aspects of the client’s interest and
actions. This permission is found in a comment to the rule on competence,20 not as a distinct rule.
Moreover, the Canadian provision does not include morals among the non-legal considerations on
which the lawyer can express views. In stark contrast to the FLSC Model Code, the ABA Model
Rules contain explicit and strongly stated support for lawyers discussing the moral considerations
of a case with the client. The explicit support begins with Rule 2.1, which says, “In rendering
advice, a lawyer may refer not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic,
social and political factors, that may be relevant to the client’s situation”.21 The lawyer receives
permission under this rule to raise moral and other considerations with the client.
The commentary to the rule begins by noting the potential for purely legal advice to be of
limited value to the client, saying that, “Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little
value to a client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people,
are predominant. Purely technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate”.22 Given
the limitations of purely legal advice, the ABA Model Rules grant permission to the lawyer to raise
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non-legal consideration (most notably moral considerations for your present purposes) with the
client. The commentary states, “It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral and ethical
considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical
considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will
be applied”.23 The permission is explicitly connected both to the moral aspects of the case itself
and to the influence of moral considerations on legal interpretation. Finally, emphasizing the
importance of non-legal considerations, the commentary to Rule 2.1 of the ABA Model Rules also
discusses cases in which the lawyer should raise non-legal considerations even in response to a
client who “expressly or impliedly ask[s] the lawyer for purely technical advice”.24
As long as the adversarial model of adjudication is in use, it appears that the debate between
traditional models of lawyering and alternative models of lawyering will continue to be relevant.
The theories bring forward differing answers to the core question of whether the lawyer should
take anything else into consideration other than the interests of the client.
(1.2) Waves of Philosophical Legal Ethics
Debates in legal ethics have extended in a variety of directions on the moral branch of the
philosophy of lawyering. Traditional and alternative visions of lawyering underlie many existing
and emerging approaches to the philosophy of lawyering, as the debates develop in waves of
scholarship. The waves of philosophical legal ethics theories cannot be reduced to merely being
different ways of supporting traditional models of lawyering or alternative models of lawyering.
That is to say that developments in legal ethics have been about much more than each wave of
legal ethics theory stating zealous advocate models and alternative models in the terms of their
own new theory (in terms of the philosophical concepts that the author has argued is significant).
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However, each wave of philosophical legal ethics has contributed a range of perspectives and deep
insights about the debate between traditional models of lawyering and alternative models of
lawyering. In works tracking the historical development of philosophical legal ethics, scholars
such as Katherine Kruse,25 and Bradley Wendel and David Luban (in their joint work),26 outline
the development of two waves of legal ethics. These waves of legal ethics conform to the trend
observed by Ayers of defining an abstract value that lawyers should pursue and exhorting lawyers
to pursue that value.27
The first of these waves approached problems in legal ethics equipped with the tools and
understandings of moral philosophy and political philosophy.28 This includes the application of:
philosophical theories in normative ethics; political philosophy and political stances and
movements, such a liberalism and critical legal studies (which often sought to understand the role
that law plays in systems of oppression as well dealing with contested questions about how law
can be used to promote change or whether the oppression imposed by the legal system must simply
be resisted); and religious theories of lawyering, which focus on integrating faith traditions into
the life of a lawyer.
During the second wave of philosophical legal ethics, theorists turned to legal philosophy
to inspire accounts about lawyering. Included among these approaches are: the legal positivist
theories of H.L.A. Hart and Joseph Raz,29 Dworkinian interpretivism,30 and Lon Fuller’s
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procedural naturalism featuring the internal morality of law.31 In my own earlier graduate work, I
developed a theory of lawyering based on Fuller’s internal morality of law.32
The dominant debate in legal philosophy, which also gives the second wave much of its
shape, is between legal positivism and natural law theory. The debate between legal positivism
and natural law theory centres on the relationship between law and morality, especially the
question of whether the validity of law depends on law’s moral merits. According to positivism,
law and morality are ontologically independent. Crucially, the validity of law does not depend
(certainly not by necessity) on law’s moral merit.33 Speaking broadly, “Natural law theory is a
mode of thinking systematically about the connections between the cosmic order, morality, and
law”.34 There is a wide variety of natural law theorizing, most of which suggests important and
often necessary connections between law and morality, while not claiming that law’s validity and
essence depend on its moral merits.35
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Models of lawyering (traditional and alternative) and jurisprudential questions about the
nature of law intertwine deeply in philosophical legal ethics. Perhaps most critically, in an
approach to philosophical legal ethics that looks to derive insights about lawyering from the nature
of law and law’s relationship to morality, some theories of legal philosophy have a stronger internal
impetus to support some models of lawyering more than others. This is seen especially when
contrasting legal positivist theories with natural law theories. Legal positivism more readily
supports traditional models of lawyering, while natural law theory lends itself better to supporting
alternative models of lawyering. Alternative models of lawyering are often also proposed on
grounds other than natural law theory. For instance, critical approaches to legal theory can also be
the driving force behind alternative models of lawyering.36 For the sake of manageability, this
dissertation mentions models of lawyering based on critical approaches to law but will draw the
main juxtaposition of jurisprudential theories of lawyering as involving legal positivism and
natural law, supporting traditional models of lawyering and alternative models of lawyering,
respectively.
(1.2.1) Legal Positivism & Traditional Models of Lawyering
Legal positivism’s core tenet is the dependence thesis—the idea that the validity of law
does not depend on law’s moral merits.37 This thesis is better advanced within the philosophy of
lawyering by approaches to lawyering that emphasize the distinctness and separation of law and
morality in legal work. Specifically, positivists would oppose the idea that lawyers should
introduce moral considerations into their advice to clients. This opposition to the inclusion of moral
considerations within the work of lawyers is especially true of positivist theories—like Raz’s—
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which focus on law as an exclusionary reason for action. Joseph Raz is a key influence in positivist
strands of philosophical legal ethics, especially in his political philosophy.
Raz emphasizes the dispute resolution function of law as vital to cooperative action in
society. He claims that law provides an authoritative settlement of disputes, and guide for action,
by replacing the differing substantive claims (the differing reasons for action) underlying those
disputes (e.g., differing views about moral values/norms) with legal reasons for action (i.e., legal
sources and judgments containing legal values/norms). Thus, rather than bringing our different
viewpoints and arguments (about morality and other topics) into all of our practical interactions
with other people and with public and private institutions, we can cite the legal resolution that law
has provided to a dispute as the reason for which we will take a certain course of action and for
which the other person or institution in a situation should take a certain course of action.38
Raz’s argument about law’s dispute resolution function can be read descriptively and
prescriptively. His argument both describes law’s independence from morality being based on
law’s dispute resolution function and provides politically and morally grounded reasoning about
when and how to act in a way that is guided by this same function.39 Law’s dispute resolution
function is politically and morally valuable, says Raz, because the authoritative resolution
provided by law helps individuals who have a plurality of viewpoints live peacefully and
cooperatively with one another in the same society.40 Law cannot perform this authoritative
replacement role if law is bound to be consistent with the reasons for action (i.e., moral
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values/norms) that law was meant to replace when resolving disputes about those underlying
concerns.41
The fact that Raz’s account of positivism is descriptive and has a strong prescriptive
element positions it better to translate into a theory of legal ethics than positivist theories that are
more purely descriptive. By contrast, the Midas Theory of law,42 an even stronger positivist theory
than Raz’s, is a stark example of a descriptive positivist theory that would be difficult to translate
into legal ethics. The theory is more purely descriptive than any other positivist theory—not
relying on, or offering, supporting arguments (especially prescriptive arguments) from political or
moral philosophy. The key focus of the Midas Theory is to explain what happens when law
interacts with other domains of knowledge and how law keeps its essential ontological
independence43 while interacting with these other domains of knowledge.
Law’s ontological independence from other domains of knowledge is guaranteed by law’s
freedom to develop its own goals, methods, and institutions apart from the conceptions of other
disciplines. The nature of the relationships between disciplines themselves, rather than additional
political and moral argumentation of the kind that some positivists give,44 allows law to both
interact with other domains of knowledge and maintain its ontological independence from those
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domains. The Midas Theory says that when the law seems to adopt conceptions from other
domains of knowledge, what the law is actually doing is creating a legal analogue, an ontologically
legal conception of the shared concept that law has in common with that other field.45 The
workings of this theory are illustrated with through comparison with the myth of King Midas, who
was able to turn everything that he touched into gold. So too, law turns things it touches into law.
The Midas Theory is concerned about describing what law as a domain has the ability to do, not
with evaluating what the domain does. Lawyers would have difficulty abiding by, or resisting, the
Midas Theory because the theory is so free of normative content.
By contrast, Raz’s theory of law discusses benefits, grounded in moral and political
philosophy, that law provides. Philosophical legal ethicists who have been inspired by Raz’s
reasoning contend that law’s dispute resolution function justifies the traditional model of
lawyering in general and its components. The traditional model of lawyering, Razian authors
suggest, accounts best for the mediating role that the lawyer places in the dispute resolution
function of law. If lawyers reintroduce moral considerations into the lawyer-client relationship,
the lawyers are allowing for the terms of the underlying conflict to make their way into the dispute
resolution process that is supposed to replace the terms of the underlying conflict.46 However, it
may be possible even in positivist terms, to distinguish between cases in which lawyers raise moral
considerations to discourage a client from fully pursuing his/her legal entitlements and cases in
which lawyers might raise a moral point in favour of the client pursuing his/her legal entitlements.

Poscher uses the terms “concepts” and “conceptions”, which he borrows from WB Gallie, “Essentially Contested
Concepts” (1955) 56 Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 167.
46
See Dare, supra note 2 at 70–73 (arguing that, in order to respect the dispute resolution function of law, lawyers
should refrain from re-introducing into their legal work the substantive arguments, e.g., moral arguments, that law has
addressed in resolving disputes). But see Wendel, “Legal Ethics & Separation”, supra note 29 at 100–106 (taking the
view that it can be appropriate, under an inclusive positivist account of law, for lawyers to refer to morality).
45

21

The latter exhortation uses morality to support the use of the resolution to a problem provided by
law. It thus makes use of the prescriptive aspects of Raz’s positivist theory.
At a granular level, Tim Dare argues that justification for the principles that make up the
traditional model47—the principle of neutrality, the principle of non-accountability, and the
principle of partisanship—can be based in the dispute resolution function of law, especially in
resolving disputes between “reasonable but inconsistent views”.48 Dare contends that the principle
of neutrality supports both the functioning of law’s dispute resolution process in a pluralistic
society and the application of the decisions reached by these same dispute resolution processes.
“[L]egal representation”, Dare notes, “is at least sometimes necessary to secure legal rights”.49 He
further expands that if lawyers calibrate the zealousness of their representation, or otherwise fail
to serve clients with whom they disagree, then lawyers can render a person’s legal rights
(especially the rights of an unpopular client) “worthless”.50
Given that lawyers play a vital role as mediators in law’s dispute resolution function, Dare
claims that this mediating role must be respected by not placing blame on the lawyer for the views,
goals, or character of the client.51 Thus, in support of the principle of non-accountability, Dare
says that honouring the value of procedures that recognize and respond to “reasonable pluralism”
also requires the recognition of the role that lawyers play in the legal system that mediates between
differing viewpoints.52 He reasons, moreover, that lawyer non-accountability removes a barrier to
representing clients within the dispute resolution processes of law. Even when the lawyer takes on
an unpopular client, the lawyer can cite the principle of non-accountability “in response to the
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mistaken assumption that they would not have taken on the case if they did not endorse the goals
of the client”.53
For the principle of partisanship, Dare begins his defence by identifying two levels of
zealous advocacy: “hyper-zeal” and “mere-zeal”.54 According to the “hyper-zeal” conception of
traditional lawyering, a lawyer will attempt to secure “any advantage obtainable for her client
through the law”,55 even when the particular benefit does not fall within the purpose of the law in
the case on which the lawyer is working. This hyper-zealous conception of traditional lawyering
can be associated with Lord Brougham’s classic statement about zealous advocacy, in which he
argues that the lawyer must pursue the client’s interests “by all means and expedients, and at all
hazards and costs to other persons, and, among them, to himself”.56 Brougham expands that the
lawyer “must not regard the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others”
and must “go on reckless of consequences”.57 Dare makes the connection between Brougham and
“hyper-zealous” lawyering too.58 In the “mere-zeal” conception, on the other hand, the lawyer
works to achieve for the client all that the client is legally entitled to obtain under law, with “no
obligation to pursue interests that go beyond the law”.59
Dare is critical of the “hyper-zeal” conception and presents “mere-zeal” as the correct way
in which to apply traditional zealous advocacy such that the approach to legal practice achieves
law’s dispute resolution function.60 Stated briefly, his argument against hyper-zeal is that being
hyper-zealous places the lawyer’s actions beyond what can be justified by the role of the lawyer
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within the social institutions of law. Crucially, we are told that, “Lawyers occupy roles in an
institution designed to allow pluralist communities by specifying what rights members of the
community shall have. The role-obligations are framed by reference to the point of that
institution”.61 Since, by definition, the lawyer who practices hyper-zeal seeks to secure more than
the client’s legal entitlements, such a lawyer is exceeding the task of getting for the client the things
that the dispute resolution processes have determined s/he should have. In some cases, securing
for the client more than his/her legal entitlements will mean denying others the things that the
dispute resolution process of law has determined they should have, whether those things are
substantive or procedural legal rights.
Some limited prohibitions on exercises of hyper-partisanship exist in codes of professional
conduct. Putting the point more generally, the ABA Model Rules specify that, “The advocate has
a duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause, but also a duty not to abuse
legal procedure. The law, both procedural and substantive, establishes the limits within which an
advocate may proceed”.62 Dealing with the relationship between the opposing parties and counsel
and competition within the adversarial system of adjudication, the ABA Model Rules also explain,
“The procedure of the adversary system contemplates that the evidence in a case is to be marshalled
competitively by the contending parties. Fair competition in the adversary system is secured by
prohibitions against destruction or concealment of evidence, improperly influencing witnesses,
obstructive tactics in discovery procedure, and the like”.63 Similarly, the FLSC Model Code
prohibits lawyers from “instituting or prosecuting proceedings that, although legal in themselves,
are clearly motivated by malice on the part of the client and are brought solely for the purpose of
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injuring the other party”.64 At least some cases of hyper-partisanship will involve lawyers using
legal proceedings merely to harm other parties for the client. In such cases, getting for the client
everything that law can be made to give involves using the law merely to harm another party.
Notwithstanding Dare’s distinction between mere-zeal and hyper-zeal for the purpose of
justifying the principle of partisanship using Razian political philosophy, it is fair to consider both
conceptions of zeal to be traditional models. A lawyer who practices hyper-zeal can respect the
principle of neutrality by not allowing his/her own view of the moral merits of the client’s case to
affect the zealousness of the representation. Such lawyers can be granted the benefit of the
principle of non-accountability as other people do not judge the lawyer by the goals of the client.
Finally, as long as hyper-zeal does not lead the lawyer into illegality, it appears to be merely
another conception of the principle of partisanship.65 Dare himself recognizes the “pedigree” of
hyper-zeal and its association with the famous words of Lord Brougham.66 This is not to say that
I consider hyper-zeal to be consistent with any model of lawyering that I would endorse. However,
the history of legal ethics shows that hyper-zeal has a strong claim to be a conception (if not the
leading conception) of the traditional model of lawyering.67
The unifying focus expressed by conceptions of the traditional model based on mere-zeal
and conceptions of the traditional model based on hyper-zeal is the centrality of the duty to the
client. Even though traditional models would recognize duties at least also exist to the courts,68 the
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duty to the client is most emphasized by the two approaches to zeal and to the legal and political
systems overall are trusted with the duty to consider the interests of other parties. Lawyers are
meant to strictly perform the primary function that they are said to have in the society-wide system
of dispute resolution: pursuing their client’s interests.
(1.2.2) Natural Law Theories & Alternative Models of Lawyering
In contrast to legal positivism and its support of the traditional model of lawyering, natural
law theories, which emphasize connections between law and morality, will fit better with
alternative models of lawyering that argue that lawyers should bring moral, or other extralegal,
considerations into the advising context with the client and even into the lawyer’s selection of
clients. Natural law theory does not necessarily lead to a complete rejection, or to any rejection, of
the traditional model of lawyering. Advocates of numerous natural law theories might well accept
the basic idea in traditional models, for example that lawyers must act as champions in vindicating
their clients’ legal interests and must not bring their own morality into their work as lawyers.
However, natural law would be an awkward fit with the exact principles stated in traditional
models of lawyering, whether in the conception given by Lord Brougham or Tim Dare. The
motivations and theoretical bases of natural law theories have aspects that would more strongly
incline them to recognize the place of morality in the work of the lawyer.
There is greater divergence between natural law theories of jurisprudence than between
positivist theories of jurisprudence. Natural law theories are based on vastly different moral
groundings and even claims about legal ontology. As noted earlier, most natural law theories
suggest important and often necessary connections between law and morality, while not
necessarily claiming that law’s validity depends on law’s moral merits.69 Nevertheless, one theme
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that emerges in some natural law theories is the argument that law’s validity can (or does) depend
on law’s moral merits.70 Thus, natural law theories differ with one another even in terms of their
response to the main thesis of positivism, the leading rival to natural law theories. The differences
go even deeper.
A significant portion of the divergence between natural law theories can be explained by
the fact that, whereas legal positivism aspires to make an important but narrow point about legal
ontology, many natural law theories are bound up with projects of articulating whole ways of life
and worldviews. For example, natural law theory has deep roots in religious traditions. At the same
time, secular strands of natural law theory also exist.71 Positivism does not have such broad
aspirations about articulating whole ways of life or playing a role in religious systems of thought.
However, the distinction between religious and secular natural law traditions has the potential for
substantial divergence. If law has vital, and even ontologically necessary connections to morality,
then it matters a great deal, for example, what the ontological grounding of the morality is—a
question to which religious and secular philosophical viewpoints speak.
In distinguishing between religious natural law theories and secular natural law theories, I
do not mean natural law theories that have been articulated by people who are religious believers
as opposed to people who are not religious believers. By secular natural law theory, I mean natural
law theories that are not premised on adherence to a particular religious belief. Accounts of natural
law such as Fuller’s procedural naturalism certainly fall under this heading. If Dworkin’s account
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of law is taken to fall under natural law theory, then he too would belong here.72 John Finnis also
offers aspects of his natural law theory that can be understood without particular religious or
theological assumptions, while noting also that questions about God can have a significant
explanatory role in his theory.73
Natural law theory is also among the competing positions in moral philosophy74 and
political philosophy.75 Natural law speaks to crucial concerns in politics philosophy, such as
relationships between individuals, between individuals and communities (as well as states),
relationships between communities, and natural rights. Moreover, as a theory that seeks to be the
centre of, or participate in, the articulation of entire worldviews, natural law theory provides a
moral basis for wide swaths of substantive law. Natural rights, for example, can be the basis of
much of constitutional and human rights law. This is not to say that legal positivists philosophers
have not made arguments in political philosophy. Earlier in this dissertation, I emphasized the
aspects of political philosophy that are in Raz’s positivist theory. The point is, rather, that few
theses in political philosophy require, or are motivated by, the theses of legal positivism itself. The
dependence thesis has highly limited relevance to questions such as the justification of the
See generally María Lourdes Santos Pérez, “Dworkin and the Natural Law Tradition” in Francisco José Contreras,
ed, The Threads of Natural Law (New York: Springer, 2013) 211 (discussing the nuances in the relationship between
Dworkin’s theory of law in relation to natural law theory, including the fact that it is difficult to classify Dworkin
because he does not frame his theory in relation to the traditional debate between legal positivism and natural law
theory). Bix also says of Dworkin’s interpretive theory of law that “it is a ‘natural law theory’ (a term that Dworkin
rarely adopted for his own work) in the broad sense that it asserts that there is no sharp conceptual separation between
what law is and what it ought to be; rather, moral evaluation is an integral part of the process Dworkin proposes for
determining what the law requires”. See Bix, Dictionary, supra note 33 sub verbo “interpretive theory of law”.
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existence of the state, the form of government, and the relationship between citizens and the state.
As natural law touches such broad and contested ground, it has greater potential to splinter than
the much more narrowly focused legal positivism.
In addition to serving as the basis for divergences in natural law theory, these broader
connections with ways of life and worldviews are what positions natural law theory to better
connect with alternative models of lawyering. There will be an affinity between natural law
theorists and advocates of alternative models of lawyering who call for lawyers to incorporate
morality into their legal practice, including into the context of advising the client. Natural law
theory it capable of furnishing both the moral ideas that lawyers would want to incorporate into
their legal practice and the justification for bringing those ideas into their legal practice. The
affinity between natural law theory and alternative models of lawyering is easiest to understand in
the case of natural law theories which argue that there are at least some moral conditions for the
validity of law. An example would be Lon Fuller’s theory of law, in which he argues that some
level of abidance of the rule of law is a necessary moral condition for the existence of law.76 I have
previously articulated a theory of legal ethics that is based on Fuller’s thesis about the validity of
law.77
More strongly than Fuller’s procedural naturalism, theories that identify substantive moral
norms as conditions of legal validity exist as well,78 and could be the basis of philosophical theories
of lawyering based on their account of the validity conditions of law. If the lawyer is faced with a
case in which a purported law that is relevant to the case violates a moral condition for the existence
See generally Section (2.3.1), below; Emanuel Tucsa, “The Gold Standard: Legal Theory and Fuller Revisited”
(2020) 13:1 Wash U Jurisprudence Rev 85 (both proving a detailed account of Fuller’s argument about the internal
morality of law).
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of law, then natural law theory about law’s validity conditions both gives an impetus for the lawyer
to seek the incorporation of morality into his/her legal practice (i.e., the concern about the moral
issues at stake) and the justification for incorporating morality into his/her legal practice (i.e., the
failure of the purported law to actually meet the standard for being law and the lawyer’s
responsibility to raise this issue).
The connection between natural law theory and alternative models of lawyering is found
not only in the existence criteria of law. Some natural law theories argue that morality is a
(necessary) source of normativity that gives meaning to law (especially to legal rules). Dworkin is
one such theorist, taking the view that “[d]etermining what the law is in particular cases depends
on moral-political considerations about what it ought to be”.79 This dependence is present because
law includes not just rules, but also principles.80 Principles work in terms of weight, rather than in
an all or nothing manner (as rules do). Principles necessarily raise moral considerations about ideas
such as justice. Indeed, on Dworkin’s view, “propositions of law are true if they figure in or follow
from the principles of justice, fairness, and procedural due process that provide the best
constructive interpretation of the community’s legal practice”.81
William Simon, who has taken Dworkin’s legal theory into the realm of legal ethics, argues
that lawyers, like judges, should interpret the bounds in law in accordance with the background
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values that inform law, including especially justice.82 If a lawyer is advising a litigant in a case
that involves legal norms that have morality embedded within them (e.g., a constitutional law case
about values such as freedom and equality), the lawyer will be discussing moral norms as s/he
explains these parts of the case to the client. In Dworkin’s case, the impetus to incorporate morality
into legal practice and the justification to do so are one and the same: the fact that legal
interpretation cannot be done without discussing the morality that is embedded in the law.
Beyond the question of discussing morality with the client and including morality in legal
arguments, Simon proposes grounds by which lawyers can use Dworkinian thinking to resist unjust
law. Boldly, in his application of Dworkin’s legal philosophy to the philosophy of lawyering,
William Simon critiques the idea of there being a categorical duty for lawyers to obey the law. 83
In the approaches to natural law articulated thus far, the lawyer is called to go far beyond merely
pursuing the client’s legal entitlements. The lawyer is giving moral analysis, reintroducing the
considerations that law was meant to replace.84
Though not impossible, it is a more awkward fit to deploy natural law theories in support
of traditional models, with their principles of neutrality, non-accountability, and partisanship.85
Even within a legal system that uses an adversarial model of adjudication, a natural law theory of
lawyering could completely reject at least one of the aspects of traditional models of lawyering:
lawyer non-accountability. Dare grounds the principle of non-accountability in the argument from
political philosophy that Raz uses to support his account of law having value for its dispute
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resolution function in a pluralistic society.86 According to Dare, if we recognize that law plays an
important mediating role in disagreements between reasonable viewpoints, we cannot assume or
require that lawyers, who have a gatekeeping role in the mediating processes, have any particular
viewpoint, even though lawyers play an adversarial role in the mediating process.87
To assume that lawyers’ views are in alignment with their clients’ views/goals is to treat
lawyers in a way that fails to recognize their procedural role in the dispute resolution system of
law. Such a reading of the lawyer does not allow the lawyer to play a personally neutral role in
either (1) helping the legal system decide between reasonable differing viewpoints or (2)
facilitating the application of already-existing legal norms that have authoritatively decided
between reasonable differing viewpoints. To deny the lawyer his/her neutrality is to smuggle
underlying substantive disagreement (e.g., disagreement about a moral issue to which law applies)
back into the legal order. The locus of the disagreement merely shifts from the substance of the
dispute to the relationship between participants in the legal dispute.
This Razian account makes sense in discrete scenarios that fit the model of two parties in
a legal dispute, each having competent legal representation. A natural law theory of lawyering
might not necessarily want to completely reject the idea that lawyers should not be held morally
responsible for their clients’ goals. At the very least, advocates of natural law theory might want
to avoid placing moral accountability on the so-called “last lawyer in town”. More broadly, legal
systems need lawyers to perform procedural functions on behalf of clients, even to conduct
proceedings that will lead to just resolutions of disputes. Natural law theorist should have no
problem recognizing that defendants in criminal trials require a legal defence, no issue with a
lawyer competently providing such a defence, and no reason to disincentivize such lawyers.
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However, Dare’s argument in favour of the principle of non-accountability is not adequate
to the task of describing legal systems, or lawyers’ role in legal systems, as they actually are. Dare
does not adequately describe the fact that lawyers, who are members of a self-regulating
profession, are central figures in shaping and giving meaning to law in the activity of legal
interpretation—itself a political endeavour.88 Lawyers are actively involved with strategic
planning for their clients even beyond legal disputes. For large repeat clients, lawyers can even
become identified with the client’s political and economic cause. Dare’s account also omits the
fact that legal adjudication, especially at the appellate court levels, is heavily laden with political
values that are shaped by lawyers. Judges too cannot simply be taken as neutral arbiters, especially
in relation to questions that require the interpretation of moral and political values. These factors,
largely raising moral concerns such as justice and equality, differ too widely from the account of
dispute resolution that is imagined by traditional models of lawyering.
The other two aspects of traditional models—the principle of neutrality and the principle
of partisanship—will be difficult for advocates of any account of lawyering within an adversarial
system of adjudication to give up completely. With respect to the principle of neutrality, as scholars
as dissimilar as Tim Dare and Allan Hutchinson have argued, it would be inappropriate for a
lawyer to take on a client and then calibrate his/her service to the client on the basis of the extent
to which the lawyer agrees with the moral merits of the client’s cause.89 It may be appropriate for
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a lawyer to refuse to represent a client because of the lawyer’s disagreement with the client’s
cause,90 but that calculation must be made before the lawyer begins representing the client.
At the same time, the principle of neutrality does not prevent the lawyer from raising his/her
moral concerns with the client. This is especially so if lawyer non-accountability has already been
rejected. If the lawyer can be held morally responsible for the goals that s/he pursues on behalf of
the client, then the lawyer has every reason to counsel the client against violating precepts of
morality that would bring the lawyer’s practice of law out of alignment with the requirements of
natural law, or the moral theory that the lawyer believe will be the best guide. Similar reasoning
applies to the principle of partisanship. Overzealous applications of the principle of partisanship
could also be challenged on similar grounds. If the lawyer is morally accountable for what s/he
does in pursuing the client’s aims, then the lawyer has an impetus to avoid partisanship in favour
of immoral ends. Holding lawyers morally accountable (against the principle of nonaccountability) allows a torrent of moral considerations become live questions in lawyers’ ethics.
Natural law theories come in so many varieties and address such a broad range of
philosophical questions that it is difficult to lay out general statements that translate natural law
theory into a theory of lawyering. One is best served by discussing specific natural law theories.
At the very least, however, natural law theories of lawyering would be unsatisfied with the
positivist calls to keep moral considerations out of the lawyer/client relationship and broader legal
practice.
(1.3) Setting the Stage for an Epistemological Turn in Legal Ethics
I offer the epistemology of lawyering in this dissertation as a broad expansion of the
resources of philosophers of lawyering, not as a replacement for existing theories. I do not suggest
90
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that the preceding waves of philosophy of lawyering and their understandings need to cease or be
supplanted by the approach to the philosophy of lawyering that I offer in this dissertation. There
is great insight in what has been said and much remains to be said by drawing inspiration from
earlier works that were more connected with various aspects of moral theory. Moreover,
developments will continue in moral philosophy and legal philosophy that can inspire work in the
philosophy of lawyering. Philosophers of lawyering themselves will continue to make
advancements in moral philosophy and legal philosophy to the mutual benefit of these fields.
Moral philosophers, legal philosophers, and philosophers of lawyering who work in ethics are also
likely to make developments in their domains that can benefit the epistemology of lawyering. The
development of epistemological research in the philosophy of lawyering should be responsive to
insights from, and reciprocally contribute to, the development of the parts of the philosophy of
lawyering that are based on moral philosophy and on legal philosophy.
Rather than attempting to arrive at definitive answers to a set of problems, my primary aim
in this dissertation is to supply philosophical resources. Allan Hutchinson emphasizes the
importance of “the discursive resources that lawyers can use to address and occasionally resolve
ethical challenges that perennially confront them”.91 In his own alternative theory of legal ethics,
he describes Just War Theory, the inspiration for an account of lawyering that he recently
developed, as not being a “definitive manual for conducting a just war, but as a set of discursive
resources to frame reflection and orient decision making”.92 I have a similar aim for the
epistemology of lawyering that I offer, aimed at providing resources that can be used to address
problems in the philosophy of lawyering.
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Hutchinson argues that the traditional model of lawyering, and its defences found in legal
positivist account of philosophical legal ethics, leave lawyers with few discursive resources to
resolve ethical challenges. Hutchinson states, “Indeed, the traditional framework runs out at
exactly the point when lawyers most need some set of conversational resources by which to
identify and help resolve the conundrums of how to be a good legal professional in modern
society”.93 I argue that the problem of running out of discursive resources goes even deeper when
the philosophy of lawyering is conceived of broadly to include branches of philosophy such as
metaphysics and epistemology. Though ethics is a vital part of the philosophy of lawyering, though
legal ethics has many discursive resources and even answers from competing perspectives to
various problems, and though legal ethics is perhaps the natural point at which to begin
philosophical inquiries into lawyering, legal ethics is only one aspect of what can be a richer
philosophy of lawyering. The issue is thus not merely that traditional frameworks in legal ethics
run out, but that philosophical legal ethics runs out of resources that can be provided by a
philosophy of lawyering that considers other branches of philosophy. The aim of this dissertation
is to identify and provide epistemic discursive resources for challenges and assumptions that have
existed all along in the legal profession, and in the philosophy of lawyering.
Showing the value of epistemic discursive resources involves some demonstrative
application of the resources. However, that application need not arrive at an uncontestable result
for the resources to be shown worthy of further exploration and application. In addition to not
having the aim of displacing existing theories of the philosophy of lawyering, it is also not my aim
to resolve every existing controversy in the philosophy of lawyering. Nor should it be expected
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that an epistemology of lawyering will provide discursive resources that assist with every existing
dispute in the field.
I do not bring forward my epistemological theory of lawyering in order to assist advocates
of traditional models of lawyering or alternative models of lawyering. Certain aspects of
epistemology, and certain theories of epistemology, may be more supportive of one side than
another. Though this dissertation is not actively seeking to come down on one side or another of
existing debates in the philosophy of lawyering, it would be a mistake to imagine that
epistemology, or specific epistemological theories, are a neutral set of resources that can be
employed equally to the benefit of any existing theory of lawyering. Resources and the use of
resources often bring with them embedded values. This is especially so for a set of resources that
is stated in normative terms, as is my virtue epistemology of lawyering. As I argued just above,
although models of lawyers and philosophies about the nature of law can diverge in theory, some
models of lawyers are better fits with some theories about law.
Statements about improving cognition, or about how cognition should work, come both
with values embedded in them and are given additional meaning by people reading those
statements from the perspective of their own values and assumptions. Existing perspectives will
be informed by commitments to models of lawyering, ethical stances, and philosophies of law. My
own sympathies from my work in philosophical legal ethics are with the procedural naturalism of
Lon Fuller and alternative models of lawyering. Although I will say when the epistemological
ideas in this dissertation are compatible with different models of lawyering and different theories
of law, it is not my purpose here to give an approach to the study of lawyering that is equally
favourable to all existing views. Developing discursive resources for a field of study (especially
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one that deals in normative ideas) does not require neutrality about the implications of those
discursive resources.
Eventually, I do hope to engage in a deep epistemic study of models of lawyering and the
philosophical theories with which those models of lawyering are most closely aligned. This work,
which would be normative and evaluative, would draw conclusions about the extent to which
models of lawyering succeed on epistemic grounds and are supported by epistemic theories. Some
analysis that touches on these questions will be unavoidable even in this dissertation. Even a
demonstration of the applicability of discursive epistemic resources will require some evaluation
of existing theories and answers to problems in the philosophy of lawyering. However, a sustained
analysis of models of lawyering is beyond the scope of this dissertation.
(1.4) Truth, truths, and Lawyers94
This dissertation strongly aligns with a certain perspective on questions of truth: the
correspondence theory of truth. Assuming the correspondence theory of truth is not necessary to
benefit from a virtue epistemology of lawyering. However, I will articulate the virtue epistemology
of lawyering in a way that takes that stance on the nature of truth. Other theorists may have
different understandings about truth. I welcome input from these perspectives that are different
from my own, but I will not purposely articulate the ideas in this dissertation in a way that leaves
room for those different perspectives. Wherever the development of a line of thought requires that
one takes a position on the metaphysics of facts, I will take the position articulated in this section.
The correspondence theory has its origins in what the philosopher Susan Haack describes
as the Aristotelian Insight, which says that “to say of what is that it is, or of what is not that it is
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not, is true”.95 According to this view, truth is a property that can be had by propositions,
statements, beliefs, theories, interpretations, etc. It is a relationship between things like statements
and reality.96 If a statement claims that S and it is actually the case that S, then the statement has
the property of truth. The correspondence between the statement and reality is what makes the
statement true. The statement can then also be called a truth. As Haack says, “Truths are the many
and various propositions, beliefs, etc., which are true”.97 Haack also explains that there is a
distinction between truth/truths and what is merely taken to be truth/truths. She identifies the latter
with scare quotes and says that they may be described as “so-called” truth/truths.98 I will refer to
them as purported truth/truths. Recognizing that purported truths exist, it is also vital to recognize
that truths can have problems. Truths can be vague or partial, for example.99 Thus, “Truth…is
simple; but truths are not”.100 The property is simple, but the bearers of the property are not simple.
Within lawyers’ work, there are at least four topics about which there can be truths.
Lawyers can also have knowledge about these topics and play an epistemic role in the discovery
of these truths during legal disputes. The topics are: (1) facts that pertain to a case, (2) law (e.g.,
relevant statutes and case law), (3) knowledge about other domains of human endeavour that are
related to the field of law in which the lawyer practices, and (4) knowledge about what to do as a
lawyer in a situation. The lawyer has distinct roles in relation to these topics as s/he interacts with
different participants in the legal process. The first topic will be the focus of the substantive content
of this dissertation, all the while also being in service of the fourth topic. The second and third of

Ibid at 17, citing Aristotle, “Book IV” in The Metaphysics, translated by Hugh Tredennick (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1933) 146 at 201.
96
See Haack, “Truth, Truths”, supra note 94 at 17–18 (defining truth and truths).
97
Ibid at 17 [emphasis in original].
98
Ibid at 18.
99
See generally Susan Haack, “The Whole Truth and Nothing but the Truth” (2008) 32:1 Midwest Studies in
Philosophy 20 [Haack, “The Whole Truth”] (explaining some difficulties in identifying and understanding truths).
100
Ibid at 22.
95

39

these topics raise other basic metaphysical and epistemological issues that will not be the focus of
this dissertation, though stances on issues under these two topics will be briefly addressed.
A key aspect about truth is its objectivity.101 This is a metaphysical question that relates to
the basic epistemic questions pursued here. In this dissertation, the key aspect of metaphysical
objectivity is what Leiter calls “cognitive independence”. This is a kind of independence that is
needed for the existence and character of an entity (or class of entities) to be independent of the
human mind. As Leiter explains:
An entity is cognitively independent of the human mind if its existence and
character does not depend on any cognizing state of persons: for example, belief,
sensory perception, judgment, response, and so on....A metaphysically objective
thing is, accordingly, what it is independent of what anyone believes or would be
justified in believing about it (or what anyone perceives it to be or would perceive
it to be under certain conditions, etc.).102
Leiter says that cognitive independence is based on the idea that there is a difference
between something that “seems right” or true about reality and “what actually ‘is right’” or true
about reality.103 The exact way in which reality is independent of the human mind, and thus the
nature of the possible distinction between what “seems right” and “what actually ‘is right’”, is a
matter of substantial debate. Leiter outlines four possible ways in which to conceive of the
cognitive independence of reality, beginning with a view of reality as dependent on the human
mind, on one side, and going to reality’s full cognitive independence from the human mind, on the
other. He summarizes:
(1) According to subjectivism, what seems right to the cognizer determines what is
right.
(2) According to minimal objectivism, what seems right to the community of
cognizers determines what is right.
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(3) According to modest objectivism, what seems right to cognizers under
appropriate or ideal conditions determines what is right.
(4) According to strong objectivism, what seems right to cognizers never
determines what is right.104
Haack’s description of truth aligns with strong objectivism as she says, “[W]hether a proposition
is true or is false is normally an objective matter; i.e., that it is neither necessary nor sufficient for
a proposition’s being true that you, or I, or anyone, believes it”.105 In this dissertation, I take the
facts of a legal case to be strongly objective, meaning that the facts of a case are cognitively
independent of any cognizers, including clients, lawyers, and the trier of facts, whether that is a
judge or jury. In this view, facts are strongly objective.
My focus is on the application of the truth-seeking function to the task of discovering
factual truths. Claims about the truth-seeking function of legal adjudicative procedures can be
found in some of the earliest work in the modern philosophy of lawyering. Luban and Wendel
track claims about the truth-finding function of the adversarial system of adjudication, noting that
Monroe Freedman and Lon Fuller were early advocates of the idea that the importance of partisan
advocacy in the truth-seeking and rights-vindicating function of the adversarial system of
adjudication can justify the partisan role of the lawyer, including as conceived under the standard

Ibid [emphasis in original], citing Brian Leiter, “Objectivity and the Problems of Jurisprudence”, Book Review of
Law and Objectivity by Kent Greenawalt (2002) 72:1 Tex L Rev 187 at 192 (giving these four definitions). There are
interesting questions to ask about minimal objectivism in terms of “what seems right to the community of cognizers”.
Does it matter if the community of cognizers believes that a truth is strongly objective? Does this community itself
understand that objectivity is minimal with respect to the relevant field? There will perhaps be contexts, such as fashion
(an example taken from Leiter, “Book Review”, ibid at 195), in which the community does know that objectivity is
minimal, and other contexts, such as morality, perhaps, where the community does not know about the nature of the
mind-independence, or lack thereof, of a topic. The community may well believe that moral reality is strongly
objective when it may actually be minimally objective. It is important to ask how such viewpoints relate to the
mechanics of minimal objectivism about a topic. For minimal objectivism to be true of a certain field, do some metaclaims about objectivity (such as the statement that “fashion is minimally objective”) need to be strongly objective?
The questions outlined here should not be taken as objections to any of the conceptions of objectivity listed here. One
could ask such questions about any of the conceptions of objectivity just listed; asking these questions would indeed
need to be done to have a deep understanding of these views. I mention these questions here only to note that there
are mechanics beneath the level to which I will be able to go in the present dissertation.
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model of lawyering.106 More recently, HL Ho, “The trial—or more specifically trial deliberation—
seeks the truth…via justified belief in the facts of the case”.107 He also specifies that “the factfinder must find that p only if one would be justified in believing that p”.108 In an extended

See Luban & Wendel, supra note 2 at 350, citing Monroe H Freedman, Lawyers’ Ethics in an Adversary System
(Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1975); Lon L Fuller & John D Randall, “Professional Responsibility: Report of the Joint
Conference” (1958) 44:12 ABA J 1159. Luban and Wendel are critical of this line of thought that they cite in Freedman
and Fuller, calling it the “adversary system excuse”. The critique given by Luban and Wendel says that “[t]he problem
with the adversary system excuse is that it is only as good as the adversary system, which is an imperfect truth-seeker
and rights-defender”, Luban & Wendel, supra note 2 at 350. While they are right on the point that the success of the
justification does depend on the effectiveness of the adversarial system at seeking the truth, their subsequent argument
for the idea that the adversarial system does not seek the truth well is not well founded. Luban and Wendel point out
many of the ways in which the adversarial system allows lawyers to suppress facts. See ibid at 351. Luban and Wendel
are correct that the gamesmanship than can be played by lawyers makes it difficult to assert, even in the abstract, that
the adversarial system of adjudication is “the best method of finding the truth”. Ibid. I discuss the effects of
gamesmanship on the ability of the legal system to find truth below in Section (2.2). In many situations, the adversarial
system will struggle at the task of discovering the truth and is unlikely to emerge as the best method for arriving at
truth in all situations. However, the example used by Luban and Wendel indicates that they are considering situations
for which the adversarial system was not designed, e.g., making a choice between two job offers. This example is
fundamentally unlike the problem that the adversarial system is meant to address: a dispute. The systems that are
effective at truth-discovery in a dispute may be entirely different from those that work situations that do not involve a
dispute.
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Moreover, many of the “tricks” that lawyers can play in favour of their client are not choices made for the purpose of
making the adversarial system less effective at discovering the truth. Rather, the tricks exist as applications (or
sometimes abuses) of rights that exist to protect other values, such as privacy. The mere fact that the adjudicative
system makes trade-offs that do not always involve maximizing truth-seeking does not imply that the adjudicative
system is a poor means of seeking the truth. Many other excellent truth-seeking processes may make similar tradeoffs that do not give complete priority to obtaining knowledge. Perhaps no truth-seeking process would be willing to
allow certain actions (e.g., certain moral violations), even if doing so would maximize truth-seeking in a particular
instance or overall.
We must also be on guard to recognize that the particular rights-protecting trade-offs that are made by the American
legal system should not be laid at the feet of the adversarial system of adjudication. Other jurisdictions need not make
all the same trade-offs when implementing the adversarial system. Not all legal systems have the American
exclusionary rule of evidence, for example. See Adam Liptak, “U.S. Is Alone in Rejecting All Evidence if Police Err”,
The New York Times (19 July 2008), online: <www.nytimes.com/2008/07/19/us/19exclude.html> [perma.cc/3WXLD92W]. But see Dimitrios Giannoulopoulos, Improperly Obtained Evidence in Anglo-American and Continental Law
(Oxford, UK: Hart Publishing, 2019) (contesting the idea that the American exclusionary rule for illegally obtained
evidence is as unique as it is usually presented to be and proposing a renewed expansion of excluding evidence).
Finally, legal systems might make some short-term trade-offs about truth-seeking to promote the broader truth-seeking
of the legal system in the long term. Lawyer-client privilege exists to protect the advising context, so that the client
will share information freely with his/her lawyer. Protecting this privilege may impede truth-seeking in a particular
case but protecting the privilege might be vital to the basic need to have the client share information, which is the
basis for the lawyer to perform his/her role in the adjudicative process itself. A poorly informed lawyer may disrupt
the contest of positions that is thought to be at the heart of the truth-seeking function of the adversarial system. Thus,
we trade short term truth-seeking for the long-term benefit of the truth-seeking ability of the adversarial system.
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Canadian treatment of the topic of client perjury, David Layton and Michel Proulx say, “A central
objective of the adversarial criminal justice system is the search for truth”.109
Lawyers play a vital role in the adversarial system’s truth-seeking function. The system is
designed around the idea of a clash of competing viewpoints, articulated by partisans110
(lawyers),111 in which the passive and neutral observer(s) decide(s) questions of fact and law. As
Johnston and Lufrano explain, “The adversary system is based on the assumption that the truth of
a controversy will best be arrived at by granting the competing parties, with the help of an
advocate, an opportunity to fight as hard as possible”.112 In a regulated fashion, lawyers serve the
client’s self-interest because “[t]he system operates on the assumption that the self-interests of the
combatants will clash so as to hone the issues in such a way as to find the truth, and thus, reach a
just result”.113
The truth-seeking function of the adversarial system of adjudication is also well recognized
by the rules that govern the legal profession, both explicitly and implicitly. For example, in the
commentary section of Rule 3.3 of the ABA Model Rules, which deals with the lawyer’s candour
towards the tribunal, the ABA Model Rules deal directly with the central case study of this
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Self-represented litigation must be recognized as a significant obstacle to the functioning of the adversarial system’s
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<representingyourselfcanada.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/09/srlreportfinal.pdf>
[perma.cc/5UB2-EVQ4]
(providing statistics for self-represented litigants in Canada, giving detailed accounts of the experiences of selfrepresented litigants, and discussing how the legal system can address the needs of self-represented litigants).
112
Robert Gilbert Johnston & Sara Lufrano, “The Adversary System as a Means of Seeking Truth and Justice” (2002)
35:2 J Marshall L Rev 147 at 147.
113
Ibid.
110

43

dissertation, and refer to “the truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to
implement”.114 The FLSC Model Code, discussing communication with witnesses, says, “There is
generally no property in a witness. To achieve the truth-seeking goal of the justice system, any
person having information relevant to a proceeding should be free to impart it voluntarily and in
the absence of improper influence”.115 Codes of professional conduct also put forward duties and
premises that treat the adversarial system as having a truth-seeking function. Examples include
rules prohibiting deception of the tribunal.
In discussing the truth-seeking functions of legal systems, it will be helpful to recall the
distinction between truth/truths and purported truth/truths.116 Consider the context of a trial, which
I will use to distinguish between factual truths and purported factual truths. All epistemic agents
involved in a trial, or who become aware of a trial, arrive at purported facts. In a criminal trial, for
example, purported facts will be possessed by the complainant(s), the defendant, the defence
lawyer(s), the prosecution, the police, witnesses (including expert witnesses), intervenors, family
and friends of the complainant(s) and the defendant, the court reporter, the media, any person who
learns about the case, the judge, and, most crucially, the trier of fact, which in most criminal trials
will be a jury. The adversarial process of adjudication is said to be a contest of positions that will
allow the neutral trier of fact to form perceptions about the case. The contest of positions itself is
said to be a process that is epistemically beneficial to the trier of fact by allowing the trier of fact
to decide from evidence that is rigorously presented in the face of an adversary who will oppose
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the position being offered.117 Ideally, and most crucially for the outcomes of a trial, the trier of fact
arrives at a belief in purported facts that match the actual facts.
When the facts of a case are set out, such as in a judgment, what is being given is always
the purported facts, even when all parties involved agree on the facts. Indeed, the only type of fact
ever possessed by epistemic agents is a purported fact. There is no external source in a legal system
to definitively confirm the extent to which perceived facts match the objective facts. Purported
factual truths are always subject to being overturned by evidence that brings purported facts in
alignment with the actual facts. When evidence emerges, demonstrating that purported facts did
not match the true facts, parties should modify their account of purported facts to be more closely
aligned with what the evidence indicates are the actual facts.
Epistemic agents may be able to form perceptions about the extent to which another agent’s
purported facts match the actual facts. Consider the following example:
(1) Agent A is aware of some evidence that changes Agent A’s perception of the
facts of a case to more accurately match the objective facts;
(2) Agent B is unaware of this same evidence;
(3) both agents have reached perceptions about the facts of the case; and,
(4) the first agent is aware of the second agent’s ignorance of this evidence.
In this case, Agent A can form a correct perception that Agent B has a perception of the facts that
less accurately matches the objective facts that Agent B’s perception does. There would be no
external source to definitively confirm Agent A’s perception about Agent B’s perception, but
Agent A’s perception would correspond with reality. Correspondence itself between purported
facts and objective facts does not depend on absolute verification of the correspondence. A simple
example of the comparison perceptions of facts would be Agent A believing that the defendant in

See Haack, “The Whole Truth”, supra note 99 at 33, where she describes the epistemic expectations that are made
of parties in adversarial litigation and how the confrontation of ideas is supposed to pursue truth. She is specifically
focused on how the process works in cross-examination.
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a criminal trial did not perform a certain act that is the subject of a criminal trial because Agent A
has heard about the defendant’s alibi, whereas Agent B has not yet heard about the alibi.
Correspondence exists independently of whether it can be verified by other people or by legal
processes. This is because, as Haack says, knowledge and truth are not the same thing. Something
can be true without people knowing it.118
The epistemological study of lawyering does not depend on claims about the truth-seeking
excellence of any particular legal process or practice. At the most basic level, an epistemology of
lawyering only needs to show that knowledge is, in some way, relevant to the work of lawyers. In
this dissertation, I will be working with the view that adversarial system of adjudication can vary
in its capacity at discovering the truth about the facts of a case and that lawyers affect the extent
to which the system discovers the truth about those facts.

See ibid at 22; Haack, “Truth, Truths”, supra note 94 at 19. Haack applies the distinction between knowledge and
truth to the context of the adversarial system.
118

46

Part II – Positions & Turns in Epistemology
My thinking about the importance of epistemology in legal ethics has taken somewhat of
a similar path as some recent developments in epistemology. The two key developments are: (1)
the development of social epistemology, which involves a turn to the social aspects of
epistemology and (2) the development of virtue epistemology, which is based on the taking up of
virtue ethics as a model for theorizing about knowledge and thereby developing the character of
intellectual agents in accordance with sets of epistemic/intellectual virtues. These two
developments in epistemology provide opportunities for finding new insights into the
epistemology of law and legal ethics. Both developments share the basic move of repositioning
focus away from the traditional epistemic project of defining abstract conditions of knowledge and
solving puzzles about the way in which the individual person can acquire knowledge.
An example of this traditional approach is the definition of knowledge as an individual
having justified true belief (the JTB theory of knowledge).1 Under the JTB theory, Person A knows
that Person B was at 16th and P Streets at 11:00 pm on a specific day if Person A has a justified
belief that Person B was at 16th and P Streets at 11:00 pm and Person B actually was at that
location at that time.2 The JTB theory, though having a long history, has been shown to be
inadequate by the Gettier counterexamples (situations in which the JTB conditions are met and yet
in which the person who meets the conditions does not have knowledge).3 Substantial work in 20th
century epistemology has been dedicated to amending the JTB theory to respond to the Gettier

See generally Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa & Matthias Steup, “The Analysis of Knowledge”, The Stanford
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2018), Edward N Zalta, ed, online: Center for the Study of Language and
Information, Stanford University <plato.stanford.edu/entries/knowledge-analysis/> [perma.cc/JY2X-2KJ6], s 1.
2
With this example, I am referring to Freedman’s illustration of the Client Perjury Trilemma, which I discuss in detail
in Part V of this dissertation. The illustration is given below in Section (7.1) at note 24 and accompanying text.
3
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counterexamples. These efforts to amend the JTB theory also adhere to the traditional approach of
defining abstract conditions that an individual must meet in order to have knowledge.
I view all the broadly-defined approaches to epistemology—including traditional
individual-focused, social epistemology, and virtue epistemology—as rewarding philosophical
endeavours. Recent developments should not be taken as wholesale replacements for traditional
epistemology. Yet, as this dissertation will show, each turn in epistemology beyond the traditional
individual-focused approach provides substantial resources for understanding the epistemic role
of the lawyer in the legal system and aspects of the legal system that are based upon differing
models of the epistemic role of the lawyer.

(2) Social Epistemology – A “Social Turn”4 in Approach to Epistemology
Social epistemology is the first major turn in epistemology that inspired this dissertation.
Rather than focusing on the epistemology of individuals, which has been the primary focus of
epistemology in analytic philosophy, the attention shifts to the epistemology of societies and social
systems. This insight is vital in understanding the epistemology of lawyers, who play an epistemic
function in a system.
(2.1) Defining Social Epistemology
Although social epistemology is relatively new in terms of explicit distinction from
standard epistemology, the social epistemologist Alvin Goldman argues that social epistemic
thinking can be traced throughout the history of philosophy, even if this thinking was not a distinct
approach to epistemology.5 He points to Plato asking about how a layperson can decide whether

Finn Collin, “The Twin Roots and Branches of Social Epistemology” in Miranda Fricker et al, eds, The Routledge
Handbook of Social Epistemology (New York: Routledge, 2019) 21 at 22.
5
See generally Alvin Goldman, “Social Epistemology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2010),
Edward N Zalta, ed, online: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University
<plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/epistemology-social/> [perma.cc/F4X5-P7AP]. [Goldman, “Social
Epistemology”] at s 1.
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to trust someone who holds himself/herself out to be an expert and to Locke and Hume, who asked
how we can decide whether to rely on the testimony of others.6 In contemporary epistemology, it
is possible to identify two leading approaches to social epistemology, one based on epistemology
as studied in analytical philosophy and another which takes an approach that is influenced more
by sociology.7 Alvin Goldman is a prominent scholar in the former school of thought, while Steve
Fuller is a prominent scholar in the latter.8 My own academic background is in analytic philosophy,
so I will draw more on the insights of authors who work in that field.
Most basically, Goldman defines social epistemology as, “[T]he study of the social
dimensions of knowledge or information”.9 More robustly, the philosopher Karen Jones describes
social epistemology as “[A] research project characterized by a commitment to understanding the
role of social relations and institutions in the production of knowledge. Social epistemology is a
normative and not merely a descriptive project inasmuch as it aims to evaluate and not merely
describe our epistemic practices”.10 Emphasizing the focus of social epistemology, Goldman
proposes a distinction between individual epistemology and social epistemology. According to
him, “Individual epistemology would identify and evaluate psychological processes that occur
within the epistemic subject. Social epistemology would identify and evaluate social processes by
which epistemic subjects interact with other agents who exert causal influence on their beliefs”.11
The evaluative aspect (i.e., the epistemic evaluation of social institutions and practices) is perhaps

See ibid. See also Goldman’s scholarship on the epistemology of experts in Alvin I Goldman, “Experts: Which Ones
Should You Trust?” (2001) 63:1 Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 [Goldman, “Experts”].
7
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8
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Epistemics” (1987) 73:1 Synthese 109 [Goldman, “Foundations”]; Steve Fuller, “On Regulating What Is Known: A
Way to Social Epistemology” (1987) 73:1 Synthese 145.
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the dominant aspect of the literature on social epistemology. The standard according to which our
social practices should be evaluated is, of course, also up for debate.
Goldman’s approach to social epistemology is only one of many, but his view is congenial
to my own philosophical commitments and to the direction in which I would like to take my
approach to the social epistemology of law. With respect to the normative preoccupations of social
epistemology, Goldman argues for a normative social epistemic theory that he calls “veritism”. In
this view, true belief is the “ultimate epistemic aim” and is the epistemic standard according to
which social institutions and practices should be evaluated.12 Thus, under veritism, a social
institution or practice that is better at producing true beliefs will be assessed as being better from
a social epistemic perspective. Some alternatives to veritism that Goldman examines include
epistemic: (1) relativism, (2) consensualism, and (3) expertism. These other social epistemic
theories would evaluate social institutions and practices not according to whether they are linked
to the production of true beliefs, but on the basis of (1) coherence with the viewpoints and methods
of a community or group, (2) “the existence or promotion of consensus, or agreement with
consensual opinion”, or (3) the “promotion of expertise or in terms of agreement with expert
opinion”.13 These other approaches to the normative aspect of social epistemology are worth
considering elsewhere, however, I will limit my attention in this dissertation to Goldman’s veritism
because, in my research, he is the social epistemologist who has devoted the most attention to the
epistemology of law, his veritism lines up well with my own epistemic viewpoints, and it also lines
up well with the virtue epistemic perspective that is the ultimate focus of this dissertation.
While Goldman has worked on a number of other topics in social epistemology, my
attention in this dissertation will be directed towards aspects of his theory that demonstrate the
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practical applicability of social epistemology—especially to law—as well as the epistemic
resources that social epistemology can bring to the study of law and knowledge in law. A study of
Goldman’s account of veritism and its normative standards is well suited to the achievement of
this task. Goldman provides a number of veritistic standards, i.e., “truth-linked standards”, that he
says “can be used to [epistemically] appraise social institutions and practices”.14 Five standards to
which he has given particular attention are: “(1) reliability, (2) power, (3) fecundity, (4) speed, and
(5) efficiency”.15 Respectively, Goldman delineates these terms in veritistic social epistemology
(i.e., social epistemology that has the aim of evaluating social institutions and practices on the
basis of their ability to produce truth beliefs) as: (1) “the ratio of truths to total number of beliefs
a practice would foster”, (2) “the ability of a practice to help cognizers find and believe true
answers to the questions that interest them”, (3) the degree to which true beliefs are widely
produced, (4) the relative amount of time that a practice takes to arrive at true beliefs, and (5) the
cost of acquiring true beliefs.16 We can make use of the rubric that Goldman provides by turning
to a field of knowledge and assessing whether the social practices and institutions perform well
according to Goldman’s veritistic criteria. That is exactly what I will do in the following section.
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(2.2) Social Epistemology, Law, and the Adversarial System
The topics with which social epistemology is concerned are prominently seen in the work
of lawyers, including “the justification of testimony, the role of epistemic divisions of labour and
norms for cognitive authority, the role of social interests in inquiry, and the role of socially
available background beliefs in justification”.17 At a general level, it is worthwhile for the
philosophy of lawyering to delve into the social epistemology of law because lawyers have a
central role in producing and using knowledge about law and about law’s relationship to other
disciplines, including morality. The lawyer, as an actor within a legal system (whether s/he is
engaged in advising, litigation, political advocacy, etc.), has the role of making knowledge about
law available to citizens (especially to clients), so as to make law and the legal system operative
for, and accessible to, those same citizens. Inquiring into the social epistemology of law requires
a social epistemology of lawyering, which will allow us to talk about the practical and systemic
aspects of the lawyer’s epistemic relationship to legal and moral reality.18
Although the natural sciences have received the most attention in social epistemology,19
some leading scholars in the field, such as Alvin Goldman, have done substantial work on the
social epistemology of law. Almost from the beginning of the emergence of social epistemology
as its own school of epistemological thought, Goldman has been discussing the social
epistemology of law. He has studied the epistemological foundations of legal systems, the
presentation and use of legal evidence and the epistemic roles of judges and lawyers in the
adversarial and inquisitorial models of adjudication.20
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Legal systems are excellent candidates for consideration under the kind of epistemic rubric,
including an assessment of “(1) reliability, (2) power, (3) fecundity, (4) speed, and (5) efficiency”
discussed above.21 Goldman has indeed undertaken this kind of analysis, critiquing the adversarial
system of adjudication from the perspective of whether it effectively pursues truth.22 The following
account of Goldman’s social epistemology of law offers an example of the way in which we can
gain insights about law at the systemic level by undertaking a social epistemic analysis of legal
systems. I demonstrate the epistemic resources that social epistemology brings to discussions of
legal epistemology and legal ethics and set up a theoretical background that is necessary for a deep
understanding of the insights that virtue epistemology can bring to the same subjects.
Goldman provides an especially thoughtful social epistemic account of the role of the
lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication—a social practice that has epistemic aims. He has
dedicated more attention to this topic than perhaps anyone else in the field of the epistemology of
law. Many of the issues that Goldman discusses in relation to lawyerly epistemic activity are
familiar topics in legal ethics. Thus, epistemology and legal ethics do a great deal of mixing here.
As a veritistic social epistemologist, Goldman is interested in the question of whether legal
systems effectively arrive at true beliefs. He describes his concerns about adversarial logic23 being
used to support epistemic claims about the truth-seeking function of common law legal systems.
The primary epistemic reasoning behind the adversarial system of adjudication used in common
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law jurisdictions is that there are epistemic merits to legal proceedings in which there is a contest
of arguments between partisans, decided by a neutral arbiter.24 Notably for the purpose of this
dissertation, having competing sides argue their position as adversaries is an effective way to
determine what the facts of a case are.25 The courtroom context is the situation in which adversarial
logic can most fully be applied. Being the representatives of adversarial participants within legal
systems that use the adversarial model, lawyers do work that is subject to many epistemic questions
related to lawyers’ contribution to the truth-producing ability of legal systems.
Goldman is skeptical about how effective adversarial systems of adjudication are at
determining factual truths. A significant aspect of his arguments on this topic comes down to what
he says about the role of lawyers in the adversarial system of adjudication. Goldman points out
that, even in activities that are part of adversarial processes such as litigation, lawyers are involved
with the production of knowledge in the legal system in a far more robust way than simply
providing arguments before a neutral arbiter. Goldman contends, “[N]ot all that attorneys do in a
partisan spirit counts as ‘arguing’. In effect, certain lawyerly activities create or change the
evidence rather than simply interpret or debate it”.26 Goldman expands this point by arguing that
lawyers do not always contribute to the veritistic (i.e., truth-oriented) excellence of the adversarial
system. He says, “These dimensions of [lawyers’] activities may hide or camouflage the truth
rather than bring it into clearer focus, and the effects of these activities cannot easily be overturned
or rebutted by the arguments of opposing lawyers”.27
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Discussed above in Section (1.4).
Such systems may also be good at deciding questions of value, e.g., interpreting value-laden terms in constitutions.
The focus here, though, is on more questions of fact, such as whether a person was at a specific location at a certain
time on a certain day.
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Goldman, Social World, supra note 20 at 296.
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Adversarial legal systems thereby allow problematic behaviour from, and create
problematic incentives for, lawyers even as part of adversarial processes. The epistemic logic that
adversarial systems have about truth production (especially about producing true beliefs in the trier
of fact) may actually be undermined when an adversarial approach is taken to the legal processes
that exist to support and provide factual, and legal content for, the clash of arguments that take
place in contexts like trials. Thus, doing well in epistemic terms in the adversarial process of
adjudication might require mitigating adversarial behaviour in certain contexts. Goldman
illustrates these points by considering the topic of document discovery.
The example of document discovery shows the way in which lawyers are more deeply and
problematically involved with knowledge production in legal proceedings than would be suggested
by the epistemic justifications of the adversarial system. Stated generally, Goldman is concerned
about the role of the lawyer in controlling access to the information that is supposed to guide the
adversarial process as it attempts to arrive at true beliefs. He provides a social epistemic analysis
of the rules of civil procedure relating to document discovery and, in doing so, he is aware of the
way in which different models of lawyering28 play into this analysis. The primary focus in this
discussion is on traditional models of lawyering, though other models could also easily be subject
to criticism.
Goldman and the epistemologist William Talbott distinguish between two types of
evidence and the social epistemic problems of disclosure that arise in relation to each type of
evidence. On one hand, “known positive evidence” is “evidence that a party is aware of that tends
to support its position, and thus which it intends to introduce at trial”.29 On the other hand, “known
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Models of lawyering are discussed above in Section (1).
Talbott & Goldman, “Games”, supra note 20 at 95 [emphasis in original]. See also Goldman, Social World, supra
note 20 at 301, “Positive evidence is evidence that can assist a party’s cause if presented to the trier of fact”.
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negative evidence” is “evidence that a party is aware of that tends to rebut or undermine its
position, and thus which it would not want to be introduced at trial”.30 With respect to each type
of evidence, there is the potential problem that adversaries will want to withhold the evidence as
long as possible (or perhaps entirely) to obtain strategic (and indeed epistemic) advantages in
litigation. Such strategic moves may be realistically expected in adversarial contests and may even
be protected by rules of evidence and lawyers’ ethical duties, but they can also undermine the
ability of the adversaries to make properly informed arguments in the adversarial context of
litigation, i.e., to play their part in the truth-seeking functions of adversarial systems.
Encouragingly, Goldman and Talbott note that some problems related to documentary
discovery are rather well-handled by rules of civil procedure and thus do not pose substantial
problems. Existing requirements in rules of civil procedure to disclose evidence are well suited to
providing the correct incentives to parties to act in accordance with the epistemic purposes of the
adversarial system of adjudication when disclosing positive evidence. Indeed, given that parties in
a legal dispute want their own positive evidence to be disclosed in court, provisions for excluding
undisclosed positive evidence, or allowing for an adjournment if evidence has not been disclosed,
are sufficiently effective that no substantial differences arise between the way in which models of
lawyering approach the disclosure of positive evidence. In the case of the disclosure of positive
evidence, the epistemic beneficiaries are the other party and his/her lawyer, but the legal
beneficiary is the client. Thus, while one could imagine scenarios in which a hyper-zealous lawyer
attempts to evade the disclosure of positive evidence until as late a time as possible, all models of
lawyering would eventually argue in favour of disclosure of positive evidence.

Talbott & Goldman, “Games”, supra note 20 at 95 [emphasis in original]. See also Goldman, Social World, supra
note 20 at 301, “Negative evidence is evidence that would hurt [a party’s] cause”.
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Goldman and Talbott argue that the solution to the problem of non-disclosure of positive
evidence, largely an issue of trial by ambush, is “[T]o provide the judge with the power to
sanction…nondisclosure to the extent necessary to negate any advantage that a party might try to
gain by nondisclosure”.31 This can be as simple as ruling evidence to be inadmissible if it is not
disclosed.32 Another potential solution for dealing with such problems is simply adjournment and
the granting of time for the other lawyer to prepare a response to the positive evidence that had not
been disclosed.
The case of negative evidence, on the other hand, demonstrates deep epistemic challenges
for the adversarial model of lawyering as well as substantial differences between models of
lawyering and these models’ views of the epistemic role of the lawyer within the adversarial
system. To illustrate these differences, Goldman and Talbott engage in the extended analysis of a
hypothetical product liability case in which a defendant company that produced a type of
medication over which a lawsuit is taking place has an internal memo that is known to the
company’s lawyer and which speaks to potential dangers of an ingredient in the medication.33 The
memo is negative evidence from the perspective of the defendant’s case—it is positive evidence
from the perspective of the plaintiff’s case—and the defence wants to avoid disclosure of this
document. Unlike positive evidence, which the lawyer has an incentive to introduce in court, the
lawyer has a strong incentive to prevent the discovery of negative evidence.34 Goldman and Talbott
consider the question of the proper course of action for a defence lawyer as assessed in terms of
the social epistemology of law.

Talbott & Goldman, “Games”, supra note 20 at 107.
See ibid.
33
See generally ibid at 107–141.
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The authors argue that, depending on the rules of civil procedure that are in place, a defence
lawyer who engages in a model of lawyering that does not support zealous resistance to
disclosure—I offer the example of a defence lawyer who practices some alternative model of
lawyering that more fully considers the interests of third parties—may be at a competitive
disadvantage in the market for legal services when compared with a defence lawyer who is willing
to zealously resist even a meritorious request for disclosure.35 Straightforwardly enough, this is
because disclosure of such negative evidence weakens the defendant’s case (perhaps even raising
concerns about loyalty) though the defendant entered the market for a lawyer for the purpose of
obtaining a loyal defender to win, or favourably settle, the case that the defendant is facing.
A crucial feature of document discovery is that, although the adversarial context is relevant
in that the lawyer can, to some extent, justify his/her resistance to disclosure as part of the standard
push and pull between lawyers representing their own clients’ interests, the lawyer who wants to
discover information by way of obtaining disclosure of documents has the epistemic disadvantage
of not being on an equal epistemic footing with respect to the evidence that the opposing side (in
this case, the defendant company and the defendant’s lawyer) has in its possession.36 Thus, the
lawyer seeking information by way of document disclosure is often not able to respond effectively
to practices that would undermine the promotion of knowledge. Moreover, in the case of a dispute
over disclosure, there is no way for an adjudicator to take in information from two informed
representatives and render a decision. Certainly, refusal to disclose documents can be challenged
before a judge; however, the judge who decides on such a matter is not always (or possibly even
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See generally ibid at 123–127, where Goldman discusses the disadvantages faced by a lawyer who treats the legal
process as a truth-finding exercise when compared to a lawyer who treats the legal process largely as a competition
constrained by rules of procedural justice.
36
Of course, this is also true the other way around. The plaintiff has some information that the defendant wishes to
obtain, and in relation to which the defendant is at an epistemic disadvantage. However, if the legal dispute is like the
one about product liability that Goldman presents, the defendant will usually have far more information that the
plaintiff wishes to access, and thus about which the defendant has an epistemic advantage, than the other way around.
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ever) in the position of being informed by the adversarial process about all aspects that would be
relevant to rendering a decision on this matter. Rather, the party seeking to avoid disclosure is at
an epistemic advantage over all other parties, including the judge, in relation to any dispute over
disclosure simply in virtue of knowing the document.37
The imbalance between litigators raises difficulties for the adversarial model of
adjudication and for traditional models of lawyering that want to emphasize the epistemic
reasoning of the adversarial model to justify a more aggressively partisan style of legal practice.
Because the adversarial context is inchoate during the discovery process, models of lawyering that
would endorse vigorous resistance of document disclosure cannot properly raise the epistemic
logic of the adversarial system to argue against the opposing side. That is to say, during document
discovery, the lawyer is not merely playing a highly particularized role that is epistemically
checked by the opposing lawyer. When the lawyer resists a request for disclosure, information
may simply be unavailable for the broader epistemic processes of the adversarial contest.38
Thus, if traditional models of lawyering are to allow for opposition to the disclosure of
documents such as the ones discussed in Goldman and Talbott’s product liability example, it is not
open to advocates of traditional models to argue that such actions are justified, at least in part, by
the checking mechanisms of the adversarial process. Advocates of traditional models of lawyering
cannot simply argue, without additional explanation, that the standards for proper epistemic
behaviour (truth-seeking standards in veritistic social epistemology) are not the same for the roledifferentiated epistemology of the lawyer as for the non-lawyer generally without role-

See generally Talbott & Goldman, “Games”, supra note 20 at 112–127, especially 115–122.
Sometimes, the request is invalid, in which case the information should not be available. Other times, the request is
valid, in which case the information should be available.
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differentiation.39 In the early stages of litigation, lawyers are still informing themselves to be able
to properly exercise the checking mechanisms during trial. The checking mechanisms that apply
to earlier stages of litigation are, by definition, less epistemically informed. Pointing out this
objection is a special concern of social epistemology, as a site for inquiring into the social
conditions in which knowledge—in this case, knowledge about the facts of a legal dispute—is
created and shared.
The epistemic imbalances just explained in relation to negative evidence and document
discovery pose problems with respect to the ability of the adversarial system to excel at the
epistemic standards of “(1) reliability, (2) power, (3) fecundity, (4) speed, and (5) efficiency”. The
lawyer’s ability to prevent disclosure of negative evidence or to make such disclosure a difficult
process (a burdensome and troublesome ability for another lawyer to check), can substantially
impair the legal system’s ability to satisfy all five of Goldman’s conditions. Perhaps most notably
for the purpose of existing concerns in legal ethics, roadblocks in the way of the disclosure of
negative evidence can drastically reduce the legal system’s epistemic speed and efficiency. It can
increase the duration of litigation (and the number of person-hours spent on a case), thus decreasing
epistemic speed. The amount of time spent on a case will also be accompanied by an increase in
the number of billable hours as well as in the complexity of litigation, thus increasing the legal
fees that need to be spent to discover negative evidence and decreasing epistemic efficiency. These
social epistemic concerns link up well with access to justice concerns in legal ethics.40
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Note that zealous opposition to disclosing documents can also be made on the basis of non-epistemic values or
principles in the legal system. Thus, the justification, as well as the explicit legal argument given in court, could be
based on arguments available in the rules of civil procedure that pertain to the protection of specific legal rights and
values rather than truth-seeking concerns. However, in such a case, we would recognize that the argument against
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See generally Lonny Sheinkopf Hoffman, “Access to Information, Access to Justice: The Role of Presuit
Investigatory Discovery” (2007) 40:2 U Mich JL Reform 217 (exploring the way in which pretrial access to
information and asymmetric control of information by potential litigants affect access to justice).
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In addition to pointing out these challenges about negative evidence, Goldman and Talbott
argue about the way in which the rules of civil procedure could be better structured to improve the
performance of the legal system under veritistic social epistemic evaluation. These proposals
including reworking the incentives that motivate lawyers and removing disadvantages for
practicing law in ways that do not exploit unfair knowledge imbalances that fall outside of
behaviours that the adversarial model of adjudication can justify. Goldman and Talbott propose
multiple solutions to these problems beyond the rules of civil procedure that were in place when
their paper was written. These solutions include specific additional disclosure rules as well as
professional sanctions for failure to disclose.41 Canvassing those proposals will not be helpful to
the purpose of this dissertation.
Instead, it will be beneficial to realize that the role of the lawyer in document discovery,
and the incentives that may motivate the lawyer who is engaged in discovery, show that s/he is
epistemically involved in the adversarial process in a way that is much more robust than is set out
by the adversarial system’s claims about the epistemic benefits of a clash of arguments. According
to Goldman and Talbott—I agree with them on this point—the lawyer, in addition to being
involved in the social epistemic task of arguing about the subject matter of a case, is at least also
involved in the social epistemic task of producing and changing evidence that the adversarial
system uses.42 Legal practice can create problems for the epistemic story that is presented in

See generally Talbott & Goldman, “Games”, supra note 20 at 128–151.
Expanding on this point by turning to the work of Allan Hutchinson, we should also be aware of the epistemic
implications of the insight that lawyers are also involved in the task of producing and changing the law that the
adversarial system considers. See some of Allan Hutchinson’s discussion about law’s indeterminacy and the
interpretative insights that he draws from this in Allan C Hutchinson, “A Loss of Faith: Law, Justice and Legal Ethics”,
Book Review of Lawyers and Fidelity to Law by W Bradley Wendel [unpublished, archived in author’s personal
collection] at 9–10. Hutchinson illustrates the way in which existing law can always be unsettled and reconfigured by
individuals involved in the legal process. Chief participants in this would be lawyers. Thus, I would argue that the
potential of using social epistemic analysis in law is greater than Goldman has stated. Such analysis can also be
relevant to substantive discussions about law.
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support of systems of adjudication, necessitating a social epistemic approach to law that deals
directly with the way in which legal professionals fit (or do not fit) into epistemic reasoning that
supports the adversarial model of adjudication.
I hope to have given an appetizing taste of the applicability of social epistemic insights to
the field of law. There is a great deal of theoretical and practical progress that can be made in
considering the role of the lawyer in shaping the results that legal systems produce depending on
the way that the systems are socially organized (e.g., as an adversarial system). As summarized
here, such an analysis can be done in a more systematic way using the criteria developed in
epistemology, especially as those criteria are focused on taking account of the social influences on
the production of knowledge. Most importantly, social epistemology provides the broader
epistemic context for my own proposals about studying the epistemology of law and lawyering.
My proposals about virtue epistemology are informed by the insights that social epistemology
provides about the epistemology of social systems like law.
(2.3) Social Epistemology & Legal Philosophy
A notable difference between my approach to the epistemology of law and Goldman’s is
that, when undertaking a social epistemic assessment of legal systems, he starkly separates law
and morality. Before undertaking his epistemic analysis of law and legal systems, Goldman sets
out the fact that he will be examining systems with statutes, histories of case law and canons of
legal interpretation. He then goes on to say:
Whether these laws and so forth are good from a moral point of view is not up for
present discussion. The question of their goodness falls into the realm of general
moral and political philosophy…. I shall assume that the job of an adjudication
system is to apply whatever laws are ‘on the books’ (and constitutionally
legitimate). If those laws are bad, they should doubtless be changed. But it is not
the job of the adjudication system as such to effect that change.43
43

Goldman, Social World, supra note 20 at 272–273. Later in the same passage, he also discusses judicial review, and
the idea that the proper place of remedies for bad legislation is at the legislative level (a point that, on its own, may or
may not be relevant to the natural law/positivism debate depending on how those viewpoints are stated). My interest
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In making this statement, Goldman is, at the very least, taking the dependence thesis as an
assumption that underlies his analysis.44
More troublingly, however, Goldman may be assuming away morality from legal
adjudication and from the epistemology of law. Debates about the place of morality in law are
deeply relevant to the theories of legal philosophy themselves and for the epistemology of law.
Natural law theory45 places the connection between law and morality at its core such that the
goodness of laws cannot be limited to the moral and political realm. Some account of goodness is
(1) necessarily part of the legal realm and the system of adjudication and (2) necessarily considered
by the adjudication system. Most natural law theories suggest important and necessary connections
between law and morality without making claims that legal validity depends on the legal system’s
adherence to morality, but some natural law theories propose that legal validity (including the
validity of the laws on the books) depends upon law’s abidance of moral norms. Goldman’s
statement leaves no room for these views of law.
The sharp line that Goldman draws between legal questions and moral questions assumes
away not just debates between legal positivism and natural law, but even the debate between
inclusive legal positivism and exclusive legal positivism. Legal positivists argue amongst
themselves about whether legal institutions (i.e., legislatures and courts) can incorporate morality,
including moral values such as fairness, into the legal system and as conditions for the validity of
law in their particular legal system via the rule of recognition.46 Inclusive legal positivists (or soft

in this passage is not in Goldman’s view on the role of the judiciary, but in the assumptions he states that are directly
relevant to the natural law/positivism debate by way of their implication of the dependence thesis.
44
Explained above in Section (1), especially notes 33–35, 37 and accompanying text.
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Discussed above in Section (1.2).
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See Brian Bix, ed, A Dictionary of Legal Theory, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) sub verbo “legal
positivism – inclusive v. exclusive positivism” 123.
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positivists) contend that morality can be incorporated into law by contingent choices made by legal
institutions to adopt moral concepts, such as fairness and justice, into positive law. Exclusive legal
positivists (or hard positivists) reject the idea that morality can be incorporated into law,47 though
law may consult morality to inform itself about conceptions within the field of morality.48
Goldman’s statement could at taken as an endorsement of exclusive legal positivism. At the very
least, his view leaves little, or no, room to consider the idea adjudication in a legal system in which
morality has been incorporated into law by contingent choices made within such a legal system.
Goldman should reconsider the jurisprudential assumptions that he makes. Modestly, I
argue that an epistemology of law should make room for the existing discourses in legal
philosophy, including the ranges of positions that include legal positivism, natural law theory, and
other theories of jurisprudence. Reconsidering Goldman’s assumption to achieve this modest goal
should involve dropping, or clarifying, that the law on the books is not the only source of norms
relevant to adjudication. More strongly, however, I argue that natural law theory is a better fit for
Goldman’s own epistemic ambitions. This is so for at least three reasons: (1) the merits of natural
law theory itself as an account of jurisprudence, (2) the built-in concern that much of natural law
theory has about epistemology, (3) the connection between natural law theory and alternative
models of lawyering. The natural law theory that I endorse is Fuller’s procedural naturalism. Fuller
proposes that the rule of law (which he describes as the internal morality of law) provides a
necessary connection between law and morality. The way in which Fuller establishes the

See ibid; Ralf Poscher, “The Hand of Midas: When Concepts Turn Legal, or Deflating the Hart-Dworkin Debate”
in Jaap C Hage & Dietmar von der Pfordten, eds, Concepts in Law (New York: Springer, 2009) 99 at 109.
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Poscher, supra note 48 at 107–109. Law would inform itself about moral conceptions in the same way as it informs
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that, when making these statements, Poscher is already describing his own Midas Theory, which purports to dissolve
the debate between inclusive legal positivists and exclusive legal positivists.
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connection between law and morality is based in the conditions upon which the ontological
essence49 of law depends.
(2.3.1) Procedural Naturalism’s Own Merits
In an effective and moderate way, Fuller’s procedural naturalism holds out the rule of law
as a necessary condition for being a legal norm. Morality is thus assumed by all things legal. As
explained by Brian Leiter in his work on law and objectivity, “The class of legal reasons can come
to include moral reasons in two ways. First…sources of law—like statutes and constitutional
provisions—may include moral concepts or considerations. The United States Constitution
provides the most familiar examples, since it speaks of ‘equal protection’, ‘liberty’, and other
inherently moral notions”.50 The legal theories that have been discussed so far in this dissertation
are largely of this first kind. “Secondly,” Leiter argues, “moral reasons might be part of the class
of legal reasons because they are part of the very criteria of legal validity”.51 Leiter explains,
“Satisfying the moral criteria might be necessary for a norm to be a legal norm, or it might be both
necessary and sufficient. The strongest forms of natural law theory hold the latter”.52
According to Fuller, there is a set of moral conditions that “legal systems” and particular
“laws” must meet in order to perform the function of law. Since law’s essence involves the
performance of this function, these moral conditions are also requirements for belonging to the
ontological category of law (criteria of legal validity).53 Fuller’s idea, also called the “internal
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Above in Section (1.2.1), note 43 and accompanying text.
Brian Leiter, “Law and Objectivity” in Jules L Coleman & Scott Shapiro, eds, Oxford Handbook of Jurisprudence
and Philosophy of Law (Oxford University Press, 2002) 969 at 978.
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Ibid.
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Fuller’s work on the ontological essence of law has been packaged in terms that are workable for a debate in
jurisprudence that is concerned with legal validity. Kristen Rundle discusses the awkward fit that legal validity has in
Fuller’s jurisprudence. She notes that the term “legal validity” has its inheritance in legal positivist jurisprudence and
explores the extent to which legal validity occupied Fuller’s thinking and the place that legal validity takes in his work.
See Kristen Rundle, Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the Jurisprudence of Lon L Fuller (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2012)
at 76–85. Rundle is right to say that “Fuller’s writings are otherwise concerned with the much broader task of
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morality of law”,
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has two main steps: a functionalist thesis and a moral thesis.55 In legal

philosophy, the first of these steps receives little contestation and the second is a minority position.
The functionalist thesis posits that the rule of law is a necessary condition for the validity of law
because the abidance of the rule of law is necessary for legal systems, and particular laws,56 to
perform their functions as members of the ontological category of law. This function is guiding
conduct. Described in broader terms, the function is subjecting human conduct to the guidance of
rules. As Fuller quotes the words of Vaughan CJ in Thomas v. Sorrell, 1677, “[A] law which a
man cannot obey, nor act according to it, is void and no law: and it is impossible to obey
contradictions, or act according to them”.57

within the meaning of law as a concept”, ibid at 79. I thank Rundle for her commentary on this point, in which she
highlighted the extent to which I am packaging Fuller’s ideas for my purposes here. I have indeed packaged Fuller’s
work in a way that focuses on the language of legal validity, and which was not the focus of Fuller’s work. At the
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misreading of his work. Questions about legal validity deal with a slice of Fuller’s work, but the slice is important and
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was the focus. Simmonds argues that this debate “is a battle where Fuller’s general strategy offers every prospect of
victory,” and that seeking to move focus away from Fuller’s contribution to this debate “risks conceding important
territory to those who have in reality failed to achieve the outright victory that is sometimes ascribed to them”, NE
Simmonds, “Freedom, Responsible Agency and Law”, Book Review of Forms Liberate: Reclaiming the
Jurisprudence of Lon Fuller by Kristen Rundle (2014) 5:1 Juris 75 at 76. Rundle and Simmonds are both astute here.
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foundations.
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Fuller provides eight desiderata that a purported “system of law”, and purported particular
“laws”, cannot completely ignore and still belong to the category of law because failing in these
conditions would be to fail to guide conduct.58 The desiderata are: (1) generality—the legal system
should have general rules; (2) promulgation—laws should be published; (3) prospectivity—laws
should be prospective; (4) clarity—laws should be clearly stated and understandable; (5)
consistency—laws should be consistent with one another; (6) possibility—laws should not
command the impossible; (7) constancy—laws should not be subject to constant change; (8)
congruence—consistency between the law as declared and as administered.59 Fuller receives broad
agreement on this first step of his procedural naturalism, including from inclusive legal positivists
like H.L.A. Hart and exclusive legal positivists like Joseph Raz.60
The second aspect of Fuller’s procedural naturalism, his moral thesis, posits that the rule
of law, and Fuller’s eight desiderata, are also moral conditions for the validity of law. The
desiderata themselves implicitly recognize individual autonomy and set a baseline of respect for
individual autonomy as a necessary condition for the validity (or essence) of law. As Fuller says
while discussing the account of humanity that is implied in the internal morality of law, “To
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See Fuller, Morality of Law, supra note 54 at 39. Beyond setting a minimal functional standard below which law
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embark on the enterprise of subjecting human conduct to the governance of rules involves of
necessity a commitment to the view that man is, or can become, a responsible agent, capable of
understanding and following rules, and answerable for his defaults”.61 Fuller describes law’s
commitment to a view of human nature that recognizes people’s autonomy as “the most important
respect in which an observance of the demands of legal morality can serve the broader aims of
human life generally”.62
Violations of Fuller’s desiderata fall below this baseline of respect for individual
autonomy. Fuller goes as far as to say, “Every departure from the principles of law’s inner morality
is an affront to man’s dignity as a responsible agent”.63 Raising specific examples of departures
from the rule of law, Fuller argues that, “To judge [a person’s] actions by unpublished or
retrospective laws, or to order him to do an act that is impossible, is to convey to him your
indifference to his powers of self-determination”.64 This wrong can be especially egregious in the
case of criminal law, where one can raise examples such as a citizen being required by a “law” to
perform an impossible task and possibly being imprisoned for failing to perform the task. This
example would result in a loss of liberty (through imprisonment) based on a “law” that failed to
respect the person’s autonomy in the first place.
Not every aspect of morality creates a validity condition for law based in the internal
morality of law. Fuller recognizes this as he says, “I have repeatedly observed that legal morality
can be said to be neutral over a wide range of ethical issues”.65 His desiderata are specifically
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relevant to law’s function of guiding human conduct.66 A “legal system”, or a “law”, that violates
substantive morality—but that does not undermine the conduct-guiding function of law67—can be
critiqued on moral grounds. However, such violations would not result in a failure to perform law’s
conduct-guiding function. For example, a “law” that has the purpose and/or effect of segregating
neighborhoods racially, while subject to rebuke on substantive moral and political grounds, as well
as possibly other grounds in the positive law that may be inspired by the substance of moral
conceptions, does not fail to perform the conduct-guiding function of law as long as the “law” is
consistent with Fuller’s eight desiderata. Such a “law” would not raise the specific concerns about
legal validity that come from the rule of law. Thus, Fuller’s view identifies a limited set of moral
norms as internal functional conditions for the essence of law. The pushback that Fuller receives
on his moral thesis concerns whether his desiderata are truly moral conditions or simply functional
conditions.68
Goldman, like legal positivists, could argue that Fuller’s eight desiderata are indeed
conditions for the existence of law, but that they are merely conditions of efficacy. In that sense,
Goldman could help himself to these desiderata and recognize their epistemic relevance while still
endorsing a conceptual split between law and morality. Such a move would return any argument
that I have with Goldman’s jurisprudential assumptions to the familiar debate about whether
Fuller’s conditions are moral conditions or merely conditions of efficacy. Delving too deeply into
the debate Fuller’s moral thesis would take this dissertation far afield. The aim here has been to
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show that jurisprudential debates themselves push against the decision to make the jurisprudential
assumption that Goldman makes.
(2.3.2) Epistemology & Natural Law
Beyond the merits of natural law theory over legal positivism, epistemic ideas are built into
different approaches to natural law theory. Several of Fuller’s eight desiderata are directly relevant
to epistemology. Fuller’s theory is concerned with the ability of those who are governed by law to
know the law. Desiderata with notable relevance to epistemology include: (2) Promulgation, (3)
prospectivity, (4) clarity, (5) consistency, (7) constancy, (8) congruence.69 Their epistemic
relevance is the following:
(2) Promulgation: A law that has not been declared openly by the lawmaker(s) to
others cannot be known.
(3) Prospectivity: A law that is retroactive presents either an obligation that cannot
be known to be binding, or cannot be known at all because the law may not have
even been drafted, for at least a portion of the time to which it purports to apply.
(4) Clarity: A law that is difficult to understand (e.g., because they contain unclear
terminology) is difficult, or perhaps impossible, to know.
(5) Consistency: A law that is inconsistent, even logically contradictory with itself,
fails to present a norm that can be known.
(7) Constancy: A law that is too frequently in flux will be difficult for those
governed by law to know.
This is not to say that these desiderata are found in Fuller’s internal morality of law
completely or mainly because of their relevance to epistemology.70 Saying so would rob the
desiderata of the more robust meanings that Fuller gives them. As noted above, a crucial aspect of
the desiderata is that they respect individual autonomy. One could also elaborate other aspects of
the desiderata, such as their concern that law treat people fairly. Even so, it is noteworthy, in an
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epistemic approach to law and lawyering, that the desiderata of Fuller’s theory of legal philosophy
have clear epistemic aspects to them. Concern about the ability of the governed to know the rules
is a built-in aspect of Fuller’s internal morality of law.
Other natural law theories go far beyond Fuller with built-in epistemic concerns. The
natural law theory of John Finnis is one such example. Finnis gives a broad theory of natural law
that connects law with the project of pursuing human flourishing. In explicating this approach,
Finnis proposes a set of basic goods, among which are included knowledge and practical
reasonableness.71 Fuller’s epistemic concern in the internal morality of law is with knowledge as
a condition for allowing people to plan their lives and act on those plans. People cannot plan in
relation to law if the law denies them the knowledge about law necessary to make such plans.
Finnis goes further, setting knowledge as one of the basic goods that individuals seek in the course
of life.
Consider the following example that illustrates the difference between the places given to
epistemology in Fuller’s theory and Finnis’ theory. Fuller gives basic requirements that the law
must meet to regulate scientists’ pursuit of knowledge about the natural world. Finnis is focused
on supporting the impetus behind the scientist’s desire to achieve knowledge about the natural
world. These are compatible but different epistemic concerns. One question is largely focused with
the question of “how”, whereas the other is focused on the question of “why”. Notably, for the
purpose of this dissertation, Finnis’ account of the basic requirements of practical reasonableness
raises concerns that link up well with discussions of behavioural legal ethics and debiasing
strategies that lawyers should adopt to deal with the negative effects of partisanship.72 Here, Finnis
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is an example of the depth to which epistemic concerns can reach in natural law theories that adopt
a more substantive approach, as compared to Fuller’s procedural naturalism.
This subsection contains a great deal that a legal positivist could endorse. I noted earlier
that there is wide agreement with the functional step in Fuller’s argument about the internal
morality of law.73 Beyond being able to endorse even the jurisprudential ideas discussed in this
section (e.g., the functional aspect of Fuller’s internal morality of law), positivists can agree to the
epistemic concerns raised by these natural law theories. There is no reason a positivist could not
agree that Fuller’s desiderata have an epistemic element and that this epistemic element is
important in explaining why the desiderata act as functional conditions for the existence of law.
Positivists could also agree with the motivations that Finnis gives behind pursuing a certain good
as part of one’s life plan. Why, then, do the arguments raised in this section raise any reason that
an epistemology should have any greater affinity for natural law theory in particular? The reason
is that, though positivism is compatible with the epistemic concerns raised here, positivism itself
does not contain any impetus to raise these concerns. The positivist dependence thesis does not
raise any epistemic concern beyond its own propositional truth. By contrast many natural law
theories themselves contain concerns about epistemology built into the theory. The theories that
already have built in concerns for epistemology should not be assumed away in an epistemology
of law and lawyering.
(2.3.3) Social Epistemology, Natural Law Theory, & Lawyering
Finally, natural law theory speaks to the exact epistemic concerns that Goldman has about
lawyering in the adversarial process of adjudication. It must be understood that Goldman’s
concerns about the adversarial process are deeply linked to prevailing models of lawyering and the
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legal philosophical viewpoints that are associated with those models of lawyering. Consider the
following illustration of the way in which models of lawyering have a crucial place in explaining
the epistemic complaints that Goldman has about adversarial systems of adjudication.
Goldman discusses the epistemic problems that exist in relation to disclosing negative
evidence in adversarial proceedings. The disclosure of negative evidence is vital to a full hearing
of the evidence and to informed adversarial argumentation in a case. However, as Goldman says,
disclosing negative evidence, especially if other lawyers are not also disclosing negative evidence,
places the lawyer who does disclose negative evidence at a competitive disadvantage. By no means
do codes of professional conduct encourage lawyers to avoid the proper disclosure of negative
evidence as part of the document discovery process in adversarial proceedings. Codes of
professional conduct do, however, contribute to informing adversarial structures with the
traditional model of lawyering. For example, the FLSC Model Code also states that, “The lawyer’s
function as advocate is openly and necessarily partisan. Accordingly, the lawyer is not obliged
(except as required by law or under these rules and subject to the duties of a prosecutor set out
below) to assist an adversary or advance matters harmful to the client’s case”.74
Adversarial dispute resolution structures reliably raise Goldman’s epistemic concerns
when the legal professionals who work within the structures adopt specific styles of legal practice.
Adversarial systems of adjudication and traditional models of lawyering can mutually shape and
reinforce one another in negative ways. Being a good adversary in the context of a specific legal
culture can come to mean engaging in behaviours that benefit the client at significant epistemic
costs that undermine the intended epistemic benefits of adversarial dispute resolution systems. The
most aggressive traditional models of lawyering, those based on Lord Brougham’s statement of
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zealous advocacy and hyper-partisanship,75 risk countenancing abuses of legal processes to avoid
the disclosure of negative evidence. Goldman’s epistemic concerns thus arise from features of
the adversarial model of adjudication and traditional models of lawyering gone awry.
Alternative models of lawyering offer the potential of avoiding these pitfalls. As explained
above,76 alternative models of lawyering allow for lawyers to consider the interests of third parties
and to raise moral considerations with the client, such as the question of whether what the client
is doing is moral. In the case of document discovery, alternative models might consider the public
interest, or the interests of other stakeholders, in acquiring information from the lawyer’s client
when considering the question of keeping negative evidence from being seen.
Natural law theory offers paths for better awareness of the epistemic pitfalls of traditional
lawyering within adversarial systems of adjudication. Natural law theory also better aligns with
alternative models of lawyering that might avoid the specific epistemic concerns raised by
Goldman. As I argued above,77 models of lawyering are not completely neutral with respect to the
philosophy of law; nor are models of lawyering neutral to questions about the extent to which
moral norms form part of the law and have a place in legal adjudication. It may even be the case
that models of lawyering assume accounts of jurisprudence: traditional models most readily
assuming legal positivism and (at least some) alternative models most readily assuming some
version of natural law theory. Relatedly, some theories in legal philosophy—especially theories
about the relationship between law and morality—have a greater impetus to support some models
of lawyering over others.
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Traditional models of lawyering put forward norms such as the principle of neutrality
(which prohibits lawyers from allowing their own views of the moral merits of the case to affect
the zealousness with which they pursue client objectives), the principle of lawyer nonaccountability (which exhorts against judging lawyers on the basis of the morality of the client’s
case), and the principle of partisanship (which requires the lawyer to seek to maximize the
likelihood of the client’s victory).78 Adversarial litigation in common law systems is conducted
with the understanding that lawyers are not supposed to bring their moral views into their
relationship with the client. The idea that the lawyer’s moral views should be kept separate from
the lawyer-client relationship (a tenet of traditional models) is difficult to make if moral values are
embedded in the law or if morality is part of the validity conditions of law (tenets of natural law
theory). The situation is not as stark for alternative models of lawyering; alternative models of
lawyering are more compatible with legal positivism than traditional models of lawyering are
compatible with natural law theory. However, an important avenue for connecting morality to the
lawyer-client relationship (a helpful thing under alternative models of lawyering) is lost if morality
is not somehow embedded in law and/or is not part of the validity conditions of law (a tenet of
legal positivism).
If Goldman’s epistemic concerns arise out of the combined influence of both the
adversarial system of adjudication and traditional models of lawyering, then questions about law’s
relationship with morality as expressed in legal philosophy should not be assumed away. Leaving
a space to ask those questions about law and morality allows us to place additional scrutiny on the
harshest aspects of traditional models of lawyering that, within adversarial systems of adjudication,
condone behaviours such as harsh questioning of witnesses and perhaps even abuse of legal
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processes to conceal negative evidence. Asking these moral questions, especially from a natural
law perspective, thus has potential to greatly enrich the critical resources that social epistemology
can bring to existing adjudicative systems and the styles of lawyering that dominate therein.
Social epistemology is an important recent turn in epistemological thought. It has wide
ranging applications to law and can provide great insight into legal ethics as well. Additionally, it
sets the stage for the analysis that I wish to undertake in this dissertation as I take account of
another turn in epistemology: virtue epistemology. In particular, the idea of virtue orientation in
virtue epistemology is substantially enriched by the background of social epistemology.
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(3) Virtue Epistemology – A Virtuous Turn in Approach to Epistemology
Whereas authors such as Goldman have studied the epistemology of law from an
overarching systemic point of view or from the perspective of attempting to understand specific
practices within legal systems (e.g., the disclosure of evidence), I am looking at the epistemology
of law from the perspective of the professional life of the lawyer. I am considering the epistemic
demands placed on lawyers by their professional role, especially the ethics of their professional
roles, which deal with issues such as advising clients about the law, the ethics of taking a particular
course of action, and strategies for presenting evidence to juries. From this inquiry, I expect to
provide an illuminating reading of the philosophy of lawyering.
The approach an epistemology of lawyering taken by someone working purely from a
social epistemic point of view would look much like Goldman’s. A social epistemic study that
focuses on the role of the lawyer would engage in both the descriptive and normative analysis of
the role that the lawyer plays in legal systems, especially under various models of lawyering. If
one were to approach the normative project of social epistemology purely in line with Goldman’s
veritism, one would focus on assessing the extent to which the lawyer, through the services that
s/he provides in the legal system, contributes to the legal system’s ability to produce true belief.
Towards this end, one might take up Goldman’s veritistic standards and ask how the lawyer
contributes to the legal system’s epistemic reliability, power, fecundity, speed, and efficiency. In
many ways, this approach would be an extension of the previous discussion about document
discovery.1 There is immense value in such analysis and Goldman’s work will continue to inform
this dissertation. However, my intention is to take an approach that deals more deeply with both
the professional intellectual and moral life of the lawyer within the social institutions and practices
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of law. With this in mind, I turn to the task of discussing virtue epistemology and the intellectual
resources that it provides to the epistemology of lawyering.
(3.1) Understanding the Virtuous Turn
Despite providing a meaningful change in focus from traditional epistemology, there is an
extent to which social epistemology is—in its focus on developing abstract conditions of
knowledge and dealing with problems that occur for individuals in obtaining knowledge—
substantially a broadening of ideas that are done in the spirit of traditional epistemology. As the
virtue epistemologist Jason Kawall summarizes:
Generally, discussion in [social epistemology] has been devoted to (i) to the notion
of collective, or group beliefs and their justification, (ii) to how individuals can
come to know ‘social facts’, (iii) to how knowledge-building institutions (such as
the sciences) should be organized to maximize the production of knowledge, and
(iv) to how being embedded in an epistemic community can impact upon
attributions of knowledge (justification, warrant) to individual knowers.2
Kawall’s description of these projects is that they “either overlap with those of individualistic
epistemologists, or they focus on groups and their organization”.3
The project of virtue epistemology involves a more substantial divergence from traditional
epistemology. When one comes to study virtue epistemology, it quickly becomes evident that the
commitments and tools guiding the project of virtue epistemology are inspired by those in the field
of ethics. According to epistemologists John Turri, Mark Alfano, and John Greco, the two basic
commitments of virtue epistemology are (1) that “epistemology is a normative discipline”, and (2)
that “intellectual agents and communities are the primary source of epistemic value and the
primary focus of epistemic evaluation”.4 In explicating the first of these commitments, as shown
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directly below, virtue epistemology develops an evaluative aspect that is even stronger than that
of social epistemology. The evaluative aspect and the extent of its application are the key
distinguishing features of virtue epistemology. In the second commitment identified by Turri,
Alfano, and Greco, we see an ability to epistemically evaluate both individuals as well as systems
and social practices. This second commitment allows for the prevalence of the social analysis of
epistemology (consistent with social epistemology) while also providing more impetus to focus on
the normative analysis of the epistemic life of the intellectual agent. In this dissertation, the key
epistemic agent is the lawyer.
The way in which virtue epistemology’s two commitments become the grounds for a
distinct epistemological theory is by the way in which virtue epistemologists take their inspiration
from the moral theory of virtue ethics. Turri, Alfano, and Greco compare virtue epistemology and
virtue ethics in the following way:
Virtue ethics explains an action’s moral properties in terms of the agent’s
properties, for instance whether it results from kindness or spite. [Virtue
epistemology] explains a cognitive performance’s normative properties in terms of
the cognizer’s properties, for instance whether a belief results from hastiness or
excellent eyesight, or whether an inquiry manifests carelessness or discrimination.
For virtue ethics the relevant properties are moral virtues and vices, and for [virtue
epistemology] intellectual virtues and vices.5
This is said to be the “direction of analysis” that virtue epistemology takes when compared to
traditional approaches in epistemology (which would proceed by stipulating abstract conditions
for knowledge, followed by assessments of claims to knowledge on the basis of whether the person
meets the abstract conditions).6 Rather than evaluating the beliefs of people on the basis of whether
they meet an abstract standard, virtue epistemology looks for the epistemic agent’s practice of
intellectual virtues.
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The idea in virtue epistemology is that an agent’s epistemic position is strengthened by
action that is in accordance with epistemic virtues such as circumspection, conscientiousness, and
honesty. The agent’s epistemic position is weakened by action that is in accordance with epistemic
vices such as gullibility, intellectual laziness, epistemic insouciance,7 and dishonesty. Providing a
similar account of virtue epistemology, John Greco summarizes the way in which virtue theory reorients the basis of normative analysis. He says:
Just as virtue theories in ethics try to understand the normative properties of actions
in terms of the normative properties of moral agents, virtue theories in epistemology
try to understand the normative properties of beliefs in terms of the normative
properties of cognitive agents. Hence, virtue theories in ethics have been described
as person-based rather than act-based, and virtue theories in epistemology have
been described as person-based rather than belief-based.8
The task of defining epistemic virtues is a crucial task within the broader project of virtue
epistemology. This task exists one level of abstraction above this dissertation. Whereas my project
here is best described as an effort in applied epistemology (specifically, applied virtue
epistemology), the task of explaining what a virtue is would be done at a level of abstraction that
could be described as normative epistemology.9 Similar to how moral concepts such as “good”,
“right”, and “moral virtue” are defined at the level of normative ethics, the concept of “epistemic
virtue” would be defined at the level of normative epistemology.
One effort to give what might be best described as indicators of epistemic virtues, is
undertaken by the virtue epistemologist Jason Baehr who provides “four dimensions of intellectual
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virtue”.10 Baehr himself says that his dimensions are not meant to be taken as either necessary or
sufficient conditions for intellectual virtue. They are meant to “cover[] enough of the relevant cases
to be explanatorily illuminating and useful”.11 The dimensions are set out in four principles,
described in terms that address the question of what it takes for a person to have an intellectual
virtue. The principles are the following.
Motivational Principle (MP): A subject S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if
S’s possession of V is rooted in a “love” of epistemic goods.12
“Love” is meant to be taken broadly and can also be expressed as “‘being for’ epistemic goods”.13
Showing commitment to epistemic good in a way characterized by epistemic virtue can be
distinguished from engaging in behaviour that produces epistemic goods merely for things such as
social standing or career interests.14
Affective Principle (AP): S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S takes
pleasure in (or experiences other appropriate affections in relation to) the activity
characteristic of V.15
The affective principle is meant to highlight the connection between one’s affections and virtue.
Baehr cites Aristotle, who argues that being virtuous should largely be pleasurable or at least free
from pain.16 Baehr also recognizes that the appropriate affections in relation to some intellectual
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virtues may be more varied, allowing for feelings of pain or regret when one has made a major
error.17
Competence Principle (CP): S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S is
competent at the activity characteristic of V.18
The competence principle emphasizes the need to deliberately practice and improve upon
intellectual virtues.19 Additionally, it may provide the link between reliabilist and responsibilist
approaches to virtue epistemology.20
Judgment Principle (JP): S possesses an intellectual virtue V only if S is disposed
to recognize when (and to what extent, etc.) the activity characteristic of V would
be epistemically appropriate.21
Baehr explains that this last principle gives a crucial place in virtue epistemology to practical
reasoning.
Baehr’s approach to defining what an epistemic virtue is and what it means for a person to
be epistemically virtuous provides a helpful reference point in this dissertation. This task is not the
primary focus of this dissertation. My work here is an effort in the applied virtues epistemology,
bringing the normative resources of virtue epistemology to the topic of lawyering. However, one
a cannot provide an applied normative analysis without at least some reference (explicit or implicit)
to the general normative level of abstraction. As such, I will explain additional normative concepts
throughout this section and return to them as needed in this dissertation.
Even as we recognize virtue epistemology’s change in the direction of analysis, we should
not suppose that virtue epistemology must, by necessity, reject the philosophical contributions of
traditional epistemology. Virtue ethics does not need to be stated in a way that puts it in direct
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contradiction with non-aretaic theories of ethics (such as deontology and consequentialism).
Similarly, virtue epistemology need not be stated in a way that puts it in direct contradiction with
other theories of knowledge (including especially the traditional theories of foundationalism and
coherentism, which do begin with abstract definitions of knowledge), or as being dismissive of the
preoccupations of these traditional theories (such as defining knowledge and epistemic
justification in abstract terms).
Thus, I embrace many of virtue epistemology’s insights and am keen to apply them to the
subject of law, especially in a way that is aware of the complementary project of social
epistemology. However, I will only endorse a virtue epistemological approach that makes room
for traditional epistemological debates. Ignoring the traditional questions in epistemology would
result in missing some of the value of virtue epistemology. One aim for which virtue epistemology
can be used is to gain insight into the traditional questions of knowledge and justification; some
epistemologists have pursued exactly that end.22 More crucially, just as it appears in ethics that
virtue ethics cannot stand alone without abstract accounts of the good and the right, virtue
epistemology’s insights will ultimately be incomplete without an abstract theory of knowledge to
explain the aim of our intellectual virtues. The role of traditional epistemology in such explanations
is to reference beliefs in addition to people. The epistemology of this dissertation is strongly, but
not exclusively, “person-based”.23
(3.2) Reliability & Responsibility
Robert C. Roberts and W. Jay Wood discuss intellectual virtues as “simply acquired bases
of excellent intellectual functioning—this being one of those important and challenging
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generically human kinds of functioning”.24 Excellent intellectual functioning may have two
aspects: (1) skills/capacities/competencies and (2) character traits. This is not to say that every
intellectual virtue is made up of both of these aspects, but rather that there are intellectual virtues
representing each of these aspects. A key distinction is drawn in virtue epistemology between
“reliabilist” perspectives and “responsibilist” perspectives on epistemic virtues.25 The two views
differ in terms of what they regard as being intellectual virtues. The epistemologist Will Fleisher
describes the reliabilist conception of virtue as being synonymous with “a competence”;26 he
defines competence in epistemology as “a disposition to succeed reliably enough at some type of
performance”.27 In their account of epistemic virtues, reliabilists “include faculties such as
perception, intuition, and memory”, which can be called “faculty-virtues”,28 and which help people
succeed at intellectual performances. Of note is that, contrary to Roberts and Wood, some
reliabilists will classify as virtues capacities that are not acquired and that may not be possible to
develop to any significant extent, or perhaps even at all.29
In comparison, responsibilists “understand intellectual virtues to include cultivated
character traits such as conscientiousness and open-mindedness”, which can be called “traitvirtues”.30 Character traits can be defined as “disposition[s] to form beliefs and/or desires of a
certain sort and (in many cases) to act in a certain way, when in conditions relevant to that
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disposition”.31 A virtuous disposition to form beliefs and/or desires, or to act in a certain way,
picks out the mean between two vicious dispositions.32 Crucially, the intellectual virtues
recognized by the responsibilist school are traits that individual epistemic agents can be held
responsible for developing.33 Lorraine Code explains that the idea of “‘responsibility’ can highlight
the active nature of knowers/believers”.34 To illustrate the distinction between reliability in
knowing and responsibility in knowing, Code compares the way in which a computer passively
and accurately records knowledge to the way in which a person actively makes choices about
“modes of cognitive structuring” and can be held responsible for these choices;35 the computer
cannot be so held. This dissertation takes a responsibilist perspective on intellectual virtues and
the virtue epistemology of lawyering. The remainder of this text, especially Section (4) is primarily
dedicated towards articulating responsibilist concerns and applying responsibilist ideas. Thus,
much of the present section will contain a brief treatment of what would be the focus of a reliabilist
epistemology of lawyering.
The reliabilist perspective has aspects in which it goes against Ayers’ account of virtues.
Reliabilism aligns with competence or skill, the latter of which Ayers distinguishes from virtues.
According to Ayers, “virtues are essentially connected to intrinsic values, while skills need not
be”.36 In ethics, the example of compassion illustrates Ayers’ account of responsibilist virtues.
Compassion, a virtue, is described by Ayers as being “conceptually linked to the intrinsic value of
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other people’s well-being”.37 By contrast, Ayers notes that skills can be used to produce things
that have no intrinsic value or that are even intrinsically bad. He gives the examples of a skilled
con artists or a skilled composer of advertising jingles.38 Like Ayers’ description of skills, the
epistemic faculty-virtues recognized by reliabilists have the potential to become decoupled from
intrinsic goods. Memory, for example, can be used to accomplish something good, such as
recalling the inspiration given in a speech, the kindness of a colleague in assisting with an urgent
matter, or recalling a rule of civil procedure that assists a client in asserting his/her legal rights in
a trial. However, memory can also be used to recall grudges, excuses for stubbornness, personally
scandalous information that can embarrass an individual, fears that keep a person from developing
himself/herself,39 and even advertising jingles.
Ayers recognizes important dissimilarities based in the reliabilist and responsibilist
schools. However, the contrast that he draws between virtues and skills (not recognizing
skill/capacities/competencies, i.e., faculty-virtues, as a type of virtues) is too sharp and should take
account of potential for rapprochement between reliabilists and responsibilist. It is even important
to avoid a possible misconception that could arise in reading Ayers’ distinction between virtues
and skills. Saying that skills are not essentially connected with intrinsic values and that skills can
be used for intrinsically good, neutral, or even bad purposes does not mean that skills are equally
suited to, or likely to be used for, any of these kinds of purposes as a matter of fact.40 Though it
may be conceptually possible to associate skills with any of these three categories, it may be
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difficult to conceive of, or enact good, neutral, or bad things to do with certain skills. There may
be limited opportunities to do good, neutral, or bad things with certain skills.
Consider examples of skills that are more suited to be used for intrinsically good purposes.
Knowing how to close a wound by stitching is a skill in the medical profession. Philosophers will
be able to provide many thought experiments in which knowing how to close a wound can be used
for bad purposes. Thought experiments in which a doctor is presented with the choice of
intentionally killing one patient so that the patient’s organs can be used to save five other people41
presume that at least someone involved with performing these operations knows how to close the
incisions made to perform the transplants. However, it is also true, as a contingent matter, that such
cases of using the skill of closing a wound for bad purposes are extraordinary in medicine. A less
fanciful example to illustrate the suitedness of some skills towards the good, even while not
eliminating the possibility of being used for evil, would be the skill of playing an instrument like
the piano. Nefarious purposes for skills such as playing the piano can be conjured up; artists, for
example, have supported immoral governments through their artistic endeavours. However, the
skill to use an instrument like a piano to make music is much more suited for virtuous purposes
related to aesthetic experience, neutral purposes, or even mildly irritating purposes (e.g.,
advertising jingles) than it is for nefarious purposes.
The lack of necessary connection between skills—or faculty-virtues—and the good does
not rule out the possibility that certain skills/faculty-virtues can be associated (even closely so)
with good or bad. Focusing specifically on cognitive faculty-virtues, while recognizing the
potential for cognitive faculties to be abused, those faculties should not be taken as purely value
neutral from the perspective of virtue epistemology. The possibility of virtuous or vicious usage
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does not imply equal aptness for each type of usage. Many cognitive skills are normally more fit
for epistemically virtuous purposes, and are more often used for epistemically virtuous purposes,
even though they can also be used for vice.
Ayers himself comes close to this point when he recognizes that “virtues require skills”.42
He notes that, “People who have virtues are inclined to do what is necessary to develop the relevant
skills. Virtues necessarily imply commitments, and we can often tell what commitments a person
has by noticing what skills she has invested her energies in developing. So there is a sense in which
skills can be a better gauge of virtue than the choices a person makes in any one situation”. 43 The
fact that specific “skills”44 are relevant, and even necessary, for the development of specific
“virtues”45 demonstrates that these “skills” have strong contingent connections with “virtues” and
are better suited for some aims than others. This recognition of the suitability of skills for certain
aims calls for a less sharp distinction between trait-virtues and faculty-virtues. My further
discussion of the relationship between trait-virtues and faculty-virtues will provide examples of
faculty-virtues that are better suited for epistemic virtue than vice, even while not excluding the
possibility of being used for vice.
On the topic of a rapprochement between the two leading approaches to virtue
epistemology, Turri, Alfano, and Greco note that some scholars have rejected the idea that one
must choose between reliabilism and responsibilism since faculty-virtues and trait-virtues “all
seem equally good candidates to promote excellence or flourishing”. 46 Turri, Alfano, and Greco
suggest, for example, that “[f]aculty-virtues seem indispensable in accounting for knowledge of
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the past and the world around us” and that “[t]rait-virtues could be required to account for the full
range of richer intellectual achievements, such as understanding and wisdom, which might
presuppose knowledge but which arguably also exceed it”.47 Will Fleisher challenges the
distinction between reliabilism and responsibilism, arguing that the two theories should be seen as
complementary, with responsibilism building on what he sees as the more foundational project of
reliabilism.48
Christopher Hookway argues for both reliability and responsibility as aspects of excellent
intellectual functioning. Supporting reliabilism, he says that “we would not be reliable seekers
after the truth or effective solvers of theoretical problems if we did not possess specific skills and
capacities: good eyesight and hearing, a reliable memory, good knowledge of specific subject
matters and so on”.49 Epistemic character traits, on the other hand, “enable us to use our skills and
capacities effectively when inquiring and deliberating”.50 Hookway later goes on to explain that,
Success in inquiry thus depends upon the wisdom embodied in our judgements and
upon the cognitive habits and skills we have acquired through education,
experience, and training. Success depends upon our epistemic ‘character’. How
observant I am will influence whether relevant evidence grabs my attention; and
how intellectually honest I am will influence whether I generally come to doubt
propositions once presented with sufficient counter‐evidence to them.51
I join these scholars in rejecting the need to choose between reliabilism and responsibilism.
The philosophy of lawyering itself is well positioned to show that making a good decision in
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preferring faculty-virtues or trait-virtues is more a matter of adapting to the epistemological topic
being considered and deciding which epistemic considerations the author wishes to emphasize.
There is a sense in which the reliabilist perspective is best positioned to connect with the
technical sense of the “good lawyer”. In understanding the technical sense of the good lawyer, I
take my lead from an address given by John A. Sutro, a Past-President of the State Bar of
California. Sutro discusses the concept of a “good lawyer”. While he does engage with ideas that
are broader than the technical sense of good lawyer, such as ethical duties to help the poor and
duties to engage in the political process, much of his account of the “good lawyer” aligns with
what it would mean to be a “good lawyer” under a reliabilist account of virtue epistemology.
Speaking generally, Sutro says that, “‘The Good Lawyer’ has two major characteristics: he has
developed a high level of professional competence, and he devotes a significant part of his life to
the ‘higher aspects’ of his profession which are unrelated to the pursuit of financial gain”.52 Given
the standards mentioned by Sutro throughout his address, I suggest that he is discussing the “higher
aspects” of the lawyer’s technical/functional role as much as he is discussing any moral obligations
that the lawyer has. Thus, his account of the “good lawyer” is characterized by concerns about
competence.
Sutro sets out specific ways in which the “good lawyer” will meet these two general
standards. Discussing the lawyer’s intellectual capacity to deal with a variety of situations, Sutro
cites the famous Judge Learned Hand, who “once said [that the good lawyer] is a person with ‘a
bathtub mind’; he can fill his head with facts immediately necessary, then pull the plug, scour
away all recollection of those facts, and refill for the next situation”.53 In terms of the lawyer’s
reasoning and problem solving skills, “‘The Good Lawyer’ can analyze a complicated set of facts
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and state them for anyone to understand. He can find solutions to his clients’ problems, and he can
convince others of the soundness of his position, be they his clients, opposing counsel, courts or
juries”.54 The good lawyer is thus a persuasive advocate for his/her client’s cause. Sutro’s “good
lawyer” is also skilled at drafting documents because s/he, “draws contracts which cannot be
construed to bind his client to more than was intended or to obligate the other party to less than
was intended. Lawyers, even more than most writers, must make sure that their words mean and
convey precisely what they intend, no more, no less”.55
Sutro discusses a number of other elements of the good lawyer that relate to the lawyer’s
duties to the client, to the legal system, and to the lawyer’s conduct in legal proceedings. These
elements include: meeting deadlines that are important to the client, preparation for the
eventualities of cases,56 acting as a ‘stabilizing influence’ in disputes, conducting himself/herself
in accordance with fairness in court by not misquoting or misleading, being kind in dealings with
other individuals, especially those who do not have legal training,57 upholding the rights of
individuals (Sutro is especially referring to individuals who are accused of crimes) to have access
to—and representation in—the adversarial system (a ‘truth-seeking contest between equal
rivals’),58 etc. This account of the technical sense of the “good lawyer” is admittedly incomplete,
but it provides a provisional understanding that centres on the ideas of competence and what Sutro
calls “higher aspects” of the lawyerly profession.
Granted, some elements of Sutro’s account include normative considerations that involve
the development of traits for which one can be held responsible to develop. Being kind to other
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participants in the legal process (especially those without legal training), and meetings deadlines,
can be considered under the responsibilist heading. However, Sutro’s account of the good lawyer
leans heavily in favour of the development of competencies, which is more strongly associated
with skills, faculties, and reliabilism. A lawyer who has the “bathtub mind” described by Learned
Hand is demonstrating excellence with his/her faculties of memory. This lawyer is succeeding at
being a “good lawyer” in the technical meaning of the term, which also emphasizes the lawyer’s
professional competence. With developments cognitive science, reliabilist accounts of virtues are
likely to become ever more sophisticated. Reliabilism may even be better positioned to respond to
scientific developments and to apply them to lawyering, as can be done in behavioural legal
ethics.59
Reliabilism and responsibilism both have aspects in which they can enrich an epistemology
of lawyering. Since this dissertation emphasizes normativity and the epistemic accountability of
lawyers, I take the responsibilist perspective. Responsibilism underscores the lawyer’s choice to
be a certain kind of professional. In taking this perspective, I am not rejecting reliabilism, or the
idea that competences can be considered virtues or saying that competences should be rejected
from the purview of virtue epistemology. Indeed, I will mention reliabilist virtues in this
dissertation. I am making a choice about which virtues to emphasize so that I can highlight the
epistemic accountability of the legal profession. This focus on taking epistemic responsibility is
what follows in this dissertation.
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(3.3) Virtue Orientation
Ethicists sometimes make a distinction between self-regarding ethical virtues and otherregarding ethical virtues.60 The virtue epistemologist Jason Kawall describes self-regarding virtues
as, “[V]irtues which tend to directly benefit oneself”.61 These virtues “guide and assist us in
achieving our own personal flourishing and well-being”.62 An example of such a virtue would be
prudence. In contrast, other-regarding virtues are “[V]irtues which tend to directly benefit
others”.63 According to Kawall, “[Other-regarding] virtues do not aim primarily at promoting the
flourishing of the agent who abides by them, but rather tend to help others in the agent’s moral
community (and the community as a whole) to flourish”.64 One key example of an other-regarding
virtue in ethics is generosity. In relation to this distinction between self-regarding virtues and otherregarding virtues, I refer to “virtue orientations”. I suggest this as a general term to refer to the idea
of virtues creating benefits that are aimed in particular directions, i.e., the orientation of virtues to
the self or to others. A key aspect of virtue orientation is that both the orientations of regard for
oneself and regard for others constitute desirable behaviour from the perspective of ethics and the
study of knowledge when they are exercised at the appropriate time and in the appropriate measure.
In the context of the development of virtue epistemology, Jason Kawall has proposed that
intellectual virtues can be similarly categorized into self-regarding and other regarding virtues.65
The direction of benefit is the same with epistemic virtues as it is for moral virtues. Examples of
intellectual virtues classified under this rubric include the self-regarding epistemic virtues of
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perceptiveness and intellectual courage and the other-regarding virtues of honesty and integrity. A
key distinction between moral virtues and epistemic virtues of each orientation is that, while it
appears that there is no single kind of benefit that is essentially pursued through moral virtues
(unless we discuss overall general benefits such as rightness or goodness), knowledge is the central
benefit that is achieved by the exercise of epistemic virtues. Thus, the exercise of ethical virtues
may provide a number of benefits, whether they are material (e.g., the generous act of giving food
to a hungry person), emotional, intellectual, etc., but the exercise of epistemic virtue will always
be directed towards the promotion of knowledge, or related ideas of epistemic flourishing.66
Perhaps the greatest insight that can be gained by appreciating the distinction between selfregarding epistemic virtues and other-regarding epistemic virtues is that there is a need to engage
in focused analysis of other-regarding virtues. This distinction itself brings to light the fact that
there exists a whole class of underexplored virtues that can enrich our picture of intellectual virtue,
as well as our approach to the social aspects of knowledge. Kawall argues that epistemologists
have left the topic of other-regarding virtues underexplored. According to him, “epistemologists
have focused on the study of epistemic self-regarding duties and virtues. They have concerned
themselves with how individual epistemic agents can flourish qua individual epistemic agents…”67
In line with the projects of traditional epistemology, virtue epistemologists have been,
“[A]ttempting to determine which intellectual virtues lead to knowledge, what constitutes
sufficient justification or warrant to attribute the status of knowledge to an agent’s beliefs or
acceptances, and so on. Thus, they have focused on each agent’s own personal set of beliefs and
its formation”.68 These projects centre around the idea of acquiring as much knowledge as one can,
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sometimes characterized in terms of acquiring a large number of true beliefs and as few false
beliefs as possible.69 An approach to epistemology that refocuses our attention on other-regarding
virtues and their connection to social epistemology is needed to appreciate insights beyond
traditional analytic epistemology, in which, “Discussion of an agent’s epistemic community would
arise only insofar as the members of this community are potential sources of knowledge via
testimony, or as the presence of an epistemic community has an impact on attributions of
knowledge or justification to the agent”.70
Kawall suggests that developing both self-regarding and other-regarding epistemic virtues
may be important aspects of “epistemic flourishing” and that a person who does not develop both
sorts of epistemic virtues may be “a deficient epistemic agent”.71 Illustrating this point, he argues
that “A good epistemic agent wants to contribute to knowledge…More generally, we wish to share
knowledge and our views with others in our communities. The traits which help us in providing
knowledge to others could thus be seen as epistemic virtues”.72 This is especially the case in
specific areas of human endeavour. For example, contribution to knowledge is the central goal (or
one of the central goals) of the university, whether that is through the support of research or through
teaching. Certain professions, such as the medical profession and the legal profession, take
contribution to knowledge to be part of their core missions. Moving away from other-regarding
institutional and professional roles, individual citizens in their daily life frequently seek to share
their knowledge and views with members of their community. These desires and purposes are all
part of a picture of virtue epistemology that falls under Kawall’s proposals.
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Such an argument shows that other-regarding epistemic virtues are fundamentally social
and that their development is properly studied under both the headings of social epistemology and
virtue epistemology. Other-regarding epistemic virtues may be the key capacities that epistemic
agents need to develop in order to make positive contributions to the veritistic excellence of social
institutions and social practices. While individual agents must indeed develop self-regarding
epistemic virtues so that they can acquire the individual knowledge and capabilities needed to have
something to contribute to the knowledge of a community, it is other-regarding epistemic virtues
that will allow individuals to contribute to the epistemic reliability, power, fecundity, speed, and
efficiency of social institutions and social practices.73 Thus, the other-regarding virtue of honesty
promotes the epistemic reliability and efficiency of a social institution or social practice. An
awareness of the primacy of other-regarding virtues in social epistemology allows us to pursue the
link between social epistemology and virtue epistemology in an effective way.
Certain other-regarding epistemic virtues and insights can be expected to receive a great
deal of attention regardless of whether any scholarly refocusing in the direction of virtue
epistemology and social epistemology had taken place. These virtues are relevant to traditional
epistemic inquiry. For example, honesty has always been a factor in epistemic analysis, including
in epistemic problems related to experts and witness testimony. Other virtues include creativity
and integrity,74 which can also readily be seen as relevant to classic epistemological questions.
However, many other valuable pieces of the epistemic puzzle are not essentially related to classical
problems in epistemology and thus would likely continue to go underdeveloped without
developments in epistemology that focus on intellectual virtue and recognize virtue orientation.
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Kawall mentions some of these virtues and insights. They include sincerity, “duties to develop the
skills of a good teacher, and…duties to develop the skills of a good listener (and critic) insofar as
these help other epistemic agents to articulate and examine their own beliefs carefully and
lucidly”.75 These elements of epistemic agency are underexplored but Kawall argues that they may
“be as essential to being a good epistemic agent as having reliable sensory faculties or good reading
skills”.76 Indeed they are essential for the task of being a good epistemic agent because our
individual and collective epistemic success is tied to the epistemic development of our community.
Of great benefit to my approach in this dissertation is the practical and personal quality of
many of the underexplored other-regarding epistemic virtues. Rather than being abstract notions,
such as epistemic warrant or epistemic power,77 they are highly personal basic elements of the
lawyer’s intellectual and moral life within the social institutions and practices of law. Being a good
listener, for example, is crucial to the role of the lawyer, as it is to the role of the judge, members
of a jury, or to performing several other roles within the legal system. Good listening is essential
to acquiring and synthesizing information78 and for giving others the time and space to articulate
their own views. Listening is a skill that must be actively done by a person; it is not a property that
a person or thing simply has.
A crucial point about self-regarding and other-regarding virtues is that the categories
should not be used too strictly, and that the main characterizing trait of a virtue will tend to
determine the way in which the virtue is categorized under this scheme. In many cases, possibly
even in most cases, it will be possible to discuss the other-regarding benefits that self-regarding
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virtues provide and vice versa. In the case of ethical virtues, for example, while prudence is
discussed as a self-regarding virtue, it is also easy to see how other people would benefit from a
person’s prudence. On a global level, consider the fact that the entire world would have benefitted
from a more prudent financial sector when it comes to the practices that caused the financial crisis
of the late 2000s. Although the financial sector’s other-regarding failures were more egregious
than its self-regarding failures, the self-regarding failures are also noteworthy. On a local level,
entire communities benefit when households exercise prudence in managing their money and
resources well. Similarly, in the case of intellectual virtues, while intellectual courage can be
discussed as a self-regarding virtue,79 it is easy to see the way in which others benefit from a
person’s exercise of intellectual courage. A person’s exercise of intellectual courage may introduce
novel ideas to a situation, thus challenging and enriching the epistemic position of a group.
Considering examples from the other direction, an individual may benefit from the exercise
of other-regarding moral virtues such as generosity. Spending time volunteering in a soup kitchen
may develop character traits, such as industriousness and dependability, that also make for
personal success. Similarly, again, in the case of intellectual virtues, while honesty is discussed as
an other-regarding virtue, it is not difficult to imagine ways in which the exercise of honesty
benefits oneself, either by producing positive goods or by preventing certain types of negative
results (e.g., negative consequences that arise for being dishonest). Honesty creates an atmosphere
of trust in which individuals benefit from richer interactions, additional opportunities brought
about by the demonstration of trustworthiness, etc. These interactions can include opportunities to
develop one’s knowledge and expertise. One can lose these types of opportunities and even be
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sanctioned in certain circumstances because of the lack of honesty. Thus, there are substantial
epistemic benefits that accrue to the self by the exercise of honesty.
None of these nuances in my introduction of the idea of virtue orientation mean that the
categories of self-regarding and other-regarding virtues are unhelpful. Prudence and intellectual
courage do indeed primarily benefit the self. Generosity and honesty are especially directed
towards the benefit of others. Thus, the descriptors “self-regarding” and “other-regarding”
illuminate the orientations of virtues, but the categories should be applied flexibly and with the
understanding that complexity always lies beneath any account that can be given of epistemic
virtues, including ones provided in this dissertation.
Having a flexible understanding of “self-regarding” and “other-regarding” also has benefits
in allowing for more nuanced explanations of models of lawyering and difficult situations that
lawyers face as a result of the role-differentiation of the legal profession. The terms are thus best
taken as signals, not straitjackets.
(3.4) The Epistemic Virtues of Individuals & Communities
Aretaic approaches to epistemology can benefit from a consideration of their social aspects.
Of “human cognitive interdependence”, Lorraine Code says that “in most of the more complex
and interesting things one might claim to know, even within one’s own field of expertise, one is
dependent upon the cognitive authority of other, better informed, and/or differently specialized
knowers whose intellectual virtue clearly matters”.80 I will first suggest that the practice of
epistemic virtue by individuals can improve the knowledge production of social institutions and
practices. Second, and leading into a virtue epistemic understanding of the adversarial system
explored in Section (4) of this dissertation, I will introduce some ways in which social settings can
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sometimes complicate conceptions of, and the practice of, epistemic virtues themselves, as well as
the way in which the practice of epistemic virtues and vices agglomerate to the benefit or detriment
of social practices and institutions.
If our normative epistemic assessment inquires into the capacity of social institutions and
practices to produce true beliefs, then we may ask how epistemic virtues contribute to this aim.
This is the application of Goldman’s veritistic account of social epistemology to virtue
epistemology. More specifically, the aim is to ask whether the practice of epistemic virtues/vices
by individual cognizers improves/worsens a social institution’s/practice’s achievement for
Goldman’s veritistic standards: (1) reliability, (2) power, (3) fecundity, (4) speed, and (5)
efficiency.81 Without turning to a sustained treatment of this topic, we can observe strong
indications that virtuous cognition on the part of individuals who are part of social institutions, and
who engage in social practices, will tend to improve the capacity of social institutions/practices to
generate true beliefs. Relatedly, vicious cognition will undermine the ability of social
institutions/practices to generation true beliefs.
Cognizers who are virtuous on reliabilist grounds will have faculty-virtues, such as
perceiving ideas and events accurately and the ability to recall relevant information, by which the
cognizers are able to perform the more technical aspects of knowledge acquisition, production,
and dissemination. Perceiving ideas accurately and having a good memory, for example is one
way in which an individual can make a positive contribution to the epistemic reliability of a social
institution or practice, i.e., to “the ratio of truths to total number of beliefs” a social institution or
“a practice would foster”.82 To consider just one type of benefit, when individuals have better
memories, that is likely to increase the number of true beliefs and reduce the number of false
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beliefs that are generated by social institutions and practices that involve witnesses giving
testimony about past events. Granted, as discussed earlier,83 reliabilist faculties will not always be
used for intrinsically good purposes. Though skills may have a strong association with certain
intrinsic goods, it is possible to deploy many skills for ethically and epistemically neutral or bad
purposes. Even so, many responsibilist virtues, including accurate perception and good memory,
will have strong associations with the epistemic good.
Cognizers who are virtuous on responsibilist grounds will have trait-virtues such as
conscientiousness (by which they work diligently to promote the acquisition of knowledge) and
open-mindedness (by which they consider ideas beyond those with which they have become
comfortable). Considering the latter of the two virtues, since open-mindedness increases the
consideration given to different ideas, the practice of open-mindedness by individuals can also
increase the epistemic power of a social institution or practice, i.e., the “the ability of a practice to
help cognizers find and believe true answers to the questions that interest them”.84 Conversely, the
intellectual vice of closed-mindedness might undermine a social institution’s epistemic power,
speed (the relative amount of time that a practice takes to arrive at true beliefs),85 and efficiency
(the cost of acquiring true beliefs) by deterring consideration of new ideas.86 Related to openmindedness, intellectual courage may be an important virtue for anyone wishing to add to the
epistemic fecundity, i.e., the degree to which true beliefs are widely produced,87 of a social
institution or practice. Intellectual courage can be the crucial step by which cognizers overcome
barriers to the spread of knowledge.
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Further insight can be gained about the contribution that epistemic virtues make to veritistic
achievement by describing the practice self-regarding intellectual virtues and other-regarding
intellectual virtues in relation to social institutions and practices. Through this line of thought, we
can understand the extent to which epistemic benefits directed towards the self and directed
towards others increase the ability of social institutions to arrive at true beliefs and to satisfy
Goldman’s veritistic criteria. Increasing the veritistic excellence of social institutions/practices
may require the honing of certain epistemic virtues that are oriented towards the epistemic benefit
of particular cognizers. As the practice of epistemic virtue is oriented towards epistemic others,
especially towards key epistemic others for those social institutions and practices, the practice of
other-regarding epistemic virtues is likely to provide an epistemic benefit to these institutions and
practices.
Investigating the way in which the practice of epistemic virtues contributes to the veritistic
excellence of social institutes and practices provides fertile ground on which to consider the ideas
of social epistemology and virtue epistemology together. The achievement of veritistic excellence
by social institutions/practice is made into an aim of virtue epistemology. To some extent,
however, this uses the newer theory of virtue epistemology to return to the older ways of
epistemology that is focused on meeting abstract conditions for the possession of knowledge. That
is to say that it looks at the aretaic in terms of the fulfillment of abstract conditions for the
possession and promotion of knowledge. I do not reject this aim. However, I have in mind the
study of integrations between social and aretaic epistemology that are more in line with the
conceptions of the latter. Such an endeavour would involve consideration of the way in which
social settings can complicate conceptions of, and the practice of, epistemic virtues and vices, as
well as the way in epistemic virtues work together in social practices and institutions.
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Recognizing that communities (and I would also argue processes/activities) can have
epistemic virtues is of great relevance in providing an epistemology of legal ethics. This insight is
a natural result of studying social epistemology and virtue epistemology together. Moreover, it
adds a level of complexity to the social understanding of virtue epistemology because, as the virtue
epistemologist Christopher Hookway notes, there are epistemic virtues of communities, such as
“facilitating debate and regulating the progress of investigations—which may not be reducible to
the virtues of the individuals who belong to them”.88 The potential split between part and whole
allows for each to have complex needs and for the two to exist in counterintuitive relationships.
Hookway’s statement brings forward an epistemic logic that is similar to the epistemic logic of the
adversarial model of adjudication. Continuing in this vein of thought, he says that the irreducibility
of the epistemic virtues of communities to the epistemic virtues of individuals “complicates what
we can say about individual virtues”.89
To illustrate these complications, Hookway gives the example of the epistemic virtues of
a small community—namely, a research team. Without recognizing the ability of individual virtues
and community virtues to diverge, one might think that individuals’ practice of epistemic virtues
always helps the team epistemically and individuals’ practice of epistemic vices always harms the
team epistemically. On the contrary, Hookway says that a research team “may benefit from having
some members who are dogmatic, and unwilling to take on board new possibilities, while others
are much more ready to take seriously seemingly wild speculations”.90 He has taken two extremes

88

Hookway, supra note 29 at 189.
Ibid.
90
Ibid.
89

103

virtuous critical thinking and said that, “What would be vices in individual inquirers may be virtues
when possessed by members of a team”.91
On a team, where members who exemplify the vices of dogmatism and unwariness can
check one another and where there may also be members who practice the virtue in between the
vices, the collective result can be more than an aggregate of vices. The dogmatic team members
might keep the team from pursuing fruitless but exciting avenues of research and may be a forceful
critical voice checking deviations from their dogmatic view. Additionally, to the extent that the
views of the dogmatic team members conflict with one another, the dogmatic members can check
one another’s interpretations and understandings. The team members who are prone to take wild
speculations seriously may spur the team to consider new and exciting ideas, beyond what their
existing approaches could conceive. The practice of vices can actually contribute to the virtue of
the team. Previewing what I will say later about the adversarial system of adjudication, the social
virtue of the team may be found in the clash of ideas between individuals who are presently
practicing vices, or what might be understood as vices absent the social context.
Social dimensions thus allow for dynamics between virtues that are beyond what an
individual can experience. What does the logic of the adversarial system of adjudication and of
various models of lawyering within the adversarial system mean for the individual’s practice of

Ibid. See also Feng Shi et al, “The Wisdom of Polarized Crowds” (2019) 3:4 Nature Human Behaviour 329. They
found that there can be benefits to having political polarization among contributors to collaborative work. Such
polarization is often cast in a largely negative light that is expected reduce the potential for fruitful intellectual
collaboration. However, the political polarization of collaborators practicing intellectual vices motivated by their
political preferences can lead to an epistemically virtuous community collaboration. The authors studied collaboration
on Wikipedia articles about contested topics. Politically polarized editors would more frequently call on other editors
to abide by Wikipedia’s neutral point of view policy, ibid at 8–9. The neutral point of view policy says that, “All
encyclopedic content on the platform must be written from a neutral point of view (NPOV), which means
representing fairly, proportionately, and, as far as possible, without editorial bias, all the significant views that have
been published by reliable sources on a topic” [emphasis in original], “Wikipedia: Neutral point of view” (last
modified
5
June
2021),
online:
Wikipedia
<en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Wikipedia:Neutral_point_of_view&oldid=1027050549>
[perma.cc/GEX7GUPU].
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the epistemic virtue of honesty and for the legal community’s practice of the epistemic virtue of
honesty? The complex relationship between individual and community virtues is explored below92
as I discuss the epistemic roles and virtues of lawyering in the context of the adversarial model of
adjudication. This relationship has wide-ranging relevance to all virtue epistemic analysis of law
and legal ethics.
None of this is to say that communities should seek to widely promote the individual
epistemic vice that works in specific social contexts. Considering the example of the research team,
while the presence of some dogmatic members may benefit the community overall, there is a point
of diminishing returns and a point at which the proliferation of the epistemic vice among individual
members of the community will reduce the epistemic virtue of the community. Thus, while
epistemic communities may benefit from the epistemic vices of individuals, it does not follow that
epistemic communities should promote individual vices such as dogmatism. Nor does it follow,
either, that epistemic communities should refrain from attempting to change the epistemically
vicious behaviour of individuals, by encouraging individuals to either simply give up the epistemic
vice or begin to practice the associated epistemic virtue. It would be epistemically vicious for a
community to purposely keep an individual in the practice of epistemic vice, or to fail to present
the individual with the encouragement and support to practice epistemic virtue, merely so that the
community can benefit at the individual’s expense.
The relationship between social epistemology and virtue epistemology plays a central role
in applying virtue epistemology to the social context of lawyering. The remainder of this
dissertation will primarily focus on the way in which social settings complicate conceptions of,
and the practice of, epistemic virtues and vices, as well as interactions between epistemic virtues
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and vices. This project, out of the approaches discussed in the present section to the relationship
between the aretaic and the social, allows for more focus on the epistemic life of the individual
actor and notions of taking responsibility. Such endeavours can be done in the language of virtue
epistemology, rather than merely applying virtue epistemology to achieve more traditional
epistemic aims of meeting the conditions for having knowledge.
(3.5) An Objection – Is This Just Ethics?
Jason Kawall considers an important objection to his proposal about virtue orientation that
can be broadened out to virtue epistemology generally and that also applies against my proposals
in this dissertation. With respect to the key ideas in Kawall’s work, the objection contends that “all
other-regarding virtues or duties fall within the realm of ethics” 93 and do not also fall within any
other realm. If this is the case, then all of Kawall’s other-regarding virtues would be ethical virtues
rather than epistemic virtues. More broadly, this objection, if successful, takes away the ideas used
by virtue epistemology and allocates them to another field—morality. Moreover, it says that virtue
epistemology does not add any insight to these ideas that morality is not already doing or cannot
also do.
Similarly, one could argue that my proposal in this dissertation about the use of virtue
epistemology in law is actually just dealing with ethical considerations about lawyering, and that
I am not bringing forward any distinctively epistemic insights. This objection suggests itself quite
readily in legal ethics because many virtues that I have discussed thus far, especially otherregarding virtues,94 are found in the professional ethics codes of the legal profession. One could
argue that classifying other-regarding virtues merely as ethical requirements of the legal profession
(and not also classifying them under epistemology) sufficiently describes other-regarding virtues
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and duties. Hence, one might ask “is this just ethics?” Is virtue epistemology—or wide swaths of
virtue epistemology—just ethics?
This objection against Kawall’s virtue epistemology, and against the use of virtue
epistemology in the philosophy of lawyering, is targeted against other-regarding virtues. It would
be more difficult to run this objection in relation to self-regarding epistemic virtues, which often
either lack (or have minimal) ethical aspects or simply have more distinct epistemic aspects that
stand out in contrast to moral virtues that may also apply to the situation. Other-regarding virtues
do not contrast with moral virtues as much. Granted, some self-regarding epistemic virtues may
have ethical dimensions. For example, the epistemic virtue of conscientiousness may have
implications for what some moral theorists might argue are our self-regarding moral duties to
develop our own capacities rather than leading an indolent life. However, numerous self-regarding
epistemic virtues, such as circumspection, creativity, foresight, and perceptiveness are more
clearly epistemic. It would be difficult to make the case that these self-regarding epistemic virtues
are also moral virtues at all, never mind being purely moral virtues. This may be because otherregarding virtues are, by definition, about our treatment of others (a key aspect of morality),
whereas some self-regarding epistemic virtues do not raise the issue of treatment of others at all.
Often, self-regarding epistemic virtues are better described as skills/capacities, thus being
more aligned with the reliabilist side of virtue epistemology. By contrast, other-regarding virtues,
which are often better described as character traits, fall within the bounds of the responsibilist side
of virtue epistemology.95 It is not clear how ethics—a normative field—would purport to be a
better classification than reliabilist virtue epistemology for the exercise of capacities that largely
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aim at descriptive goals, such as the acquisition of factual knowledge. Thus, the objection that
Kawall considers to his own views (and that I am also applying against my own ideas in this
dissertation) strikes more directly against responsibilist virtue epistemology (which recognizes
responsibility for developing traits)96 than reliabilist virtue epistemology (which need not give the
same recognition to notions of responsibility).
Kawall’s reply to the criticism of his account of epistemic virtues is instructive for
responsibilist virtue epistemology generally and for a responsibilist virtue epistemology of law.
He demonstrates that the pertinence of ethics to a topic does not preclude there also being distinctly
epistemic considerations about that same topic that cannot be explained by ethics alone. Moreover,
if positive reasons can be offered for the presence of considerations that cannot be explained by
ethics alone, then it must be recognized that a subject matter is more than “just ethics”, i.e., is not
solely within the domain of ethics. Ethics is thus part of the discussion around the topics being
considered but cannot encompass the whole discussion. This is a positive case for the recognition
of epistemic considerations about other-regarding virtues alongside ethical considerations about
those virtues. It is also a case for identifying the distinctly epistemic and responsibilist aspects of
any topic.
Kawall proposes an analogy between epistemology and another field—aesthetics—that
also interacts with morality and that may face the “is this just ethics” objection. As with
epistemology, the application of aesthetics to a topic can be contested such that there are questions
about whether aesthetics applies, morality applies, or both apply. However, when this question
arises, aesthetics can readily offer considerations that cannot be explained by morality alone.
Kawall asks us to look at the example of a member of an orchestra. 97 He lists the other-regarding
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duties that a member of an orchestra has, including “to follow the conductor, to adjust her dynamics
as appropriate to the other players and the music being performed, and so on”.98 Kawall recognizes
that these other-regarding duties may be “both aesthetic and ethical: aesthetic insofar as they lead
to a better performance, ethical insofar as they show a proper respect for others”.99 Importantly,
Kawall argues that it is implausible that the other-regarding duties that apply to this example could
be described as purely ethical duties. The other-regarding duties are vital to the achievement of
certain aesthetic goods, such as “more complex harmonies [and] a broader palette of tones…”100
Thus, a musician who abides by these other-regarding duties has opportunities to achieve a wider
range of things aesthetically than a musician who does not abide by the other-regarding duties.
These are aesthetic considerations that extend beyond the domain of morality, thus justifying the
dual classification of an orchestra performance as ethical and aesthetic.101 If we find Kawall’s case
convincing, then we can conclude that, even if all other-regarding duties do fall within the realm
of ethics, it does not thereby follow that they do not also belong to other disciplines as well.
Moreover, a positive case can be made that other-regarding duties also fall under other headings,
in the same way that Kawall made an affirmative case for aesthetic other-regarding virtues.
A similar reply could be given in favour of a responsibilist epistemology of lawyering and
would perhaps be even stronger than Kawall’s musician analogy. That is to say, there is possibly
a stronger positive case to be made that other-regarding virtues that pertain to the practice of law
are both moral and epistemic virtues, rather than merely moral virtues. The reason for this is that
other-regarding virtues play an even more central role in law than in aesthetics. Although a
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musician can achieve additional aesthetic excellence by respecting other-regarding aesthetic
virtues, a musician could also achieve aesthetic excellence simply by performing as a solo artist.
S/he may choose never to exercise other-regarding aesthetic/moral virtues or completely lack the
opportunity to exercise these virtues and yet still achieve aesthetic excellence. To take it to an
extreme, a hermit with a musical instrument (even if the instrument is his/her own voice) could
make beautiful/stirring music on his/her own, without ever harmonizing with any other musicians
or ever being heard by an audience. Even so, the fact that musicians can (and can choose to)
achieve aesthetic goods by collaborating with one another is sufficient for Kawall’s purposes, in
showing that a musician’s other-regarding virtues may also be aesthetic virtues, in addition to
being moral virtues. To refute the claim that the other-regarding virtues that a musician practices
are not merely moral virtues, Kawall only needs to address cases in which other-regarding virtues
are applicable.
This argument works even more so in the case of law because the existence of a legal
system and epistemic co-operation with other legal practitioners are required for someone to
function as a lawyer (or to achieve any good produced by a legal system) at all. Contracts, advice,
negotiations, pleadings, motions, the presentation of evidence, etc., are meant to be (and only make
sense functionally) as interactions between individuals, whether other litigants, third parties, and
officers of the court. A person who succeeds at the other-regarding virtues and duties of lawyering
is not only a more ethical person but engages in epistemically better legal practice. S/he advances
essential epistemic excellences, goals, and logic (e.g., adversarial logic) that belong to the field of
law. These epistemic excellences contribute to the broader normative, moral, social and political
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benefits that governance by law gives to human societies.102 In contrast, a person who fails
completely at the other-regarding epistemic virtues of a lawyer fails completely at the work of a
lawyer and in the task of contributing to the possibilities that humans are given when they subject
their conduct to guidance by a system of law. With this, we see that the form of Kawall’s reply to
the “is this just ethics?” objection is even stronger in the case of legal practitioners than it is in the
case of musicians. Music and other aesthetic achievements can be practiced individually. Some of
law’s benefits (e.g., fact-finding) are epistemic. Lawyers have a vital role in achieving these
epistemic benefits. Those epistemic benefits, or any other benefits of law, cannot be achieved
individually. Other-regarding epistemic virtues in law thus do properly fall under the heading of
epistemology and are ripe for analysis under rubrics such as Goldman’s veritistic social
epistemology and the virtue epistemology of authors such a Kawall and Baehr.
Beyond being able to answer the objection just presented, the foregoing arguments
distinguishing virtue epistemology and ethics highlight some essential insights for the remainder
of this dissertation. Classifying a certain behaviour as epistemically virtuous or as epistemically
vicious does not automatically lead to a classification of that behaviour as ethically virtuous or
ethically vicious. A person could be epistemically virtuous while not being ethically virtuous, e.g.,
being honest with someone who you know intends to do something unethical with the information.
A person could also be epistemically malevolent in pursuing an ethically good result, e.g., lying to
achieve an ethically good result. The inverse is also true. Ethical excellence is not necessarily
epistemic excellence. Ideally, people will be both epistemically virtuous and ethically virtuous in

This argument is related in structure to Fuller’s argument about the internal morality of law, briefly discussed above
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most situations. However, the remainder of this dissertation, especially as it deals with difficult
case studies, recognizes that epistemology and ethics can come apart from one another.
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Part III – Knowledge & Lawyers
We have explored developments in the philosophy of lawyering (historically mostly in
ethics) and developments in epistemology. Throughout, I have mentioned other authors’
application of concepts in ethics and epistemology to lawyers. Ethics can be divided into metaethics, normative ethics, applied ethics; legal ethics falls under the latter. Relatedly, the preceding
parts of this dissertation were meant to explain the normative theory of virtue epistemology.1 I
mentioned lawyers to illustrate ideas, but my primary focus was on articulating approaches to the
study of knowledge. The remainder of this dissertation is focused on the applied epistemology of
lawyering.

(4) A Virtue Epistemology of Lawyering
In Section (4), I articulate my approach to the philosophy of lawyering, based on virtue
epistemology. As stated earlier, I do not eschew existing approaches to the philosophy of
lawyering based in ethics or traditional approaches to epistemology. Thus, I will use insights and
reasoning from fields such as philosophical legal ethics and especially social epistemology.
Nonetheless, in line with the general direction of virtue theory previously explained, the remainder
of this dissertation—whether discussing theories or a case study—aims to articulate a way of being
as a lawyer, rather than a set of abstract norms for lawyers to follow. This project in applied
epistemology can have many important aspects. My focus here is on the intellectual life of the
lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication. Some considerations may need to be modified or
expanded for work that lawyers do outside of the central procedures of the adversarial system (e.g.,

I am using “normative” here to refer to both branch of ethics (between metaethics and applied ethics) and to the
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in transactional or advising situations,2 where the adversarial context is either not present at all or
not fully present/not fully operational).
(4.1) Epistemic Volition – Enemies of the Epistemic Good?
A key aspect of assessing a person’s disposition in relation to virtue (whether epistemic or
ethical) is his/her volition. Does the person want to perform an action that is epistemically or
ethically good? Questions about volition are central to understanding a person’s virtue or vice.
Ayers, who has endorsed a virtue ethics approach to legal ethics, describes virtues as “dispositions
to act and react in the right ways, for the right reasons, and at the right times”.3 Ayers expands,
“Virtues are dispositions to promote intrinsic values well; we can’t say that someone has a virtue
without making a value judgment about the things they do, feel, and believe”.4
Volition can be described in terms of benevolence and malevolence—intending to do good
for its own sake or bad for its own sake. Ethical ideas of benevolence and malevolence are familiar,
but there are epistemic versions as well. The epistemic versions identify basic epistemic
dispositions, including seeking to promote the acquisition of knowledge and seeking to undermine
the acquisition of knowledge. Concern about volition in epistemology is heavily aligned with the
responsibilist school of virtue epistemology.5 The focus is placed on the epistemic decisions made
by agents and the will of agents in relation to knowledge.
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If epistemic benevolence is taken to be the task of promoting the epistemic good for its
own sake, then this is not a volition that can be derived from the lawyering role and/or models of
lawyering. There are rare examples in which the lawyer’s own volitions will transcend the roledifferentiation of the lawyer and even the lawyer’s duties to the client. The most numerous
examples will be found in cause lawyering. A lawyer who makes it his/her cause to seek equal
educational opportunities for marginalized communities may indeed be motivated by a desire to
provide epistemic benefits to the marginalized communities. A lawyer who litigates for the
protection of the freedom of the press and freedom of information laws may be epistemically
benevolent in a similar way. Outside of the litigation context, a lawyer who participates in public
education about law and in community organizing may be said to, in some central way, be seeking
the epistemic benefit of the community. Additionally, one could argue that a defamation lawyer
may be motivated by epistemically benevolent aims. Desiring the epistemic good can go beyond
promoting the acquisition of knowledge. Epistemic benevolence can include the desire to prevent
belief in falsehoods and the practice of epistemic vices, of which defamatory statements are an
excellent example.
However, the commitments above are largely personal to the lawyer. Most generously, the
commitments may be highly correlated with the character of lawyers who practice in certain fields
for certain clients and who become involved in certain types of projects and causes, discussed in
the previous paragraph. The commitments do not arise out of the adversarial and differentiated
lawyering role itself. Coming out of the lawyering role, lawyers pursue the epistemic benefit of
others in service of the legal cause of their client within the adversarial system of adjudication.
The epistemic good may be achieved as part of the adjudicative process but seeking the epistemic
good for the sake of the epistemic good is not built into the role of the lawyer. On the contrary,
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lawyers must frequently oppose the acquisition of knowledge by others, such as with privileged
information, which is vital for trust in the lawyer-client relationship. Lawyers are called upon by
codes of professional conduct and by theories of lawyering (including the one advocated in this
dissertation) to be epistemically virtuous in particular situations, for the benefit of specific parties,
and in service of the adversarial system of adjudication.
I have argued earlier6 that one of the purposes and functions of the adversarial system of
adjudication is to discover truths, such as factual truths. However, the facts that (1) the adjudicative
system seeks the truth and (2) that the lawyer has a vital role within that system, do not lead to the
conclusion that the lawyer himself/herself either has, or is encouraged to have, a will towards the
epistemic good. Agents can have volitions that are different from the good that a system wants to
achieve. Indeed, systems may count on the strategic harnessing of otherwise vicious wills and traits
to create positive outcomes when put through the structures of the system. Some would argue that
capitalism does this with greed.
In the case of lawyers, their reputation for twisting facts and twisting meaning has become
so strong that it is worth asking, especially for the purpose of a dissertation on virtue in
epistemology, whether lawyers are actually opposed to the epistemic good. Doing so will allow us
to understand whether lawyers’ volitions, especially as influenced by their differentiated role,
needs to be counterbalanced or harnessed in special ways to better promote the truth-seeking
function of the whole adjudicative system. The remainder of this subsection will be dedicated to
exploring, whether lawyers are opposed, in the strongest sense, to the epistemic good.
“[M]alevolence is essentially paradigmatically a matter of opposition to the good as such”,
Jason Baehr explains.7 Baehr describes this opposition as being “robustly volitional, active, and
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‘personally deep’”.8 By “robustly volitional”, Baehr means that the opposition is willful and
involves “hostility or contempt for the good”.9 “Active” means that the person makes “attempts to
stop, diminish, undermine, destroy, speak out, or turn others against the good”.10 For the opposition
to be “personally deep”, it must be a core concern of the person, cannot be given up easily, and
must be connected with the person’s view of his/her self.11 Notably, however, Baehr does not think
that malevolence has such a wide scope that it requires the person to oppose the good in all possible
ways. He says that a person can simply oppose some limited part of the good, such as generosity,
and even be inconsistent by wanting other people to be generous towards him/her.12
Baehr defines “opposition to the good as such” in a way that leaves room for quite a wide
range of attitudes towards the good. Inspired by the Satan figure in Milton’s Paradise Lost, Baehr
sees opposition to the good as making the good into one’s enemy,13 coining the term “enemize” to
mean making an enemy of something or someone.14 One way in which Baehr could have defined
“opposition to the good as such” is in terms of non-instrumental opposition to the good. He
considers this when looking at the definition of malice given by the philosopher Robert Merrihew
Adams, which Baehr takes to be the same trait as malevolence and which Adams describes as noninstrumental opposition to the good.15 While recognizing that there will be a great deal of overlap
between making an enemy of something or someone and being non-instrumentally opposed to that
thing or person, Baehr argues that non-instrumental opposition to the good does not cover all of
the ways in which a person could be “opposed to the good as such”. For example, a person might
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instrumentally oppose a thing or person—making that thing or person an enemy—because that
thing or person supports another thing or person that has also been enemized. Baehr thus wants to
include reasoning of the form “the friend of my enemy is my enemy” within his definition of
“opposition to the good as such”.16 Making the good into one’s enemy on an instrumental basis
would thereby count as “opposition to the good as such”.
A crucial distinction that Baehr draws is between impersonal malevolence and personal
malevolence. Impersonal malevolence is opposition to goodness itself as an abstract end, whereas
personal malevolence is opposition to “a person’s or a group of people’s well-being or share in the
good”.17 Impersonal epistemic malevolence involves deeper commitments against the epistemic
good than can be considered in this dissertation. Baehr’s examples of impersonal epistemic
malevolence are of religious malevolent figures (e.g., Satan), whose cosmic missions are broader
than can be achieved by lawyers, Al Pacino films notwithstanding.18 More down to earth, a striking
example that Baehr gives of personal epistemic malevolence is found in the story of Frederick
Douglass, the former-slave, abolitionist, and statesman.19 In his autobiography, Douglass describes
his efforts to learn how to read and write, which had been denied to him as a slave. He describes
the way in which the family to which he belonged (as a slave) would angrily take reading materials,
like newspapers, away from him when they caught him reading. This family is not described as
being opposed to the epistemic goodness of literacy itself, but they were opposed to Frederick
Douglass’, and all slaves’, share in the goodness of literacy. As Baehr describes, the family was
“enemiz[ing] Douglass’s epistemic well-being”.20
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Connecting this example with the focus of this dissertation—legal systems—opposition to
the epistemic wellbeing of slaves was not merely the practice of particular families. Numerous
American states had anti-literacy laws that prohibited the education of slaves.21 These laws directly
attacked the epistemic wellbeing of slaves. Well after the end of slavery, segregation-era laws and
policies limited the educational opportunities of Black people in America.22 Moreover, epistemic
barriers—such as literacy tests that only Black people were required to pass in order to vote—were
erected to continue the oppression of Black people.23 At the very least, these literacy tests (and
other public policies like them), in which one person uses another person’s epistemic oppression—
and other oppression—as an instrument are at least examples of moral malevolence.24 Using
epistemic oppression as a means may also itself be an example of epistemic malevolence.25
The distinction between impersonal epistemic malevolence and personal epistemic
malevolence very quickly brings up questions about whether lawyers engage in either form of
malevolence, especially as a basic requirement of lawyering (including under specific models of
lawyering). The question of impersonal epistemic malevolence is somewhat easier to answer.
Lawyers are not called on to oppose epistemic goodness as an abstract end. No code of professional
conduct, model of lawyering, or professional incentive calls on lawyers to oppose the abstract
notion of epistemic goods.

See generally Christopher M Span, “Learning in Spite of Opposition: African Americans and their History of
Educational Exclusion in Antebellum America” (2005) 131 Counterpoints 26.
22
See generally A’Lelia Robinson Henry, “Perpetuating Inequality: Plessy v. Ferguson and the Dilemma of Black
Access to Public and Higher Education” (1998) 27:1 JL & Educ 27 (explaining the rhetoric in favour of racial
segregation in education, as well as the implementation and effects of racial segregation in education).
23
See generally Natasha N Jones & Miriam F Williams, “Technologies of Disenfranchisement: Literacy Tests and
Black Voters in the US from 1890 to 1965” (2018) 65:4 Technical Communication 371.
24
As the aim of the proponents of these barriers was to deny Black people the right to the political and moral good of
voting.
25
It should also be noted that using another person’s epistemic oppression to deny him/her the political and moral
good of voting likely also has some element of wanting to prevent the oppressed person from changing policies in a
way that would be to his/her own, and his/her community’s, epistemic benefit (e.g., increasing access to education in
oppressed communities).
21
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Personal epistemic malevolence, which opposes “a person’s or a group of people’s wellbeing or share in the good”,26 is another matter. This possibility is especially noteworthy since
Baehr allows for epistemic malevolence to come down to instrumental opposition to the epistemic
good.27 A lawyer might thus be instrumentally opposed to the epistemic good of certain
participants in a legal proceeding because the good of those other participants supports the good
(especially the epistemic good) of a thing or person that has been enemized. Under the adversarial
system of adjudication, especially under the guidance of Lord Brougham’s traditional model of
lawyering, if the legal adversary can be considered to be enemized,28 then it might be concluded
that one engages in epistemic malevolence even by opposing the epistemic good of any person or
group of people whose epistemic benefit would also be to the legal benefit of the adversary in the
case. This would be instrumental personal malevolence.
Before proceeding, it is crucial to recognize that I am not asking whether individual lawyers
are, or have been epistemically malevolent, including while practicing law. Lawyers, like all
epistemic agents, can have epistemically vicious volitions. There are doubtlessly specific lawyers
who were, and are, epistemically malevolent. Such lawyers are likely an exceedingly small
percentage of all lawyers, as they would be an exceedingly small percentage of all people in any
group. In any case, the focus in the present section of this dissertation is not aimed at exploring
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Baehr, supra note 7 at 193.
Above, notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
28
The clear exception to this is the role of the prosecutor in a criminal trial, since the role of the prosecutor is not the
normal adversarial role, but instead involves duties to act “fairly and dispassionately”, Federation of Law Societies of
Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct, FLSC 2019, online (pdf): FLSC <flsc.ca/wpcontent/uploads/2019/11/Model-Code-October-2019.pdf> [perma.cc/U4WA-H2T7] [FLSC Model Code], r 5.1-3
commentary 1. This is in contrast to the defence counsel in a criminal trial, which is given perhaps the most clear
partisan role in all of law, being given the duty to “protect the client as far as possible from being convicted, except
by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction and upon legal evidence sufficient to support a conviction for the offence with
which the client is charged”, ibid, r 5.1-1, commentary 9.
27
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actual cases of epistemic malevolence among lawyers. Instead, the aim is to consider the concepts
and norms in the legal profession that could are relevant to epistemic malevolence.
At first blush, it may look as if codes of professional conduct require lawyers to be
instrumentally personally malevolent. The most consequential example is that lawyers seem to
oppose the epistemic good of the other side’s lawyer because giving an epistemic benefit to the
opposing lawyer supports the legal interests of the opposing litigant. Additionally, lawyers have
complicated epistemic relationships with the trier of fact. On one hand, the lawyer supports the
epistemic good of the trier of fact because the lawyer wants the trier of fact to obtain knowledge
about facts that are legally beneficial to the client. Such beneficial facts might be presented through
testimony, documents, etc. On the other hand, the lawyer opposes the epistemic good of the trier
of fact when the trier of fact can gain an epistemic benefit that will benefit the adversary in the
legal process. Zealous advocacy requires lawyers to assert legal rights that keep pieces of evidence
(such as privileged documents or evidence that is obtained inappropriately by the legal adversary)
from being seen by the trier of fact; an important goal is to keep the legal adversary from gaining
an epistemic benefit or legal advantage that could be prevented from being acquired. This is the
difference between the ways in which lawyers are expected to treat positive evidence and negative
evidence.29 Lawyers must seek to introduce all positive evidence, while opposing the introduction
of negative evidence (where a legal basis exists for opposing the introduction of negative
evidence). Sometimes, an effect way of opposing the epistemic good is to give some, but not all,
information.
Even outside of a direct litigation context, lawyers obtain confidential information that, if
revealed, could be to the benefit of numerous parties and stakeholders in the wider society (e.g.,

29

Above in Section (2.2) at notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
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information about a client company polluting beyond what is allowed by environmental
regulations). Receiving such information would be to the epistemic benefit of parties outside of
the company and could also turn into the legal benefit of these third parties if the third parties were
to receive confidential information that supports a claim that they have against the lawyer’s client.
Despite (or perhaps rather because) revealing the information would be to the epistemic (and legal)
benefit of third parties, the lawyer is bound by confidentiality to keep from revealing such
information. The lawyer opposes the epistemic good that could be done to these third parties by
acquiring the information. Thus, it appears that there are numerous ways in which basic lawyering
duties oblige the lawyer to be personally epistemically malevolent in an instrumental way,
opposing other people’s share in the epistemic good (i.e., oppose their acquisition of knowledge)
in order to pursue (or protect) the client’s legal interests against (or from) the legal adversary.
The expected judgment that would arise out of classifying lawyerly behaviour as epistemic
malevolence is that being epistemically malevolent is a negative thing about lawyers. However,
lawyers may actually fit a very narrowly tailored epistemic status that allows for a positive reading
of epistemic malevolence. In the background of his discussion of epistemic malevolence, Baehr
allows for a volitional status that has a complicated relationship with the basic workings of virtue
epistemology. He says that he wants to allow for the possibility that epistemic malevolence may
not always be an epistemic vice.30 Epistemic malevolence might be “driven by a sufficiently
epistemically appropriate ultimate motivation, such that it is not really an intellectual vice”.31
Perhaps lawyers fit such a niche role. Their role in the legal system may call on lawyers to be
epistemically malevolent—especially in relation to the legal adversary, but also possibly to the
adjudicator, and third parties—because the legal system’s ultimate motivation is the discovery of
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See Baehr, supra note 7 at 190, n 2.
Ibid.
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truth via the adversarial system of adjudication. Perhaps the adversarial system of adjudication
works of the basis that epistemic malevolence is necessary on the part of adversaries. Lawyers
may need to enemize the epistemic good of the adversary to serve their own client’s legal interests.
While lawyers do have a complicated relationship with the epistemic good, it would be a
mistake to say that, by design or because of any legal or professional norms of conduct, lawyers
are required or encouraged to be personally epistemically malevolent, even in an instrumental way.
Lawyers are not asked to be epistemically malevolent in a negative sense or in the niche positive
sense that Baehr allows. Neither codes of professional conduct nor models of lawyering call on
lawyers to enemize the epistemic good itself or the epistemic good of other people. Indeed, lawyers
are required to make honest disclosures as part of discovery processes.32 Adversaries collaborate
too much to be epistemically malevolent even towards one another; they benefit one another too
much in service of the adversarial system’s goals to be epistemically malevolent. Describing legal
work as requiring personal instrumental epistemic malevolence fails to appreciate the role,
including the epistemic role, of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication and the means
by which this system purports to pursue truth. Returning to a key concept from social
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See American Bar Association, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA, 2019, online: ABA
<www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/mod
el_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents/> [perma.cc/5WED-59ZP] [ABA Model Rules], r 3.4, “A
lawyer shall not: (a) unlawfully obstruct another party’s access to evidence or unlawfully alter, destroy or conceal a
document or other material having potential evidentiary value. A lawyer shall not counsel or assist another person to
do any such act…(d) in pretrial procedure…fail to make reasonably diligent effort to comply with a legally proper
discovery request by an opposing party”; ibid, r 3.4, commentary 2, “Documents and other items of evidence are often
essential to establish a claim or defense. Subject to evidentiary privileges, the right of an opposing party, including
the government, to obtain evidence through discovery or subpoena is an important procedural right. The exercise of
that right can be frustrated if relevant material is altered, concealed or destroyed”; FLSC Model Code, supra note 28,
r 5.1-2, “When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must not:…(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence
the course of justice by offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false or deceptive
affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed or otherwise assisting in any fraud, crime or illegal conduct”. One
could also cite the more general duty of candour that lawyers have to the tribunal, which applies to the lawyer’s work
in an “ancillary proceeding conducted pursuant to the tribunal’s adjudicative authority, such as a deposition”, ABA
Model Rules, r 3.3, commentary 2. See also FLSC Model Code, supra note 28, r 5.1-1 (the lawyer’s duties as an
advocate, including the duty of candour owed to the tribunal).
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epistemology, the volitional status of the lawyer cannot be assessed apart from the lawyer’s role
in the epistemic division of labour found within legal systems.33 The adversarial system of
adjudication requires lawyers to be partisan, not opposed to the good. The adversarial system exists
with the assumption that the legal adversary will also have a lawyer articulating its position in a
partisan way.
Codes of professional conduct recognize this as well. For its part, the ABA explains, “The
[ABA] Rules presuppose a larger legal context shaping the lawyer’s role. That context includes
court rules and statutes relating to matters of licensure, laws defining specific obligations of
lawyers and substantive and procedural law in general”.34 The special context gives meaning to
rules that require lawyers to behave in ways that would not be in line with normal expectations
about promoting the epistemic good. In the case of the examples considered above, we are looking
at lawyer-client confidentiality and must be aware of the special context and special role that
supports this obligation. In lawyering, the partisan needs of the lawyering role depend on the ability
of the client to trust the lawyer enough to freely share information about the case with the lawyer.
The legal system does not exist to oppose the epistemic good of anybody; it does, however, require
participants to play counterintuitive roles, including keeping confidential information that could
benefit other people.35 Playing such a role is not the same as enemizing the epistemic good of the
opposing party or of third parties.
The argument that lawyers are called to be malevolent fails in another more substantial
way, even excluding the fact that lawyers practice in a special context. At a basic level, keeping
confidences, even outside of a professional context, is not opposition to the epistemic good. The
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Some social epistemic analysis of the adversarial system of adjudication is provided above in Section (2.2).
ABA Model Rules, supra note 32, Preamble and Scope, commentary 15.
35
See a detailed explanation of the lawyer’s special role in the adversarial system of adjudication below in Section
(4.2).
34
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epistemic good does not require the end of privacy, or that all things be known by all people. This
is all the more so in many professional contexts, where a range of epistemic goods, and other
goods, depend on the keeping of confidence by a professional. Typically, confidentiality
encourages the free sharing of information between the client and the (non-legal) professional so
that the professional may assist the client in the pursuit of a goal. Sometimes there are entire
bundles of goods that are pursued under the protection of different kinds of confidentiality or
promises of discretion. The professional’s confidentiality thus facilitates the client’s performance
of an other-regarding epistemic good—freely sharing information with the professional—which
serves another good that may or may not have further epistemic elements, such as medical
treatment or other advice.
In the legal context, the lawyer’s own ability to acquire information from the client and to
present that information for the epistemic benefit of adjudicators and other observers depends on
the ability of the client to trust that the lawyer will keep the client’s confidences. A lawyer who
protects client confidences is not, merely in virtue of not sharing knowledge as widely as possible,
personally epistemically malevolent, showing contempt for another person’s, or group of people’s,
participation in the epistemic good. Lawyering is complex, dissonant, even discomforting, but it
is not (epistemically) malevolent.
(4.2) Epistemic Role-Differentiation in the Adversarial System
Popular criticisms of lawyers often portray lawyers as stretching the truth and lying. Even
from a scholarly perspective, criticizing dishonesty among lawyers, John Humbach says, “The
lawyer’s skill is to weave stories that are false out of statements that are true”.36 This dissertation
just considered the question of whether lawyers are, and are called to be, epistemically malevolent.
John A Humbach, “The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An Essay on Honesty, ‘Lawyer Honesty’ and
Public Trust in the Legal System” (1999) 20:1 Pace L Rev 93 at 94. Humbach goes on to criticize traditional lawyering
on this basis.
36
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At the opposite end, lawyers and the legal profession hold themselves out to be defenders of truth
and even openness about the truth, especially about their own client’s account of the facts or even
economic and social phenomena, when their client is an institution. Both images contain insights
about lawyers,37 but a full picture of the lawyer’s epistemic role requires consideration of the
lawyer’s role within the broader system of which s/he is a part. Lawyers do have a vital role in
improving the wider community’s, and the legal community’s, epistemic position. Even as the
lawyer provides epistemic benefits to the community, the benefits accrue to the community in a
way that needs explanation beyond the idea that lawyers practice epistemic virtues.
Adversarial legal systems require participants to perform specific roles in order for the
legal systems to perform their broader functions of determining the facts of the case and applying
the law to the facts.38 At the most basic level, the way in which the adversarial system of
adjudication is supposed to work is that the competing parties present evidence and arguments that
support their own position in the dispute that is being litigated.39 The judge, and possibly a jury,
behave as disinterested parties, receiving the competing evidence and arguments and deciding the
case on the merits (making legal and factual findings that are assigned to their roles).40 The process,
Sometimes with rhetorical aims in mind, in Humbach’s case, and other times for the sake of exploring a wide range
of possibilities, in my case considering epistemic malevolence above in this dissertation.
38
I am simplifying the process, focusing on what the adversarial purports to do, rather than describing all of its nuances
or political, sociological, and other insights about what the adversarial system of adjudication does in practice.
39
See American Bar Association, ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct, as
amended 1980, Chicago: ABA, 1981, EC (Ethical Considerations) 7-19 (explaining the partisan role of the lawyer in
presenting a case before neutral arbiter). This code is no longer in force, but the reasoning that it expresses about the
adversarial system remains. In this section on the “Duty of the Lawyer to the Adversary System of Justice”, the code
says, says of the lawyer’s partisan role in the adversarial system, “The duty of a lawyer to his client and his duty to
the legal system are the same; to represent his client zealously within the bounds of the law”.
40
Judges, of course, take a more active role than juries because judges must manage the legal process itself, deciding
questions such as the admissibility of evidence. My thanks to Kate Tucsa for raising the way in which jurors come to
the cognitive activities that are part of trials. Jurors’ epistemic role in trials are among the least normatively
differentiated from the moral and epistemic standards that apply to life outside of the adversarial litigation process.
That is to say that the things that are virtuous for jurors to do inside of trials are also largely things that are virtuous to
do outside of trials (e.g., attentiveness, fair-mindedness, critical thinking, and reasoning). However, jurors experience
among the highest degree of differentiation (other than perhaps a non-expert witness giving testimony) between the
degree of difficulty involved in virtuously performing their role in a trial and being ethical and epistemically virtuous
in their everyday lives. Epistemic actors such as lawyers, judges, and expert witnesses have relevant training and
37
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in totality, purports to obtain knowledge about the facts of a case by relying on a contest in which
partisans act for their side, and only for their side. The disputants have the strongest impetus to put
forward their viewpoint and often the best ability to do so because of their access to evidence.
The adversarial system calls upon lawyers, as representatives of parties in a legal dispute,
to play a specific role that assists the community in acquiring knowledge about law and facts
pertinent to law (usually the facts of cases). Lawyers do things such as advising clients about their
options (legal and practical), investigating the facts of cases and the law that applies to a case,
presenting evidence and arguments at trial (about both facts and law), bringing cases to the
appellate level (at which the courts can develop the law) and (less commonly) assisting in the
mobilization of social movements, among other activities. Lawyers even contribute to knowledge
about law in ways that are less obvious, such as disclosing legal sources (including both those that
are advantageous and those that are disadvantageous to their client’s case) to the opposing side in
a legal dispute. Additionally, in situations such as document discovery, lawyers contribute to other
participants’ factual knowledge about a case by disclosing, to the opposing party, factual evidence
that is pertinent to a case. Thus, lawyers advance their own clients’ case and cooperate in processes
that facilitate the opposing party’s ability to advance its own case. These two aspects involve the
presentation and disclosure of positive evidence and negative evidence.41 These actions require the
practice of epistemic virtues of the reliabilist and responsibilist variety. They require epistemic
skills such as reading comprehension and clear speaking, as well as epistemic traits such a
perseverance and honesty.

experience for the task that they are performing and for the degree of difficulty involved. Jurors, by contrast, may have
no such epistemic readiness. Jurors’ work is not differentiated as much by the norms involved in that work as it is by
the dramatic difference in the technical aspect of the epistemic task itself. Such differentiation in epistemic degree of
difficulty deserves its own attention in a virtue epistemology of legal processes.
41
Discussed above in Section (2.2) at notes 29–30 and accompanying text.
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However, in applying ethics to lawyering, it is recognized that lawyers do things that are,
or could be, unethical if done by non-lawyers, including non-lawyer professionals. The same is
true in epistemology. Lawyers do things that work against, or could work against, the epistemic
good of both the lawyer himself/herself and the epistemic benefit of the broader community.
Ethically and epistemically, lawyers take actions that would be blameworthy or bad outside of the
legal context but which are said to be justified by the role of lawyers in the adjudicative system in
which lawyers work. Put in terms that are the focus of this dissertation, lawyers do things that are
difficult to reconcile with ethical and epistemic virtue outside of the legal context.
This is not to say that all lawyerly behaviour can be described in this negative way. Much
of what lawyers do (e.g., presenting positive evidence or challenging the relevance of negative
evidence) is virtuous—ethically and epistemically—needing no further justification. However,
some crucial lawyerly behaviour (required by the adversarial system, by models of lawyering, and
by rules of professional conduct) would be unethical, and would be against the epistemic good, if
done outside of the legal context (especially if our concern is about acquiring knowledge about a
discrete case under immediate consideration). In service of their partisan position, lawyers will do
things such as keeping confidential information about clients (whether that information has to do
with legal or illegal actions by the client, even helping clients avoid justified criminal and civil
sanctions), impeaching the credibility of, or aggressively cross-examining, witnesses who are
telling the truth,42 challenging the admissibility of evidence that reveals facts about the case, and
using limitation periods to have a legal dispute dismissed.43 Note also that, as has been discussed
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Of course, the question of whether a witness is being truthful is a question for the trier of fact to determine. That
this is recognized should be clear from the discussion of partisanship below.
43
Especially in a single case, revealing confidential information would often increase knowledge. Impeaching the
credibility of a witness who is telling the truth may cause the trier of fact to disbelieve the witness, may discourage
the witness from giving testimony, and could discourage other witnesses from coming forward in the future. Having
evidence ruled inadmissible, especially in a discrete case, reduces access to knowledge about the case, even as it
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above in Section (2.2), lawyers’ incentives and patterns of behaviour in adversarial systems of
adjudication can be misaligned with the goal of promoting the acquisition of knowledge.44
The way in which lawyers relate to epistemic virtues and advance the epistemic interests
of society is thus not easily analogized to other disciplines that have received attention in
epistemology, such as science. Compare the standard professional actors in science and law:
scientists and lawyers. To state things simply, scientists make epistemic contributions to the wider
society and to the scientific community by much more straightforwardly practicing epistemic
virtues, including both self-regarding epistemic virtues and other-regarding epistemic virtues.45
Scientists must practice epistemic virtues such as objectivity, thoroughness, perseverance,
adaptability, courage, honesty, and intellectual humility, among others.46
These virtues can be challenging to practice, especially in relation to the technical fields to
which scientists apply epistemic virtues. Scientific research has specific needs for the way in which
these virtues must be practiced. For example, conducting scientific research might require a more
specific conception of objectivity and thoroughness than other fields have. However, the difference
between the way in which epistemic virtues are practiced in the sciences and the way in which
they are practiced by non-scientists outside of the sciences is much smaller than the difference
between the practice of epistemic virtues within the legal profession and the practice of epistemic

protects other rights and interests. Having a case dismissed due to a limitation period prevents the legal system itself
from discovering knowledge because the legal system will simply not attempt to discover the knowledge.
44
Indeed, Goldman has argued that the adversarial system of adjudication may fare worse than the inquisitorial system
of adjudication. Thus, in addition to calling on the lawyer to do things that would not be ethically and epistemically
justifiable outside of the legal context, adjudicative systems may not always be well structured to achieve goals that
are ethically and epistemically justifiable. Exploring that critique of the adversarial system of adjudication is beyond
my purposes in this dissertation.
45
This statement is too simplistic on its own because there is a complex history of applying epistemic virtues.
Epistemic virtues are understood and shaped by the scientist’s milieu, being therein imbued with cultural, political,
and religious significance. An extended treatment of this topic is given in Jeroen van Dongen & Herman Paul, eds,
Epistemic Virtues in the Sciences and the Humanities (Cham, Switzerland: Springer, 2017). Even so, as will be clear
from the remainder of this section, the way in which the scientist makes epistemic contributions to society is
profoundly different from the contributions that the lawyer makes.
46
Those are just the responsibilist epistemic virtues.
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virtues by non-lawyers outside of the legal context. Simply, the work of scientists, even when they
take critical/skeptical roles, does not appear to be opposed to the acquisition of knowledge
(including the community’s acquisition of knowledge). Science, like human activities generally,
benefits from the practice of what can be described unmistakeably as epistemic virtues. It is rarely
difficult to explain how elements of scientific research (especially essential elements) can be
consistent with the practice of epistemic virtues.
The most direct analogue in law to the scientist is not the lawyer but the legal scholar. Like
the scientist, the legal scholar, whether through publishing scholarly works or teaching in a law
school, is expected to contribute to the legal community’s knowledge of law and the legal system.
The application of epistemic virtues (such as honesty, intellectual courage, and intellectual
humility) to scientists can be translated to the role of the legal scholar. That is to say, the epistemic
excellence of each role in their respective fields of knowledge is unambiguously improved by the
practice of these epistemic virtues. Moreover, no essential element of the work of the legal scholar
is difficult to reconcile with the epistemic virtues mentioned in this section. Gaining knowledge
and giving access to knowledge (i.e., practicing self-regarding epistemic virtues and otherregarding epistemic virtues) about a topic is a clear-cut epistemic and practical good for both the
scientist and the legal scholar.47
On the contrary, the lawyer’s role does not centre around a knowledge promoting function
in such a straightforward way. It can be difficult to see how some essential lawyerly behaviours,
including core duties of the legal profession, are consistent with epistemic virtues. How, for
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The significant complicating factor for the legal scholar is the way in which politics (often or always) enters into
his/her work. See generally Duncan Kennedy, “Legal Education as Training for Hierarchy” in David Kairys, ed, The
Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique, 3rd ed (New York, NY: Basic Books, 1998) 54 (explaining the politics of
legal education). Even so, the legal scholar’s work does not turn epistemic virtues on their head in the way that lawyers’
work in the adversarial system does. Being a legal scholar does not essentially involve blocking the epistemic benefit
of other people.

130

example, is keeping confidences about illegal behaviour or aggressively cross-examining a truthful
witness consistent with honesty that promotes the acquisition of knowledge? How can having a
case dismissed for not being commenced before a limitation period be consistent with the practice
of any epistemic virtue?
There is a limited, but still enlightening, extent to which the lawyer, meeting all
expectations of him/her, is epistemically like a problematic example of a scientist: the scientist
who has allowed financial interests to (usually subtly) influence his/her work rather than
objectively apply the scientific method and report on whatever results s/he obtains. Evidence and
interpretations are given in accordance with the finding that the scientist/lawyer wants to report
and wants others to believe. The key difference is that when such behaviour is discovered from a
scientist, it is rightly criticized from epistemic and moral perspectives for the violation of both
scientific standards and the trust of the community. Conversely, the legal system and the ethics of
lawyering purposefully use this kind of practice (which would be blameworthy outside of law) to
achieve a number of goals, including epistemic ones.48
The reason that we cannot simply ask whether a lawyer has met the standards of the various
epistemic virtues and why some behaviours that would be considered bad when done by scientists
count as good or acceptable when done by lawyers might be explained by the fact that lawyers
participate in an epistemic system in which the straightforward exercise of epistemic virtues is not
always what the system needs of the lawyer in order to perform its own epistemic ends.49 We might
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It must be recognized that the scientist who takes money to reach a predetermined result is doing something much
worse than the lawyer who takes money to advocate for a position. Even if the scientific community recognizes that
this happens and has mechanisms to check any such behaviour, this is not the same as working in a system that is
designed to work with paid partisanship as a matter of regular operations. Having a filter that is meant to prevent the
negative effects of a behaviour does not leave a system as prepared for the behaviour as working on purpose with the
behaviour.
49
There is some extent to which scientists do this also. For example, scientists running a study might not immediately
tell the study’s participants the purpose of the experiment. This is so that they can receive genuine responses. However,
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describe this reality as a “role-differentiated epistemology” that arises out of the adversarial system
of adjudication. As Hutchinson says, “When acting in a professional capacity, persons can (and
occasionally must) make decisions and act in a way that might be different to what they would do
in a personal and nonprofessional context”.50 Going deep into the lawyer’s life, the lawyer can (or
must) sometimes act in ways that violate his/her own moral views.51 Crucially, though such actions
would not be permissible outside of the legal system,52 they are permissible within the legal system
because of the expectations that the system places on its participants to act in support of the
system’s mechanisms.
In the same way that role-differentiated morality allows and/or encourages lawyers to
engage in behaviour that would be declared morally flawed in other areas of life, role-differentiated
epistemology allows and/or encourages lawyers to engage in behaviours that would be
epistemically problematic in other areas of life—i.e., behaviours that would undermine the
promotion of knowledge—in order to promote overarching systemic benefits. Some of these
benefits may even be moral or epistemic. Allowing lawyers to deviate from the moral and
epistemic requirements that non-lawyers should normally follow can produce benefits, even moral
and epistemic benefits. Role-differentiation should not be understood as a trumping of regular
moral and epistemic requirements, but as a carve-out for a special role. It is a recognition that
cooperative action and systems have requirements and produce benefits that ask different things
of individual participants than that they behave righteously as individuals.

such practices rise nowhere near the allowances that are made for lawyers in their role in the epistemic structures of
law.
50
Allan C Hutchinson, Fighting Fair: Legal Ethics for an Adversarial Age (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2015) at 13. Putting it in terms of moral norms, we can say that lawyers can (and must) perform actions in their
lawyering role that violate moral norms that govern outside of the adversarial system and the role that lawyers have
in that system.
51
See ibid at 13.
52
The opposite of such actions would actually sometimes be mandated outside of the legal system.
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If the virtue epistemology of lawyering is role-differentiated, we cannot simply ask whether
the lawyer has exercised any particular virtue when looking at the lawyer from a normative
epistemic perspective. Instead, a specialized virtue epistemic analysis must be undertaken. This
specialized analysis must take account of the epistemic system within which the lawyer works.
Our account of epistemic virtues such as honesty must be suited to the task of being applied to
legal contexts such as negotiations, as well as the advising contexts and the advocacy contexts, in
which lawyers practice.53 The benefits of undertaking this analysis are that we will be able to both
have an epistemic account of lawyering that is responsive to specific demands that legal systems
make of their main professional actors, and we will also gain insights into these systems themselves
and competing conceptions thereof.
Role-differentiation does not mean that all norms that are not role-differentiated are lifted,
relaxed, or otherwise modified. In the case of morality, even as lawyers can abide by a
differentiated morality while on the job, that differentiation does not simply remove all moral
requirements. As Hutchinson argues, “Professionals do not have carte blanche to do whatever suits
them; they must tailor their ethical commitments to the precise contours of their professional
situations”.54 The reasons that justify the lawyer’s deviation from his/her regular moral obligations
only extend to deviations from morality that serve the purposes that the lawyer’s work is intended
to fulfill in the legal system. Hutchinson goes on to say that the justification for role-differentiation
determines both (1) when the lawyer’s role calls for differentiated standards of behaviour and (2)
what those differentiated standards of behaviour are.55

53

Advising and advocacy contexts are discussed above in Section (4) at note 2.
Hutchinson, supra note 50 at 14.
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Hutchinson argues that the public interest is purported to justify the lawyer’s roledifferentiation, meaning that lawyers are only permitted (or required) to deviate from general
morality when such a deviation serves the public interest.56 He further explains that the “public
interest” is contested.57 It thus follows that the instances in which role-differentiation applies, and
the behaviour permitted by role-differentiation, can be contested. In legal ethics, one norm that
emerges in common between different visions of the public good is the “commitment to the Rule
of Law”.58 From the perspective of governing the legal system, the public will generally also have
an interest in the functioning of whatever adjudicative system is used by the legal system that
governs their society. In common law legal systems, having an interest in the functioning of a
system of adjudication means that the public has an interest in the functioning of their existing
adversarial system of adjudication.
The structure of the argument about the public interest as the justification for the lawyer’s
moral role-differentiation carries over into epistemology. Similar to the way in which the benefit
given to the public by the adversarial system of adjudication justifies and shapes the lawyer’s roledifferentiated morality, the epistemic benefits given to the public by the adversarial system of
adjudication justify and structure the epistemic role of the lawyer. Epistemic role-differentiation
is defined specifically by the public’s epistemic interest. Virtue epistemic norms that apply outside
of the legal context would not apply when the lawyer’s deviation from non-differentiated
behaviour serves public interests that can justify the deviation.
Defining the public epistemic interest that would justify an epistemic role-differentiation
for lawyers is a task that falls squarely within the purview of the social epistemology of lawyering.
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See ibid.
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As with a discussion of the public interest in moral evaluation, the public’s epistemic interest is
contested and can be specified in a wide variety of ways. Earlier, I discussed some different
preoccupations that social epistemology can have, i.e., different epistemic aims and standards of
achievement for social relationships. I cited Goldman’s work discussing relativism,
consensualism, expertism, and veritism, the last of which Goldman endorses.59 These
preoccupations can raise entirely different considerations about justifying the lawyer’s epistemic
role-differentiation. Giving a definitive account of the justification of epistemic role-differentiation
is beyond the scope of this dissertation. However, I will work on the basis that ensuring that the
legal system has an ability to discover truths (especially factual truths) is common between
different accounts of the public epistemic good.
Veritism, which assess the ability of social institutions and practices to produce true beliefs
coincides well with the purported aims of the adversarial system of adjudication. In line with Alvin
Goldman’s veritism, my social epistemic preoccupation (which I bring to defining the epistemic
interest that justifies the lawyer’s epistemic role-differentiation) is the ability of social institutions
or practices to produce true beliefs. The public’s interest in the legal system is well connected with
this preoccupation towards the production of true beliefs because, as noted previously in this
dissertation, the adversarial system is purported to have some capacity to arrive at true beliefs
about the facts of a case.60 Crucially, Goldman limits the impetus to find true beliefs to questions
that interest cognizers. Knowledge about all sorts of trivialities can be acquired that do not aid the
specific intellectual efforts of cognizers. Such knowledge would be a burden or an obstacle, rather
than being valuable. The lawyer’s impetus to acquire more truths is limited to the truths that the
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Above in Section (2.1).
Above in Section (1.4).
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lawyer can helpfully integrate into arguments for the client before the adjudicator or into activities
surrounding legal disputes such as ongoing efforts to settle the dispute with the opposing party.
(4.3) Epistemic Others in the Adversarial System
Epistemic virtue orientation, a concept that draws on both social epistemology and virtue
epistemology,61 is susceptible to being influenced by the epistemic divisions of labour of epistemic
agents in adversarial litigation.62 As could be expected from the recognition of epistemic roledifferentiation for lawyers, the exigencies of adversarial litigation upend our expectations about
virtue orientation—expectations that have been formed on the basis of social dynamics outside of
litigation and legal work.63 Under the unique circumstances of adversarial litigation, virtue
orientations—especially other-regarding virtues—have highly structured meanings suited to legal
processes.
One of the most crucial aspects of understanding role-differentiation in any social system,
including adversarial litigation, is to account for the presence of multiple kinds of participants
within the system. Accounting for the presence and role of participants allows for a fuller
explanation of context and an explanation of the benefits that are expected to be achieved by
participants’ actions in that context. That is to say, knowing about participants in the system allows
for a fuller explanation of roles within that system, of role-differentiation, and of the justification
for that role-differentiation. Many epistemic agents in a legal system must develop and practice
epistemic virtues in the legal process to be of epistemic benefit to others and to the adjudicative
system as a whole. In addition to lawyers, these epistemic agents include judges, juries, witnesses,

See generally Jason Kawall, “Other-Regarding Epistemic Virtues” (2002) 15:3 Ratio 257 at 261–266 for virtue
epistemology and 266–268 for social epistemology.
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Recall my mention of this topic above in Section (2.2) at note 17 and accompanying text.
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Other milieus, such as the transactional context and lawyering in social movements, for example, each bring their
own nuances.
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and other actors who should also receive extended attention in terms of how the adversarial system
shapes the meaning of epistemic concepts in relation to their roles.
Knowledge about the roles and benefits given by the key participants just mentioned is
vital for making prescriptions for the behaviour of every participant in the legal system. In
particular, understanding these roles allows us to discuss epistemic “others” and how these others
relate to lawyers’ role-differentiated other-regarding virtues. Who is the other? What role does this
particular other have in the legal system and in the pursuit of the adjudicative system’s epistemic
aim of acquiring knowledge about things like facts? How must the lawyer exercise other-regarding
virtues in relation to other participants in the legal system so that the legal system can achieve the
epistemic goal of discovering truths?
Identifying the relevant “other” (the party that is supposed to receive the benefit of otherregarding epistemic virtues), the role of the other, and the way in which to be of epistemic benefit
to the other cannot be done thoughtlessly. This is true in life generally and is much more so in
law.64 “Others” are potentially multitudinous, are shaped by the lawyer’s many roles and can also
be classified as calling for a different level of epistemic regard depending on the model of
lawyering that the lawyer is practicing. The choices that lawyers make, and that legal ethicists call
on lawyers to make, in identifying “others” is a substantial dividing line between traditional models
of lawyering and alternative models of lawyering. Thus, the identification of epistemic “others”
should be taken as both a descriptive task as well as a normative task.

Note that the term “other” here is used very differently from the way it is used when discussing topics such as
discrimination or postmodern ideas of alterity. Those ideas may be important in developing a better understanding of
the “other” in virtue epistemology. However, discussions about the “other” in virtue epistemology are meant simply
to recognize the importance of epistemic agents besides ourselves, whatever their position in social institutions and
practices.
64
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The client might always be an “other”65 in relation to whom the lawyer must be
epistemically virtuous (especially in the advising context). Additional “others” may include: the
opposing party and his/her lawyer (e.g., during disclosure processes), the courts or tribunal (if
litigation has been commenced), mediators, government officials such as police, third parties (e.g.,
stakeholders), witnesses, expert witnesses, juries, the media, the lawyer’s own employees
(including colleagues, managers, paralegals, administrative assistants, articling students/summer
students), the regulatory body that governs lawyers (e.g., possibly to make a complaint about
another lawyer or to defend a complaint against oneself), the lawyer’s own professional insurance
company, etc. The lawyer, of course depending on his/her specialization and practice context, may
have to deal with a number of these “others” in any particular case and succeed epistemically when
interacting with these individuals and groups.
The understanding that there are many epistemic “others”, i.e., many beneficiaries of
epistemic virtues, should also bring to light the fact that while there will be epistemic virtues, both
self-regarding and other-regarding (e.g., perceptiveness as a self-regarding virtue and integrity as
an other-regarding virtue) that are relevant to all, or almost all, contexts, there may also be virtues
that are particularly important, or which may be emphasized in specific ways (including by
different models of lawyering) in dealing with specific “others” in different practice contexts or at
various stages of adversarial processes. Consider the way in which the appropriate way to practice
the virtue of honesty can shift based on the context and epistemic other to whom the lawyer must

I say “might always” because I have not yet considered the way in which to discuss epistemic virtues in relation to
clients who may not have the capacity to decide legal matters for themselves, such as very young children or
individuals who are suffering certain types of disabilities, impairments or incapacities. My early thinking is that, while
the lawyer must, of course, be ethically virtuous in relation to such clients and pursue the legal interests of the clients,
epistemic virtues in contexts such as that of advising would likely be oriented primarily, although not necessarily
exclusively, towards the litigation guardian. Depending on each case, (for example, children at various stage of
development), the lawyer should also substantially orient his/her epistemic virtuousness towards a client who does not
legally have the capacity to make decisions on legal matters.
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give an epistemic benefit. In the context of a dispute being heard in a court, it is important for a
lawyer to be candid in representing the law and the facts to the court66 and to not assist others in
being dishonest—thus the requirement to “not influence a witness or potential witness to give
evidence that is false, misleading or evasive”.67 However, the dynamics of the court context do not
carry forward into every legal practice scenario. For example, it may be proper for a lawyer to be
less than completely honest when negotiating a settlement.
Discussing negotiations, Hutchinson distinguishes between lying and bluffing. “Lying”, he
explains, “involves not only telling untruths, but also doing so in order to mislead”.68 Bluffing can
be considered telling an untruth as a recognized part of a contest. Bluffing thus exists “[i]n a
context in which one professional negotiator is unlikely to accept all the other negotiator’s
statements at face value and is likely to be engaged in similar behavior”. 69 A plaintiff’s lawyer in
a personal injury case might say that his/her client will not settle for less than $1 million, when the
lawyer knows that the client will settle for $800,000. Similarly, a defence lawyer in such a civil
case might say that the defendant will not pay more than $500,000, when the lawyer knows that
the client is willing to pay as much as $700,000.
There is a great deal of difference between the requirements of the other-regarding virtue
of honesty when the “other” is the court vs. when it is the counterparty in a negotiation. In the first
case, the lawyer’s honesty is central to the epistemic aims of the adversarial system, whereas in
the second case, some lack of honesty is part of the expected posturing of the context. Each
situation has a fundamentally different sort of epistemic reliance on the lawyer’s honesty. The
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See ABA Model Rules, supra note 32, r 3.3; FLSC Model Code, supra note 28, r 5.1-1 and 5.1-2 (ABA and FLSC
duties of candour and duties against misleading the tribunal when acting as an advocate).
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FLSC Model Code, supra note 28, r 5.4-2. See also ABA Model Rules, supra note 32, r 3.4(b), prohibiting the
lawyer from “counsel[ing] or assist[ing] a witness to testify falsely”. ABA Model Rules, r 3.4, commentary 1 speaks
of what it means to have “fair competition in the adversary system”.
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Hutchinson, supra note 50 at 116.
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parties themselves depend on the lawyer’s honesty to different extents and for different reasons.
The court relies on the lawyer’s honesty a great deal as a passive recipient that cannot actively
seek out the facts for itself nor rebut the lawyer’s presentation of the facts when the facts are being
presented by the lawyer.
In the negotiation context, the counterparty can actively check the other party. The
counterparty can challenge, for example, the size of the loss that the other party claims to have
experienced. The other party in a negotiation thus depends less on the lawyer’s honesty and expects
much less than fully truthful statements. As such, the lawyer can behave differently in a negotiation
with respect to practicing honesty than people would normally behave in order to be epistemically
virtuous or than s/he would behave in relation to an epistemic other who is more passive and cannot
take a competitive position in response to the lawyer. The lawyer’s role in negotiations is
differentiated—with respect to the other-regarding virtue of honesty—from the behaviour that
would be expected of him/her as a contribution to the spreading of knowledge in other contexts.70
The relationship between epistemic others and virtues in adversarial systems of
adjudication is one of the most promising sites of collaboration between social epistemologists and
virtue epistemologists. For the purpose of this dissertation, it will suffice to say that the roles of
epistemic others structure social contexts, as well as the justifications for, and shape of, roledifferentiation in the practice of epistemic virtues.
(4.4) Virtue Epistemology and Models of Lawyering
In Section (1.1), I discussed models of lawyering for the sake of historical context. In
Section (1.2), I explored morally deepened understandings of models of lawyering that can be
given by philosophical legal ethics. Treading into epistemology in Section (2.3.3), I raised models
70

This is not to say that the context of being before a court is not always differentiated with respect to honesty. It is
merely to emphasize how the gap between justified epistemic behaviour can vary in different contexts and in relation
to different parties who can be the beneficiaries of other-regarding virtues.
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of lawyering as a way of expanding the image of lawyering that is considered in social
epistemology. In those sections, I worked with an approach to the philosophy of lawyering based
on legal ethics. As I have expressed in this dissertation, that branch of the philosophy of lawyering
has been fruitful, and should continue developing, but should not continue to be the solitary branch
of the philosophy of lawyering that grows. Thus, my aim here is to express models of lawyering
in terms that centre epistemic concerns, especially the normative epistemic concerns of virtue
epistemology. I do not intend for this subsection to be primarily an evaluation of the overarching
merits of various models of lawyering using a virtue epistemic model—though that task must
eventually be undertaken in the virtue epistemic study of law and lawyering. My purpose for
discussing models of lawyering in this dissertation is to take account of one of the primary
distinctions in approaches to legal practice. I also aim to explain why different models might
accept, emphasize, and conceptualize epistemic virtues differently.
Competing models of lawyering primarily debate the range of people and concerns that a
lawyer is permitted, or obligated, to benefit and/or consider.71 These questions structure the way
in which the two broadly described models of lawyering—traditional and alternative—conceive
of the lawyer’s relationship to the client and whether the lawyer has permissions or obligations to
consider people other than the client. Closely related is the question of the scope of any permissions
or obligations that exist in relationships with clients and/or other people. Specifically, how far is
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For much of this subsection, I will turn from the language of the aretaic (which focuses on the evaluation of actions
and actors) to the language of the deontic (which focuses on the “oughts” and duties of a moral code). See generally,
Larry Alexander & Michael Moore, “Deontological Ethics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Winter 2016),
Edward N Zalta, ed, online: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University
<plato.stanford.edu/entries/ethics-deontological/> [perma.cc/FA47-8CN5]; Jarek Gryz, “On the Relationship
Between the Aretaic and the Deontic” (2011) 14:5 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 493, explaining the distinctions
between these two approaches to normativity. I do so because the deontic normative language has been so dominant
in scholarly works in legal ethics, in codes of professional conduct, and in describing the various models of lawyering.
Many of the concerns expressed in legal ethics using deontic language can be expressed in aretaic ways that emphasize
the development of character over the satisfaction of abstract conditions for being ethical. My language here is a nonrecast steppingstone to the language of virtue in discussing models of lawyering.
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the lawyer permitted or required to go to benefit the client and/or other people? In addressing these
topics, traditional and alternative models of lawyering interact in different ways to accounts of,
and justifications for, the adversarial system and lawyers’ roles with that system.
Models of lawyering were created in the field of legal ethics. Up to this point, models of
lawyering, and debates about models of lawyering, have been posed in moral terms. For example,
may, or must, the lawyer consider whether injustice or suffering is being imposed on a third party
(i.e., a non-litigant stakeholder) by the lawyer’s service to the client and seek to prevent or stop
that suffering or injustice? To use the language of virtue orientation, the distinction between
traditional models of lawyering and alternative models of lawyering can be explained as a
difference over whether, and to what extent, lawyers can, or must, practice other-regarding
(ethical) virtues in relation to people other than their own client and the extent to which those
other-regarding (ethical) virtues can or must be practiced. Lawyers’ practice of self-regarding
virtues receives little attention in existing discussions about models of lawyering, except perhaps
in relation to competence.72
In traditional models of lawyering, as conceptualized in legal ethics, lawyers owe otherregarding ethical duties (duties to benefit others or avoid causing harm to others) primarily to the
client and the courts. Duties to opposing counsel, opposing parties, third parties, the public, etc.
are either rejected or are minimal. The duties are expressed in accordance with the primary
objective of each competing traditional model of lawyering: hyper-zealous lawyering and merelyzealous lawyering. The person described by Dare as the hyper-zealous lawyer—the lawyer who
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Self-regarding virtues merit more attention in the philosophy of lawyering than the brief attention that has been
given to duties like competence. This lack of attention may be because ethics not as well-suited to consider benefits
to the self as epistemology is. Later in this current section, I also briefly discuss self-regarding virtue in relation to
competence. In Part IV of this dissertation, I address theories that provide much more substantial frameworks in which
to discuss self-regarding virtues.
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tries to obtain everything for the client that the law can be made to give73—would reject ethical
duties to others besides the client in an extreme way. As Lord Brougham says, “[A]n advocate, in
the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world, and that person is his client. To
save that client by all means and expedients, and at all hazards and costs to other persons, and,
among them, to himself, is his first and only duty; and in performing this duty he must not regard
the alarm, the torments, the destruction which he may bring upon others”.74
Permission is explicitly denied to even take account of other people besides the client and
of other concerns besides the interests of the client. Regard for the court, too, is given merely, and
perhaps grudgingly, for instrumental reasons in service of the client; disregarding the court is not
a long-lasting recipe for consistently achieving results for the client. However, like the law as a
whole, the court must be made to give the client whatever the lawyer can obtain for the client.
Recognizing freestanding duties to other people besides the client reduces the ability of the lawyer
to use, and even bend, the law to the client’s advantage.
Alternatively, Dare’s merely-zealous lawyer, who seeks only to pursue the client’s legal
entitlements, might slightly enlarge the circle of regard for other parties as the lawyer recognizes
limits on what the lawyer should make the law do for the client. The merely-zealous lawyer has
deep ethical commitments to the functioning of the legal system and to ensuring that legal rights
are vindicated. Furthermore, the merely-zealous lawyer’s approach to practice is said to be justified
by the dispute resolution function of law and by the fact that the legal system enables people who
have a plurality of viewpoints to coexist.75 These ethical commitments, expressed as part of a
traditional model of lawyering, prohibit the merely-zealous lawyer from considering the interests
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of, and seeking to assist, third parties.76 However, the same commitments also expand the lawyer’s
other-regarding duties beyond what the hyper-zealous model can support on the basis of principle.
At a minimum, the merely-zealous lawyer is committed to assisting the court in arriving at a
decision that vindicates the legal entitlements of the participants. The lawyer is prohibited from
showing so little regard for the court as to simply try to obtain from the court everything that the
court can be made to give the client, regardless of whether those things are the client’s actual legal
entitlements.
Other-regarding ethical duties, and permissions, to consider the interests of others, are
much more wide-ranging and substantial in alternative models of lawyering. Alternative models
of lawyering, as conceptualized in legal ethics, share in common with all traditional models robust
duties to the client and share with merely-zealous traditional models similarly substantial duties to
the courts. Significantly, alternative models might also emphasize duties and permissions to
consider opposing counsel, opposing parties, third parties, the public, etc. In alternative models of
lawyering, there exist a greater number of participants and stakeholders in relation to whom the
lawyer may, or must, provide robust benefits, or at least avoid harming, and in relation to whom
the lawyer may, or must, behave in ethically virtuous ways. The recognition of permissions and
obligations to consider the interests of people besides the client might lead practitioners of
alternative models of lawyering to refuse to take on a certain client, to dissuade clients from
pursuing certain courses of action, or even to withdraw from representing a client. There are
multiple alternative theories of law that, on the basis of different moral and political underpinnings

Bradley Wendel, a defender of a traditional model that supports seeking the client’s legal entitlements, limits the
scope of the lawyer’s other-regarding moral duties so that the lawyer can abide by another set of other-regarding moral
duties, namely those to the community to not “unsettle” the political decisions that they have made in creating law.
See W Bradley Wendel, “Legal Ethics and the Separation of Law and Morals” (2005) 91:1 Cornell L Rev 67 at 97.
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(e.g., commitments to promoting moral justice or avoiding moral injustice), would support varying
degree of permissions and obligations to consider others’ interests.
One should not overstate the degree to which alternative models call for lawyers to focus
on other-regarding ethical virtues beyond those owed to the client. Few alternative models would
so emphasize other-regarding duties or permissions to assist people other than the client to such
an extent that all lawyers are called to permanently behave as social activists. Thus, it would be a
mistake to conclude that traditional models have an entirely anemic account of norms related to
non-clients while alternative models call lawyers to be so other-regarding as to make the client
merely a co-equal or secondary concern for the lawyer next to other participants and stakeholders.
Any adversarial model of lawyering must recognize a lawyer’s primary duty, concern for, and
relationship with, the client. The question is the coexistence of other duties, and room for other
concerns, not the replacement of duties to, or concern for, the client.
Ethical approaches to models of lawyering are deeply meaningful but leaving models of
lawyering to the field of ethics is too philosophically limited. Far from belonging exclusively to
legal ethics, any topic that raises differing views about the persons and concerns that lawyers may,
or must, consider can be understood in terms of the debate between traditional and alternative
models of lawyering.77 Models of lawyering can be expressed as conceptions outside of the domain
of ethics.78 This includes claims about which epistemic concerns may, or must, be considered by
lawyers and to whom the lawyer may, or must, provide epistemic benefits. The key question to
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distinguish models of lawyering in epistemology is: what permissions or obligations (if any) does
the lawyer have to consider the epistemic interests of people other than the client? Virtue
epistemology sheds new light on the question of who the lawyer must benefit and the extent to
which models of lawyering permit, or even require, the lawyer to benefit other people. This
expansion of perspective is done in accordance with the particular way in which the models
conceive of the lawyer’s duties to the client in the adversarial system of adjudication.
If the relationship between models of lawyering and norms of different orientations
(especially other-regarding norms directed at others who are not the client) is nuanced in legal
ethics, it is substantially more complex in the way in which models of lawyering manifest virtue
orientation in epistemology. Epistemic norms of both orientations—to the self and to others
(including non-clients)—are relevant to the work of the lawyer regardless of which model of
lawyering s/he is practicing. Additionally, models of lawyering apply in more finespun ways when
conceptualized in the field of epistemology. Models of lawyering are less able in epistemology to
deny outright whole collections of permissions and obligations merely because of the direction in
which the benefits would go.
Theorists and practitioners of all models of lawyering, will be concerned with selfregarding epistemic virtues. Preparation, conscientiousness, perceptiveness, and additional
relevant self-regarding epistemic virtues are non-negotiables in any legal practice. Even just for
their importance to basic lawyerly competence, self-regarding epistemic virtues are necessary both
for a model of lawyering that is focused exclusively on seeking the benefit of the client and for
models of lawyering that incorporate concerns for other parties. A lawyer cannot commence a
case, defend a case, conduct discovery, advise a client, have an initial meeting with the client, or
even be licensed to practice law, without benefitting himself/herself epistemically.
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Furthermore, self-regarding epistemic virtues are non-negotiables of just about every
epistemic activity. Imparting epistemic benefits to others is deeply tied to, and often has an
immediate need, for epistemic benefits to oneself; sharing knowledge involves acquiring
knowledge. For example, from the outset of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer must
exercise self-regarding epistemic virtues related to being a good listener and having the ability to
elicit information about the case from the client in order for the lawyer to acquire basic competence
about the facts of the case.79 Self-regarding virtues such as good listening are what permits the
lawyer to function as an expert and champion for the benefit of the client.
Virtue epistemology opens up the sky for other-regarding norms for traditional and
alternative models of lawyering. A wide swath of other-regarding epistemic benefits are essentials
for legal practice under any model of lawyering in adversarial systems. Other-regarding epistemic
norms begin with the client, the central other to whom the lawyer owes duties of loyalty and
fiduciary duties. The lawyer must accurately and candidly advise the client about his/her legal
interests. Advising the client is the primary epistemic benefit that the lawyer gives directly to the
central epistemic other that s/he serves in the lawyering role.80 This commitment to other-regarding
client-oriented epistemic virtues (which come out especially in the advising context) is a vital part
of any adversarial model of lawyering. These models, which function by way of lawyers as
champions for their client, must all recognize a primary duty, concern for, and relationship with,
the other for whom the lawyer is a champion. From this point of agreement onward, models of
lawyering diverge from one another in their response to the idea of other-regarding epistemic
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behaviour. The divergence is based upon their vision of the purpose of lawyering within
adversarial legal processes. Nonetheless, the need for other-regarding epistemic virtues abounds.
For the two traditional models considered in this dissertation, the aims of legal
representation are either those of hyper-zealous lawyering (obtaining for the client everything that
the law can be made to give) or of merely-zealous lawyering (obtaining for the client his/her legal
entitlements). Even within these narrowly defined aims, to obtain the results that the models seek
for the client, the lawyer must practice other-regarding epistemic virtues for the benefit of a large
number of other participants in court processes. At the very least, lawyers must benefit the trier of
fact and the opposing party (through the disclosure of negative and positive evidence).81 Providing
epistemic benefits to these others is required as part of the fact-finding processes of the adversarial
system.
With respect to the trier of fact during litigation, the lawyer must demonstrate several
epistemic virtues in order to perform his/her role(s) in the adversarial system during stages such
as oral advocacy. At a minimum, these virtues include some version of those stated by Jason
Kawall and quoted above, especially: honesty, creativity (in the sense of inspiring others), and
exercising good listening skills.82 These other-regarding epistemic virtues are to be exercised in
relation to the judge and/or jury for the epistemic benefit of the judge and/or jury and for the legal
benefit of the client. Considering these virtues from an epistemic perspective adds substantially to
what can be said from merely an ethical perspective. During oral advocacy in a trial, much of what
the lawyer says can engage the lawyer’s ethical duties, however the ethical duties at play are
largely negative, requiring the lawyer to not deceive the court. Except through the duty of
competence (which is steeped in epistemology), the ethical duties do not themselves contemplate
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things such as effective methods of framing ideas and conveying information in ways that
accurately inform the hearer. Virtue epistemology is an approach that allows for broad discussions
of what it takes to positively benefit the trier of fact, rather than merely to avoid misleading the
trier of fact.
Recognizing the need to benefit others epistemically in the ways just mentioned, does not
mean, however, that giving such benefits is free of tension with the basic principles of each model
of lawyering. The hyper-zealous lawyer begins to bristle even at the basic other-regarding concern
for the trier of fact just mentioned. Beyond participants whose epistemic benefit can assist the
client, legally and perhaps epistemically, the lawyer has no permission from the hyper-zealous
model to provide epistemic benefits to other people. Even with respect to others who the lawyer
must benefit in order to assist the client, e.g., the trier of fact, hyper-zealous lawyering has no
impetus within the model itself to place intrinsic value upon the epistemic benefit of these nonclients. While the hyper-zealous lawyer is not encouraged or permitted to be dishonest with the
trier of fact;83 hyper-zealous lawyering actively rejects the idea that the lawyer has duties to anyone
other than the client.
The trier of fact is a means to an end for hyper-zealous lawyering, rather than an epistemic
other whose epistemic benefit the model sees as essential to its own implementation and
vindication.84 If giving an epistemic benefit to the trier of fact leads to a legal benefit to the client,
then hyper-zealous lawyering can happily give epistemic benefits to the trier of fact. If giving an
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epistemic benefit to the trier of fact will lessen the legal benefit for the client, the hyper-zealous
lawyer is called by the hyper-zealous model to stretch and bend rules to give as little epistemic
benefit to the tier of fact with respect to knowledge that will lessen the legal benefit to the client.
In abiding by these rules, the hyper-zealous lawyer may have to tolerate some amount of
disadvantage to the client or find a legal way to avoid giving a benefit to the trier of fact that would
also be in the disadvantage of the client (e.g., by having evidence excluded or claiming privilege
on documents).
In merely-zealous lawyering, by contrast, the trier of fact is a vital epistemic other who
must receive an epistemic benefit from the lawyer (in the form of evidence about facts) (1) as part
of service to the client and (2) as part of the functioning of the legal system and thus the model of
lawyering itself. This is not to say that merely-zealous lawyers are keen to surrender their client’s
advantage or positions by freely offering up information to epistemically enrich the court. Merelyzealous lawyers are not ignorant of litigation strategy. However, merely-zealous lawyering, which
emphasizes the political and moral value of legal institutions, including the adjudicative system
and the courts themselves, has an explicit impetus for the lawyer to ultimately desire that the trier
of fact is accurately informed and can give the client his/her legal entitlements, not more or less
than his/her legal entitlements.
From the perspective of attempting to develop legal practice as a way of being and
developing epistemic character traits, there is a substantial difference between seeking the
epistemic benefit of the other—in this case, the trier of fact—only for the sake of strategic benefit
(as the hyper-zealous lawyer does) and seeking the benefit of the other both for strategic benefit
and as part of the substantive principles underlying one’s particular model of lawyering. This
distinction in motivations is illuminating even in cases when the practical actions that the lawyer
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takes are the same under either traditional model. Thus, merely-zealous traditional lawyering
extends the circle of others whose epistemic benefit the lawyer can seek on principle and who can
receive the benefit of earnestly applied epistemic character traits.
Merely-zealous lawyering cannot stop there, however, and sees perhaps the biggest
expansion out of all models in the people who it can recognize as epistemic others, and in relation
to whom the model supports the principled practice of epistemic virtues. The adversarial system
of adjudication has a structure by which it carries out the processes of legal dispute resolution, the
most formal of which is litigation. Part of this process involves partisan adversaries presenting
their evidence and arguments before a neutral arbiter. Practicing merely-zealous lawyering, with
its emphasis on the dispute resolution processes of law—showing a deep commitment to the
adversarial process—has a principled reason to value the epistemic benefit of the neutral arbiter
(e.g., the trier of fact). However, there are other processes that require the lawyer to provide an
epistemic benefit in order to contribute to the function of the adversarial system.
One particularly unexpected example that illustrates the potential to expand the circle of
epistemic others, especially in relation to a version of the traditional zealous advocate model of
lawyering, is the opposing litigant and his/her lawyer during the disclosure process. Lawyers
following traditional models may not actually cognize a desire for the opposing party to benefit
epistemically from a disclosure. However, the adversarial system requires disclosure processes for
litigants to obtain vital information and to avoid trial by ambush. Though an assent to the
traditional model does not mean that any particular lawyer seeks the epistemic benefit of any
particular legal adversary, it does mean that the lawyer must hope that disclosure processes
generally serve the purpose of informing the adversarial litigation process.
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Practitioners of hyper-zealous lawyering have reasons to want this process to work solely
for the sake of their own client’s advantage. Seeking whatever benefit the legal system can be
made to give, hyper-zealous lawyering leaves room for lawyers to desire the existence of broken
aspects of disclosure rules, of which lawyers can routinely take advantage for the benefit of their
own client. By contrast, practitioners of merely-zealous lawyering have principled reasons to want
disclosure processes to work for all litigants. Merely-zealous lawyers may not want any particular
legal adversary to learn anything that helps that adversary but are committed to providing
epistemic benefits to the archetype of the legal adversary in a system of adjudication. This same
reasoning can be applied by both traditional models of lawyering to any other parties who play
roles that require an epistemic benefit.
Finally, as with ethics, alternative models of lawyering have the capacity to recognize
broad epistemic permissions and obligations to participants and stakeholders in legal processes.
Like merely-zealous lawyering, this includes many participants, even the legal adversary.
Depending on the details of the particular alternative model, the epistemic benefit given to the
epistemic other can be recognized for at least the three principled reasons: (1) as part of service to
the client and (2) as part of the functioning of the legal system, and (3) as part of service to a
principle that is built into the model (whether that principle is epistemic or not). The third
principled reason for giving benefits to epistemic others is based on grounds that are different from
traditional models of lawyering, including merely-zealous lawyering.
The merely-zealous lawyer can recognize the need to benefit the legal adversary as part of
carrying out the adversarial model of adjudicating disputes. Giving this epistemic benefit of the
legal adversary is justified on procedural grounds. However, in merely-zealous lawyering, there is
no permission or obligation to give an epistemic benefit to the legal adversary simply for the sake
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of epistemically benefitting the legal adversary (and apart from the procedural requirements of the
adversarial system). By contrast, alternative models of lawyering allow for the possibility of
seeking the epistemic (and even non-epistemic) benefit of the legal adversary even for reasons
other than the procedural requirements of the adversarial process. A lawyer practicing an
alternative model may have reasons founded in the particular alternative model itself to want the
legal adversary to acquire knowledge, e.g., facts about a case.
One possible class of examples would be situations in which a lawyer represents a single
and powerful organization that harms a disparate group of individuals (such as with environmental
liability issues). In addition to simply wanting the case to move through the adversarial litigation
process towards resolution, a lawyer practicing an alternative model may have theoretical support
(epistemic and non-epistemic) for seeking to have the client-organization admit truths to the
individuals who have been harmed. Lawyers working for the polluting client and practicing an
alternative model of lawyering might consider the epistemic benefit of the legal adversary (e.g.,
plaintiffs suing the corporation for causing environmental and consequent health harms) as part of
an alternative model’s normative prescriptions to consider the interests of parties besides their
client. By contrast, traditional models have reasons grounded in their visions of the lawyer’s role
in the legal system to oppose giving such epistemic benefit to legal adversaries.
Alternative models of lawyering also go beyond having different groundings for sharing
knowledge, and beyond wanting to share different types of knowledge, with epistemic others who
are also recognized by merely-zealous theories of lawyering. Depending on the precise details of
the particular alternative model, adherents can recognize permissions, and even obligations, to
people who would be beyond the circle of epistemic others that could occupy the concern of
traditional models of lawyering. Lawyers practicing alternative models may be called to provide

153

epistemic benefits to sections of the public (especially stakeholders), and even to the broad public,
who are not participants in any currently active legal process. Preventing a harm to a community,
e.g., an environmental harm, may require giving that community knowledge about the danger
caused by a polluting company. In such cases, a virtue epistemic theory of lawyering can lend
support to the ethical impetus that is already behind the goal of protecting the public in some
alternative models of lawyering. Thus, virtue epistemology and epistemic virtue orientation
provide grounds for reframing the reasons that lawyers who practice alternative models of
lawyering might cite for giving epistemic benefits to epistemic others and for expanding the group
of epistemic others that the lawyer has an impetus to benefit.
Models of lawyering relate to virtue epistemology in different ways. Traditional and
alternative models of lawyering will view the impact of promoting particular intellectual virtues
(whether self-regarding or other-regarding, or particular competing virtues within each of those
virtue orientations) as having different implications for the conceptual justifications of the
adversarial system (e.g., for the ability of adversarial litigation to be an effective means of
providing knowledge of the facts of a case, for vindicating the rights of parties, or for whatever we
believe are the aims of adjudication as practiced in common law legal systems). At the same time,
virtues and the idea of virtue orientation are complicated by concepts such as partisanship and roledifferentiation in the philosophy of lawyering, especially as advocated by competing models of
lawyering (traditional models of lawyering and alternative models of lawyering). Competing
models of lawyering have the conceptual grounding to support virtue development (ethical and
intellectual) in ways that emphasize each virtue orientation differently when it comes to the many
roles that lawyers play. These dynamics will continue to be relevant throughout this dissertation.
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(4.5) Epistemic Partisanship
Thus far, I have explained key concepts in virtue epistemology and the way in which those
concepts take shape in the differentiated role that lawyers have in the adversarial system of
adjudication. I have indicated my preferences in terms of approaches to lawyering. However, a
normative approach to epistemology demands stronger stances than I have taken thus far.
Additionally, the epistemology of lawyering requires more focused accounts of what it means to
be an epistemically virtuous lawyer than can be given by piecemeal accounts of discrete virtues. I
will propose here a tailored epistemic approach to lawyering that works with the truth-seeking
epistemic purposes of the adversarial system and with the justifications for the normative epistemic
differentiation85 of the lawyer’s role. Crucially, I am not proposing a super-value or core virtue to
which all other values and virtues can be reduced. I am proposing an epistemic virtue that merits
special emphasis in the role-differentiated context of lawyering in an adversarial adjudicative
system. This virtue exists alongside other epistemic virtues that still apply and that need to be
practiced in a way that is responsive to the legal context.
Lawyering in the adversarial system of adjudication, a special context in which the lawyer
supports epistemic checks and balances, requires neither thoroughgoing dispositions of epistemic
benevolence, nor thoroughgoing dispositions of epistemic malevolence, from lawyers. Rather,
lawyering in the adversarial system requires epistemic partisanship. In traditional models of
lawyering, partisanship is understood as the requirement for the lawyer to “maximize the
likelihood that the client’s objectives will be attained”.86 This account of partisanship is an aspect
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of some models of lawyering that are grounded in ethical theory; it serves the positivist
underpinnings of some traditional models of lawyering.87
In my epistemology of lawyering, partisanship is even more relevant to the central concerns
of supporting the system of adjudication than it is in traditional models of lawyering. The key
difference between partisanship in moral/political theories of lawyering and partisanship in my
virtue epistemic theory of lawyering is in terms of what can be observed about the partisanship
norm when emphasis is placed on the role of partisanship in serving a system with an epistemic
aim. I consider partisanship in terms of the role that it plays in supporting the adversarial system
of adjudication in performing its basic functions, especially seeking truth. Due to this focus, I will
have a different conception of the norm of partisanship than existing ethical theories and possibly
different results when I apply my conception of the norm. I allow for the possibility that my
epistemic approach to partisanship will be consistent with conceptions of partisanship from legal
ethics theory (including traditional models of lawyering, which are informed by particular moral
and political principles), but I do not actively seek that consistency.
In an adversarial system of adjudication, lawyers are key facilitators of the conflict of
positions through which the adversarial system operates. During litigation, lawyers champion their
client’s case before neutral triers of fact and law. This involves marshalling and disseminating
knowledge in a way that advances the client’s cause. Far more foundationally than being an ethical
duty to maximize the client’s chances of success, partisanship within the context of the adversarial
system of adjudication can be considered the lawyer’s key contribution to the epistemic functions
and excellences of the system. Seen in this light, having a specialized function in the community’s
adjudicative system, what we can call “epistemic partisanship” (i.e., partisanship conceived in light
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of the epistemic functions that a lawyer performs in the adversarial system of adjudication) can be
taken as an epistemic virtue. Epistemic partisanship might be one of the central epistemic virtues
with which an epistemology of lawyering must be concerned.
Partisanship is best conceived of in responsibilist terms, rather than reliabilist terms. It is
not a skill, capacity, or a faculty-virtue. It is not “a disposition to succeed reliably enough at some
type of performance”.88 Rather, it is a trait-virtue. Partisanship is an undertaking of a certain role
within the adversarial system of adjudication, a taking of responsibility for the legal and epistemic
interests of the client. The partisan has a “disposition to form beliefs and/or desires of a certain
sort and (in many cases) to act in a certain way, when in conditions relevant to that disposition”.89
Speaking in the broadest terms, my epistemology of lawyering conceives of epistemic partisanship
within the context of the adversarial system of adjudication as:
a disposition to (a) desire the epistemic and legal success of the client, which leads
to (b) taking action to support the advancement of the client’s cause, (c) in service
of the adversarial system of adjudication, especially its truth-seeking function.90
In the normal course of events during litigation, this disposition will require the lawyer to do things
such as marshal evidence and information that furthers the interest of the client and check evidence
and information that undermines the epistemic and legal interests of the client. I define the
“epistemic success of the client” as persuading the adjudicator of the client’s position by presenting

Will Fleisher, “Virtuous Distinctions: New Distinctions for Reliabilism and Responsibilism” (2017) 194:8 Synthese
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the adjudicator with truths, especially on disputed factual matters or on conceptual matters that can
be known.91 In this dissertation, I restrict myself to epistemic success on factual matters.
Like epistemic virtues that are not based in role-differentiation, epistemic partisanship
should be understood as a mean between two vices. These two vices are epistemic neutrality and
epistemic hyper-partisanship. An epistemically partisan lawyer pursues the client’s legal interests
while playing the proper epistemic role of the lawyer in the adversarial system of adjudication.
The two vices fail to take appropriate action at the appropriate time to serve the adversarial system
of adjudication. An epistemically neutral lawyer would be one who does not favour his/her client’s
cause, and who thus has no purpose as part of an adversarial dispute resolution process. Epistemic
hyper-partisanship puts forward the client’s case in a way that undermines the ability of the neutral
arbiter to perform a truth-seeking function, perhaps even deceiving the court.
Epistemic partisanship can fulfill all four of Jason Baehr’s dimensions of intellectual
virtue.92 Lawyers who practice epistemic partisanship in service of the adversarial system of
adjudication and its truth-seeking function can be for the epistemic good (the motivational
principle),93 i.e., for the legal system’s effective functioning at discovering truth. They can take
pleasure, or have other suitable affections, in relation to performing epistemic partisanship (the
affective principle).94 Lawyers must be competent at the activities that are characteristic of
epistemic partisanship, e.g., marshalling evidence (the competence principle).95 Finally, in order
to be epistemic partisans, and not fall into the epistemic vices associated with legal practice,
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lawyers must be able to recognize when, and to what extent, epistemic partisanship is epistemically
appropriate (the judgment principle).96
With respect to the judgment principle, which is central in a responsibilist virtue
epistemology, I distinguish between two levels of partisanship: global partisanship and local
partisanship. Global partisanship takes the side of the client regardless of whether taking the side
of the client serves the functions of the adversarial system of adjudication, and regardless of
whether the particular actions that the lawyer is taking for the client serve the justifications for the
lawyer’s role and role-differentiated norms. Local partisanship takes the side of the client only in
service of the functions of the adversarial system of adjudication, and thus only on grounds that
serve justifications for the lawyer’s role and role-differentiated norms. Within the adversarial
system of adjudication, lawyers must not practice global partisanship and must practice local
partisanship. Global partisanship leads to the vice of epistemic hyper-partisanship. Local
partisanship satisfies the judgment principle for the virtue of epistemic partisanship.
My distinction between global partisanship and local partisanship has a connection with
Tim Dare’s distinction between hyper-zealous lawyering and merely-zealous lawyering. Recall
that the hyper-zealous lawyer attempts to obtain for the client everything that the law can be made
to give and the merely-zealous lawyer attempts to obtain for the client all of the client’s legal
entitlements.97 Dare’s distinction explains two approaches to practice that are encompassed by my
broader distinction between global partisanship and local partisanship. His definition of the two
approaches distinguishes a failure (based in overzealousness) and a success to satisfy the
conditions that Razian legal positivism provides for the role-differentiation of the lawyer.
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In Dare’s theory, the appropriateness of the style of practice is defined in relation to the
question of whether the lawyer facilitates the dispute resolution function of law by seeking to
vindicate all of the client’s legal entitlements and nothing more. The key question is about whether
a particular justification for role-differentiation of the lawyer is satisfied. By contrast, my
distinction between global partisanship and local partisanship is based simply on the question of
whether the lawyer is serving the justifications for the lawyer’s role and the role’s associated
normative differentiation within the adversarial system. Dare’s distinction focuses on a particular
justification for role-differentiation, whereas my distinction is about serving any/all justification(s)
for role-differentiation. Global partisanship and local partisanship can thus encompass the
distinction between hyper-zeal and mere-zeal. Both sets of concepts remain useful but speak to
different concerns in relation to individual lawyers, models of lawyering, and aspects of the legal
system.
Epistemic partisanship is not the combination of epistemic benevolence for one’s client
along with epistemic malevolence for the legal adversary. Epistemic partisanship does not make
an enemy of the epistemic good. Nor, crucially, does an adversarial legal relationship imply that
lawyers make an enemy of the epistemic good of the legal adversary. Lawyers are playing a role
in a system that is intended to give a fair hearing to the adversaries in a legal dispute. Part of giving
a fair hearing is the use of a process that is believed to allow the trier of fact a good chance to
arrive at true conclusions about the facts of a case. In jurisdictions that use the adversarial system
of adjudication, the truth-seeking process requires the parties to a dispute to put forward the
strongest possible case from their partisan perspective, allowing a disinterested adjudicator to
judge the merits of these partisan positions.
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While nobody’s epistemic good is enemized by epistemic partisanship, the way in which
epistemic partisanship serves the pursuit of truth (and, thinking about law as a social system, the
way in which partisanship aids in the pursuit of Goldman’s five veritistic social epistemic
standards—(1) reliability, (2) power, (3) fecundity, (4) speed, and (5) efficiency 98) is less obvious
than the way in which an epistemically benevolent agent would pursue truth, and than the way in
which an epistemically malevolent agent would oppose the discovery of truth, within the legal
system. The key difference, as I have explained throughout Section (4) of this dissertation, is that
the epistemic aim behind partisanship is facilitated by the practitioners of epistemic partisanship
through a clash of positions within the adjudicative system. If someone were to behave like a
lawyer without having the other key aspects of the adversarial system (i.e., a partisan opponent
and a neutral arbiter) this person’s behaviour (e.g., being highly protective of information) would
often be making it far more difficult for any social practice in which s/he participates to achieve
Goldman’s veritistic standards. Some lawyerly behaviour would not even make sense for any
epistemic agent to practice without the context of the adversarial system of adjudication.99
In contrast to epistemic partisanship, epistemic benevolence and malevolence, which are
capable of affecting the social epistemology of the adversarial system, do not rely on the processes
of the legal system to either be effective or ineffective at their aims. Benevolently giving another
person the benefit of an other-regarding virtue such as honesty can be done in the context of legal
processes, but one can be honest and achieve the epistemic effects of honesty apart from the
litigation process. Similarly, a person can malevolently deceive another person within a legal
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process, but one can be deceptive and achieve the epistemic effects of deception outside of a legal
process. Partisanship gains meaning from the process.
Of course, this is not to say that epistemic partisanship works perfectly as long as it is
practiced within the processes of the adversarial system of adjudication. The system makes sense
of the disposition and gives it a place to function; the system does not guarantee that partisanship
will serve the legal system impeccably. Even within the adversarial system of adjudication,
lawyerly partisanship—ethical and epistemic—may often oppose the legal system’s discovery of
truth and achievement of Goldman’s veritistic standards.100 Such pitfalls are perhaps features of a
system of adjudication that is based on a clash between parties who are represented by
champions.101 A system of conflict that is effective in the aggregate may, in virtue of its own core
mechanisms, sometimes impede the achievement of its ends.
Occasionally, the clash itself impedes the system’s epistemic goals. Legally legitimate
behaviour by lawyers, such as protecting the client’s privileged information can go against the
achievement of all five of Goldman’s standards, and will very frequently reduce that speed at
which true beliefs are acquired and increase the cost of acquiring those true beliefs. 102 Lawyers
within the legal system itself (the very system that gives meaning to their work) can undermine
the veritistic epistemic goals of the legal system. Lawyerly partisanship, even as a virtue that
supports the adversarial system of adjudication, can sometimes make Goldman’s standards more
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difficult to achieve. A good system and its supporting virtues can be far from perfection in realizing
its aims.
In addition to its own stumbling blocks and internal limits, epistemic partisanship has limits
that are external to epistemology and the structures that systems put in place to pursue epistemic
ends. The legal community does not have the sole aim of achieving epistemic ends through the
processes of the legal system. The acquisition and promotion of knowledge is a crucial value of
legal systems, but it is not the only value that a legal system pursues or should pursue. Other values,
norms and virtues exist alongside epistemic values, norms, and virtues. Domains beyond
epistemology itself may place constraints on the pursuit of epistemic values and may even
supersede epistemic values.
Epistemologists have already appreciated this dynamic in their application of epistemic
ideas to the field of science. In particular, in accordance with well established practices in the
sciences, epistemologists have recognized moral constraints on the pursuit of knowledge. Alvin
Goldman argues that:
Although veritistic value is the fundamental benchmark of epistemic virtue, it is
obviously not the only value. Nor is it the preeminent value for all purposes of life
and action. Epistemological or scientific value sometimes conflicts with moral
value, and when they conflict, epistemological value must give way. There is a
moral ‘side-constraint’ on scientific research, which is that the conduct of such
research should not violate human rights or injure people.103
Goldman illustrates this by discussing the moral and epistemic value of conducting certain types
of scientific experimentation on human subjects. He says that the reasons to not undertake some
types of experimentation are “not because it would lack scientific or epistemic value. Rather, it is
a case in which the moral disvalue trumps the scientific value”.104
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A similar analysis of constraints can be undertaken in relation to legal processes. In some
situations, the evidence-seeking missions of various legal actors are limited not because the
information that they would, or could, discover would lack factual/legal/epistemic value and would
thus by unhelpful to the truth-seeking mission of the adversarial system of adjudication. Instead,
some non-epistemic legal

and moral

norms/values

may constrain

the pursuit

of

factual/legal/epistemic value that would be achieved by discovering evidence. These nonepistemic legal and moral values sometimes take pre-eminence over the factual/legal/epistemic
value of the evidence-seeking missions of legal professionals and other participants in
investigative roles.
The search for evidence about the facts of a case is constrained by constitutions, statutes,
common law, and other legal norms and values. These norms and values are legal instantiations of
society’s respect for the moral rights and human dignity of citizens. The United States’ Bill of
Rights notably includes the right against unreasonable search and seizure, the right against selfincrimination, the right to a jury trial, among other norms that limit and shape the search for
evidence and the adjudication of facts.105 The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms contains
similar provisions.106 The rights against unreasonable searches and seizures and the right against
self-incrimination can make it more difficult for the police and for the court to obtain evidence

See US Const amend IV (search and seizure), amend V (self-incrimination), amend VI (jury trial – criminal law),
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See Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the
Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 8 (search and seizure), ss 11(c) and 13 (self-incrimination), and s 11(f) (jury
trial – criminal law).
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about a case. In certain situations, the police and courts may never discover some evidence because
of these rights. Jury trials also raise a host of epistemic issues that may be avoided or mitigated
(from an epistemic perspective) if the trier of fact is someone more experienced at hearing and
weighing evidence.107
Legal protections for various kinds of privileged relationships (e.g., lawyer-client, spousal)
may also restrict the pursuit of knowledge about the facts of a case. Furthermore, models of
lawyering may do the same, as traditional models of lawyering encourage lawyers to zealously
protect their clients’ confidentiality, while alternative models may discourage lawyers from
aggressively pursuing the disclosure of certain types of information from vulnerable participants
in the legal process, such as from victims of sexual assault. Even if it true that a fuller picture of
the facts of a sexual assault case could be gained by highly aggressive questioning of a sexual
assault complainant (a premise that has not at all been shown to be true),108 alternative models of
lawyering that take into account the interests of third parties would exhort lawyers against such
aggressive questioning.
All of these rights, norms, and values can be said to constrain, block, or impede the legal
system’s epistemic efforts in a case. Nonetheless, constitutions, statutes, common law, and other
legal norms and values place these epistemic restrictions on legal systems and on actors within
legal systems because there are competing non-epistemic values that must be vindicated, and
which can trump the search for truth in some ways and to some extent. Epistemic ends, though
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Clearly, there would also be arguments for the inverse, suggesting that jury trials provide epistemic advantages in
addition to moral/political/non-epistemic advantages. Even so, it is important to recognize the epistemic challenges
that jury trials present.
108
If the premise cannot be shown to be true, then one possibility is that such highly aggressive questioning would be
more likely to create a distorted account of the facts, thus undermining the epistemic aims of the adversarial system
of adjudication. In such a case, aggressive questions may actually be shown to be a stumbling block of epistemic
partisanship itself.
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crucial for the legal process,109 are not the only values in the legal system. As in science, there are
other concerns (legal and moral) that place constraints on the search for knowledge in law. This
reality will affect conceptions of epistemic virtues. This includes epistemic partisanship which,
though its justification and ability to be of epistemic service to the adversarial system persists,
must be practiced in accordance with these restrictions that are external to the epistemic needs of
adversarial adjudication.
With all its messy and inconvenient nuances, the idea of epistemic partisanship is the
central epistemic virtue that will structure the remainder of this dissertation, especially the Client
Perjury Trilemma case study in Part V. My analysis will be directed towards the lawyer’s
development of the character trait of partisanship, which is a virtue within the lawyer’s role in
serving the adversarial system and its truth-seeking function.

109

The legal system depends on knowledge of the facts of cases.
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Part IV– Adjacent Theories of Lawyers’ Cognition
Epistemology, like the other branches of philosophy, is not free of interaction with, or
influence from, other domains of knowledge, and should not be thought to be so in the philosophy
of lawyering. As I have stated about my broader aims in this dissertation, epistemology can be part
of a more wide-ranging reimagining of the study of lawyering. This re-envisioning centres the
cognitive life of the lawyer. Two other fields of study—education and behavioural science—can
be partners in developing a study of lawyering that, through the combined strengths of these fields,
is descriptive, normative, and reformative.

(5) Metacognition – Pedagogy & Epistemology
Legal education is undergoing reformation. As clinical legal education continues its rise,1
law students are being challenged to broaden their skills far beyond the all-important final exam
that tests a student’s ability to reason through, and apply, principles from decisions made in
appellate court cases.2 Richer pedagogies of instruction and evaluation are also at the disposal of
legal educators.3 Developments in legal education that better prepare law students for the realities
of legal practice recognize a broader range of intellectual capabilities, as well as other capacities,
that have a place in legal education and that are necessary for legal practice. There are increases
both in the choices that learners have and in demands that are made of learners. In addition to the
initial training that lawyers must have to practice law, the legal profession requires lifelong

See generally Gemma Smyth, Samantha Hate & Neil Gold, “Clinical and Experiential Learning in Canadian Law
Schools: Current Perspectives” (2017) 95:1 Can Bar Rev 151.
2
See generally Steven Friedland, “A Critical Inquiry into the Traditional Uses of Law School Evaluation” (2002) 23:1
Pace L Rev 147; Steve Sheppard, “An Informal History of How Law Schools Evaluate Students, with a Predictable
Emphasis on Law School Final Exams” (1997) 65:4 UMKC L Rev 657.
3
See generally Anthony Niedwiecki, “Teaching for Lifelong Learning: Improving the Metacognitive Skills of Law
Students through More Effective Formative Assessment Techniques” (2012) 40:1 Capital UL Rev 149; Anthony S.
Niedwiecki, “Lawyers and Learning: A Metacognitive Approach to Legal Education” (2006) 13:1 Widener L Rev 33;
Carol Springer Sargent & Andrea A Curcio, “Empirical Evidence that Formative Assessments Improve Final Exams”
(2012) 61:3 J Leg Educ 379.
1
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learning. Regulators of the legal profession recognize this as they have adopted and refined
requirements for continuing legal education. Basic competence in the present, and over the course
of a career, requires a lawyer to be adept at learning, and skillful at imparting what s/he has learned,
to key epistemic others—especially clients, judges, and juries. Lawyers’ opportunities to take
responsibility for their own cognitive development are increasing and persistently relevant to a
lawyer’s career.
Pedagogy and epistemology are ready to inform lawyers in exercising these opportunities.
The two fields share a core focus: the imparting of knowledge. Between these two disciplines,
there is a shared concept—metacognition—that should play an ever-increasing role in informing
understandings of how knowledge is acquired and imparted. Metacognition4—which is defined
most simply as thinking about thinking—is built on the insight that thinking is itself an aspect of
education that can be studied, understood, and purposefully structured. Making a helpful
distinction, the educational psychologist Gregory Schraw explains that “cognitive skills are
necessary to perform a task, while metacognition is necessary to understand how the task was
performed”.5 When students learn to think about thinking, they become more than passive
recipients of knowledge and can do more than muddle through their education. Students who
engage in metacognition can themselves improve and direct their own learning processes. The
relevance of metacognition is not limited to the formal schooling context. It goes beyond any
endeavours that are explicitly directed towards education.

See generally John H Flavell, “Metacognition and Cognitive Monitoring” (1979) 34:10 American Psychologist 906,
one of the earliest works on metacognition.
5
Gregory Schraw, “Promoting General Metacognitive Awareness” (1998) 26:1/2 Instructional Science 113 at 113,
citing Ruth Garner, Metacognition and Reading Comprehension (Norwood, N.J: Ablex, 1987).
4
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The philosopher Jerry Green proposes that metacognition itself be understood as an
epistemic virtue.6 Green carefully specifies the definition of metacognition in a way that links up
with the aims of virtue epistemology and its category of epistemic virtue. He defines metacognition
as:
[A] disposition to (a) form beliefs, desires, and feelings about one’s own epistemic
situation, processes, goals, and performance, which lead to (b) the mental activity
of monitoring, regulating, adapting, and evaluating about one’s own epistemic
situation, processes, goals, and performance, when (c) in conditions prompting selfaware attempts at problem-solving or strategic thinking.7
Green’s account of metacognition is responsibilist,8 describing metacognition as a character trait,
rather than as a skill.9 He goes through a detailed application of Jason Baehr’s dimensions of
intellectual virtues—which are presented from a responsibilist perspective10—finding that
metacognition meets the demands for qualifying as an epistemic virtue, including the motivational
principle, the affective principle, the competence principle, and the judgment principle.11
The disposition of metacognition is a self-regarding epistemic virtue—a virtue that “tend[s]
to directly benefit oneself”.12 The direct benefit that metacognition gives to the self is in serving
the intrinsic and instrumental value of competence and intellectual growth. As Kawall recognized,

See Jerry Green, “Metacognition as an Epistemic Virtue” (2019) 35:1 Southwest Philosophy Review 117 [J Green,
“Metacognition”].
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Ibid at 120.
8
See ibid at 121.
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See ibid at 120, citing the definition of “character trait” given by Christian B Miller & Angela Knobel, “Some
Foundational Questions in Philosophy about Character” in Christian B Miller et al, eds, Character: New Directions
from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015) 19 at 21. Recall the definition
of “character trait” given above in Section (3.2) at note 31 and accompanying text. Note, however, that Green
recognizes the ways in which metacognition involves skill, particularly in that good metacognizers “are skilled at
monitoring and evaluating their own knowledge and abilities, and at having an accurate assessment of their own status
and performance”, J Green, “Metacognition”, supra note 6 at 123. This is part of Green’s application of Baehr’s
competence principle.
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See Jason Baehr, “The Four Dimensions of Intellectual Virtue” in Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote & Ernest Sosa, eds,
Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and Chinese Philosophy: The Turn Toward Virtue (New York: Routledge,
2016) 86 at 86.
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the distinction between self-regarding virtues and other-regarding virtues should not be applied
too rigidly. Particularly when attempting to understand the metacognition of a professional, it is
vital to allow room for the self-regarding benefits of metacognition to be of substantial indirect
benefit to epistemic others.
In a more recent line of scholarship, authors have developed the concept of social
metacognition. This concept can add a great deal of nuance to our understanding of the virtue
orientation of metacognition. Definitions of social metacognition, especially in relation to
metacognition simpliciter, are still very much being contested. According to one line of thinking,
metacognition is thinking about one’s own thought.13 Social metacognition, by contrast, can
include thinking about the thoughts of others and thinking about social relationships.14 Here too,
the direct beneficiary of social metacognition is the person who thinks about others’ cognition and
about social relationships. Thus, the direct beneficiary is the self. However, the purpose of social
metacognition will often be to eventually provide an indirect benefit to epistemic others. Later in
this dissertation, I will apply ideas from social metacognition to the lawyer’s actions leading up to
the Client Perjury Trilemma, especially in the earliest stages of the advising context. In the present
section, I will restrict myself to metacognition being an endeavour of thinking about one’s own
thought.
As virtues are means between vices, so too is metacognition a mean between two vices.
Hints at identifying these related vices can be seen when Green discusses the feelings and
phenomena experienced by agents who do not metacognize virtuously. These feelings and
phenomena are associated with the Dunning-Kruger Effect, on one hand, and Imposter Syndrome,

See Pablo Briñol & Kenneth G DeMarree, “Social Metacognition: Thinking About Thinking in Social Psychology”
in Pablo Briñol & Kenneth G DeMarree, eds, Social Metacognition (New York: Psychology Press, 2012) 1 at 3.
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13

170

on the other. The Dunning-Kruger Effect describes an unskilled person’s inability to appreciate
his/her own ignorance or incompetence, and thus often being overconfident.15 Imposter Syndrome
is a person’s feeling of being a phony or a fraud because s/he believes things such as that s/he is
not as intelligent as others perceive him/her to be or that his/her achievements are not actually due
to his/her intelligence or capabilities.16 These feelings and phenomena themselves are not the vices,
however. They are the result of epistemic vices. The feelings and phenomena described as the
Dunning-Kruger Effect and Imposter Syndrome can be associated with several vices, intellectual
and otherwise, that contrast with the virtue of metacognition. For example, the Dunning-Kruger
Effect may be associated with the epistemic vice of intellectual arrogance and Imposter Syndrome
may be associated with the epistemic vice of intellectual servility or “obsessive introspection”17.
Between such vices stands the virtue of metacognition, which can assist in addressing the problems
that these vices cause.
Components of metacognition have been finely divided and subdivided. Some of these
components, “monitoring, regulating, adapting, and evaluating”, are mentioned in Green’s
definition of metacognition as an epistemic virtue.18 Yet, there remains substantial contestation
about these components—enough so that they inform different models of metacognition.19

See J Green, “Metacognition”, supra note 6 at 123, citing Justin Kruger & David Dunning, “Unskilled and Unaware
of It: How Difficulties in Recognizing One’s Own Incompetence Lead to Inflated Self-Assessments” (1999) 77:6
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Psychotherapy: Theory, Research & Practice 241.
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Exploring in depth the different components and models of metacognition that are part of the
ongoing scholarly debate is beyond the scope of this dissertation. Instead, I will briefly lay out
some of the key concepts that are helpful for providing an applied virtue epistemology of the legal
profession.
“Knowledge of cognition [also called metacognitive knowledge] refers to what
individuals know about their own cognition or about cognition in general”.20
“Regulation of cognition [also called metacognitive regulation] refers to a set of
activities that help students control their learning”.21
“Metacognitive experiences are any conscious cognitive or affective experiences
that accompany and pertain to any intellectual enterprise. An example would be the
sudden feeling that you do not understand something another person just said”.22
Knowledge of cognition is subdivided into “at least three different kinds of metacognitive
awareness: declarative, procedural, and conditional knowledge”.23 The former, declarative
knowledge, “includes knowledge about oneself as a learner and about what factors influence one’s
performance”.24 Procedural knowledge is about how to do things.25 Finally, “[c]onditional
knowledge refers to knowing when and why to use declarative and procedural knowledge”.26
Regulation of cognition has been divided into three skills. They are:
Planning, which “involves the selection of appropriate strategies and the allocation
of resources that affect [cognitive] performance”.27 Examples include laying out
the sequence of a strategy and allocating time for a cognitive task.28
Schraw, supra note 5 at 114 [emphasis added]. Accord Flavell, supra note 4 at 906, “Metacognitive knowledge is
that segment of your…stored world knowledge that has to do with people as cognitive creatures and with their diverse
cognitive tasks, goals, actions, and experiences” [emphasis added].
21
Schraw, supra note 5 at 114 [emphasis added].
22
Flavell, supra note 4 at 906 [emphasis added]. Examples that Green gives of “epistemic feelings” can be prominent
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‘feeling of knowing’”, and the “‘feeling of forgetting’”, J Green, “Metacognition”, supra note 6 at 119, citing Santiago
Arango-Muñoz, “Metacognitive Feelings, Self-Ascriptions, and Mental Actions” (2014) 2:1 Philosophical Inquiries
145.
23
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Monitoring, which “refers to one’s on-line awareness of comprehension and task
performance. The ability to engage in periodic self-testing while learning is a good
example”.29 Two key questions related to monitoring are, “Do I have a clear
understanding of what I am doing?” and “Does the task make sense?”30
Evaluating, which “refers to appraising the products and efficiency of one’s
learning. Typical examples include re-evaluating one’s goals and conclusions”.31
Key questions involve asking which things worked and what should be done
differently to improve next time.32
In metacognitive knowledge and metacognition regulation, we have the capacity to
understand our own cognition and the means by which we can take action in relation to our
cognition (usually action to improve cognition). Metacognitive experience, the final component
that I discuss here, is not as robustly developed as the last two components of metacognition but
is nonetheless indispensable to, and unavoidable in, cognition. Moreover, metacognitive
experience plays an important role in the truth-finding efforts undertaken within adversarial
systems of adjudication. Anastasia Efklides, a professor of cognitive and experimental psychology,
describes metacognitive experience as “the interface between the person and the task”, 33
“provid[ing] the input that activates metacognitive skills that control action and behaviour”.34
Being overwhelmed by the large volume of documents in a disclosure is a metacognitive
experience, as is a witness’ feeling of being caught with an inconsistency is his/her testimony. The
experience of being overwhelmed by the number of documents in a disclosure can drive the lawyer
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to consult his/her metacognitive knowledge and to take regulative action that will allow him/her
to bring meaningful order to the documents to find the information that will be useful to the client.35
Metacognition allows thinkers to take responsibility for their own cognitive development
and is thus vital to an epistemology of lawyering. Numerous participants in legal proceedings
require, and will benefit from, metacognition. The ways in which participants ought to, and do,
engage in metacognition will be heavily influenced by the participants’ role in the adversarial
system of adjudication. Some roles, such as the lawyer and judge, have extensive declarative,
procedural, and conditional knowledge required to perform their role in the legal process. These
roles require extensive regulation of cognition, including metacognitive planning, monitoring, and
repeated evaluation of one’s own cognitive processes and performance. Lawyers and judges will
build up a deposit of metacognitive experiences that will inform their metacognition (often in
helpful ways but also possibly in stultified ways). By contrast, jurors and non-expert witnesses
may have little to no knowledge of their cognition in a way that is relevant for the purpose of being
involved in a legal proceeding. They will have highly limited, or no, opportunities to control their
acquisition of knowledge about, and for, legal proceedings. Perhaps most anxiety-inducing,
infrequent and first-time participants in legal proceedings will have highly limited metacognitive
experiences that could add to their metacognitive knowledge or inform efforts at metacognitive
regulation.
Legal representation itself can be described, in part, as an offloading of metacognition from
the client to the lawyer. When a client is represented by the lawyer, it is the lawyer who takes the
bulk of responsibility for assessing his/her own understanding of concepts and facts that are
relevant to the case. This offloading is appropriate because the lawyer has specialized training in
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Of course, not all cognizers will respond so virtuously to difficult or unpleasant metacognitive experiences. Some
cognizers will respond to metacognitive experiences in epistemically vicious ways.
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the topic, which comes with much more developed metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive
regulation, and much more challenging metacognitive experiences that relate to adversarial legal
processes.36 The lawyer has already done a tremendous amount of metacognition to refine his/her
own thinking. This includes basic metacognitive work to become competent about a field in the
comparatively lower stakes environment of law school and/or any subsequent professional
training. Additionally, after practicing for several years, the lawyer will have done a great deal of
metacognitive work under the stresses and stakes of the lawyer’s career. The lawyer will hopefully
have taken numerous such positive steps that allow him/her to better prepare for adversarial
proceedings and have better cognitive reactions during such proceedings. By contrast many clients
will have too infrequent experiences with legal processes to develop their metacognition enough
that they can deploy it as a disposition in legal proceedings.37
Metacognition about the lawyer’s own understanding of the facts of a case and about the
lawyer’s expertise with a field of law are crucial aspects of the lawyer’s competence in a case.
This applies to the earliest stages of the lawyer’s interactions with a client, during which the law
assesses whether s/he actually can competently serve the client. A lawyer telling a client that s/he
cannot represent him/her in a case because s/he is not competent in a field of law, in dealing with
a specific problem, or even that s/he is overburdened with his/her current case load are acts based
on metacognition. The lawyer has declarative knowledge about his/her own ability to carry out the
cognitive labour required for a task and has the conditional knowledge to know that s/he must act
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on the basis of his/her declarative knowledge, admitting that s/he cannot do that work and taking
appropriate action in assisting the client to find other representation.38
When a lawyer decides that s/he can become competent in a practice area in a reasonable
time to serve the client properly,39 the lawyer must engage in metacognitive planning to set out the
path along which s/he will achieve competence and must engage in metacognitive monitoring to
assess his/her own comprehension of the practice area and performance in using his/her newly
acquired comprehension to serve the client. If done well, the lawyer can use these aspects of
metacognition to have the metacognitive experience of successful learning and application, rather
than a metacognitive experience such as stumbling at trial, failing to make a crucial manoeuvre,
and being sued or disciplined for malpractice.40
Relatedly, the act of asking for an adjournment to prepare for a fact or a legal source that
has not been disclosed requires the lawyer to engage in metacognition. In such a case,
metacognition begins with the lawyer’s experience of being unaware of the information being used
by the opposing side. The lawyer’s request for an adjournment to prepare a response immediately
commences the lawyer’s metacognitive planning. Once the adjournment is granted, the lawyer sets
to the task of planning how s/he will become knowledgeable about the information, including
logistical planning and time allocation. While familiarizing himself/herself with the information,
the lawyer must engage in metacognitive monitoring to ensure that s/he is preparing a sufficient
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response to give when court resumes. Numerous additional opportunities to practice the various
components of metacognition exist in legal processes. Such inquiry can inform both our concepts
of metacognition specifically and epistemic virtue more broadly.
Some of the richest benefits of an epistemology of lawyering can be achieved by making
the thinking process itself an explicit concern for lawyers. A legal profession that has learned from
the epistemology of lawyering should not merely want lawyers to think well in a sense that means
nothing more than acquiring information reliably and/or responsibly. Lawyers are already some of
the most intellectually adept members of society in terms of their ability to acquire knowledge and
reason logically. An epistemically aware legal profession should want lawyers to virtuously take
responsibility for their own thinking processes—understanding and evaluating their own
acquisition and use of knowledge through metacognition. What I have given here is just a small
example of the ways in which metacognition plays into the legal process through the role of the
lawyer. Metacognition in law merits its own extended scholarly treatment, focusing especially on
legal education. In this dissertation, I will refer again to concepts in metacognition. I will apply
concepts in metacognition to explain the way in which the Client Perjury Trilemma applies to the
early stages of the advising context,41 in which the lawyer takes the role of imparting declarative
and procedural knowledge to the client, as well as setting the groundwork for the lawyer’s own
application of procedural knowledge.

41

Below in Section (7.3.1).
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(6) Behavioural Legal Ethics – Science and Knowledge
Every theory that applies to humans and that describes humans relies on some assertions
and/or assumptions about human nature, especially human capacities. Epistemologists Roberts and
Wood argue that “different conceptions of the human person and his place in the universe yield
strikingly different pictures of proper human functioning, and thus of the virtues”.1 One crucial
aspect of understanding the human person is done on scientific grounds. Olin and Doris describe
virtue epistemology as “empirically committed” to accounts of human cognition.2 Virtue
epistemology makes, and relies on, claims about human psychology that ultimately must respond
to challenges and knowledge from sciences that study human cognition. Human psychology will
confound purely theoretical approaches to human cognition. Consider the following.
In purely theoretical terms, it would initially seem that the goal of any epistemic agent
should be to maximize his/her practice of epistemic virtues. Although the perfect practice of all
the cognitive virtues might in theory create the best possible cognizer, actual cognizers have much
more complicated relationships with knowledge. Some psychological literature demonstrates that
the possession of some cognitive virtues can actually be consistent with less cognitive excellence
or achievement in other respects. Consider the example of intellectual humility, which has been
conceived of in general terms as “humility specific to the domain of thoughts, beliefs, ideas, and
opinions”.3 More specifically, intellectual humility involves “understand[ing] and accept[ing] that
[one’s] cognitive faculties are not perfect and that [one’s] viewpoints may, at times, be
erroneous”.4 It is said to “involve[] openness to new information that may improve one’s current
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Robert C Roberts & W Jay Wood, Intellectual Virtues: An Essay in Regulative Epistemology (Oxford: Oxford
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knowledge”.5 Intellectual humility is considered an intellectual virtue; it is an epistemically helpful
trait that can be expected to support the acquisition of knowledge because intellectually humble
people should better understand their own thinking and are open to viewpoints that are different
from their own.
Though epistemic humility is a virtue, the scientific effort to understand intellectual
humility complicates the picture of how intellectual virtues are associated with intellectual
performance. Krumrei-Mancuso et al. found that meeting the “not a know-it-all” aspect of
intellectual humility was predictive of a lower grade point average among honours students who
participated in the study.6 The authors also cite research which finds that “intellectual arrogance
predicts better course grades”.7 This is not a case of epistemic virtues conflicting, calling for a
pluralistic approach that recognizes multiple competing virtues. Rather, it is a case of one particular
virtue and one particular vice having results that complicate what it means to pursue epistemic
benefits well overall. None of this means that a person should avoid having intellectual humility
and instead be intellectually arrogant. It does mean, however, that being epistemically virtuous
might involve more than just finding the mean between two vices.
Moreover, the empirical information brought forward by Krumrei-Mancuso et al. shows
that virtues are not purely associated with favourable epistemic results and that vices are not purely
associated with unfavourable epistemic results. Even if virtues have a strong tendency to lead to
favourable epistemic outcomes, some measure of negative might come with the positive in some
situations and vice versa. In the legal context, underestimating one’s own cognitive abilities and
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performance—a result associated with intellectual humility—may lead a lawyer to be more careful
about taking on a case in an area of practice with which s/he is less familiar. This might help the
lawyer to abide by his/her professional duty of competence as s/he avoids matters that are outside
of his/her expertise. However, underestimating one’s own cognitive abilities and performance can
come with downsides, perhaps even slowing a lawyer’s professional development as s/he
underestimates his/her competence for more challenging legal work. These observations about
human psychology and virtuous behaviour show that there is a need for more nuanced analysis of
the possession and expression of virtues. Cognitive science can inform such research endeavours.
It is a poor theory of virtue epistemology that does not respond to this empirical knowledge.
Efforts to understand such nuances between the ideal and reality, and the way in which
context influences the examples under discussion, can be greatly enriched by the empirical study
of the human mind. A crucial concern in epistemology and psychology is about whether the human
mind is capable of doing the things that virtue epistemology calls on it to do, i.e., whether epistemic
virtue is psychologically realizable.8 Applied to the virtue epistemology of lawyering, the question
becomes whether the human mind can do the various things that people are supposed to do in the
roles that are part of the legal system, including lawyers, judges, juries, witnesses (of the fact and
expert varieties), etc. Such complication may call for a distinction between the best possible
epistemic character and best actual epistemic character. The best possible epistemic character is
possessed by a being who maximizes the epistemic virtues and has them in perfect alignment,
leading to perfect epistemic results. The best actual epistemic character is the character of the
human being who most fully possesses the epistemic virtues. The lawyer, like any human, can at
most fulfill the latter.

8

See Olin & Doris, supra note 2 at 666 (discussing the psychological realizability of epistemological virtues).
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Within the academic study of lawyering, the field of behavioural legal ethics is at the
vanguard of applying psychological concepts and research methods to lawyers.9 I will not be able
to give any sort of robust scientific account of human nature in this dissertation. A scientific
account of lawyers and virtue epistemology would require the consideration of empirical research
that goes far beyond the normative focus that I have here. Even so, this brief consideration of
scientific accounts of human nature will allow me to present a virtue epistemology of lawyering
more carefully, at the very least by acknowledging some empirical questions that pertain to my
epistemic approach to the philosophy of lawyering.
(6.1) Avoiding Determinism in Behavioural Legal Ethics
A crucial potential pitfall should be recognized before considering specific arguments that
behavioural legal ethics (or any scientifically informed account of human nature) should be part
of a turn in the philosophy of lawyering that focuses on the cognition of lawyers. Based on patterns
of thinking that can arise in psychology, this pitfall poses problems both for moral reasoning about
lawyering and for a virtue epistemology of lawyering. Focusing on the effects of determinism on
moral reasoning, Luban and Wendel note, “[P]sychologists sometimes lapse into something like
determinism, the view that human moral choice is an illusion”.10 Determinism makes not only
moral choice into a delusion; it also turns any attempts to purposefully direct cognitive processes
into delusions. Just as one cannot actually make moral choices on determinism (i.e., an agent
cannot perform actions other than the actions that the agent actually performed),11 one cannot make

See generally Jennifer K Robbennolt & Jean R Sternlight, “Behavioral Legal Ethics” (2013) 45:3 Ariz St LJ 1107
(providing the first “comprehensive survey of the implications of psychology for legal ethics”, ibid at 1113).
10
David Luban & W Bradley Wendel. “Philosophical Legal Ethics: An Affectionate History” (2017) 30:3 Geo J Legal
Ethics 337 at 363.
11
I am working with a conception of free will that is described as libertarian free will. See generally Timothy
O’Connor & Christopher Franklin. “Free Will”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2020), Edward N
Zalta, ed, online: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University
<plato.stanford.edu/entries/freewill/> [perma.cc/VQ4R-ZW9M], s 2.5 (explaining different libertarian accounts of
free will).
9
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decisions related to one’s own cognition if determinism is true. This is a loss for an epistemological
theory based in virtue, which introduces ideas such as epistemic character, virtue, and vice. On
determinism, the idea of improving one’s epistemic character is illusory. Virtuous character traits,
rather than being earned or existing through responsible behaviour, become scripted programs that
human beings execute. You cannot attempt to improve your conscientiousness. You simply are as
conscientious as you were determined to be. If you become more conscientious or less
conscientious, you determined to do so. A parallel explanation could be given for vicious character
traits. This line of thought into which psychologists sometimes fall risks becoming a reliabilism
for machines, not for human beings.
Beyond what determinism implies for choice in abstract terms, Luban and Wendel raise a
significant problem that determinism poses for practical reasoning. Luban and Wendel argue that
determinism, when used in practical reasoning, can be an excuse to avoid responsibility.12 They
are talking about the effect that a belief in determinism can have on practical reasoning about moral
behaviour, but the same critique applies to practical reasoning about epistemic behaviour. The lack
of ability to change what one does can be an excuse to engage in bad epistemic practices. Just as
one can use determinism as an excuse for doing an action that harms another person, or that fails
to do a good thing for another person, one could use determinism as an excuse for failing to listen,
not communicating well, being intellectually arrogant, promoting biased reasoning, and even being
intellectually dishonest.
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See Luban & Wendel, supra note 10 at 363. Serious arguments can be raised about determinism and agents,
including lawyers. I welcome that discussion as part of a broader philosophy of lawyering. Even so, dealing robustly
with such questions is well beyond the scope of what I can hope to achieve in this dissertation. Thus, I will limit
myself to a discussion of what Luban and Wendel describe as being the effects of determinist beliefs on practical
reasoning.

182

Within the legal realm, a lawyer might use determinism as an excuse for behaviours such
as failing to develop a sufficient understanding of the client’s needs, being condescending or
paternalistic to the client, being abusive in cross-examining a witness, failing to disclose
documents, and even deceiving other parties or the court. Extending even beyond the excuses that
one can give to oneself for one’s own behaviour, deterministic thinking can too easily offer excuses
for problematic answers to cases such as the Client Perjury Trilemma that I discuss as the central
case study of this dissertation. This case study raises epistemic considerations about the behaviour
of multiple parties at once. To offer just one example, deterministic thinking about the cognition
of other participants in the adjudicative process can offer an excuse for the lawyer to avoid
exhorting others (especially the client in this case) against epistemically bad behaviour and might
even be raised as an excuse for other-regarding intellectually vicious behaviour. Given that, under
determinism, people cannot change their own cognitive processes to make them any better than
what has been causally determined to happen, determinism in practical reasoning may “simply
offer you false comfort as you follow the path of least resistance”.13 With the foregoing pitfalls
about psychological research and determinism in mind, this dissertation will reason on the basis that
participants in legal processes are not locked into predetermined moral choices or predetermined
modes of thinking.

(6.2) Partisanship & Lawyers’ Psychology
Returning to the topic of assumptions about human nature, I turn to Andrew Perlman, who
raises a question about the structural integrity of theories of lawyering. Perlman identifies an
assumption that exists within numerous theories of legal ethics and in relation to which behavioural
legal ethics can bring forward challenging empirical research. The objective-partisan assumption

13

Ibid. Note that this criticism also assumes that free will exists and that lawyers actually can make choices. If
determinism makes human choice into an illusion, then the comfort is not false and the path of least resistance. The
path that is actually chosen would simply be the only possibility.
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is the idea that “lawyers are capable of acting as partisans—being affiliated with one side of a
matter—while remaining sufficiently objective about their own conduct to resolve ethical
dilemmas in the manner theorists prescribe”.14
When Perlman discusses “partisans”, he is not referring merely to the partisanship principle
of legal ethics, which says that, “A lawyer must, within the established constraints on professional
behavior, maximize the likelihood that the client’s objectives will be attained”.15 Perlman is
referring to a broader conception that can be used outside of the context of law and that
encompasses the partisanship principle in legal ethics. Perlman’s broader conception defines
partisans as being “people who fit the dictionary definition of a ‘partisan,’ that is, those who are
adherents to, or aligned with, a specific ‘party, faction, cause, or person’”.16 Put simply, he is
referring to being on a side. This broader type of partisanship itself has effects on human
psychology that have gone underexplored in the literature on legal ethics.
The effects of partisanship challenge the objective-partisan assumption and theories that
rely on the assumption. The effects include various cognitive biases that can prevent lawyers from
accurately assessing their own behaviour, factual matters in the case, and their client’s
circumstances. Perlman gives the following examples as effects of partisanship. Optimism bias “is
the tendency to imagine that our futures are going to be more positive… than we should reasonably
expect”.17 Perlman says that optimism bias helps explain why a lawyer might overestimate his/her
client’s chance of success.18 Perhaps more troubling, optimism bias is a factor that may lead to
ethical fading, which is the experience of “hav[ing] difficulty identifying situations that implicate
Andrew M. Perlman, “A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics” (2015) 90:4 Ind LJ 1639 at 1640.
David Luban, “Partisanship, Betrayal and Autonomy in the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A Reply to Stephen
Ellmann” (1990) 90:4 Colum L Rev 1004 at 1004 [footnote omitted]. Recall also, above in Section (1.1) at note 5, the
account of partisanship given as part of the conditions of traditional models of lawyering.
16
Perlman, supra note 14 at 1643 [footnote omitted].
17
Ibid at 1654 [footnote omitted].
18
See ibid.
14
15
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ethical concerns”.19 It is a failure to understand that ethical issues even apply to a scenario. One
could describe this as a failure of moral sensitivity.20 Confirmation bias, yet another possible
distortion in cognition that can be caused by partisanship, is a person’s bias “in favor of
information that is consistent with…desired conclusions”.21 In a lawyer, confirmation bias may
distort the ability of the lawyer to assess whether the client is complying with the law.22
In addition to identifying the need to interrogate the objective-partisan assumption,
Perlman offers scientific evidence that weighs against the objective-partisan assumption.23 That is
to say that the evidence counts against the assumption that a person can be a partisan and be
objective about his/her own conduct or the conduct of those on whose behalf s/he is a partisan.
None of this evidence is conclusive, but it offers important early insights into the psychology of
partisans. Perlman cites evidence about the ability of partisanship to distort judgements when
group affiliations exist24 and when individuals have affiliations to causes.25 His focus there is on
the conduct of non-professionals.

Ibid at 1663–1664, n 153 and accompanying text, citing Ann E Tenbrunsel & David M Messick, “Ethical Fading:
The Role of Self-Deception in Unethical Behavior” (2004) 17:2 Social Justice Research 223.
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Neil Hamilton discusses the application of the model to the legal profession. See Neil Hamilton, “Assessing
Professionalism: Measuring Progress in the Formation of an Ethical Professional Identity” (2008) 5:2 U of St Thomas
LJ 470. The capacities are: moral sensitivity (“the awareness of how an individual’s actions affect other people”, ibid
at 485, citing James R Rest & Darcia Narváez, eds, Moral Development in the Professions: Psychology and Applied
Ethics (Hillsdale, NJ: L Erlbaum Associates, 1994) at 23); moral reasoning and judgment (“deliberation regrading the
various considerations relevant to different courses of action and making a judgment regarding which of the available
actions would be most morally justifiable”, Hamilton, supra at 485–486); moral identity and motivation (“‘the
importance given to moral values in competition with other values…’”, ibid at 487, citing Rest & Narváez, supra at
24); and, moral implementation (the “ego, strength, perseverance, backbone, toughness, strength of conviction, and
courage” required to see through moral behaviour, Hamilton, supra at 487, citing Rest & Narváez, supra at 24).
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Perlman, supra note 14 at 1656, n 112, citing Linda Babcock & George Loewenstein, “Explaining Bargaining
Impasse: The Role of Self-Serving Biases” (1997) 11:1 Journal of Economic Perspectives 109 at 114.
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More concerning, however, Perlman cites research on the effects that partisanship has on
professionals, including lawyers specifically. As an example of a type of non-lawyer professional,
auditors at accounting firms “were, on average, more likely to find that the company’s financial
reports complied with generally accepted accounting principles (GAAP) when they played the role
of the company’s accountant than when they were assigned to be the investor’s accountant”.26
Discussing lawyers, Perlman cites the distorting effects that partisanship has had on the conduct
of prosecutors, especially as these distorting effects have had a role in prosecutors’ failures to meet
their disclosure duties.27
For the objective-partisan assumption to be sustained, evidence must show that lawyers
behave differently than the examples considered, or arguments must be given about why lawyering
is different in terms of the way in which partisanship does or does not distort the cognition of the
lawyer on matters that are crucial to practicing the lawyer’s role. If role-differentiation, for
example, is to be the saving grace of the lawyer, it must be explained what it is about the lawyer’s
differentiated role, and that place of that roles in the legal system, that addresses the distorting
effects of partisanship. The fact that a system calls for partisanship and is built around partisan
contests is not sufficient reason to say that the system cannot be harmed by the distorting effects
of partisanship. On the contrary, Perlman argues that the legal profession may be particularly
vulnerable to the distorting effects of partisanship because partisanship is built into the role of the
lawyer; lawyers have exactly that “institutional function”.28 “[L]awyers”, Perlman says, “are
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supposed to make the best case for the client’s position”.29 Consequently, the lawyer’s partisan
work ends up being tied to his/her professional and personal self-worth. Biasing effects can be
stronger when people tie their projects and work to their self-worth, thus placing the lawyer at a
higher risk of falling into the cognitive biases being discussed.30
A word of caution is warranted here. It would be naïve and self-defeating to interpret the
objective-partisan assumption so strongly that the presence of the assumption is taken as being a
sufficient weakness in a theory to be a defeater for that theory. After all, the person who makes the
critique based on the objective-partisan assumption could himself/herself be described as a partisan
of his/her own theory and could thus be subject to similar biases that can arise in any partisan.
Unless the critic has a meta-theory about addressing assumptions in reasoning, the type of
behaviourist critique brought forward by Perlman would be subject to the same critique that he
makes of advocates of traditional models of lawyering and advocates of alternative models of
lawyering. His own theory would be making assumptions about the objectivity of the advocates of
those theories. But this is not how Perlman’s arguments should be read. Speaking about lawyers,
Perlman says that he is not suggesting that lawyers will never be able to use existing models of
lawyering—currently advanced without addressing the objective-partisan assumption—to
distinguish between permissible and impermissible behaviour.31 Perlman’s point is that the
objective-partisan assumption has gone uninterrogated in legal ethics. His contribution is to both
identify this problem and suggest approaches to ameliorate legal practice. Making the objectivepartisan assumption is only a problem for a theory if the objective partisan assumption is false.
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Theories as disparate as zealous advocate models of lawyering, alternative models of
lawyering, and even the cognitive approach to lawyering for which I am arguing in this dissertation
depend on the objective-partisan assumption. If the objective-partisan assumption is false, then
key aspects of these competing accounts of lawyering could be undermined. Zealous advocate
models “assume[] that lawyers are capable of acting as partisans—representing one side of a
matter—and actually identifying the line between permissible and impermissible behavior”.32
Perlman challenges the idea that a partisan lawyer is capable of doing everything legally
permissible to advance the legal interests of the client, going right up to the line of legality, but not
crossing the line into impermissible behaviour. The issue is that, as summarized in the present
section, partisanship itself may distort the ability of the lawyer to identify where the line is.
Perlman argues, “[I]f the lawyer is encouraged to approach a line that the lawyer cannot clearly
identify, the lawyer is at a heightened risk of engaging in impermissible behavior”.33 Impermissible
behaviour could involve breaches of codes of professional conduct, or they could also involve
crossing from mere-partisanship to hyper-partisanship34 (an ethical line that the partisan lawyer
may not be able to identify because of the cognitive biases brought about by partisanship itself).
Alternative models of lawyering, on the other hand, “assume[] that lawyers are capable of
acting as partisans (in the sense of being aligned with one side of a matter) while making
independent moral assessments about the client’s ends or the selected means”.35 The danger for
zealous advocate models was there being too much partisanship, i.e., too much of a good thing
from the perspective of zealous advocate models of lawyering. Conversely, alternative models of
lawyering run risks related to having lawyers show concern for considerations (e.g., moral
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considerations such as justice) that may be opposed to partisanship or that limit the scope of
partisanship. Someone who is a partisan may have a different reading of the requirements of justice
or other values that alternative models call on lawyers to consider in addition to the law. 36 A
partisan who does not see moral requirements as s/he normally does might be more hesitant to
raise moral concerns with the client and might be willing to accept more in the way of morally
questionable (or even immoral) behaviour from clients (and potential clients) before giving any
sort of response.
Similarly, theories of lawyering based on virtue epistemology assume that lawyers are
capable of being partisans while practicing epistemic virtues. In a virtue epistemology of
lawyering, lawyers must be capable of being partisans and still correctly identifying the boundaries
between virtue and vice—especially the mean between pairs of opposing vices. More specifically,
lawyers must be able to behave in ways that work with the epistemology of the adversarial legal
system within which their epistemically differentiated role exists and which needs their practice
of role-differentiated epistemic virtues.37 If partisanship distorts the lawyer’s ability to identify the
difference between epistemic virtue and vice, the lawyer risks becoming unable to practice
epistemic virtues, even possibly the partisan epistemic virtues that allow lawyers to advance their
clients’ positions. To put the concern in terms that are the primary focus of this dissertation,
partisanship may distort the behaviour of lawyers beyond what the legal system can use to
effectively pursue its truth-seeking function through conflicts between partisan champions. For

See ibid at 1646–1647 (Perlman applying his critique of the objective-partisan assumption in William Simon’s
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example, confirmation bias might distort epistemic virtues associated with discerning which types
of arguments the trier of fact will find persuasive.
The potential problems go even deeper. The cognitive biases created by partisanship pose
challenges not only in knowing what virtue requires in a particular situation but also to a person’s
development of epistemic virtues. Earlier, I discussed the Baehr’s principles that a person must
fulfill in order to possess an epistemic virtue. These principles include the motivational principle,
the affective principle, the competence principle, and the judgment principle. Satisfying the
judgment principle requires a disposition to recognize when acting in a way that is characteristic
of a virtue would be appropriate.38 If partisanship interferes with the ability to identify the
difference between virtue and vice in particular situations, it can also interfere with the
development of the disposition to distinguish between virtue and vice. Dispositions are acquired
and/or honed over time. This is potentially a devastating problem for a responsibilist virtue
epistemology of law, i.e., a theory of lawyering that depends on lawyers’ development of epistemic
traits.
Finally, in applying Perlman’s critique of the objective-partisan assumption to the virtue
epistemology of lawyering, it should be recognized that the virtue epistemology of lawyering
stands out from the other theories and philosophies of lawyering that make the objective-partisan
assumption and to which Perlman applies his scientifically informed critique of the objectivepartisan assumption. This is not because of any special logical relationship between virtue
epistemology and psychology. If Perlman’s critique shows that the accounts of human cognition
to which virtue epistemology and the virtue epistemology lawyering are “empirically committed”39
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are untrue, then virtue epistemology will be unable to stand. However, this is also the case when
it comes to other approaches to lawyering that depend on the objective-partisan assumption, and
this which have similar empirical commitments. Logically, theories of lawyering that have a
foundational reliance on the objective-partisan assumption will all fail if the objective-partisan
assumption is untrue.
However, virtue epistemology in general, and the virtue epistemology of lawyering in
particular, have a relationship with psychology that traditional models of lawyering and alternative
models of lawyering do not have. This relationship is that psychology and epistemology share
some core subject matter and concepts. Their focus is both on the human mind. One comes from
science and the other comes from philosophy. In this way, psychology and epistemology are like
law and morality, which also share core concepts and subject matter. 40 Making an assumption
about something that is studied in another field (as traditional models and alternative models do)
and sharing core subject matter are not the same thing. Virtue epistemology and psychology have
a potential to collaborate and compete in ways that philosophical ethics and legal philosophy will
not interact with psychology.
No silver bullet for bias is found in Perlman’s work, psychology more generally, or in
theories of lawyering. Responding to a critique of the objective-partisan assumption does not mean

See generally Ralf Poscher, “The Hand of Midas: When Concepts Turn Legal, or Deflating the Hart-Dworkin
Debate” in Jaap C Hage & Dietmar von der Pfordten, eds, Concepts in Law (New York: Springer, 2009) 99 at 105
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and other disciplines on the other is not structural but quantitative and qualitative. Quantitatively many, though not
all, legal questions have an equivalent in moral or political theory; qualitatively the two disciplines for one thing share
some of their most important and crucial concepts, not only profane ones as in the case of meteorology; for another
they are both normative disciplines”. Ibid at 108–09. Cf Leslie Green’s discussion of necessary connections between
law and morality that do not undermine the idea that law can fail to meet moral standards but still be valid law. Green
says that law necessarily: “regulates objects of morality”, “makes moral claims of its subjects”, “is justice-apt”, and
“is morally risky”. Leslie Green, “Positivism and the Inseparability of Law and Morals” (2008) 83:4 NYUL Rev 1035
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positing a way for lawyers to be free of bias and thus completely clear minded in their ability to
make the discernments that competing models of lawyering need lawyers to make.41 Advocates of
various approaches to lawyering should not aspire to show how our theories of lawyering allow
for perfect decisions by our competing visions of objective-partisans. More fruitful responses
recognize that partisanship poses dangers, not destinies. There can be reasons to support
partisanship and ways in which to mitigate the negative effects of partisanship. The reasons to
desire some level of partisanship have been discussed above in Section (4). Thus, I focus here on
mitigating the negative effects of partisanship.
Virtue epistemology stands ready for the aim of mitigating the negative effects of
partisanship with concepts and language for just this task. The concept of virtue orientation is
particularly instructive here. Recall that virtue orientation introduces the idea of self-regarding
virtues (virtues that primarily benefit oneself) and other-regarding virtues (virtues that primarily
benefit others). Cognitive biases interrupt both directions of benefit. The lawyer himself/herself is
prevented by cognitive biases from achieving understanding, or full understanding, about his/her
clients’ cases. S/he may reduce his/her ability to produce self-regarding epistemic benefits related
to the case the case. Consequently, the lawyer’s ability to provide role-differentiated epistemic
service to the legal system (to help the legal system seek truth as a champion for his/her client) can
also be compromised, as there is a diminishment in the lawyer’s ability to meet all of the
expectations (efficacious and ethical) that are placed on him/her as the client’s champion. S/he
may advise his/her client in ways that are overly optimistic, may misjudge evidence, fail to speak
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persuasively to the trier of fact, etc. Thus, the lawyer fails to give the other-regarding benefits upon
which the legal system relies.
Though both self and others are epistemically harmed by cognitive biases, the concept of
virtue orientation helps us see that addressing cognitive bias is primarily done by benefitting the
self epistemically. Other people are often harmed (epistemically, legally, ethically, and otherwise)
by another person’s cognitive biases, but it is the epistemic self that must grow in order to
overcome the biases. The most direct epistemic beneficiary of overcoming biases is (and must be)
the person who overcomes the bias. Other parties may also gain an indirect epistemic benefit, as
well as other benefits (legal, financial, etc.). Moreover, other parties may also be the most
important beneficiaries all-things-considered. However, reducing cognitive bias and the
difficulties that partisanship poses in practicing various theories of lawyering requires active
engagement by, and epistemic benefit to, the person who holds the biases. Recognizing virtue
orientation is helpful in making this prescription for lawyers.
From recognizing biases, I turn to mitigating biases. Perlman’s own proposals for dealing
with cognitive biases caused by partisanship are highly compatible with virtue epistemology.
Perlman’s psychological approach and virtue epistemology raise similar concerns and concepts.
There is a close connection between what Perlman describes in scientific terms as cognitive biases
and what can be described in epistemic terms as epistemic vices (malformed faculties and traits).
Perlman gives proposals for dealing better with the risks of cognitive bias. These are not fixes for
the biasing effects of partisanship; they are improvements to the lawyer’s position in dealing with
bias. The proposals include approaches that can be taken by the lawyer, by lawmaking and
governing institutions, and by law schools. Among the suggested courses of action are: making
prescriptions for appropriate behaviour on the basis of context, debiasing strategies for individuals
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and even via substantive law, and teaching law students about cognitive bias.42 The debiasing
strategies that Perlman suggests for individual lawyers include seeking a second opinion,43 and
writing counterarguments to a position that the lawyer is considering.44 These strategies are
themselves subject to the difficulty of even identifying ethical concerns and thus also some crucial
situations that would benefit from debiasing strategies.45 Nonetheless, difficulty is not destiny.
Crucially, the virtue epistemology of lawyering is already ahead of other theories of
lawyering in dealing with the critiques that Perlman has made on the basis of the objective-partisan
assumption and in implementing Perlman’s own proposed responses to bias. Virtue
epistemology’s advantage comes from its approach, rather than its substantive content. The
theories of lawyering that are the target of Perlman’s critique of the objective-partisan assumption,
like theories of epistemology before the development of virtue epistemology and like moral
theories other than virtue ethics (e.g., deontology and consequentialism),46 are based on an
approach to the norms of lawyering that defines abstract conditions for the satisfaction of concepts
or roles and assessing whether individuals meet those abstract conditions. In the case of lawyering,
the abstract standards are ones such as traditional models’ zealous advocate or alternative models’
lawyer who pursues justice. Whatever the existing standard, the person is measured against the
maxim. Perlman does not criticize these theories for taking this approach, but the responses that
he proposes to the cognitive biases associated with partisanship—solutions that require looking to
the agent rather than an abstract standard—involve a different conceptual move.
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Perlman’s responses to bias resemble proposals made by theorists who take an aretaic
(virtue theory) approach to their field. His debiasing strategies are not centred around finding a
principle or set of principles to which the lawyer can adhere. Rather, they are based around
improving the lawyer’s cognitive capacities and traits. This same focus is what distinguishes virtue
epistemology from previous approaches to epistemology and the virtue epistemology of lawyering
from previous efforts in the philosophy of lawyering. The form of Perlman’s response to the biases
caused by partisanship are already baked into virtue epistemology, whereas they can merely be
grafted onto non-aretaic theories such as traditional models of lawyering and alternative models
of lawyering.
Virtue epistemology itself moves away from the practice of focusing on abstract principles
as definitions of knowledge. In dealing with Perlman’s critique, virtue epistemology has the
advantage over traditional models and alternative models (both ethical theories) of leaning on its
own core idea of developing capacities and traits to achieve epistemic ends. In this vein, achieving
ends related to cognition, whether the goals are philosophical, pedagogical, or empirical would
benefit from more robustly considering ways of being, rather than achieving any one particular
static status. This dissertation has highlighted that need and hopes to be an early step in achieving
that aim collaboratively across disciples.
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Part V – The Trilemma Lemma
This dissertation has explored a number of theories and concepts from the philosophy of
lawyering in depth. I have explored debates about the ethics of lawyering, developments in the
philosophical study of epistemology, proposed an epistemic approach to the philosophy of
lawyering, and explored ways in which adjacent approaches to the study of cognition can my
epistemic theory of lawyering. Throughout, I have given illustrations using examples in legal
practice. What is left to do is consider a sustained application of my virtue epistemology of
lawyering, drawing out nuances in my theory that cannot otherwise be understood well.

(7) Freedman’s Client Perjury Trilemma
The case study that will be the central focus of the remainder of this dissertation is Monroe
Freedman’s Client Perjury Trilemma. Classic and controversial, this case study illustrates key
aspects of an epistemological approach to the philosophy of lawyering while pushing concepts in
my epistemology of lawyering to their limit. The Client Perjury Trilemma exists because of a
conflict that can arise between core values of the legal profession. Though being an example that
is rarely experienced by lawyers and being particularly high stakes, the problem and potential
answers are widely analogizable to existing debates in legal ethics. This trilemma thus provides a
helpful basis for comparing the way in which an epistemology of lawyering can interface with
existing philosophies of lawyering and deal with similar (though less severe) tensions that exist
widely in everyday legal practice. Thus, I present the following discussion of the Client Perjury
Trilemma with the aim of both answering a difficult challenge to the epistemic ideas that I am
presently advocating and demonstrating a widely applicable way in which an epistemology of
lawyering can interface with existing philosophies of lawyering.
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(7.1) The Trilemma
With the aim of directly facing a difficult and controversial problem, Freedman asks the
question, “Is it ever proper for a lawyer to present perjured testimony?”1 Freedman arrives at this
question because he identifies three obligations that the adversarial system of adjudication imposes
upon the lawyer and that can conflict with one another, creating a trilemma, in which not all three
duties can be fulfilled simultaneously.2 Putting the trilemma broadly and in strong terms, Freedman
says that, “[T]he lawyer is required to know everything, to keep it in confidence, and to reveal it
to the court”.3 More specifically, the lawyer is required to (1) “determine all relevant facts known
to the accused” (a basic need for competent representation), (2) “hold in strictest confidence the
disclosures made by the client in the course of the professional relationship” (a basic need for
building and maintaining client trust), and (3) as an officer of the court, show candour to the court
(a basic need for the fair exchange of information in the adversarial system) in presenting the
client’s case.4 I will refer to these duties together as the IKP duties (standing for investigate, keep,
and present). An IKP trilemma can theoretically exist in many legal practice contexts, even outside
of criminal law. The central scenario to which Freedman applies his analysis, and which raises
some of the most severe problems, is the criminal defence litigation context in which a client wants
to give perjurious testimony—hence, the Client Perjury Trilemma. In this dissertation, I will

Monroe H Freedman, “Perjury: The Lawyer’s Trilemma” (1975) 1:1 Litigation 26 [Freedman, “Lawyer’s
Trilemma”] at 26.
2
Some scholars and courts have described the problem discussed in Part V of this dissertation as a dilemma,
identifying the contradicting duties differently. The dilemma is usually posed as a conflict between the lawyer’s duty
to the court (especially duties against misleading the court) and the lawyer’s duty to the client (especially the duty of
confidentiality). I regard the problems described as being fundamentally the same as Freedman’s trilemma. Posing the
problem as a trilemma that includes the lawyer’s duty of competence adds important nuance to the problem.
3
Freedman, “Lawyer’s Trilemma”, supra note 1 at 26. I describe the “require[ment]…to know everything”, ibid, less
strongly below at note 12 and accompanying text.
4
Ibid. Ayers raises a basic tension in civil litigation that is less severe, and that has important analogies to the
Trilemma, when he notes that a defence lawyer in a civil discovery “is obligated both to facilitate discovery in good
faith and to protect the interests of her client”, Andrew B Ayers, “What if Legal Ethics Can’t be Reduced to a Maxim?”
(2013) 26 Geo J Legal Ethics 1 at 56. These are duties and constraints that, if not in direct conflict with one another,
can be in tension.
1
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specify whether I am referring to an IKP trilemma or specifically to the Client Perjury Trilemma
(herein “the CP Trilemma”).
Freedman identifies the relevant provisions in codes of professional conduct that can lead
to an IKP trilemma. He does this in multiple articles5 over the course of decades, as ABA codes
of professional conduct have developed—from the Canons of Professional Ethics, to the Model
Code of Professional Responsibility, and now the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.6 The
following are the presently applicable provisions in the ABA Model Rules and the FLSC Model
Code. In the current ABA Model Rules, duties to obtain knowledge (to investigate, in my IKP
framework) about the facts of a client’s case are found in Rule 1.1—Competence—which says
that:
A lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent
representation requires the legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation
reasonably necessary for the representation.7
The ABA’s Comments on the Model Rules further specify:
Competent handling of a particular matter includes inquiry into and analysis of the
factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and procedures
meeting the standards of competent practitioners.8
See generally Monroe H Freedman, “Symposium on Professional Ethics: Professional Responsibility of the Criminal
Defense Lawyer: The Three Hardest Questions” (1966) 64:8 Mich L Rev 1469 [Freedman, “Three Hardest
Questions”]; Freedman, “Lawyer’s Trilemma”, supra note 1; Monroe H Freedman, “Client Confidences and Client
Perjury: Some Unanswered Questions” (1988) 136:6 U Pa L Rev 1934 [Freedman, “Client Confidences”]; Monroe H
Freedman, “In Praise of Overzealous Representation – Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and Other Ethical
Conduct” (2006) 34:3 Hofstra L Rev 771 [Freedman, “Overzealous Representation”]; Monroe H Freedman, “Getting
Honest About Client Perjury” (2008) 21:1 Geo J Legal Ethics 133 [Freedman, “Getting Honest”]; Monroe H
Freedman, “Lawyer-Client Confidentiality: Rethinking the Trilemma” (2015) 43:4 Hofstra L Rev 15.
6
See American Bar Association, Canons of Professional Ethics, Chicago: ABA, 1963; American Bar Association,
ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility and Code of Judicial Conduct, as amended 1980, Chicago: ABA,
1981 [ABA, Model Code]; American Bar Association, ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, ABA, 2019, online:
ABA
<www.americanbar.org/groups/professional_responsibility/publications/model_rules_of_professional_conduct/mod
el_rules_of_professional_conduct_table_of_contents/> [perma.cc/5WED-59ZP] [ABA Model Rules].
7
ABA Model Rules, supra note 6, r 1.1.
8
Ibid, r 1.1, commentary 5. During Freedman’s early writing on the CP Trilemma, the ABA, Model Code of
Professional Responsibility, the professional code of conduct that was then in force, said, “A lawyer should be fully
informed of all the facts of the matter he is handling in order for his client to obtain the full advantage of our legal
system. It is for the lawyer in the exercise of his independent professional judgment to separate the relevant and
important from the irrelevant and unimportant”, ABA, Model Code, supra note 6, EC 4-1.
5
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Additionally, the ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function9 further add that,
“Defense counsel should explain, at an appropriate time, the necessity for frank and honest
discussion of all facts known to the client in order to provide an effective defense”.10
Similarly, when it comes to acquiring the facts of a client’s case, Rule 3.1-2 of the FLSC
Model Code—Competence—requires that:
A lawyer must perform all legal services undertaken on a client’s behalf to the
standard of a competent lawyer.11
Just prior, Section 3.1-1 specifies that:
In this section, “Competent lawyer” means a lawyer who has and applies relevant
knowledge, skills and attributes in a manner appropriate to each matter undertaken
on behalf of a client and the nature and terms of the lawyer’s engagement,
including:
…
(b) investigating facts, identifying issues, ascertaining client objectives,
considering possible options and developing and advising the client on appropriate
courses of action.12
The requirement is to seek factual knowledge at a level that can be reasonably expected of a legal
professional, not to actually have all the relevant knowledge. In this way, the requirement
resembles virtue epistemology, which is about capacities, traits, and approaches to acquiring
knowledge, rather than meeting abstract conditions for having a specific piece of knowledge.
Moreover, the acquisition of factual knowledge from the client is a special concern in relation to
the CP Trilemma because the ability of lawyers to acquire factual knowledge from the client is

9

American Bar Association, Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function (ABA, 2017, 4th ed), online: ABA
<www.americanbar.org/groups/criminal_justice/standards/DefenseFunctionFourthEdition/>
[perma.cc/DAU5LEVW] [ABA Standards 2017]. The ABA Standards outline best practices for fields of law. They do not add duties
to the ABA Model Rules. However, they are useful for understanding the aims of the legal profession. See generally
ibid, Standard 4-1.1.
10
Ibid, Standard 4-3.1(a) [emphasis added].
11
Federation of Law Societies of Canada, Model Code of Professional Conduct, FLSC 2019, online (pdf): FLSC
<flsc.ca/wp-content/uploads/2019/11/Model-Code-October-2019.pdf> [perma.cc/U4WA-H2T7] [FLSC Model
Code], r 3.1-2.
12
Ibid, r 3.1-1 [emphasis added].
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acutely at risk when the CP Trilemma is raised, especially if resolutions of the CP Trilemma
undermine the ability of clients to trust lawyers to keep information confidential.
Speaking of which, the requirement that I have described as keeping client information
refers to well known duties of confidentiality. Rule 1.6 (a) of the ABA Model Rules—
Confidentiality of Information—states that:
A lawyer shall not reveal information relating to the representation of a client….13
Correspondingly, Rule 3.3-1 of the FLSC Model Code—Confidential Information—provides that:
A lawyer at all times must hold in strict confidence all information concerning the
business and affairs of a client acquired in the course of the professional
relationship and must not divulge any such information….14
Subsequent portions of the respective sections in the ABA Model Rules and FLSC Model Code
explain the exceptions to confidentiality; these exceptions do not apply to the CP Trilemma.
Finally, for my present purposes, duties related to the presentation of the client’s case are
those rules that protect the court from being misled by lawyers. Rule 3.3 of the ABA Model
Rules—Candor Toward the Tribunal—requires that:
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
lawyer;
…
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.15
The commentary to Rule 3.3 additionally specifies that:
[A]lthough a lawyer in an adversary proceeding is not required to present an
impartial exposition of the law or to vouch for the evidence submitted in a cause,
the lawyer must not allow the tribunal to be misled by false statements of law or
fact or evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.16
13

ABA Model Rules, supra note 6, r 1.6 (a).
FLSC Model Code, supra note 11, r 3.3-1.
15
ABA Model Rules, supra note 6, r 3.3.
16
Ibid, r 3.3, commentary 2.
14
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In the FLSC Model Code, Rule 5.1-1—Advocacy—stipulates that
When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must represent the client resolutely and
honourably within the limits of the law, while treating the tribunal with candour,
fairness, courtesy and respect.17
The commentary to Rule 5.1-1 then explains:
In adversarial proceedings, the lawyer has a duty to the client to raise fearlessly
every issue, advance every argument and ask every question, however distasteful,
that the lawyer thinks will help the client’s case and to endeavour to obtain for the
client the benefit of every remedy and defence authorized by law. The lawyer must
discharge this duty by fair and honourable means, without illegality and in a manner
that is consistent with the lawyer’s duty to treat the tribunal with candour, fairness,
courtesy and respect and in a way that promotes the parties’ right to a fair hearing
in which justice can be done.18
Additionally, Rule 5.1-2—Advocacy—also states:
When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must not:
…
(b) knowingly assist or permit a client to do anything that the lawyer considers to
be dishonest or dishonourable;
…
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by
offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false
or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed or otherwise assisting
in any fraud, crime or illegal conduct.19
The IKP requirements, wherever they happen to be found in professional codes or legal
norms, relate to the need for lawyers to be competent, to keep client confidences, and to deal
honestly with the court. In most cases involving litigation, the IKP requirements work together
harmoniously or can be reconciled.20 The lawyer may need to balance the duties, but the fulfillment

17

FLSC Model Code, supra note 11, r 5.1-1.
Ibid, r 5.1-1, commentary 1.
19
Ibid, 5.1-2.
20
A transactional lawyer may rarely be in a position for the IKP duties to conflict. Transactional lawyering requires
the lawyer to know the client’s circumstances and to keep information about the client confidential, but the duty to
present information to a tribunal may never become operative. Of course, it would be too simple to believe that duties
related to presenting information are completely removed in the case of transactional lawyering. Even in a transaction,
parts of negotiations about the transaction may require the revealing of information from one party to another or from
one party to a regulatory body (e.g., disclosures made during the processes of mergers and acquisitions).
18
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of each duty is consistent with the fulfillment of the other duties. The lawyer can learn about the
facts of the case, the lawyer will be permitted to keep the information that the lawyer has learned
about the client’s case confidential to an appropriate extent, and the lawyer can assist the client in
pursuing his/her legal and practical interests via an honest presentation of knowledge to the court
(especially factual knowledge for my present purposes).
If the IKP duties were routinely in irresolvable conflicts with one another, the adversarial
system of adjudication would not function properly. Copious insuperable conflicts could lead to
lawyers regularly failing to properly investigate the facts of the case, failing to keep the client’s
information confidential (which would likely result in future clients being uncooperative with
lawyers’ efforts to investigate the facts of cases), or lawyers presenting incomplete or misleading
information to the court. This would be the result of lawyers attempting to provide legal services
to the client while failing to meet the requirements of at least one of the IKP duties. Another
possibility would be that lawyers might simply have to withdraw from representing such cases,
since they could not provide legal services to the client while abiding by their professional
responsibilities as lawyers. Clients in the latter case may have difficulty finding legal
representation at all. In any of these cases, lawyers—the combatants in the adversarial system of
adjudication—would be unable to be competent champions for their clients.
To pinpoint conflicts between the three duties, it is helpful to recall the difference between
positive evidence and negative evidence, which are classifications of evidence as either helpful or
harmful to a client’s case, respectively.21 In relation to positive evidence, the IKP duties are
mutually supporting. With the information being helpful to the client’s case, the client is able to

21

Explained above in Section (2.2), especially notes 29–30 and accompanying text, citing William J Talbott & Alvin
I Goldman, “Games Lawyers Play: Legal Discovery and Social Epistemology” (1998) 4:2 Legal Theory 93 at 95;
Alvin I Goldman, Knowledge in a Social World (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999) at 301.
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readily offer the relevant positive information to the lawyer, the evidence does not normally raise
problems for the lawyer in keeping confidentiality, and the client can be happy to disclose positive
evidence information to the court. The previous sentence is slightly tentative because there may
still be aspects outside of the legal merits of the dispute that create some level of tension between
the IKP duties, even if that tension is ultimately resolved. For example, even with respect to
positive evidence, the client may not be comfortable disclosing all positive facts because some of
these facts may be embarrassing to the client or may cause the client to lose some sort of advantage
outside of the legal merits of the case. Even when a trilemma does not arise between the IKP duties
because the evidence is positive for the lawyer’s client, this does not mean that the IKP duties exist
a tensionless relationship.
Even so, for lawyers, it is negative evidence that more likely brings out tensions and even
conflicts between the IKP duties. Earlier, I discussed Goldman and Talbott’s argument that parties
are not incentivized well to disclose negative evidence.22 The same incentives can make it difficult
to abide by the IKP duties in the criminal defence context. Notably, clients may be disinclined to
reveal all negative evidence, even to their own lawyer under the protection of lawyer-client
confidentiality.23 If the client is reluctant to share negative evidence, including possibly with the
lawyer, then even the lawyer who competently seeks to acquire all relevant information may not
be able to acquire the level of factual knowledge to competently represent the client. Additionally,
lawyers may be disincentivized against presenting evidence and making arguments honestly when
the lawyer has acquired negative evidence from the client. In more mild cases (which may well be
the vast majority of cases) the tensions between the IKP duties are resolvable, i.e., all duties can

22
23

Above in Section (2.2).
See Freedman, “Three Hardest Questions”, supra note 5 at 1473.
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be fulfilled. However, Freedman deals with situations in which the IKP duties are not only in
tension, but actually conflict with one another, resulting in an IKP trilemma.
Freedman presents the following example of such a conflict between the IKP duties in the
criminal law context, which generates the CP Trilemma.
Your client has been falsely accused of a robbery committed at 16th and P Streets
at 11:00 p.m. He reveals to you that he was at 15th and P Streets at 10:55 that
evening, but that he was walking east, away from the scene of the crime, and that,
by 11:00 p.m., he was six blocks away. At the trial, there are two prosecution
witnesses. The first mistakenly, but with some degree of persuasiveness, identifies
your client as the criminal. The second prosecution witness is an elderly woman
who is somewhat nervous and who wears glasses. She testifies truthfully and
accurately that she saw your client at 15th and P Streets at 10:55 p.m. She has
corroborated the erroneous testimony of the first witness and made conviction
extremely likely.
The client then insists upon taking the stand in his own defense, not only to
deny the erroneous evidence identifying him as the criminal, but also to deny the
truthful, but highly damaging, testimony of the corroborating witness who placed
him one block away from the intersection five minutes prior to the crime.24
Freedman positions the example as one in which the reader knows that the client has been
falsely accused. The lawyer’s knowledge about the facts of a case can have consequences in terms
of the options that are available to the lawyer seeking to provide the client with an ethical (and
possibly even an epistemically virtuous) defence.25 However, readers of this dissertation and
lawyers (in the actual situation) can know that the CP Trilemma exists26 even without being

Freedman, “Lawyer’s Trilemma”, supra note 1 at 27–28.
See ABA Model Rules, supra note 6, r 3.1 (prohibiting lawyers from bringing or defending a proceeding “unless
there is a basis in law and fact for doing so”), though note that the prohibitions in r 3.1 “are subordinate to federal or
state constitutional law that entitles a defendant in a criminal matter to the assistance of counsel in presenting a claim
or contention that otherwise would be prohibited by this Rule”, r 3.1, commentary; FLSC Model Code, supra note 11,
r 5.1-1, commentary 10 (limitations on defence counsel when “the accused clearly admits to the lawyer the factual
and mental elements necessary to constitute the offence”).
26
Raising a serious concern from behavioural legal ethics, Perlman applies his analysis about the objective-partisan
assumption to the CP Trilemma. Perlman notes that partisanship itself, as understood in social psychology, can
interfere with the lawyer’s ability to identify that the CP Trilemma has arisen. Not only is the lawyer dealing with the
difficulty of the trilemma, but s/he is subject to the cognitive biases that are created by partisanship itself. These biases
may make a lawyer more likely to pursue a course of action, giving preference to one aspect of the trilemma. This is
not a resolution of the normative problem that results from the Trilemma, but rather a description of the phenomena
that are likely to influence decision-making by lawyers faced with the trilemma. I offer the following explanation of
the way in which partisanship itself can interfere with the lawyer’s ability to address the CP Trilemma. A lawyer is
24
25
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convinced of (or knowing for certain) the client’s guilt or innocence of the offence with which s/he
has been charged. All that must be known to identify the CP Trilemma is that the IKP duties
conflict in such a way that they cannot all be fulfilled together because the client intends to put
forward a version of events in testimony about which the lawyer can “reasonably draw[] an
irresistible conclusion of falsity from available information…a conclusion that not even a zealous
but honest partisan could deny”.27
The narrative that the client gives to the lawyer about the facts of the case and the client’s
communication to the lawyer of his intention to deny the truthful testimony suffices for the CP
Trilemma to be evident. IKP duties conflict in this example in response to negative evidence
against the client’s case, i.e., testimony from one witness that the client is the person who
committed the crime and testimony from a second witness that places the client close to the scene
of the crime around the time of the crime. In this case, the lawyer has already achieved the duty of
investigating facts so s/he can competently represent the client.28 Of special note for my purposes
here, among the factual evidence, the lawyer knows that the client was at the location that the
second witness specifies; the client has told the lawyer this. The lawyer must continue to fulfill the
confidentiality requirement and must present the client’s case with candour to the court. The

prohibited by the ABA Model Rules from offering testimony that the lawyer knows to be false, ABA Model Rules,
supra note 6, r 3.3(a)(3) and r 3.3, commentary 8. Perlman argues that partisanship increases the risk of the lawyer
concluding that s/he does not meet the standard of knowing that the client’s testimony will be false. See Andrew M
Perlman, “A Behavioral Theory of Legal Ethics” (2015) 90:4 Ind LJ 1639 at 1645. The specific prohibition against
knowingly offering false testimony would thus not be violated even if the client were to facilitate the false testimony.
In this lawyer’s view, one of the horns of the CP Trilemma—based on duties against deceiving the court—might thus
not even be engaged. S/he mistakenly thinks that s/he is not facing the CP Trilemma. She should see the problem, but
s/he does not. The concern expressed here is that partisanship can elevate the risk of the lawyer failing to see when
zealousness in defence of the client has made him/her unable to correctly identify when s/he is crossing the line from
permissible partisan advocacy into impermissible partisan advocacy. Answering such an objection is beyond the scope
of this dissertation.
27
David Layton & Michel Proulx, Ethics and Criminal Law, 2d ed (Toronto, CA: Irwin Law, 2015) at 338 [emphasis
in original]. See generally ibid at 338, note 37 covering the jurisprudential and scholarly approval accorded to this test
of “knowing” about the falsity of assertions of fact.
28
Below, especially in Section (7.3.1), I will consider examples in which investigation of facts is the IKP duty that is
sacrificed.
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client’s desire to commit perjury creates the conflict. If the lawyer facilitates the client in
presenting false testimony, then the lawyer knowingly participates in the deception of the court.
At the same time, the lawyer cannot reveal the client’s deception without breaching the duty of
confidentiality. Notably, for the American context, the ABA Model Rules do not permit the lawyer
to decline to offer as evidence the defendant’s testimony in a criminal law matter, even if the
lawyer reasonably believes that the testimony is false.29 In Canada too, the dominant line of
opinion among commentators and courts supports the client’s authority to determine whether to
testify and allows the lawyer to withdraw from representing the client if facilitating the client’s
testimony would violate the lawyer’s legal and ethical obligations.30 The analysis given in these
paragraphs demonstrates that Freedman’s example presents a conflict between the lawyer’s IKP
duties to investigate, keep, and, present. It is a client perjury trilemma.
(7.2) Mapping the Client Perjury Trilemma Using Virtue Epistemology
The existence of situations like the CP Trilemma is expected in virtue theory, whether
virtue ethics or virtue epistemology, because virtue theorists often accept a plurality of values into
their theories. This means that virtue theorists “believe that there are multiple intrinsic values in
the world, and that these values can’t be reduced to any one super-value like human dignity or
well-being or utility”.31 The epistemic values that pertain to the CP Trilemma, and lawyering duties
that create the CP Trilemma if the right facts arise, will normally be consistent with one another,
even as they require skill to practice and virtue to apply properly. In the vast majority of cases,
there will be no conflict between the lawyer determining the facts of the case from the client for

29

See ABA Model Rules, supra note 6, r 3.3 (a) (3) and r 3.3, commentary 7. This same rule does, however, permit
the lawyer to refuse to offer the client’s testimony if the lawyer knows that the client’s testimony will be false, ibid, r
3.3, commentary 9. The rules also give the lawyer the vital leeway of refusing to offer false testimony when that
testimony is given by a third party or by the client outside of a criminal matter, ibid, r 3.3(a)(3), rule 3.3, commentary
5–9.
30
See generally Layton & Proulx, supra note 27 at 351–353.
31
Ayers, supra note 4 at 42.
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the benefit of the lawyer’s own competence, maintaining the client’s confidence, and being candid
with the court. The values and duties may come into conceptual tension, but this tension will
usually be resolvable. However, since virtue theories recognize that values cannot be reduced to a
single master value, virtue theory also recognizes that the values will sometimes come into conflict
with one another and that this conflict can be more profound than a tension that is ultimately
resolvable with enough careful deliberation.
The ability to begin dealing with tensions between values requires an important skill and
its related virtue. Ayers identifies the skill of tolerating tension and the disposition to tolerate
tension at the right times32 as a combination of a faculty-virtue and trait-virtue that are crucial to
dealing with conflicts between norms. Without this capacity and trait, the agent may be hampered
in addressing the issues at stake. He observes that, “Different lawyers have different capacities.
For some lawyers, struggling on the horns of a dilemma may lead to nothing more than
unproductive guilt and self-berating”.33 Being able to live with the scenario is crucial to attempts
to resolve, or otherwise respond to, the conflicting norms.
Even prior to the specific virtue epistemic issue raised by the CP Trilemma, the epistemic
context of witness testimony in an adversarial litigation context—and the tensions created by this
context—must be understood. During witness testimony, the lawyer hopes to exercise otherregarding epistemic virtues so as to contribute to the knowledge of the judge and/or jury (the triers
of fact) such that the legal result of the adversarial process will be in his/her client’s favour, i.e.,
so that his/her client will win the trial. The lawyer thus has secondary epistemic goals (goals related
to the procedural carrying out of the legal process) that pertain to his/her primary legal goals (goals
related to the substantive aim of a legal process). At a level even removed from that, the lawyer’s

32
33

See ibid at 54–55.
Ibid at 55.
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contribution to the knowledge of epistemic agents other than the judge and/or jury may be relevant
to the lawyer’s purposes but is only incidentally relevant to the persuasive activity that the lawyer
is performing on behalf of the client in a trial and during witness testimony. Hence, the opposing
lawyer and his/her client may also be the epistemic beneficiaries of the lawyer’s exercise of
epistemic virtue in conducting examination or cross-examination of a witness. In a more detached
way, the court reporter, any readers of the transcript of the trial, and anyone who receives
information about the trial that is based on the transcript will also be beneficiaries of the process
of testimony in the adversarial system.34
Witness testimony is a part of adversarial litigation in which the lawyers (i.e., the
champions of the litigants) have a reduced ability to control the process of conveying information
to epistemic others. More so than during other parts of a trial, epistemic agents besides the lawyer
also influence the flow of information and may come from perspectives that are friendly, adverse,
or neutral to the lawyer’s (and thus the client’s) epistemic and legal goals. The second of these
three possibilities—participants adverse to lawyer and his/her client—is especially determined by
the epistemic nature of the adversarial process.35 Adverse participants will oppose, resist,
contradict, etc. the efforts of a particular lawyer to serve his particular epistemic and legal goals.
At the same time, even the actions of a friendly or neutral witness may not offer information in a
way that perfectly serves the lawyer’s aims. The lawyer may be able to direct the course of the

34

Document discovery is another example in which tensions arise between values and duties. The primary or
immediate beneficiaries of epistemically virtuous document disclosure are the opposing client and his/her lawyer.
Secondary beneficiaries of document discovery, via presentation of the discovered evidence by opposing counsel, are
the judge and/or jury. Additionally, there may be more removed/incidental but wide-ranging beneficiaries, such as the
public, if some information that is in the public interest is revealed during document discovery and certainly if it is
presented at trial. The incidental beneficiaries of the presentation at trial include the court reporter, any readers of the
transcript of the trial, and anyone who receives information about that trial that is based on the transcript, as was the
case with witness testimony.
35
This is not to say that influence from parties who are favourable, or neutral, to the lawyer’s epistemic and legal
interests is unrelated to the epistemic nature of the adversarial process.
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testimony through the questions that s/he asks, but s/he relies on witnesses’ answers to supply the
information or perspective that is the focus of witness testimony. The witness can throw the lawyer
off his/her intended message or make the lawyer adjust his/her approach to the behaviour of the
witness. The lawyer must also deal with the opposing lawyer’s interactions with the witness and
with the other lawyer’s attempts to frame the testimony given by the witness. Additionally, the
judge structures the disclosure of information by administering procedural rules that govern the
process of witness testimony. The lawyer is thus working alongside other epistemic agents who
can control the epistemic outcome depending on their own practice of epistemic virtues.
A crucial element of social tension in witness testimony is that a lawyer sometimes has the
epistemic aim to steer the judge and/or jury into making an unfavourable epistemic evaluation of
some witnesses (i.e., not believing those witnesses who are giving evidence that is negative to the
client’s cause). Such social tensions can be better understood by distinguishing between what I
will call a “concordant epistemic context” (or, more succinctly, a “concordant context”) and
“discordant epistemic context” (or a “discordant context”). In a concordant context, all participants
and observers want all epistemic agents to behave in an epistemically virtuous way in the context
and want all participants to be known to behave in an epistemically virtuous way by the other
participants. In the vast majority of contexts to which a virtue epistemic analysis applies, we would
at least hope for concordance. A collaborative research effort is (or can be) a concordant context.
Researchers want the contributors to the project to behave in epistemically virtuous ways (e.g.,
being honest in reporting their data) and would want all of the contributors to be known to behave
in epistemically virtuous ways. Much more mundanely and on a smaller scale, an appointment for
a yearly physical with a family doctor is a concordant epistemic context. The doctor and patient
want to be epistemically virtuous in relation to one another and are pleased to mutually implicitly
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(or possibly even explicitly, if the interaction so warrants) recognize one another’s epistemic virtue
during the consultation.
By contrast, in a “discordant context”,36 participants in the context want other participants
to be believed to be comparatively worse at practicing, or to not at all be practicing, the epistemic
virtues that are relevant to the context. The epistemic and/or non-epistemic goals of one or more
parties depend on participants making such negative, or less favourable, conclusions about other
participants. Many competitive scenarios that require the demonstration of epistemic virtue are
discordant epistemic contexts. Job applications often create such dynamics, as do proposals for
government contract. Applicant for jobs want to appear to be better at the skills and aptitudes
(some of which are intellectual) that are required on the job. The most discordant contexts are
those that involve disputes in which epistemic performance is relevant.
In some sense, all, or a vast number of, trials in the adversarial system of adjudication
create an obvious discordant context, especially when the facts of a case are in dispute. The
epistemic discordance of an adversarial trial is on display during witness testimony, especially
when a lawyer attempts to demonstrate that a witness is failing, or has failed, during the testimony
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There may be space to further distinguish between concordant, marginally concordant, non-concordant, and
discordant epistemic contexts. These terms would indicate various levels of epistemic unity of purposes and interests
between epistemic agents. Marginal concordance would indicate the presence of a weak unity of purpose and interests.
Non-concordance would include contexts in which concordance is not relevant and possibly situations in which there
is no concordance, but there is also no discordance.
In addition to distinguishing between levels of concordance, distinctions can be drawn between the ways in which
concordance or discordance arises. One distinction would be between whether concordance/discordance arises by
design or as a matter of fact. Contexts may be designed to feature concordance or discordance. Additionally,
concordance and discordance may arise as a factual matter that can align with, or differ from, what the context is
designed to create. The broader context of the adversarial system is discordant by design, as has been explained
throughout this dissertation. The narrower advising context in the lawyer-client relationship is concordant by design,
promoting candidness between lawyer and client to facilitate the free flow of information and candidness advice.
Despite the design, the contexts may or may not be factually concordant/discordant to varying extents. Litigants may
look at, and treat, one another more or less favourably—and virtuously—than the adversarial system envisions.
Lawyers and clients may have more discord (e.g., view one another with more or less trust) than the context is designed
to feature. In this dissertation, and in the CP Trilemma, I deal primarily with broad litigation contexts that are
discordant by design and discordant in fact.
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to practice epistemic virtue. Such failure to practice epistemic virtues in the discordant context of
witness testimony can be understood as the failure to practice faculty-virtues or trait-virtues that
are relevant to giving an accurate account of the facts of a case. 37 An example of a failure to
practice a faculty-virtue is being unable to remember key details about the facts of a case. A failure
to demonstrate trait-virtues, particularly egregiously, would be a witness being dishonest in his/her
testimony, thus violating his/her witness oath.
Even in a discordant epistemic context, epistemic virtues can facilitate a successful
epistemic system. Indeed, this is the central aim behind the adversarial system of adjudication. The
adversarial system deals with a dispute—itself a discordance—by structuring the aspects of
discordance into a system for truth-seeking and dispute resolution. Participants in the system
(especially lawyers on behalf of clients) use their virtues to advance competing interests in the
discordant context. The participants also use their vices to advance their interests; the system
differentiates the role and normative status (virtue or vice) of their actions within the system from
their role and normative status outside of the system. These are the features of epistemic
partisanship explained above in Part III and Part IV, especially Section (3.4),(4.2), and (4.3). When
epistemic virtues and vices (or what would be merely vices if they were not role-differentiated)
are structured into a functioning system, the legal and practical discord at the level of individuals
can become harmonies of knowledge-seeking at the level of the system.
During witness testimony, participants in the discordant context of the adjudicative system
can, with varying degrees of success, practice numerous epistemic virtues, including self-regarding
virtues and other-regarding virtues. If the client is going to give testimony during the trial, the
lawyer and the client giving testimony ought to both engage in self-regarding and other-regarding
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I am here recognizing the importance of both reliabilist and responsibilist approaches to virtue epistemology.
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epistemically virtuous behaviour. As noted earlier, the division between self-regarding epistemic
virtues and other-regarding epistemic virtues should not be taken too strictly. The client’s practice
of other-regarding virtue with the lawyer is to the direct epistemic benefit of the lawyer. Of course,
the client is seeking the epistemic benefit of the lawyer so that the lawyer may, in turn, act in the
epistemic benefit of the jury and the judge, and, ultimately, in the legal benefit (and perhaps other
practical benefit) of the client. The lawyer seeks the same chain of other-regarding epistemic
benefit, with the lawyer’s own economic benefit at the end of the chain. Ideally, there are also
moral or political ends that the lawyer seeks, such as the promotion of the rule of law, fairness,
etc.38
Keeping the focus on the priorities of this dissertation, the lawyer must practice epistemic
virtues in relation to the facts of the case. These virtues include those that are generally applicable
to the lawyer’s work; epistemic partisanship has been my focus in this dissertation. However, they
also include virtues that are specific to the context of witness testimony. The lawyer practices
reliabilist and responsibilist virtues to obtain, understand, and prompt the client to communicate
the facts of the case in a way that is helpful to the legal argument that the lawyer is presenting on
behalf of the client. Reliabilist virtues relevant to the lawyer’s work in the discordant context of
witness testimony include questioning and listening skills as well cognitive skills required to
organize information and communicate information effectively. The client too must practice
numerous reliabilist virtues related to accurate perception of the facts of the case, as well as
communication skills both when the client is speaking to the lawyer privately and giving testimony
before the tribunal. If the client fails to perceive the facts of the case properly, then his/her
testimony could be epistemically like the testimony given by the elderly woman in the fact scenario
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The explanation of these last benefits is done under theories of philosophical legal ethics that are grounded in moral
and/or political philosophy, discussed above in Section (1.1) and Section (1.2).
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summarized above to illustrate the CP Trilemma.39 The testimony would be given in good faith
but be mistaken.
Responsibilist virtues have been the key focus of this dissertation and are centrally at stake
in the discordant context of witness testimony in adversarial litigation, including the CP Trilemma.
As with reliabilist virtues, lawyers and clients must also practice numerous responsibilist virtues
to aid in satisfying the epistemic needs and structures of the adversarial system. Exploring these
virtues is the work of a treatise on the virtue epistemology of witness testimony. For my present
purposes in mapping the CP Trilemma, it will suffice to focus on the epistemic virtues that pertain
to the IKP duties. During this discussion, I refer to both duties and virtues. I have said that I do not
reject perspectives on the philosophy of lawyering that emphasize duties. Such perspectives make
important contributions to the applied theory of lawyering. I will explain the virtues in the
epistemic map of witness testimony and the CP Trilemma in relation to the duties of the lawyer.
At the same time, my own priorities are aretaic, relating to the development of professional ways
of life that allow the lawyer to perform his/her role in discordant contexts and the legal system’s
application to those contexts.
As described above, the lawyer is required—during a legal dispute that leads to litigation—
to (1) “determine all relevant facts known to the accused” (needed for competent representation),
(2) “hold in strictest confidence the disclosures made by the client in the course of the professional
relationship” (needed for building and maintaining client trust), and (3) “show candour to the
court” (needed for the fair exchange of information in the adversarial system) in presenting the
client’s case.40 The lawyer is required to investigate, keep, and present facts about the case. Even
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Above in Section (7.1) at note 24.
Above in Section (7.1) at note 4 and accompanying text, citing Freedman, “Lawyer’s Trilemma”, supra note 1 at
26.
40
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with respect to the IKP duties, numerous epistemic virtues could be relevant. This is particularly
the case with the lawyer’s duty to investigate the facts of the case as part of the duty of competence.
Responsibly investigating the facts of a case can be supported by several epistemic virtues,
including virtues that can be practiced over a long term relating to developing and maintaining
cognitive acuity and being conscientious, as well as virtues practiced in each specific case, such
as being disposed to dedicate the proper thoroughness to the investigation of facts. Dispositions to
know how to exercise such behaviours in service of the partisan epistemic needs of the client
within the adversarial system are virtues. The duty to keep client confidence is supported by a
disposition to know when and how to keep client information from being known by people to
whom the lawyer is not required, or permitted, to disclose. This virtue could be described as the
disposition to be a confidant, a person who can be trusted with secrets. A single word that might
readily capture this virtue is discretion, as in being discreet. Finally, for the virtues that correspond
to the IKP duties, the lawyer’s ability to fulfill his/her duties in presenting client information to
the court is grounded in the lawyer’s practice of the epistemic virtue of honesty when dealing with
the tribunal.
The client’s responsibilities relate primarily to the first and third of the IKP duties. The
client’s disposition to be appropriately candid with the lawyer about the facts of the case (i.e.,
completely candid about all matters about which the lawyer requires information to achieve
competence about the case) is a vital virtue to receiving legal representation that is informed by
sufficient investigation of the facts. If the client will be providing testimony to the court, the
client’s honesty in giving the testimony is vital for the lawyer’s presentation of the client’s case in
facilitation of the lawyer’s partisan role within the adversarial system. As the lawyer must be
honest in eliciting information from the client, so too must the client be honest in responding to
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the questioning before the court. The client’s honesty is also legally mandated as part of the legal
requirements for giving witness testimony. This is merely a brief mapping of the duties and virtues
that lawyers and litigants are expected to fulfill in the discordant epistemic context of witness
testimony in the adversarial system.
This discordant context, which is part of the regular functioning and truth-seeking
processes of the adversarial system of adjudication, is what the lawyer faces in the scenario that
Freedman narrates41 before the client expresses an intention to commit perjury. In Freedman’s fact
scenario, the lawyer needs to raise a doubt that the first witness (who mistakenly identified the
client as the person who committed the robbery) has failed in some way to perform an epistemic
virtue—likely a reliabilist virtue such as accurate perception. The lawyer can also show that a
factual conclusion should not be drawn from the second witness’ truthful testimony. The lawyer
must advance these assessments of the witnesses’ testimony while himself/herself practicing
epistemic partisanship and all other relevant epistemic virtues just summarized.
As the IKP duties conflict in the CP Trilemma, so too the epistemic virtues by which the
lawyer makes his/her contribution to the functioning of the adversarial system in the context of
witness testimony are disrupted in the CP Trilemma. The accused in a criminal trial has a right to
not be compelled to testify in his/her own trial.42 The accused may testify, but his/her testimony
must be given in accordance with the obligation that the adversarial process places on witnesses
to give truthful testimony. The client’s plan to practice the epistemic vice of dishonesty prompts
the conflict. Crucially, dishonesty in witness testimony is not a vice or otherwise undesirable

41

Above in Section (7.1) at note 24.
See US Const amend V; Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being
Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11, s 11(c).
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behaviour that the adversarial system has shaped to serve its purposes.43 The legal system has
provisions to check the client’s practice of the vice of dishonesty (e.g., questioning by opposing
counsel), but the epistemic vice of dishonesty is not a positive contributor to the system’s
functioning.
As the client intends to practice the vice of dishonesty by committing perjury, the lawyer
loses the ability to perfectly practice the virtues that support the IKP duties. In Freedman’s
particular scenario, the lawyer has already exercised the epistemic virtues needed to investigate
the facts of the case well enough to meet that aspect of being a competent lawyer. The lawyer
cannot now unknow the facts—nor should an epistemically virtuous lawyer want to become
incompetent by failing to know the facts.44 In the scenario discussed here, the lawyer is actually
faced with a conflict between practicing the virtue of being a confidant and the virtue of honesty.
If the lawyer facilitates the client’s perjurious testimony, then the lawyer fails to practice the
epistemic virtue of honesty. At the same time, the lawyer must not prevent the client from
committing perjury in a way that is inconsistent with the virtue of being a confidant.45 Lawyers in
other cases will be faced with other difficulties in practicing IKP-supporting virtues. When
competence has not already been achieved (or has not yet been achieved), there may be numerous
conflicts between virtues, since so many virtues support the lawyer’s achievement of factual
competence. Centrally, the common virtue epistemic problem when the CP Trilemma arises is that

43

Above in sections (2.2), (3.4), (4) for discussions of how the legal system shapes even vices and many other
behaviours (even ones that are ethically and epistemically unhelpful in other contexts) for its purposes.
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Below in Section (7.3.1), I explore a response to the CP Trilemma that is based in not investigating all the facts of
the case: selective ignorance.
45
As explained above at note 29 and accompanying text, the ABA’s Model Rules are particularly constrained because
lawyers in criminal cases are not permitted to decline to introduce the client’s testimony if the lawyer reasonably
believes that the testimony is false. To be permitted to refuse to offer the testimony, the lawyer must know that the
testimony is false.
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the lawyer cannot practice all of the virtues that support, and that are necessary to meet, the IKP
duties.
Before concluding this section, I will say something brief about epistemic volition in the
CP Trilemma. In Section (8) of this dissertation, assessing Freedman’s response to the CP
Trilemma, I will discuss the volition of the lawyer. However, as I begin my analysis of the CP
Trilemma, it is also relevant to ask about the client’s volition, as the client’s volition might inform
the epistemic analysis that we have of proposed responses to the CP Trilemma. Certain responses
to the CP Trilemma may be difficult to carry out46 or inappropriate47 for a client who exhibits
epistemic malevolence or certain kinds of epistemic malevolence. The vital question about the
client’s volition is whether the client in the CP Trilemma—the client who intends to commit
perjury—is epistemically malevolent. Specifically, does the CP Trilemma necessarily involve an
epistemically malevolent client or are there features of the CP Trilemma that make it highly likely
that the client will be epistemically malevolent?
As stated earlier, Baehr defines epistemic malevolence as opposition to the epistemic good.
This opposition can be: impersonal or personal,48 intrinsic or instrumental,49 and exists when an
epistemic agent’s opposition to the epistemic good is “robustly volitional, active, and ‘personally
deep’”.50 The distinction between impersonal epistemic malevolence and personal epistemic
malevolence informs my analysis here.51 Impersonal epistemic malevolence is opposition to the
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E.g., dissuasion or withdrawal (in a way that does not do a disservice to the next lawyer). It may be very difficult to
dissuade an epistemically malevolent client or to withdraw from representing this client while keeping him/her from
misleading his/her next lawyer into facilitating perjurious testimony or otherwise performing an epistemic vice in the
trial.
47
E.g., the narrative testimony approach. The pitfalls of the narrative testimony approach are already difficult with a
client who intends to lie, not to mention one who has enemized the epistemic good.
48
See Jason Baehr, “Epistemic Malevolence” (2010) 41:1/2 Metaphilosophy 189 [Baehr, “Epistemic Malevolence”]
at 193.
49
See ibid at 191–192.
50
Ibid at 190 [emphasis removed].
51
This distinction is discussed above in Section (4.1) and explained therein at notes 17–20 and accompanying text.
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abstract notion of the epistemic good, whereas personal epistemic malevolence is opposition to
someone’s participation in the epistemic good. Nothing in the CP Trilemma itself involves
necessarily enemizing the abstract good or being highly likely to enemize the abstract good. This
is not to say that there could not be a client in the CP Trilemma who is impersonally epistemically
malevolent. The CP Trilemma is compatible with (i.e., can feature) a client who opposes the
abstract notion of the epistemic good, but the CP Trilemma does not necessarily involve such a
client. Moreover, the CP Trilemma does not have features that act as a motivation for impersonal
epistemic malevolence, or in any other way make it highly likely that the client will oppose the
abstract epistemic good.
The question about whether the client is personally epistemically malevolent is more
difficult to resolve. The details of the CP Trilemma itself suggest that clients in the trilemma might
necessarily be personally epistemically malevolent or might be highly likely to be so. In particular,
the client who intends to commit perjury wants to prevent, limit, or control, the way in which the
court, especially the trier of fact, participates in the epistemic good. Depending on the extent of
the perjury in the case, the client might not want the trier of fact to participate in the whole truth
about the facts of the case (on the high end of personal epistemic malevolence) or in some smaller
factual element of the case (on a lower end that may or may not actually reach the level of
malevolence). The client takes some level of negative posture towards the epistemic good of the
trier of fact on an instrumental basis, rather than on an intrinsic basis. The client’s opposition to
the epistemic good of the trier of fact is aimed at securing a favourable legal result for
himself/herself. In its most broadly worrisome description, the client might be described as having
enemized the adversarial system of adjudication itself (i.e., the proper functioning truth-seeking of
the system) and thus the system’s participation in the epistemic good. The system relies on an
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honest articulation of positions and presentation of facts; the client in the CP Trilemma opposes
this to some extent.
At the same time, the wide range of situations to which the CP Trilemma could apply also
indicates that it may simply be unwarranted to attribute even personal epistemic malevolence to
clients in the CP Trilemma. The epistemic and legal aims of the client in any particular scenario
will be different. Every client’s motivation to commit perjury will be different. There is wide scope
for mitigating factors, or factors that suggest against classifying the client as epistemically
malevolent. The client may even qualify for a volitional status that Baehr leaves open when giving
his account of epistemic malevolence. In a footnote on his paper about epistemic malevolence,
Baehr says:
While I do hope to identify the defining features of epistemic malevolence, I want
leave open the question of whether epistemic malevolence is always or necessarily
intellectual or epistemic vice. Specifically, I wish to leave open…the possibility of
a person who is epistemically malevolent in sense I lay out, but whose malevolence
is driven by a sufficiently epistemically appropriate ultimate motivation, such that
it is not really an intellectual vice.52
In Freedman’s example of the CP Trilemma above, the client does not want to deceive the
trier of fact about the overall case. The client’s legal interests are jeopardized by the testimony
given by the two witnesses and the client wants to neutralize this risk to save his own legal
interests. The client’s personal epistemic malevolence would extend at most to the trier of fact
acquiring knowledge about a particular fact in the case (about the client’s presence in a location)
that would lead the trier of fact to arrive at a false overall judgment about the facts of the case. A
morally and epistemically bad act (deception) is being intentionally performed by the client in
order that a lesser epistemic bad (the jury being led to believe mistaken testimony corroborated by
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testimony that is honest but mistaken) that was unintentionally performed by the witness does not
result in the highly negative legal, moral, and epistemic result of a false conviction.
Arguably, the client is seeking to help the third party in the wrong way, i.e., to help the jury
reach the overall right conclusion in the case using illegitimate means—deception—to keep the
jury from being incorrect about a part of the whole truth in the case. It is unclear whether fixing a
serious epistemic wrong (i.e., the mistaken conclusion that the client committed the offence) by
epistemically vicious means should be described as vicious malevolence, malevolence that is not
a vice (i.e., personal epistemic malevolence that is not a vice), or perhaps not as malevolence at
all. Does the client who wants to pursue such a path oppose the participation of the trier of fact in
the epistemic good? Of course, it is not only truly innocent clients who will wish to deceive the
court for their instrumental benefit; truly guilty clients will want to succeed at instrumental
deception as well, and possibly much more often than innocent clients. In such a case, the client
might be better characterized as making an epistemic enemy of the jury as s/he seeks to act to their
epistemic detriment by deceiving them to reach an incorrect factual conclusion.
The numerous possible characterizations of the client’s behaviour and intentions suggest
that there may be a wide swath of client intention and behaviour in the CP Trilemma, some of
which is epistemically vicious but that falls short of malevolence and enemizing the ability of
another participant in the legal process (most notably, the trier of fact) to participate in the
epistemic good. Other intentions might oppose the epistemic good of a participant in the legal
process but may not be epistemically vicious. I can reach few conclusions about the client’s
epistemic volition here, but the considerations about nuances in client motivations should at least
temporarily rule out broad assessments about clients in the CP Trilemma being necessarily, or
likely, epistemically malevolent.
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With this map of the epistemic terrain, we understand the way in which the adversarial
system of adjudication uses the virtues and even vices of disputants to structure the search for truth
in the system and the way in which the CP Trilemma disrupts this function. In my consideration
of responses to the CP Trilemma, especially Freedman’s own response, I will refer to IKPsupporting virtues and to the virtue of epistemic partisanship, which touches every aspect of the
lawyer’s role in the adversarial system.
(7.3) Responses to the Trilemma
Responses to the CP Trilemma are multitudinous and cover many stages of the lawyerclient relationship. The responses are not limited to the immediate advising context after becoming
aware that the client wants to commit perjury or to the examination of the witness during sworn
testimony. I will comment on multiple responses to the CP Trilemma, comparing and contrasting
them with one another and with Freedman’s answer to the CP Trilemma. I will discuss possible
responses to the CP Trilemma in the order in which they would be available to the lawyer during
the course of the lawyer-client relationship and during legal proceedings. I will begin with
responses that are available to the lawyer as early as the outset of the lawyer-client relationship
(largely in anticipation of conflicting responsibilities) and end with responses that are available to
the lawyer after the client has committed perjury. I will, however, save Freedman’s response for
last. Freedman’s own answer—which is for the lawyer to give preference to the duties of
competence and confidentiality by presenting the client’s perjurious testimony in the normal way
that a lawyer would present client testimony that the lawyer did not suspect to be perjurious—is
the central applied focus of my analysis in this dissertation. I will thus consider the following
responses to the CP Trilemma in this order: selective ignorance, dissuasion, withdrawal from
representation, narrative testimony, disclosure of perjury, and Freedman’s proposal to assist the
client to testify in the normal way.
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My evaluative criteria for responses to the CP Trilemma will be based in virtue
epistemology, especially the virtue of epistemic partisanship. Moreover, this analysis will be
influenced by social epistemic considerations53 about the functions of the adversarial system. As I
go through these responses to the Trilemma, in the remainder of this dissertation, I recall Bradley
Wendel’s insight as he says, “Telling lawyers either to flat-out lie to a judge or to knowingly
introduce perjured testimony is the kind of uncompromising stance that riled up Monroe’s critics.
The alternatives, on the other side, would be just as troubling—a fact that critics often prefer to
gloss over”.54 We cannot praise or condemn a response to a normative problem without
understanding what that response aims to address, what the alternative courses of action aim to do,
and what the alternatives sacrifice.
In line with my caution about judging Freedman’s answer to the CP Trilemma too quickly,
I want to recommend against a related rush to judgment that Freedman himself makes about
judging people’s decisions and priorities as they deal with conflicting norms and dispositions. We
should not rush to judge a person who makes a decision or who proposes a certain course of action
in dealing with a difficult normative decision. I do not mean any of this to suggest a simplistic
prohibition against making normative judgments about other people. Normative domains cannot
function without the ability to make judgments. Instead, my caution about making judgments is
based in an informed understanding about the complexity of developing, and adhering to, ethical
and epistemic ways of being. We do not have to walk a mile in someone else’s shoes to make
judgments about that person, but we do have to take account of what is required for someone to
walk and why someone might prefer to walk a different path.

See Goldman’s veritistic standards, discussed above in Section (2.1) at note 15–16 and accompanying text, citing
Alvin I Goldman, “Foundations of Social Epistemics” (1987) 73:1 Synthese 109 [Goldman, “Foundations”] at 128–
129.
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W Bradley Wendel, “Monroe Freedman: The Ethicist of the Non-Ideal” (2016) 44 Hofstra L Rev 671 at 675–676.
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Giving the example of a friend who was opposed to the death penalty, Freedman explains
that looking at a person’s decisions can reveal the person’s true priorities much more so than the
person’s stated preferences.55 Freedman’s friend lamented that he would not be allowed to serve
on a jury because the questionnaire given by the Jury Commission to jurors asked about a potential
juror’s view on the death penalty. Potential jurors would have been disqualified if they had
indicated that they opposed the death penalty. Freedman challenges his friend, saying that “his
conduct was inconsistent with his asserted ethical priorities”.56 From his friend’s unwillingness to
lie about his views on the death penalty, Freedman concludes that the friend actually values telling
the truth to the Jury Commission more than having the power to vote in a death penalty case. Using
language similar to this dissertation’s approach to character, Freedman argues, “[W]hen ethical
values are in conflict, our decisions show what our true priorities are. In making a series of such
decisions, therefore, we create a kind of ethical profile of ourselves”.57 A different way to put this
using the language of virtue ethics might be that a person’s decisions provide indications about
what his/her actual dispositions are.
About the general principle that actions provide insights (sometimes more revealing
insights than words) into a person’s true priorities, Freedman is correct. However, it is important
to avoid applying this principle too quickly or without sufficient openness to different
explanations, as it could well be argued that Freedman has done in his example. It does not follow
that a person prioritizes one value over another, or even does not truly hold a value, just because
s/he would not commit a wrongful action (even a wrongful action that would be far lesser in
consequences than the positive consequences that the wrongful action could achieve). In the first

See Monroe H Freedman, “Lawyer-Client Confidences Under the A.B.A. Model Rules: Ethical Rules Without
Ethical Reason” (1984) 3:2 Criminal Justice Ethics 3 at 3.
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place, one might not subscribe to the consequentialist reasoning58 that is the basis of Freedman’s
argument here, which allows the commission of one wrongful action (lying) in order to produce
what the agent considers to be a positive action (preventing the use of the death penalty).
Second, Freedman makes the error of assuming that reasoning can only be done on the
basis of the scenario with which the agent is immediately faced. If one could only consider the
consequences of the current scenario—being a juror on a death penalty case—then Freedman’s
act-consequentialist reasoning59 would correctly describe the ethical priorities of someone
applying consequentialist reasoning to the scenario. However, people who are considering the
possibility of lying in order to be selected as jurors who can then prevent the death penalty from
being applied may well be considering the possibility that negative consequences can arise from
the lie. Another concern of the prospective juror may be that, though they oppose the death penalty,
they simply cannot take proper account of the multitude of factors that could come into play if they
personally make the decision to disrupt the system by breaching its rules (in this case, rules against
lying to the court). Thinking in epistemic terms, the concern may be that the potential juror cannot
take sufficient account of the factors that would affect the situation of s/he were to they lie to
disrupt a system that relies on the truthfulness of its participants.
Delaware’s history with the death penalty is illustrative of reasons to be more cautious than
Freedman is when deciding whether or how to act—and whether or how to judge other people’s

See generally Walter Sinnott-Armstrong, “Consequentialism”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, (Summer
2019), Edward N Zalta, ed, online: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University
<plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2019/entries/consequentialism/> [perma.cc/BJY6-AKGH], which most defines
consequentialism as “simply the view that normative properties depend only on consequences”.
59
“Act consequentialism is the claim that an act is morally right if and only if that act maximizes the good, that is, if
and only if the total amount of good for all minus the total amount of bad for all is greater than this net amount for
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decisions. Delaware modelled its sentencing law for capital punishment after Georgia’s capital
punishment law.60 The Delaware law created a two-stage trial. The jury made a determination
about guilt for first-degree murder in the first stage and, if the accused had been found guilty of
first-degree murder, determined the sentence in the second stage.61 Imposing the death penalty
required a unanimous decision by the jury. 11 out of 57 death-penalty cases (19%) resulted in a
death sentence while this system was in place from 1977-1991.62 There was a perception that juries
were lenient in terms of rarely imposing the death penalty. This issue came to a head in 1991, when
the jury in a murder case—in which four men killed two armoured car guards—did not impose the
death penalty on any of the four men.63
The public and political outrage about sentencing in the case led to the state of Delaware
adopting a different sentencing system for first-degree murder trials. Under the new system, when
juries convicted a defendant of first-degree murder, the trial would enter a different penalty phase
in which jurors would make findings about mitigating and aggravating factors, but in which the
final sentencing authority was given to the judge.64 When Delaware adopted the system in which
judges determined death sentences, 31 out of 58 death penalty cases (53%) were given death
sentences. From the perspective of a person who opposes the death penalty, this is a negative result.
Summarizing their findings, Hans and her co-authors write:
In 1991, the Delaware legislature moved the central responsibility for capital
sentencing away from juries to judges. Legislators were motivated to do so because,
in their view, Delaware juries were overly reluctant to give death sentences in
appropriate cases. They anticipated that replacing the jury with the judge would
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increase the likelihood that capital murders would be punished by death sentences.
Our findings confirm that they were right.65
The point here is not to say that acting against a system that one opposes (i.e., the
sentencing system) using means that are unsanctioned by the legal system (in this case, a lie about
one’s stance on the death penalty) will lead to negative results. Some of history’s greatest progress
has been achieved using strategies such as civil disobedience against unjust regimes. It is also true
that no single juror’s reluctance to give a death sentence can be blamed for the instatement of a
sentencing system that led to more death sentences. However, the legislative change that produced
more death sentences was motivated by the public’s, and legislators’, view of jury behaviour.
The point here is that understanding the consequences of action that disturbs a complex
social system is difficult. If a person refuses to covertly act against the system using deception,
that does not necessarily indicate that the person places a higher priority on telling the truth than
s/he does on his/her opposition to the death penalty. Not only are our ethical and epistemic profiles
complex, but the way in which ethical and epistemic profiles are developed is complex. If the
complications that I have raised here are considered in response to what Freedman’s friend has
said, it becomes unclear how his friend’s statements add to his friend’s ethical profile. Without
having more information about the friend than the fact that his friend was unwilling to lie to get
on a death penalty jury, it cannot be known what his friend’s true priorities are or what his friend’s
ethical profile is.
Freedman is right that a person’s decisions create a sort of ethical profile of the person.
This profile matters a great deal and is a core concern of virtue-based theories of ethics and
epistemology. However, the profile is a combination of the actions, intentions, reasoning, and
perhaps other factors that are opaque to other people. Individuals should even be careful about
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overestimating their knowledge of their own cognition. Psychological factors briefly explored in
this dissertation may impede a fully honest and complete analysis. To some extent, this means that
we may never have a complete ethical and virtue epistemic profile of a person because we often
only ever have fleeting insights about the factors underlying the profile. Since we have incomplete
information about the factors that underlie a person’s actions, and thus the elements that going into
shaping a person’s ethical and epistemic profile, we should take caution about discussing an actual
person’s actions in a particular situation and especially expanding that discussion to a person’s
overall profile.
When applying virtue epistemic analysis to actual people who are dealing with the CP
Trilemma, one of the most important epistemic virtues for observers and commentators to practice
is intellectual humility. Humility is vital in avoiding the false attribution of intentions and
reasoning to the agents whose behaviour the observer/commentator may be judging. At the same
time, we should not concede too much about the inaccessibility of factors that underlie decisionmaking. We can draw inferences between a person’s actions and what his/her intentions and
reasoning are likely to have been. As an analogy, the criminal process relies on our ability to make
some level of determinations about a person’s intentions and reasoning, though those
determinations are a small sliver of a person’s complete ethical and epistemic profile. Being
humble in making judgments a factor in another real person’s decision-making does not imply the
factor’s inscrutability.
It could be argued that the importance given to information that often cannot be accessed
makes it too difficult to apply my epistemology of lawyering. I do not at all regard the difficulty
of accessing crucial information, and the resultant tentativeness of application to actual cases, as
being fatal to the theory that I am proposing any more than such limitations are weaknesses of any
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other domain of knowledge that has not yet achieved complete knowledge (i.e., any human domain
of knowledge). Recognizing such limitations is a great advantage of a normative theory, allowing
us to better appreciate the requirements of fair-mindedly applying the theory.
Moreover, the caution taken in applying the theory to actual people does not have to
impinge upon the articulation and demonstration of the theory. Thus, in the subsequent sections of
this dissertation, I will analyze various approaches to the CP Trilemma from a perspective that
enjoys access to more information in the hypothetical than is typically available to the onlooker of
an actual situation. Such information may only later, or perhaps never, become accessible to parties
who are not directly involved in the situation. In particular, I will examine different intentions and
reasoning that lawyers, and even other participants in a litigation process, might have while they
deal with the CP Trilemma. Granting myself access to this information about the hypothetical will
allow me to provide greater insights about what can be done with a virtue epistemic analysis when
information that is normally only available to a small number of people can be use in the analysis.
I am thus calling for, and exercising, boldness in theory but caution in the application of the theory
to any other specific person.
Finally, before moving directly into a consideration of responses to the CP Trilemma, I
want to briefly address a course of action that a lawyer is well advised to take when faced with a
wide array of difficulties related to practice: seeking advice from another lawyer. At a certain point
in the deliberative process, especially if the lawyer has exhausted his/her own knowledge and
understanding,66 the lawyer’s deliberative process must seek the counsel of another lawyer. Any
theory of lawyering inspired by virtue theory should give prominent place to the need to receive
legal advice about dealing with professional challenges, including the CP Trilemma.
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The ABA Model Rules67 and the FLSC Model Code68 both permit the lawyer to disclose
confidential information to another lawyer in order to obtain advice about the lawyer’s compliance
with his/her own professional duties. The protection given to the lawyer under these rules is, in
some sense, a profession-wide metacognitive plan—a selection by the legal profession of an
appropriate strategy for the lawyer to inform himself/herself, and confirm his/her understanding
of, the professional duties that the lawyer must respect in challenging situations.69 Moreover,
structures exist to facilitate the seeking of a second opinion, including counsel assigned to this role
in large firms and ethics hotlines run by the legal profession’s own regulatory bodies.70
Seeking advice from another lawyer will often be enhanced by metacognition on the part
of the lawyer who is seeking advice: the lawyer advisee. The lawyer advisee will almost inevitably
engage in metacognitive monitoring, which is defined as, “[O]ne’s on-line awareness of
comprehension and task performance”,71 in which the cognizer asks, “Do I have a clear
understanding of what I am doing?” and “Does the task make sense?”72 The lawyer advisee will
also have metacognitive experiences of dealing with the Trilemma. S/he may experience
frustration with his/her own inability to deal with the client’s intent to commit perjury. If the lawyer
cannot think his/her way out of the CP Trilemma on his/her own, the lawyer may experience
frustration at his/her own inability to persuade the client, and perhaps even at the client’s lack of
consideration for the risks that the client would be taking by giving false testimony. The client will
also surely have his/her own complex metacognitive experiences about the situation that may have
put him/her out of step with his/her lawyer (i.e., his/her epistemic partisan).
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The lawyer advisor, who gives advice to the other lawyer, will be engaging in
metacognition about the lawyer advisee to whom s/he is giving advice and about the client. Some
of the advice that the lawyer advisor gives may be about influencing the understanding and
deliberative process of the client. For example, to the extent that the lawyer advisor may speak on
the topic of dissuading the client against committing perjury, the lawyer advisor must look to the
considerations that the client would find meaningful, especially sufficiently meaningful to
convince the client against his/her plans about giving false testimony.
Interestingly, the thought process relating to the need to seek legal advice may be different
for a lawyer than from the perspective that I am taking in this dissertation. In the case of the
practicing lawyer, s/he is wise to consider the possibility that what s/he sees as a real CP Trilemma
is merely an apparent CP Trilemma to which another lawyer may see a correct answer that allows
the lawyer to fulfill all of his/her duties and to act virtuously. If another lawyer can show the first
lawyer that s/he is not in the CP Trilemma or show him/her a way to avoid facing the CP Trilemma,
this is a great benefit to the lawyer to the beneficiaries of the lawyer’s work.
In this dissertation, the focus is on the actual occurrence of the CP Trilemma, and thus on
situations in which the legal advice that the lawyer receives might help the lawyer respond to the
CP Trilemma (possibly by navigating trade-offs among duties and virtues), but not on situations
in which an apparent trilemma can be resolved. This is not because resolving merely apparent
instances of the CP Trilemma or other apparent conflicts of duties is unimportant to an epistemic
theory of lawyering. On the contrary, resolving apparent conflicts of duties and virtues is one of
the most useful things that any theory of lawyering or piece of advice about legal practice can do.
Resolving apparent conflicts will help lawyers avoid making unethical and epistemically
undesirable decisions. It will also help lawyers avoid seeking extreme answers to the challenges
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that they face. My focus, however, is on the actual occurrence of the CP Trilemma because the
actual conflict poses a direct problem for the epistemic partisanship that I am advocating in this
dissertation. Thus, all of the responses discussed below will attempt to deal with actual instances
of the CP Trilemma.
(7.3.1) Selective Ignorance – “I Didn’t Know”
From the beginning of the legal process, the lawyer can determine the way in which s/he
approaches the client, the court, the IKP duties, and the practice of epistemic virtue during the
adjudication process. The lawyer’s ability to structure his/her relationship with other participants
includes the ability to shape the way in which communication happens between participants and
the information that participants share with one another. Selective ignorance—one approach to
dealing with the CP Trilemma—is based on structuring the communication of factual information
from the client to the lawyer. I will begin this subsection by explaining the broad structure of
communications between the lawyer and the client, especially in an advising context that will lead
to the adversarial litigation context,73 followed by a discussion of how selective ignorance alters
that process.
Communication between the lawyer and the client sets the epistemic foundation for the
lawyer’s service of the client, whether that service is done in adversarial adjudicative processes or
in other contexts that do not immediately involve dispute resolution (e.g., in facilitating a
transaction). Ideally, lawyer-client communication takes place in a concordant epistemic advising
context.74 That is to say that, ideally, the lawyer and the client behave in an epistemically virtuous
way in the advising context and want one another to be known by the other as behaving in an
epistemically virtuous way. Having the client share information with the lawyer is vital to the
73
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lawyer’s ability to achieve a sufficient level of competence about the facts of a case to perform
his/her role as an epistemic partisan in the adversarial system of adjudication and in service of the
system’s truth-seeking function. A lawyer who does not properly inquire into the facts of a case
fails to meet the professional requirement of competence.
The lawyer’s duty of competence on factual matters is well defined in codes of professional
conduct. As mentioned earlier, the ABA Model Rules, in Rule 1.1 on competence, states that, “A
lawyer shall provide competent representation to a client. Competent representation requires the
legal knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the
representation”.75 Sufficiently inquiring into the facts of a case can be understood as falling under
the requirements for thoroughness and preparation. The comments to Rule 1.1 of the ABA Model
Rules specify in further detail, saying that, “Competent handling of a particular matter includes
inquiry into and analysis of the factual and legal elements of the problem, and use of methods and
procedures meeting the standards of competent practitioners”.76
In the FLSC Model Code, factual inquiry is built into Rule 3.1-2, which requires that, “A
lawyer must perform all legal services undertaken on a client’s behalf to the standard of a
competent lawyer”.77 The preceding section, 3.1-1, defines the term “competent lawyer” as “a
lawyer who has and applies relevant knowledge, skills and attributes in a manner appropriate to
each matter undertaken on behalf of a client and the nature and terms of the lawyer’s engagement,
including…(b) investigating facts, identifying issues, ascertaining client objectives, considering
possible options and developing and advising the client on appropriate courses of action”.78
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Sufficient factual inquiry is thus definitionally part of the norm created by the rule on competence.
Competence requires the lawyer to satisfy the investigating requirement of the IKP duties.
The lawyer has significant abilities to structure communications between himself/herself
and the client—and thus also his/her own ability to acquire competence about the facts of a case.
In the early advising context, it is up to the lawyer to explain to the client the need for the client’s
epistemic virtue in communicating with the lawyer and the protections (in the form of the duty of
confidentiality)79 that safeguard the client’s information as s/he shares it with the lawyer. The
ABA’s Criminal Justice Standards for the Defense Function provide a basic guideline for
conveying such information to clients in the criminal law context. The ABA’s advice on
establishing a relationship of trust with the client begins with explaining the need for the client to
share factual information with the lawyer and the ways in which these communications are
protected. Lawyers are advised to do the following:
Immediately upon appointment or retention, defense counsel should work to
establish a relationship of trust and confidence with each client. Defense counsel
should explain, at an appropriate time, the necessity for frank and honest discussion
of all facts known to the client in order to provide an effective defense. Defense
counsel should explain that the attorney-client privilege protects the confidentiality
of communications with counsel except in exceptional and well-defined
circumstances, and explain what the client can do to help preserve confidentiality.80
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The ABA’s guidance illustrates the nuances of the relationship between self-regarding
virtues and other-regarding epistemic virtues in lawyer-client relationship within an adversarial
legal system. In explaining aspects of lawyer-client communication to the client, the lawyer wants
the client to achieve understanding about a norm so that the lawyer can obtain true beliefs about
facts of a case. The lawyer must benefit the client (an other from the lawyer’s perspective) with an
explanation of the protections that are given to communications between the lawyer and the client,
so that the client will benefit the lawyer (an other from the perspective of the client) with an account
of the facts of the case. The lawyer will use this information to exercise self-regarding virtues
needed to prepare for the trial so that the lawyer can give an epistemic benefit to the court, which
the lawyer and client ultimately hope will be to the legal benefit of the client.
The process of explaining the need for open communication and the protection given to the
communication is a major opportunity to affect client behaviour. The client can be steered towards
epistemic virtues and/or epistemic vices. S/he can be steered towards the other-regarding epistemic
virtue of honesty. An explanation that sufficiently emphasizes the duties of honesty that the various
participants in litigation have in relation to the court can support an epistemically virtuous mindset
in the client (who hears the explanation), and in the lawyer (who gives the explanation). The task
of explaining communication within the lawyer-client relationship also sets the groundwork for
carrying out some of the competing approaches to dealing with the CP Trilemma. Such an
explanation can be the first steps in a strategy of dissuasion from dishonest behaviours such as
committing perjury or a strategy of selective ignorance (the main topic of this subsection) via, for
example, what Freedman describes as a Miranda warning early in the advising context.

234

Setting the stage for lawyer-client communication can be seen as a lawyer’s exercise in
social metacognition about the thoughts of the client.81 In particular, it is an effort in the regulation
of cognition, an exercise of the skills of metacognitive planning around the client’s comprehension
of communication and protection of communication. This is to say that the lawyer’s planning about
how to explain the contours of lawyer-client communication in a way that will be meaningful to
the client’s thinking “involves the selection of appropriate strategies and the allocation of resources
that affect performance”.82 For our present concern, performance is the communication (honest
and complete or otherwise) of factual information. The ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the
Defense Function advise that, “In communicating with a client, defense counsel should use
language and means that the client is able to understand, which may require special attention when
the client is a minor, elderly, or suffering from a mental impairment or other disability”.83 Guidance
about the social regulation of cognition is thereby already present in the guidance that the legal
profession gives to lawyers.
I argued above84 that metacognition allows thinkers to take responsibility for their own
cognitive development. In the context of legal representation, metacognition is largely offloaded
from the client to the lawyer. The client can benefit from the cognitive development of the lawyer.
This cognitive development includes the knowledge of substantive law and the ability to organize
one’s factual knowledge. The lawyer takes on the responsibility of acquiring and marshalling
his/her knowledge of law and knowledge of the facts. The lawyer’s earliest interactions with the
client, in which s/he may explain the dynamics of lawyer-client communication to the client, thus
become central in facilitating the transfer of not only knowledge, but also responsibility in relation
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to that knowledge, from the client to the lawyer. The pursuit of factual competence in a case is
thus central to the lawyer taking epistemic professional responsibility for one of the litigants (the
one for whom the lawyer is a partisan). It is a key process in achieving responsibilist epistemic
virtues.
Considering the broader activity of shaping communication between the lawyer and client,
selective ignorance is not actually an approach to dealing specifically with a client who the lawyer
believes intends to commit perjury as in the CP Trilemma. Rather, selective ignorance is a strategy
in which the lawyer is interested in “gaining the tactical advantage of knowledge and the
immunity-providing benefit of ignorance”.85 Ignorance, the thinking goes, allows the lawyer to
gain a tactical advantage by avoiding limitations that norms of legal practice place on lawyers.
This is because, as Stephen Ellmann explains, “the rules of professional duty leave no room for
knowing violations, but they do leave some room for not knowing”.86
Speaking broadly about information passed between the lawyer and client, some
information, if shared with the lawyer, restricts the evidence that the lawyer can present at trial
and thus also restricts the range of possible defences that the lawyer can present on the client’s
behalf. For example, FLSC Model Code, Rule 5.1-1 [Comment 10] says that:
Admissions made by the accused to a lawyer may impose strict limitations on the
conduct of the defence, and the accused should be made aware of this. For example,
if the accused clearly admits to the lawyer the factual and mental elements
necessary to constitute the offence, the lawyer, if convinced that the admissions are
true and voluntary…must not suggest that some other person committed the offence
or call any evidence that, by reason of the admissions, the lawyer believes to be
false. Nor may the lawyer set up an affirmative case inconsistent with such
admissions, for example, by calling evidence in support of an alibi intended to show
that the accused could not have done or, in fact, has not done the act.87
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Some lawyers will thus use selective ignorance to avoid curtailment of their ability to put forward
normally permissible defences. If the client avoids admitting the factual and mental elements of a
crime to the lawyer, then the lawyer’s tactics remain unconstrained by rules such as the one just
cited because the lawyer does not know the information that would constrain his/her options.
From a social epistemic perspective, selective ignorance can be seen as an attempt to deal
with a social interaction (between the lawyer and client) that is too epistemically powerful for what
the lawyer perceives to be the client’s legal interest. One way in which to understand selective
ignorance is thus as a reduction of the epistemic power of the advising process, i.e., a reduction in
“the ability of a practice to help cognizers find and believe true answers to the questions that
interest them”.88 The lawyer’s concern is not the number of beliefs that the lawyer-client
interactions produce, but rather avoiding an epistemic process between the lawyer and client which
produces true beliefs that limit the client’s strategic options in litigation. The lawyer would
theoretically be happy to know many facts that do not place strategic limits on the work that s/he
does for the client. However, since the lawyer cannot know, before hearing it from the client, what
information will place the client at a strategic disadvantage (at which point the lawyer already
cannot be selectively ignorant anymore), the lawyer will be better able to practice selective
ignorance if s/he undertakes a measure (such as the lawyer-client Miranda warning) that will limit
the total number of beliefs that the lawyer acquires from the client (i.e., limit epistemic power).89
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An important possible benefit90 of practicing selective ignorance is that the lawyer can also
avoid facing the CP Trilemma because, as with practicing selective ignorance to protect one’s
ability to set up an affirmative case for the client, the lawyer simply never acquires enough
information to knowingly engage, or assist, in deception. On the specific topic of offering false
evidence to the court, the ABA Model Rules say, “The prohibition against offering false evidence
only applies if the lawyer knows that the evidence is false. A lawyer’s reasonable belief that
evidence is false does not preclude its presentation to the trier of fact”.91 “Knows” is defined in the
Model Rules as “denot[ing] actual knowledge of the fact in question”.92 A lawyer who never knows
that evidence is false thus never fulfills the investigation aspect of the IKP duties sufficiently to
become aware of a specific client’s intention to commit perjury and to be prohibited from
introducing the evidence (including the client’s testimony). Only by obtaining the information that
the selectively ignorant lawyer is attempting to avoid would the lawyer cross into the realm of
suborning perjury as s/he facilitates the client’s deception. By investigating in a way that avoids
this information, the lawyer never faces a conflict between the IKP duties. His/her investigations
never produce results that would allow him/her to know that s/he is facilitating the misleading of
the court.
A lawyer who is motivated by the CP Trilemma to practice selective ignorance expects that
the three duties that result in the CP Trilemma will conflict often enough that it is worthwhile for
the lawyer to modify his/her approach to lawyer-client interactions, especially in early stages of
the lawyer-client relationship. This does not mean that the lawyer expects that s/he will frequently
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have a client who wishes to commit perjury. More often than not for lawyers who practice selective
ignorance, the lawyer’s concern will simply be about not being limited in the arguments that s/he
can make on the client’s behalf, as already explained in this section.
One way to practice selective ignorance is for the lawyer to “make it clear to the client
from the outset that the attorney does not want to hear an admission of guilt or incriminating
information from the client”.93 The lawyer commences discussion about the case with what
Freedman describes as a “lawyer-client Miranda warning”.94 This warning is given early within
the advising context, setting the tone for the rest of the lawyer-client relationship. The lawyer
informs the client that s/he should not share any incriminating information with the lawyer or admit
to the lawyer that s/he is guilty of the offence of which s/he is accused. 95 This “lawyer-client
Miranda warning” may work in concert with the approach that the lawyer takes to explaining
lawyer-client communications to the client. To be clear, selective ignorance does not, strictly
speaking, require this lawyer-client Miranda warning. Since clients do not all have the same
personal traits related to sharing information and dealing with lawyers, not every client will be
equally eager to independently proffer to the lawyer all the information about his/her case. Some
clients may need to be led by the lawyer into disclosing enough information to even give the lawyer
sufficient information to build a case. What the “lawyer-client Miranda-warning” does is set up
expectations so that clients who do offer information freely to the lawyer do not give up the tactical
advantage that the lawyer wants to gain from selective ignorance.
Another way to practice selective ignorance is for the lawyer to simply “learn the [factual]
information in a way that will not ascribe knowledge to her”.96 Christian Turner describes an
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approach in which the lawyer speaks in hypotheticals, rather than about the actual facts of the case
as the client recalls them.97 Another approach that avoids the lawyer-client Miranda warning is
explained by Bradley Wendel while discussing the CP Trilemma. He cites the example of a famous
Texas lawyer named Richard Haynes, who would not ask the client for his/her account of the facts
of the case. Instead, Haynes would ask his client what the other side might say the facts are.98
Whatever the specifics of the lawyer’s approach, the lawyer is attempting to be in a state of
selective ignorance without explicitly warning the client about the limitations that can be placed
on the lawyer’s advocacy if the lawyer obtains specific kinds of information. An advantage of such
an approach is that the client may feel less confronted than s/he would by the lawyer explicitly
explaining the limitations that factual knowledge can place on the lawyer’s advocacy and may thus
be more likely to feel comfortable sharing information with the lawyer.
Selective ignorance is a difficult position to support in an epistemology of lawyering.
Admittedly, one could claim that the terminology that I have given to the approach (“selective
ignorance”) already stacks the deck against the strategy. Aware of these concerns, I offer the
following argument for the types of strategies described in this section. The argument is based on
the idea of professional discretion in pursuing factual competence and is given specifically for the
criminal defence context. In offering this argument, I will give a generous reading of the strategy
and demonstrate why it deserves the name of “selective ignorance”.
Selective ignorance can be understood, most generously, as the lawyer structuring the
client’s exercise of other-regarding epistemic virtues in the advising context. The lawyer wants the
client to give enough information for the lawyer to provide effective representation but recognizes
that the client giving too much information—even to the lawyer—could be a tactical disadvantage
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for the client. Knowing just enough to keep the lawyer’s options open could be understood as a
mean between knowing too little to deploy tactics in the client’s benefit and knowing too much to
deploy tactics in the client’s benefit.
The provisions on competence in the ABA Model Rules and the FLSC Model Code are
primarily concerned with the lawyer being sufficiently competent to use processes by which s/he
can obtain, understand, evaluate, and marshal evidence and law on the client’s behalf. Norms about
competence do not give prescriptions that the lawyer must use any particular process to engage in
factual inquiry. This strategic decision is properly left up to the lawyer. Moreover, knowing how
to make decisions about which factual inquiries to pursue is itself a hallmark of a competent lawyer
who does not waste his/her client’s resources. In the criminal defence context, in particular,
lawyers have explicit duties to “protect the client as far as possible from being convicted, except
by a tribunal of competent jurisdiction and upon legal evidence sufficient to support a conviction
for the offence with which the client is charged”.99 With this professional discretion in this practice
context, it may be reasonable for the lawyer to interact with the client in a way that is less
epistemically powerful (i.e., in a way that produces fewer total true beliefs) so that the lawyer can
most effectively pursue the client’s acquittal. Such an approach to structuring the epistemology of
lawyer-client interactions could be understood as a virtuous mean: managing one’s pursuit of
knowledge in between the vice of apathy and knowledge acquisition and what could be described
as the vice of blindly seeking to acquire all possible knowledge regardless of context.
Some ideas in virtue epistemology even resemble the generous reading that I am giving to
selective ignorance. Discussing metacognition, epistemologist Christopher Lepock describes
effective management of one’s cognition. He argues that, as with other capacities, cognitive
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processes must be applied to environments to which they are suited, in a “selective application”.100
Lepock gives the example of cases in which senses such as vision and sense of smell can be
distorted by environmental factors (e.g., lighting conditions).101 Similarly, cognitive faculties such
as “memory and deduction are only reliable when their inputs are reliably formed”. 102 Lepock’s
focus is on applying cognitive processes “only in environments in which and for contents for which
the process yields true beliefs”.103
I am not arguing here that the lawyer-client advising context (especially a conversation
between the lawyer and client about the facts of a case) is one in which the lawyer’s cognitive
faculties would not be suited to reliably form true beliefs. To the contrary, lawyers’ cognitive
virtues (faculty-virtues and trait-virtues) are well suited to reliably forming true beliefs. The
straightforward application of faculties such as memory and deduction will normally be of great
assistance to lawyers in acquiring competence about the facts of a case. However, perhaps there is
some space in an epistemically role-differentiated profession104 for a distinct approach to the
selective application of cognitive virtues. That space may be created by the client’s need for the
most robust form of partisanship in the criminal law context. In that case, the terms for selective
application of epistemic faculties and traits, including in pursuit of factual competence, would be

Christopher Lepock, “Metacognition and Intellectual Virtue” in Abrol Fairweather, ed, Virtue Epistemology
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Intellectual Virtue” in Chienkuo Mi, Michael Slote & Ernest Sosa, eds, Moral and Intellectual Virtues in Western and
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determined by the lawyer’s role in the specific context. If selective application of cognitive virtues
is appropriate, this may include using such strategies to be selectively ignorant of the facts of a
case to protect the strategic interests of the client.
The lawyer who practices selective ignorance may have determined that the type of factual
competence that emphasizes the importance of knowing all facts of a case, and the faculties and
traits needed to achieve that level of competence, are not suited to the context. When knowing
certain information would substantially reduce the strategies that a lawyer is permitted to employ
on a client’s behalf, it might be concluded that the lawyer should be permitted to refrain from
applying the epistemic virtues and skills that would give the lawyer a more complete knowledge
of the facts of a client’s case. Such a decision might be especially appropriate to the criminal law
context, where the justification for the adversarial model of adjudication is at its strongest.
The argument just considered for selective ignorance on the basis of the lawyer’s discretion
to apply epistemic virtues is insufficient for two reasons: (1) it does not set workable boundaries
for selective application of epistemic virtues and (2) it allows the lawyer to create a policy that
avoids taking epistemic responsibility for the client in a way that supports the epistemic functions
of the adversarial system of adjudication. Considering the first of these two problems, this
argument misses key factors about selective application and the Judgment Principle. Selective
application exists to minimize the inappropriate use of an agent’s epistemic capacities. As Lepock
argues, an agent can engage in selective application of his/her cognitive processes so that the agent
is “able, most of the time, to use cognitive processes to form beliefs only in environments in which
and for contents for which the process yields true beliefs”.105 The idea is to carefully exercise one’s
capacities in a way that produces epistemic successes, such as yielding true beliefs.
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This reasoning does not translate to selective ignorance by lawyers as described in the
present section of this dissertation. Here, selective ignorance, has been described as a broad
pragmatic approach that some lawyers may apply to a wide swath of cases. It is one thing to decide
that inquiring into a particular factual aspect of the case will not be fruitful or should be pursued
in a particular way. It is another thing altogether to make a blanket decision against the pursuit of
factual knowledge that is so crucial to the cases that knowledge of those facts would severely
restrict, or even negate, the ability of a lawyer to offer an affirmative defence for clients. The
former is a one-off decision in which the lawyer can be responsive to the needs of specific clients
and to the features of the specific lawyer-client relationship. The latter is a broad policy that limits
factual inquiry to avoid crucial information and that potentially reduces responsiveness to client
needs. The latter may even leave the lawyer without sufficient knowledge to make an informed
decision about which factual matters need further inquiry.
Selective ignorance, being directed at preventing the lawyer from acquiring the information
necessary to knowingly facilitating deception, can leave the lawyer poorly positioned to even
identify possible problems with the client’s expected testimony (such as an intention to lie to the
court) and without enough knowledge to even attempt to dissuade the client from committing
perjury.106 A broad policy of selective ignorance can thus prevent the lawyer from achieving full
competence of the facts but can also limit or prevent a lawyer from being able to make informed
decisions about factual competence. Rather than virtuously using one’s discernment to put
epistemic virtues in their proper context, selective ignorance discourages the use of these virtues
in a fitting context and limits the lawyer’s ability to acquire the knowledge to assess when virtues
would be properly used.
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The second problem with selective ignorance is that the lawyer thereby avoids taking
epistemic responsibility for the client in a way that supports the epistemic functions of the
adversarial system of adjudication. The lawyer’s avoidance of epistemic responsibility is
illustrated well by a practical objection that Freedman gives to selective ignorance. He argues that
selective ignorance puts the burden on the client to decide what s/he should tell the lawyer.107 Such
a strategy is an abdication of a large swath of the lawyer’s epistemic role in the lawyer-client
relationship. At the beginning of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer is passing on some of
his/her own the epistemic responsibility—and thus also professional responsibility—onto the
client. The epistemic division of labour in the adversarial system of adjudication would normally
require the lawyer to solicit this information from the client and then decide how to proceed using
the information obtained from the client. Instead of allowing the client to play his/her epistemic
role of freely sharing information about the case with the lawyer, selective ignorance either puts
the client in the position of filtering out information, especially when the lawyer gives a lawyerclient Miranda warning or walks the client through a process that filters out information (as in the
example of Richard Haynes).108 The lawyer-client Miranda warning raises reliabilist concerns that
come from the lawyer not taking epistemic responsibility for the case. On the other hand, examples
such as those of Richard Haynes prompt consideration of what the lawyer is actively doing as a
knower/believer.
In the case of the lawyer-client Miranda warning, the strategy (1) pursues ignorance, (2)
facilitated by placing an epistemic burden on the client, (3) in order to reduce the competence of
the lawyer, (4) so that the client can gain a tactical advantage supported by dishonesty. Numerous

See Freedman, “Lawyer’s Trilemma”, supra note 1 at 29.
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problems exist with this strategy for a virtue epistemic perspective. Freedman recognizes a crucial
epistemic problem that affects the epistemic reliability of the lawyer-client consultation. “[A]
lawyer”, Freedman argues, “can never anticipate all of the innumerable and potentially critical
factors that his client, once cautioned, may decide not to reveal”.109 The client may actively decide
to not reveal certain information. However, the client also does not have the epistemic skill
required to sift through and decide which facts are relevant to the case and which facts are even
legally helpful to his/her own case. When it comes to assessing epistemically and legally relevant
facts for a case, the client may believe that actually relevant facts are irrelevant and that some
actually irrelevant facts are relevant.
A problem in medical ethics is emerging that shares some similar reliabilist concerns.
Before beginning this comparison, it is crucial to note that this problem does not indicate any
malice on the part of medical practitioners. Indeed, there is a strong argument that this issue in the
practice of medicine is merely an unintended consequence of a deep commitment by doctors who
practice it to managing their medical practice well. Despite this fundamental difference of
intentions and practice of epistemic trait-virtues,110 the comparison is instructive for understanding
the reliabilist consequences that result from a professional (i.e., someone who has a particular
epistemic role) leaving some epistemic responsibility with the client (or patient). I am speaking
specifically of epistemic responsibility that would normally be passed on from the client (or
patient) to the professional.

Freedman, “Three Hardest Questions”, supra note 5 at 1472. Indeed, even if clients are not cautioned against
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In order to avoid spending excessive time on one appointment and so that they can stay on
track with their appointments, some family doctors have instituted the practice of limiting patients
to raising only one medical issue during an appointment.111 Like the legal client who is given a
lawyer-client Miranda warning, the patient who is told that the doctor will only deal with one
medical issue per visit is left with the decision about what to raise with the professional who is
seeing him/her. Just as the lawyer cannot predict the large number of factors that the client may
not disclose, doctors who have a one issue per visit policy may be unable to anticipate the number
and severity of issues that the patient will omit when the patient chooses which issue to discuss. A
patient may incorrectly rank the severity and priority of issues or may not even consider that issues
that they perceive to be distinct are actually part of the same medical problem.
The application of the professional’s knowledge is necessary to determine which facts or
medical complaints the professional must know in order to provide the appropriate professional
services. The professional has the competencies to make such judgments and to investigate such
information. Professionals are, of course, expected to direct the client (or patient) in sharing
information so that the scope of information communicated by the client (or patient) does not go
beyond the capabilities of what the professional can realistically address. However, professionals
risk substantial limitations of their epistemic reliability when they use blanket policies that limit
the transfer of epistemic responsibility from the client (or patient) to the professional.
Approaches like those of Richard Haynes involve the lawyer actively soliciting information
from the client and not raising explicit warning signs but also carefully narrowing the scope of
what the client is likely to say. As noted above, Haynes would ask the client what the other side
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might say the facts are. In the first place, Haynes’ strategy does not completely avoid the risks of
being unable to control what the client will hide from the lawyer. The client may not hold back as
much as s/he would in response to a lawyer-client Miranda warning, but Haynes’ line of
questioning may steer the client away from being sufficiently forthcoming, even for Haynes’
purposes, and may fail to give the sort of positive elicitation that would move specific clients to
share the information that Haynes wants to obtain. Haynes does not avoid reliability concerns
merely by not Mirandizing the client.
Haynes’ approach also raises concerns that fall specifically under the core of responsibilist
virtue epistemology and its application to the legal profession. The way that Haynes poses
questions to the client about the facts involves taking an active role as a knower/believer.112 The
lawyer is making active choices about the way in which s/he structures the client’s communication
of information about the facts of the case. Clients may need sustained guidance to explain what
the opposing party would say about the facts of the case, requiring the lawyer to be adept at
metacognitive monitoring of the client’s cognition to be aware of whether the client understands
and can execute the task. Explaining the perspective of the opposing side will be an unusual ask
to make of a client, rather than simply explaining one’s own perspective.
Most crucially, Haynes’ approach is highly suitable for critique using a responsibilist
approach to virtue epistemology. His approach: (1) pursues ignorance, (2) by walking the client
through a carefully choreographed communication process, (3) in order to reduce the competence
of the lawyer, (4) so that the client can gain a tactical advantage supported by dishonesty. Though
Haynes does not pursue ignorance by passing the burden onto the client, it does pursue ignorance
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in order to reduce competence. Epistemically, Haynes’ approach does not aim to facilitate a clash
of competent champions before an impartial tribunal. Rather, it aims to put forward a champion
who does not fully comprehend the situation. It is a partisan advantage sought without the support
that a competent champion gives to the adversarial system’s truth-seeking function. The lawyer is
taking epistemic responsibility in the sense that s/he is guiding the client through the process of a
consultation with the lawyer (i.e., in the sense of not making himself/herself passive about
receiving information from the client), but s/he is not taking responsibility for pursuing the
epistemic virtues by which epistemic partisanship provides a benefit to the adversarial system of
adjudication.
Selective ignorance is undertaken through the use of what John Humbach describes
critically as “[t]he lawyer’s skill”, which he says is to “weave stories that are false out of statements
that are true”.113 If a lawyer avoids acquiring select pieces of information that would limit his/her
available avenues to defend the client,114 s/he can pursue these otherwise prohibited avenues,
telling a story about the case that is false or misleading (because the story is incomplete or even
based on an incorrect account of the facts), and yet (arguably) avoid breaching rules of professional
conduct against misleading the court (because s/he is presenting only true statements and
statements that s/he believes to be true). This is a distorted process of metacognitive monitoring
that centres on the lawyer avoiding epistemic responsibility and in which the lawyer protects
his/her innocence via vice. Rather than using metacognition to advance one’s own knowledge, the
lawyer who engages in selective ignorance uses skills and practices associated with metacognition
John A Humbach, “The National Association of Honest Lawyers: An Essay on Honesty, ‘Lawyer Honesty’ and
Public Trust in the Legal System” (1999) 20:1 Pace L Rev 93 at 94.
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to acquire an advantage that is not itself connected with acquiring knowledge for oneself or
promoting the acquisition of knowledge by others, especially others who are the key epistemic
agents in an adversarial adjudicative process. Selective ignorance is thus fundamentally
inconsistent with the epistemic role of the lawyer.
(7.3.2) Dissuasion – “I’ll Convince You”
Dissuasion, if it can be achieved (and achieved properly), is an ideal response to the CP
Trilemma.115 Put most simply, the lawyer attempts to convince the client out of committing
perjury.116 The opportunity to dissuade the client arises in the advising context of the lawyer-client
relationship.117 In that context, the lawyer’s IKP duties have not yet actually come into conflict. In
the advising context, the IKP duties require the lawyer to obtain relevant information about the
case, to keep it in confidence, and to advise the client and prepare the case in a way that will show
candour to the court. The lawyer’s duty of candour before the court, does not become fully
operative (i.e., cannot be violated) in the way imagined by the CP Trilemma before the lawyer
actually has occasion to deceive the court—or to assist the client in deceiving the court—during
the lawyer’s presentation of the client’s case. Until the lawyer enters the adversarial context and
can present the client’s case to the court, the lawyer is merely preparing to present the client’s case,
not actually presenting it. If the lawyer convinces the client out of committing perjury before the
lawyer begins to present the client’s case, then the lawyer will be unencumbered by the CP
Trilemma in presenting the client’s case to the court with candour.
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Connecting back to the previous section on selective ignorance, I also note that, for the
lawyer to specifically attempt to dissuade the client out of an actual plan to commit perjury, the
lawyer must have some minimal level of factual competence about the case and some sufficient
understanding of the client’s intentions to identify the need to specifically dissuade this client. A
lawyer who practices selective ignorance can advise the client in general terms against committing
perjury, but once the lawyer understands the need to dissuade a particular client out of a specific
plan to commit perjury, the lawyer has entered the realm of knowingly assisting the client to
deceive the court if the lawyer facilitates the client’s presentation of false testimony. The lawyer
who can attempt to dissuade a client with reference to the client’s specific situation has met the
investigating requirement of the IKP duties to a large enough extent that selective ignorance, even
on that approach’s own terms, cannot be achieved.
Dissuading the client as part of the lawyer’s fulfillment of the IKP duties is well supported
by norms of professional conduct. Attempting to dissuade the client out of committing perjury is
mandated and encouraged by norms of professionalism (being stated in rules of professional
conduct). Some of the guidance in codes of professional conduct deals directly with what lawyers
are required to do in the CP Trilemma, whereas other guidance is generally stated such that
dissuading the client from committing perjury falls under its ambit. Speaking directly about the
CP Trilemma, the ABA Model Rules state, “If a lawyer knows that the client intends to testify
falsely or wants the lawyer to introduce false evidence, the lawyer should seek to persuade the
client that the evidence should not be offered”.118 The ABA gives this guidance to accompany their
rules on candour towards the tribunal.
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More broadly, the appropriateness of convincing the client out of committing perjury stems
from the nature of the advising relationship between the lawyer and the client contemplated by
codes of professional conduct. Rule 3.2-2 of the FLSC Model Code requires that, “When advising
a client, a lawyer must be honest and candid and must inform the client of all information known
to the lawyer that may affect the interests of the client in the matter”.119 The Commentary on the
rule expands that:
[2] A lawyer’s duty to a client who seeks legal advice is to give the client a
competent opinion based on a sufficient knowledge of the relevant facts, an
adequate consideration of the applicable law and the lawyer’s own experience and
expertise. The advice must be open and undisguised and must clearly disclose what
the lawyer honestly thinks about the merits and probable results.120
Giving candid advice to a client about his/her plan to commit perjury necessarily involves
the lawyer explaining the legal prohibitions against committing perjury, the sanctions that the
client faces for committing perjury,121 that the lawyer is not permitted to assist the client in
committing perjury,122 and the way in which the client’s plan to commit perjury limits the ability
of the lawyer to serve the client123. These are attempts by the lawyer to explain the negatives about
the client’s plan. Additionally, and perhaps more importantly from the perspective of changing the
client’s mind, the lawyer should offer positive arguments for litigating the case in an honest
manner, emphasizing the lawyer’s role in serving the client and the honest means of argumentation
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that the lawyer can use to advocate for the client. In Freedman’s example of the CP Trilemma, the
lawyer as of yet faces no particular restrictions on the approach that s/he may take to defending
the client.124 The lawyer should explain in positive terms how s/he will convince the trier of fact
that there is a reasonable doubt about the client’s guilt. In explaining the lawyer’s duties and the
options available to the lawyer to serve the client, the lawyer acts in accordance with a strong
foundation of norms of professional conduct supporting dissuasion.
In addition to (1) allowing the lawyer to meet his/her IKP duties and (2) the support that
dissuasion receives in norms of professional conduct, dissuasion is well at home in a virtue
epistemology of lawyering. In the first place, any lawyer who can undertake a strategy of
dissuasion in response to the plans of a specific client has already taken a level of partisan
responsibility beyond what would be consistent with selective ignorance. The lawyer would not
even be able to know that dissuasion is needed or to choose strategies for dissuading the client
without having already created an epistemic relationship with the client in which the lawyer and
the client both practice self-regarding epistemic virtues and other-regarding epistemic virtues
required to listen to one another and share information freely with one another. Thus, dissuasion
requires the lawyer to already have performed at least some minimal level of epistemic virtue in
service of his/her own duty of competence and taking of partisan epistemic responsibility from the
client.
Dissuasion from committing perjury is an act in the furtherance of epistemic virtues (e.g.,
furthering the virtue of honesty) and itself requires epistemic virtues to be performed successfully.
The epistemic virtues required are technical epistemic skills and character traits. Convincing the
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client who intends to lie against pursuing such a course of action itself is better achieved, or perhaps
only achieved, through persuasive engagement with the client. Some of this involves technical
skills, like good listening while hearing the client’s desire to take a certain course of action,
demonstrating to the client that his/her position is understood, persuasively articulating the reasons
to not commit perjury, and addressing the client’s concerns and motivations.
Trait-virtues are also required for dissuasion, having a unique direction of benefit. Recall
previously that epistemic partisanship is:
a disposition to (a) desire the epistemic and legal success of the client, which leads
to (b) taking action to support the advancement of the client’s cause, (c) in service
of the adversarial system of adjudication, especially its truth-seeking function.125
In attempting to dissuade the client from committing perjury, part (b) of epistemic partisanship
becomes wholly directed towards the client. The lawyer communicates information and advice to
the client. However, the purpose of the communication is not primarily for the client to acquire
knowledge; that would be more common in the advising context, in which the lawyer is
communicating information to the client about the law. Instead, the action that the lawyer takes to
advance the client’s cause is directed as spurring the client to practice epistemic trait-virtues of
honesty in dealing with the tribunal. Dissuasion is thus the practice of the role-differentiated traitvirtue of epistemic partisanship in support of the client’s practice of a trait-virtue, for the epistemic
benefit of the trier of fact.
Alongside the place for epistemic virtues, convincing the client out of taking the illegal
action of committing perjury allows the lawyer to fulfill his/her role in the social epistemology of
the adversarial system of adjudication. The lawyer supports the legal system in meeting Goldman’s
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veritistic criteria.126 If the client is persuaded against giving false testimony, the client avoids
introducing a factor into the legal process that would increase the number of false beliefs in the
adversarial litigation process—protecting the legal system’s epistemic reliability. A client who
gives only truthful testimony increases the ability of an adversarial trial to arrive at true beliefs
about a matter under litigation—increasing the legal system’s epistemic power. A legal process
into which false testimony is not introduced can be speedier, as no time in cross-examination needs
to be used on statements that are known to the client to be false. Finally, the cost of arriving at true
beliefs is reduced, thereby increasing efficiency, as the legal process is not put to work assessing
the truth of a false claim. Done successfully, dissuasion is the ideal result for a social epistemology
of lawyering, which is concerned with serving the client in furtherance of the epistemic function
of the adversarial system of adjudication.
What are some of the mechanics of dissuasion? The first occasion to use dissuasion might
take the lawyer by surprise or leave the lawyer with little time to think through the situation. A
client may, without having given previous indications, raise the possibility of intentionally giving
false testimony to the court. The lawyer faces an immediate need to discourage the client from
committing perjury. In such cases, dissuasion is the only response to the Trilemma that may
sometimes (at least when first deployed) be impossible for the lawyer to plan for by using careful
deliberation or seeking advice from another lawyer about compliance with the ethical duties of
lawyering. Thus, the first opportunity to dissuade a client from giving false testimony may be
undertaken without the benefit of metacognitive planning127 on the lawyer’s part. That is to say
that the lawyer may have no, or limited, opportunity to structure his/her own thinking on the topic
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or to plan about how the client will react to the lawyer’s attempt to fulfill his/her ethical and legal
duties.
Thankfully, even when the lawyer has not prepared specifically to dissuade the client in a
particular case, the lawyer is able to draw upon clear norms in the legal system against perjury, the
lawyer’s own duties to the court, and the guidance that the lawyer has given to previous clients
about testifying honestly. The lawyer has a basic foundation of content that can ground his/her
initial dissuasive reply to a client who unexpectedly indicates to the lawyer that s/he will commit
perjury. Should this first reply fail, the lawyer will need to reflect more carefully about the means
that s/he will use to communicate during later attempts at dissuasion and about the substance that
the lawyer will raise in relation to the particular circumstances of the client’s case and which might
motivate the client more than the generally stated norms of the adjudicative process.
Whereas other strategies for dealing with client perjury call for a single act (or set of acts
carried out in a short sequence) that cannot be attempted again if they fail, dissuasion can be
attempted on multiple occasions as part of ongoing advice to the client. Freedman notes that
sustained efforts to dissuade the client from committing perjury “have often proven successful”.128
The tenacity to return to an effort at dissuasion, to seek solutions, and to seek ways to reconcile a
conflict (real or apparent) of lawyering duties is itself part of the task of dealing virtuously with
situations in which values come into conflict. As Ayers says referencing a different case of
conflicting values, “A choice like this should be difficult, and it should be preceded by a sincere
attempt to have it both ways”,129 i.e., to serve the competing values and adhere to the competing
duties.

Freedman, “Client Confidences”, supra note 5 at 1953.
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Later, arguing more generally about the value of struggling with a dilemma before
choosing in favour of one particular value, Ayers says, “Rather than ending the struggle
prematurely by making a choice and moving on, it is sometimes admirable to continue racking
one’s brain in an attempt to find a practical solution”.130 Until the client actually commits the
action, the lawyer cannot be sure, and so dissuasion remains appropriate for the lawyer to continue
pursuing, even as s/he prepares other responses to his/her expectation that the client will commit
perjury. Of course, sometimes, such as in the CP Trilemma, the lawyer will face an impending
event (the trial, in this case) that will not allow additional time for reflection and reconsideration
of options. Understanding how much time is appropriate to dedicate towards racking one’s brain
is itself virtuous prudential behaviour. Even so, a key benefit of dissuasion is that it offers the
lawyer numerous opportunities and tacks at epistemic virtue in confronting conflicts of lawyering
duties.
Before ending this section, replete with praise for a strategy, and thus far only cautioning
that the strategy may not always work, I will recognize a risk of vice (epistemic and ethical). Even
a strategy that is generally permissible or laudable can be carried out in a way that is both
epistemically and ethically unvirtuous. In particular, the lawyer can attempt to dissuade the client
in a way that harms the trust in the lawyer-client relationship and in which the lawyer leverages
the client’s trust in the lawyer against the client. Making this point, Freedman argues that a
dissuasive strategy “should not include threats to betray the lawyer’s pledge of confidentiality” if
the client does not refrain from his/her plan to commit perjury.131 Threatening to reveal
confidential information in this way imperils the foundation for the client’s trust that s/he can
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safely share information with the lawyer. The foundation for the client’s trust (i.e., for the client’s
performance of other-regarding epistemic virtues to give an epistemic benefit to the lawyer) is
imperiled both as the client reasons through what has happened because of the lawyer’s threat and
as the client goes through the affective experience132 of receiving such a threat from his/her own
lawyer. Clients faced with such threats from the lawyer are likely to begin to rethink their earlier
trust in the lawyer and feel that the lawyer has a weapon that s/he can now use in other situations.
The lawyer then turns from being a confidant133 for the client to someone who uses the information
entrusted in him/her to even coerce the client.
While discussing dissuasion in the CP Trilemma, Freedman highlights not only the way in
which the lawyer’s response to the trilemma can help maintain the integrity of the knowledge
seeking aspect of litigation (especially fact finding), but also that the lawyer’s ability to protect the
epistemic integrity of the legal process depends on the lawyer’s own knowledge. Freedman says
that if the lawyer, “[L]earns that the client is going to commit perjury, the lawyer should take
advantage of the knowledge—knowledge that the lawyer rarely would have without the pledge of
confidentiality—to dissuade the client from testifying falsely”.134 The protections given to the
client by confidentiality facilitate the lawyer’s acquisition of knowledge that allows the lawyer to
dissuade the client from committing perjury. The lawyer may have acquired both the knowledge
to recognize the intent to commit perjury and the knowledge by which the lawyer can persuade the
client against perjury. If a threat to reveal confidential information weakens the client’s trust in the
lawyer, then a lawyer can thereby also undermine the foundation for his/her own ability to learn
about and deal with the particular instantiation of the CP Trilemma. Even in a single lawyer-client
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relationship, a lawyer who threatens to reveal confidential client information to dissuade the client
from committing perjury takes a serious risk of undermining the foundation for the lawyer’s own
position.
When it is used within a strategy of trying to dissuade the client, threatening to reveal the
client’s confidences can cause a shift in the lawyer’s efforts at dissuasion. In the worst case, such
a threat causes a breakdown of the lawyer-client relationship and is the last opportunity that this
lawyer has to dissuade the client. The client may end his/her relationship with this particular lawyer
and may move to another lawyer.135 Even if the client does not leave the lawyer, at least two
possible branches of outcomes arise if the lawyer-client relationship continues. On one branch, the
client is not dissuaded by the threat. If the client is not dissuaded, then the lawyer has used one of
his/her potentially most impactful dissuasive tools (a sort of nuclear option for the lawyer-client
relationship) but has still failed in the effort at dissuasion. The lawyer may continue with other
dissuasive efforts to the extent that the lawyer-client relationship can continue to bear attempts at
dissuasion. As noted earlier, however, the client’s trust in the lawyer may be severely undermined
after the lawyer has attacked the protection that gave the client the trust to share information with
the lawyer in the first place. Continued efforts at dissuasion are thus undertaken from a weak
position and with potentially incomplete information (if the client no longer shares all information
with the lawyer, for fear of another situation in which the lawyer can use the client’s trust against
the client).
On the other branch, the client is dissuaded by the threat. If the client is dissuaded, it is
possible that the client does not perceive that any harm has been done to the lawyer-client
relationship. Even if the client’s perception is correct and such harm was not caused, this does not

A problem then arises of whether the second lawyer will be able to even discover the client’s intent to commit
perjury. I deal with this same issue in Section (7.3.3), on withdrawal.
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mean that the lawyer has acted in an epistemically virtuous, or even neutral, way. The threat itself
rashly risks impairing the lawyer’s access to information from the client, thus hardly serving the
lawyer’s epistemic partisanship and epistemic function within the adversarial system of
adjudication. Alternatively, the client may be dissuaded, but may conclude that damage has been
done to the lawyer-client relationship. The client may respond in any number of ways, but one
particularly worrisome response is the client losing trust in the lawyer and holding back
information from the lawyer. If the client holds back information from the lawyer, the lawyer may
have a reduced ability to stay factually competent about the case. The lawyer could enter a clientimposed selective ignorance.136 Thus the violation of the client’s trust represented by threatening
to reveal confidential information if the client does not abandon the plan to commit perjury raises
severe epistemic risks that undermine the lawyer’s epistemic role.
Even as he speaks strongly against threatening the client with revealing confidential
information, Freedman is not blind to the potential need to take a strong approach to dissuasion (to
the need to make the perils of perjury obvious to the client). Freedman thus allows for what he
describes as “threats of adverse tactical and legal consequences” if the client commits perjury.137
This would be better described as a warning, given as part of complete legal advice, than a threat.
Notably, such a warning would be about legally legitimate consequences that the client may face
for committing perjury. The ABA Model Rules support this approach as they note that “a lawyer
may discuss the legal consequences of any proposed course of conduct with a client and may
counsel or assist a client to make a good faith effort to determine the validity, scope, meaning or
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application of the law”.138 More broadly, the FLSC Model Code, under the duty of candour, states
that:
A lawyer’s duty to a client who seeks legal advice is to give the client a competent
opinion based on a sufficient knowledge of the relevant facts, an adequate
consideration of the applicable law and the lawyer’s own experience and expertise.
The advice must be open and undisguised and must clearly disclose what the lawyer
honestly thinks about the merits and probable results.139
Informing the client of the possible negative consequences of committing perjury is just an
instance of informing the client about the negative legal consequences of performing any action
that is prohibited by law. In such cases, the client is the beneficiary of the lawyer’s knowledge,
rather than the target of knowledge that the lawyer is weaponizing against the client.
Though an ideal response when carried out properly, not every client in every situation can
be dissuaded. After considering options available to the lawyer in the CP Trilemma and
recognizing the desirability of dissuasion, the Court of Appeal in California says, “Yet, [the
persuasion solution] does not answer the question of what should be done when the client insists
on testifying falsely despite his attorney’s best efforts to dissuade him”.140 The lawyer should not
move too quickly into a conclusion that the client will not be dissuaded. Convincing the client out
of committing perjury can be a sustained effort to respond to the CP Trilemma. Should these
persistent efforts be unsuccessful, however, the lawyer should consider responses to the trilemma
other than dissuasion. The remainder of this dissertation deals with situations in which the lawyer
recognizes that s/he must consider actions other than dissuasion in response to the client’s plan to
commit perjury.
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(7.3.3) Withdrawal from Representation – “I Can’t Help You”
If a lawyer cannot achieve the ideal of dissuading a client from committing perjury, one
approach that is widely supported is for the lawyer to avoid participating in, facilitating, or in any
way condoning the client’s perjury. Lawyers can achieve this by withdrawing from representing
the client. As with dissuasion, withdrawal from representation in response to the CP Trilemma can
take place within the advising context. Thus, withdrawal from representation can be done before
the third aspect of the Trilemma, arising out of the lawyer’s duty of candour to the court, becomes
operative (i.e., before the lawyer and the client have the opportunity to deceive the court).141 Prior
to actually withdrawing, a lawyer may inform the client that, if the client persists in the plan to
commit perjury, the lawyer will have to withdraw from representing the client. This lead up to
withdrawal can also be viewed under the umbrella of threatening adverse tactical consequences,142
except that it is the lawyer who actually delivers on the threat, rather than the broader legal system
by way of a ruling made by a court against the client. The loss of one’s lawyer can be viewed as a
tactical setback within the client’s broader efforts at winning the dispute with the opposing party.
Withdrawal as a response to the client putting the lawyer in the position of being involved
in breaching the law and professional ethics is well grounded in codes of professional conduct and
norms of professionalism. The FLSC Model Code requires the lawyer to withdraw from
representing a client who insists on committing perjury. Pertaining generally to withdrawal, Rule
3.7-7 on Obligatory Withdrawal says that, “A lawyer must withdraw if:…b) a client persists in
instructing the lawyer to act contrary to professional ethics”.143 Rule 5.1-1 of the FLSC Model
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Code sets out the lawyer’s duty of candour to the court; this duty is part of the lawyer’s role as an
advocate.144 A client who cannot be dissuaded from the plan to commit perjury is persistently
asking the lawyer to participate in deceiving the court, i.e., to violate the lawyer’s duty of candour
to the court in Rule 5.1-1. Additionally, Rule 5.1-2(b) prohibits the lawyer from “knowingly
assist[ing] or permit[ting] a client to do anything that the lawyer considers to be dishonest or
dishonourable”.145 Perjury, and the facilitation of perjury, require the performance of dishonest
activities and not being candid with the court, violating Rule 5.1-2. Facilitating untruthful
testimony in court should certainly qualify as something that the lawyer considers dishonourable.
Continuing with a plan to give untruthful testimony and asking the lawyer to facilitate the
untruthful testimony is a persistent effort to have the lawyer act contrary to professional ethics.
Moreover, Rule 3.7-2 of the FLSC Model Code allows the lawyer the option to withdraw
“[I]f there has been a serious loss of confidence between the lawyer and the client”.146 The
commentary further specifies circumstances that may give “justifiable cause for withdrawal”.147
These circumstances include “if a lawyer is deceived by his client, the client refuses to accept and
act upon the lawyer’s advice on a significant point, a client is persistently unreasonable or
uncooperative in a material respect….”148 As we will see later in this section, the CP Trilemma
can involve the client withholding information from the lawyer. Furthermore, a client who persists
in his/her intention to commit perjury after the lawyer’s repeated attempts at dissuasion has refused
to accept the lawyer’s advice on one of the most immediately pressing issues in the trial (giving
honest testimony) and has also been uncooperative and unreasonable.
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In addition to the general norms on withdrawal, Rule 5.1-4 of the FLSC Model Code
pertains to withdrawal related to breaches of the lawyer’s duty of candour (and other duties as an
advocate). Rule 5.1-4 requires the lawyer to disclose and rectify the errors and omissions that s/he
makes in the performance of his/her role as an advocate.149 The commentary to Rule 5.1-4 explains,
“If a client desires that a course be taken that would involve a breach of this rule [i.e., Rule 5.1],
the lawyer must refuse and do everything reasonably possible to prevent it. If that cannot be done,
the lawyer should, subject to rule 3.7-1 (Withdrawal from Representation), withdraw or seek leave
to do so”.150 The lawyer is advised (though not mandated) to withdraw if the client desires for the
lawyer to breach the duty of candour to the court (and other norms in Rule 5.1 that govern the
lawyer’s role as an advocate).
The Supreme Court of Canada has also given broadly relevant guidance about withdrawal
in the case of R v Cunningham.151 Most notably for my purposes here, the court set out the
protections given to a withdrawal done for ethical reasons. Therein, the court says counsel may
cite “ethical reasons” as the justification for withdrawal, giving the example of “the

accused…requesting that counsel act in violation of his or her professional obligations”.152
Where a lawyer seeks to withdraw for ethical reasons, the court “must grant withdrawal”153
and “must accept counsel’s answer at face value and not enquire further so as to avoid
trenching on potential issues of solicitor-client privilege”.154 Thus, when a lawyer comes to
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understand that s/he faces the CP Trilemma, the law can and must ask for withdrawal under
codes of professional conduct, citing “ethical reasons” as the justification for withdrawal. The
court must accept this explanation and not further inquire into the matter.
The ABA Model Rules bring some complications with them that go beyond the FLSC
Model Code. In particular, the ABA Model Rules explicitly contemplate what a lawyer must do in
response to client perjury. Dissuasion, disclosure, and withdrawal are specifically discussed.155 I
will explain much more about the ABA’s stance on disclosure in response to client perjury
below.156 With respect to withdrawal, Rule 1.16 specifies terms for mandatory or optional
withdrawal. Pertaining to the former, Rules 1.16 (a) says that, “[A] lawyer shall not represent a
client or, where representation has commenced, shall withdraw from the representation of a client
if: (1) the representation will result in violation of the rules of professional conduct or other law”.157
In the CP Trilemma, a lawyer who assists the client in presenting perjurious testimony would be
violating his/her professional duty of candour to the court.158 Additionally, the ABA Model Rules
contain a broader range of justifications for optional withdrawal, including that “the client insists
upon taking action that the lawyer considers repugnant or with which the lawyer has a fundamental
disagreement”, which one should hope includes assisting the client to deceive the court.159
From a virtue epistemic perspective, there is good reason to look favourably upon
withdrawal as a response to the CP Trilemma that can be used after the lawyer has attempted, and
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failed, to dissuade the client. Withdrawal allows the lawyer to avoid personally facilitating or
condoning the practice of epistemic vice in deceiving the court. There is also a significant sense in
which the lawyer who withdraws from representing the client in the CP Trilemma practices the
role-differentiated epistemic virtue of epistemic partisanship that the adversarial system needs. I
defined epistemic partisanship as:
a disposition to (a) desire the epistemic and legal success of the client, which leads
to (b) taking action to support the advancement of the client’s cause, (c) in service
of the adversarial system of adjudication, especially its truth-seeking function.160
The client’s epistemic and legal success does not include deceiving the court. Earlier, I
defined the epistemic success of the client as persuading the adjudicator of the client’s position by
presenting the adjudicator with truths, especially on disputed factual matters or on conceptual
matters that can be known.161 Since the CP Trilemma exists when the client plans to mislead the
tribunal, a lawyer facilitating the perjurious testimony would not be presenting the adjudicator with
truths and would thus not be pursuing the client’s epistemic or legal success. In such a case, the
lawyer might be exclusively pursuing the client’s material benefit, for example.
When the lawyer cannot continue to work for the client without stepping outside the bounds
of pursuing the client’s epistemic and legal success,162 the lawyer cannot participate in a clash of
positions to facilitate the work of a neutral arbiter in service of the adversarial system of
adjudication. To continue working for the client would mean engaging in global partisanship,
which I defined as taking the side of the client regardless of whether doing so serves the functions
of the adversarial system of adjudication, and regardless of whether the particular actions that the
lawyer is taking for the client serve the justifications for the lawyer’s role and role-differentiated
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norms.163 Instead of participating in this epistemically vicious behaviour, the lawyer can withdraw
and thereby cease providing legal services when the lawyer’s actions are not supportive of, and
cannot be justified by, the adversarial system of adjudication.
Like dissuasion, though, even withdrawal is not a problem-free response to the CP
Trilemma. Although the lawyer can use withdrawal to avoid personal involvement in epistemic
vice, the lawyer’s clean hands do not, by themselves, inoculate the legal system against the client’s
intention to commit perjury. When the lawyer withdraws, the CP Trilemma also remains
unresolved from the perspective of the legal needs of the client who must now find another lawyer.
To do more than protect the lawyer, withdrawal must lead to some change in the client or the legal
proceeding. The client, for example, must be persuaded by the withdrawal (or perhaps because of
a series of results started by the withdrawal) that the benefit of persisting in the plan to deceive the
court is not worthwhile. If the client continues to pursue the legal matter and persists in the plan to
commit perjury, the adjudicative system’s own mechanisms may perpetuate the tension, or the
successor lawyer will be placed in an epistemically disadvantaged position.
Speaking of perpetuating the tension, the Court of Appeal of California in People v
Johnson, described withdrawal as an “intermediate solution[]” that “often result[s] in no solution”,
specifically when the initial lawyer’s “withdrawal leads to an endless chain of withdrawals”.164
The court is imagining a situation in which the first lawyer who represents the client in the CP
Trilemma is sufficiently competent to understand the need for withdrawal and withdraws from
representing the client. The client, not dissuaded from the plan to commit perjury, seeks
representation from another lawyer. This successor lawyer too becomes sufficiently competent to
recognize the CP Trilemma and the need to withdraw from representing the client. The successor
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lawyer too withdraws and sends the client onto the next step of a never-ending chain of
withdrawals. The client will repeatedly find himself/herself hiring new lawyers and losing their
service as the lawyers respond to the CP Trilemma by withdrawing from the relationship.
Of course, given the real-world costs and institutional/social dynamics involved with
obtaining legal representation, this chain is unlikely to have many links before some change occurs
in the client or the legal proceeding to interrupt the chain. A real client will quickly tire of hiring
and losing new lawyers and the legal community will quickly realize that something is wrong in
the client’s relationship to his/her lawyers.165 Noting the theoretical possibility of the endless
chain—of obtaining legal representation, having the lawyer understand and respond to the CP
Trilemma, and seeing the lawyer withdraw from representing the client—is not the purpose of this
line of thought. Instead, we ought to approach the Court of Appeal’s argument as showing that
withdrawal does not give a resolution to the CP Trilemma merely on the basis of the adjudicative
system’s own internal resources (which include norms of legal professionalism) functioning as
they are designed to function. The lawyer’s abidance of the norms on withdrawal do not, on their
own, resolve the scenario. To this, I add the observation that, for withdrawal to be any sort of
resolution to the CP Trilemma, withdrawal must lead to a change in the client (whether a change
of viewpoint or even simply a prudential calculation that comes out against the plan to give
untruthful testimony).
With the aim of causing a change in the client, another way in which to look at withdrawal
goes beyond considering it as an act by an individual lawyer, or as an act by a series of
disconnected lawyers acting independently (in the case of a client who attempts to have another
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lawyer allow him/her to commit perjury). Rather, if the lawyers that a client encounters are all able
to gain enough information to understand that the client plans to commit perjury, then withdrawal
by multiple lawyers can be understood as a collective effort at dissuasion in fulfillment of the
professional duties that all lawyers are bound to follow. When a lawyer withdraws, it can be taken
as demonstrating to the client that his/her desire to commit perjury is incompatible with receiving
a full defence because lawyers are not prepared to knowingly act in a way that undermines the
adjudicative system that lawyers serve. The profession will have taken a unified stance against
assisting a client to commit perjury and it is up to each lawyer that faces this problem to give that
stance practical effect. Continuing the tension of the CP Trilemma through a chain of lawyers then
becomes a measure that protects the legal system, rather than a problem with withdrawal.
Critically, the tension of duties in the trilemma and the social tension experienced by being the
client in the trilemma are aimed at causing a change in the client.
Another, more problematic, possibility may intervene well before continuing the tension
of the CP Trilemma can cause a change in the client. Withdrawal may eventually lead the client to
a lawyer who is in an epistemically disadvantaged position. This position can exist for various
reasons and serve various purposes. For example, rather than facing an unending chain of
withdrawals, the client may find a lawyer who practices selective ignorance. A lawyer in this
position will purposely not achieve sufficient factual competence to recognize the CP Trilemma
and will thus not have the impetus to withdraw from representing the client. Considering the effects
on the legal system as a whole, all that withdrawal has achieved in such a case is to shuttle the
client from a lawyer who is factually competent about the matter, and who has the integrity to
refuse to assist the client in deceiving the court, to a lawyer who builds incompetence about the

269

facts of a case into his/her practice strategy. The reasons articulated above for opposing selective
ignorance apply here too.
Finding a selectively ignorant lawyer is not the only way for the client to obtain the services
of a lawyer who is in an epistemically disadvantaged position. Describing the aftermath of a
lawyer’s withdrawal from representing a client, Freedman suggests that, “The client will then go
to the nearest law office…and withhold incriminating information or the fact of his guilt from his
new attorney”.166 In more general terms, what Freedman is saying is that, having lost a lawyer over
the CP Trilemma, the client may omit information from his/her interactions with this successor
lawyer so that the successor lawyer will not have enough information to know that the client is
planning to commit perjury and will thus not be impelled to withdraw from representing the client.
There are major virtue epistemic problems in this possibility.
Before moving onto considering those virtue epistemic problems, I will explain why the
process of transferring from one lawyer to another could put the successor lawyer in an
epistemically disadvantaged position. Would the successor lawyer not be informed by the first
lawyer about the client’s intention to commit perjury and thus also recognize the CP Trilemma?
Codes of professional conduct have provisions about the role of the first lawyer in facilitating the
transfer of information to the successor lawyer. The FLSC Model Code says that, “Co-operation
with the successor lawyer will normally include providing any memoranda of fact and law that
have been prepared by the lawyer in connection with the matter, but confidential information not
clearly related to the matter should not be divulged without the written consent of the client”.167 A
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memorandum of the facts of the case might include information that would let the successor lawyer
know that the client intends to commit perjury.
However, the first lawyer’s duty of confidentiality can interrupt a complete flow of
information from the first lawyer to the successor lawyer and could place the successor lawyer in
a position where the client can omit information in the way described by Freedman. In discussing
“confidential information not clearly related to the matter”,168 the FLSC Model Code recognizes
that the first lawyer cannot simply transfer all confidential information to the successor lawyer,
and thus that there is such a thing as confidential information that the successor lawyer can be kept
from seeing. That same rule and its commentary, Layton and Proulx argue, “appear to recognize
an implicit authority to reveal confidential information clearly related to the matter to the successor
lawyer”.169 Yet, Layton and Proulx argue that this implied authority does not prevail against the
client expressly forbidding the lawyer from sharing the information with the successor lawyer.170
If the client expressly instructs the first lawyer to not divulge information about the client’s
intended perjury to the successor lawyer, the first lawyer would be bound by the duty of
confidentiality to not disclose the information to the successor lawyer.171 By examining the virtue
epistemic problems with the client keeping information from the successor lawyer that would
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allow the successor lawyer to identify the CP Trilemma, I am dealing with situations in which the
first lawyer is held back by the duty of confidentiality from sharing this information with the
successor lawyer.
One level of virtue-epistemic problem deals with the mechanics of lawyer-client
interactions. When the client withholds information from the successor lawyer for fear of losing a
strategic advantage, the client is avoiding the practice of epistemic virtue that the contours of the
lawyer-client relationship are designed to encourage in service of the mechanisms of the
adversarial system of adjudication. The epistemology of the adversarial system of adjudication
requires competent champions for the parties to a legal proceeding. Lawyers and their clients are
given protections—in the form of duties of confidentiality and the protections of privilege—to
facilitate open and honest communication. These protections are meant to create an advising
context in which the lawyer, and especially the client, can practice other-regarding epistemic
virtues, with the aim of the lawyer acquiring competence of the facts so that the lawyer can advise
the client about the law and possibly represent the client before a neutral arbiter (if the dispute
actually makes it to court). When things work as intended, the advising context is epistemically
reliable and epistemically powerful172 for the lawyer. Quite the opposite from practicing epistemic
virtues in the way intended to support the adversarial system, the client who withholds
information173 from the successor lawyer seeks to generate false beliefs in, and deception of, the
successor lawyer so that the successor lawyer will not prevent the client from testifying falsely and
so that the successor lawyer will not withdraw.

See Goldman’s veritistic standards, discussed above in Section (2.1) at note 15–16 and accompanying text, citing
Goldman, “Foundations”, supra note 53 at 128–129.
173
Information by which the successor lawyer would identify the CP Trilemma and, eventually, be impelled to
withdraw from representing the client.
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Using Freedman’s example of the CP Trilemma, the client could attempt to keep the lawyer
from knowing that s/he was at 15th and P Streets at 10:55PM, i.e., that he was close to the scene
of the crime, even though he was moving away from the scene of the crime. If the successor lawyer
discovers this information, then this lawyer might also attempt to dissuade the client from giving
perjurious testimony and may also eventually withdraw from representing the client. The client
hiding information from the lawyer makes the conditions of the successor lawyer-client
relationship less epistemically reliable for his/her successor lawyer (i.e., worsens the ratio of true
beliefs to the total number of beliefs174 produced in the lawyer in the advising context), thus
reducing the lawyer’s factual competence.
When the client decides to withhold information to protect a tactical advantage, s/he creates
similar downsides to when a lawyer practices selective ignorance by giving a lawyer-client
Miranda warning.175 In the case of a client keeping information from a subsequent lawyer after
their earlier lawyer has withdrawn, the client can be said, in his/her reasoning process, to give
himself/herself a Miranda warning based on the events that led the first lawyer to withdraw. This
is to say that the lawyer-client Miranda warning would be self-administered by a layperson, who
would have less capacity to understand the consequences of that decision than a lawyer practicing
selective ignorance.176
Such a client places himself/herself in the position of making a strategic decision about
what information to share with his/her next lawyer. Cutting off the successor lawyer’s
opportunities for epistemic virtue, the client is also removing the successor lawyer from being in

See Goldman, “Foundations”, supra note 53 at 128 (definition of epistemic reliability).
These downsides are stated above in Section (7.3.1).
176
This is not to say that the lawyer practicing selective ignorance is any sort of model. The client self-administering
a lawyer-client Miranda warning creates an even worse epistemic relationship between that lawyer and the client,
however.
174
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a “position to attempt to discourage the client from presenting [his/her perjurious testimony]”.177
The client prevents the lawyer from giving the client the benefit of advice about the prohibitions
on perjury, the risks of perjury, and the benefits of either giving honest testimony or not testifying
at all. The client also denies, or reduces, the lawyer’s ability to think through the ways in which
the lawyer can fulfill his/her own duties to the court (especially duties related to honesty) while
representing a client who intends to commit perjury. This is the kind of decision-making and
epistemic responsibility that legal representation is supposed to provide for the client, but which
the client has appropriated to himself/herself, or at least prevented the lawyer from giving.
Broadening out my concerns from the level of epistemic mechanics in the lawyer-client
relationship, I turn to the topic of what legal representation is supposed to provide for the client by
addressing epistemic responsibility and epistemic partisanship. If legal representation can itself be
described as an appropriate offloading of epistemic work from the client and onto the lawyer,178
withdrawal from representation removes the normal aspects of the workload from the lawyer. This
does not mean that the full workload is passed from the lawyer to the client when the lawyer
withdraws from representing the client. Unless the client will self-represent from this point
onward, the load is not transferred from the lawyer to the client in the sense of requiring the client
to perform the epistemic work that is assigned to the lawyer in the adversarial system. Rather, the
client becomes newly responsible for retaining a new lawyer to bear the epistemic load.
Outside of self-representation—and dealing with the issue of the client holding back
information from the successor lawyers—the broader epistemic concern is that the client who
holds back information from the successor lawyer will deny the successor lawyer the opportunity

Freedman, “Three Hardest Questions”, supra note 5 at 1476 (discussing the possibility of a client going to another
law office and withholding information from the new lawyer after the client’s first lawyer has withdrawn in response
to the CP Trilemma).
178
Described above in Section (5).
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to take epistemic responsibility in the legal proceedings, to offload key aspects of epistemic work
from the client to the lawyer. The successor lawyer, even wanting to pursue the epistemic virtues
by which lawyers provide a benefit to the adversarial system of adjudication, can be denied the
ability to do so by a determined client who intends to give perjurious testimony. All the while, the
first lawyer is stopped from assisting the second lawyer by the duty of confidentiality that the first
lawyer owes to the client.179 If the successor lawyer never discovers the client’s deception, the
successor lawyer will have a blind spot that s/he does not know to check, thereby limiting the
extent to which s/he can acquire and marshal knowledge for the benefit of the client. If the
successor lawyer makes all appropriate investigative efforts within the lawyer-client relationship
to acquire the knowledge needed to serve the client, the successor lawyer is not committing
epistemic vice. This lawyer is like a soldier who has dispositions for courage but who is shuttled
away by others when danger arrives. The lawyer has the trait-virtues needed to give partisan but
honest representation—a function needed by the legal system—but the lawyer is not able to put
those dispositions into practice.
If some of Freedman’s worst predictions about the result of withdrawal come true, then
withdrawal ends up being far less than perfect, and potentially raises serious problems, from a
social epistemic perspective. Rather than producing a positive result by keeping false testimony
out of the adjudicative process, i.e., instead of maintaining the veritistic reliability of the
adjudicative process by preventing false beliefs from being added to the set of beliefs that the
adjudicative system produces, withdrawal would weaken the veritistic excellence of the process
by introducing misleading information into the (successor) lawyer-client relationship(s). In doing
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A lawyerly duty (confidentiality) that is meant to facilitate the functioning of the adversarial system is not merely
ignored or does not merely conflict with other duties; it exists as an obstacle to the first lawyer’s ability to rectify the
client’s relationships to his/her lawyers in line with the needs of the adversarial system.
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so, withdrawal prevents epistemic partisanship and the passing of epistemic responsibility from
the client to the lawyer. For withdrawal to do more than allow the lawyer to “evad[e] the ethical
problem”,180 it must ultimately result in some change in the client or in the legal proceedings. For
an actor with a role-differentiated epistemology in a system that seeks truth, responses to
conflicting responsibilities need to do more than allow the actor to himself/herself avoid practicing
epistemic vice.
(7.3.4) Narrative Testimony Approach – “I’ll Let You Tell Them”
The narrative testimony approach, also called “passive representation”,181 was advanced
“[i]n the early 1970s” by “members of the ABA Standing Committee on Association Standards
for Criminal Justice” who drafted the ABA Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and
the Defense Function.182 Under their proposal, the narrative testimony approach could be
undertaken after the lawyer has tried and failed at using other methods to address the CP Trilemma.
Before engaging in passive representation in response to the CP Trilemma, the lawyer would be
required to attempt to dissuade the client183 and to seek withdrawal (if feasible).184 Good
counselling and persuading the client away from misleading the court is still recognized as the
most preferrable response and outcome. Should those other avenues have failed, the lawyer would
facilitate the client’s testimony while following a specific set of instructions to avoid actively
participating in the deception of the court. The lawyer “confine[s] his examination [of the client]

Freedman, “Lawyer’s Trilemma”, supra note 1 at 28.
Freedman, “Getting Honest”, supra note 5 at 150.
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Susan E Thrower, “Neither Reasonable nor Remedial: The Hopeless Contradictions of the Legal Ethics Measures
to Prevent Perjury” (2010) 58:4 Clev St L Rev 781 at 791, n 66 and accompanying text, citing American Bar
Association, Standards Relating to the Prosecution Function and the Defense Function (ABA, 1971) [ABA Standards
1971].
183
See Thrower, supra note 182, n 67 and accompanying text, citing ABA Standards 1971, supra note 182, Standard
4-7.7(a).
184
See Thrower, supra note 182, n 68 and accompanying text, citing ABA Standards 1971, supra note 182, Standard
4-7.7(a).
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to identifying the client and permitting him to make a statement to the finder of fact”.185 The
approach prohibits direct examination and prohibits the lawyer from later “refer[ring] to or
rely[ing] on known perjury in his argument to the fact-finder”.186
Though not being widely recommended as a way of dealing with the CP Trilemma, the
narrative testimony approach continues to be permitted or required in some courts. The current
ABA Model Rules recognize that lawyers in some jurisdictions are required by courts to use the
narrative testimony approach and that the orders of such courts take precedence over other
requirements (including in professional codes of conduct) pertaining to a client who plans to give
false testimony.187 California is one jurisdiction that permits the narrative testimony approach in
the California Rules of Profession Conduct. The State Bar’s commentary on the use of the narrative
testimony approach cites the case of People v. Johnson, 188 where the Court of Appeal of California
described the narrative testimony approach as the “Best Accommodation of the Competing
Interests” when the lawyer expects the client to give perjurious testimony.189
In the Johnson case, the trial level judge agreed to a request by the defence attorney to
prevent the accused from testifying. The lawyer made this request of the trial court because the
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Thrower, supra note 182, n 70 and accompanying text, citing ABA Standards 1971, supra note 182, Standard 47.7(c). Compare Freedman’s more critical description in Freedman, “Getting Honest”, supra note 5 at 150–152.
Therein, Freedman says that the lawyer who practices the narrative testimony approach “identifies the witness as the
defendant, tells him to tell his story to the jury, and then turns his back on the defendant and sits down”, Freedman,
“Getting Honest”, supra note 5 at 150.
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Thrower, supra note 182, n 71 and accompanying text, citing ABA Standards 1971, supra note 182, Standard 47.7(c).
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See ABA Model Rules, supra note 6, r 3.3, commentary 7. Commentary 7: “In some jurisdictions…courts have
required counsel to present the accused as a witness or to give a narrative statement if the accused so desires, even if
counsel knows that the testimony or statement will be false. The obligation of the advocate under the Rules of
Professional Conduct is subordinate to such requirements”. See generally Thrower, supra note 182 at 790–797,
especially n 78 (explaining the narrative testimony approach and cataloguing instances in which it has been required,
permitted, and rejected by courts); Layton & Proulx, supra note 27 at 354, n 113 (cataloguing cases in large
jurisdictions such as California, New York, Massachusetts, Illinois, Pennsylvania, and Florida, that have adopted the
narrative testimony approach).
188
State Bar of California, California Rules of Professional Conduct, State Bar of California, 2021, online: State Bar
of California <www.calbar.ca.gov/Portals/0/documents/rules/Rules-of-Professional-Conduct.pdf> [perma.cc/QLA3HVYR], r 3.3, commentary 4.; People v Johnson, supra note 115 at 817.
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People v Johnson, supra note 115 at 817.
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lawyer expected the client to perjure himself. Later, the Court of Appeal explained that the trial
court should not have prevented the accused from testifying because doing so involved the
“impossible task” of “determine[ing], as a matter of fact, that Johnson would perjure himself once
he took the stand”.190 Instead of barring the client from testifying, the Court of Appeal said that
the trial court should have permitted the client to give testimony in the narrative form.
Though arguably preferrable to preventing the client from testifying at all, the narrative
testimony approach poses significant problems for the epistemic structure of the adversarial system
of adjudication and for epistemically virtuous lawyering within the adversarial system. Passive
representation during, and in response to, the client’s testimony is not so much an exercise in
epistemic partisanship191 as it is a break from partisanship. It makes the lawyer’s role one of
episodic or segmented representation within a single legal dispute, though the client needs
enduring and unbroken partisan representation, especially during criminal litigation.
In passive representation, the lawyer takes a posture of epistemic neutrality, even of an
observer, with respect to the client’s own testimony. A lawyer who is epistemically neutral about
an aspect of their client’s case is avoiding responsibility (in the sense of avoiding guilt) that would
accrue to the lawyer if s/he were to take positive action that facilitates the client’s deception.192
But this idea of a lawyer aiming to limit his/her own guilt by being passive is deeply connected
with avoiding the kind of responsibility that is the focus of the responsibilist school of virtue
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Ibid at 818.
Above in Section (4.5), at note 90 and accompanying text (this dissertation’s definition of epistemic partisanship).
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But see Thrower, supra note 182 at 796, where she critiques the idea of distinguishing between the lawyer passively
aiding the client’s perjury as opposed to actively assisting the client’s perjury. She argues that the ABA Model Rules,
supra note 6, r 3.3 (on candour towards the tribunal) and 1.2(d) (prohibiting the lawyer from assisting the client to
engage in criminal or fraudulent behaviour) do not make a distinction between active assistance and passive assistance.
This too is a powerful argument against the narrative testimony approach that can be explored from an epistemic
analysis, though I do not do so in this dissertation.
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epistemology. Minimizing the active nature of “knowers/believers”193 is precisely the problem
with the narrative testimony approach when it comes to the reliance that the adversarial system of
adjudication has on the epistemic partisanship of the lawyer. In the adversarial system of
adjudication, the lawyer is responsible for being one of the primary active knowers/believers,
doing epistemic work on the client’s behalf and in service of the clash of positions on which the
adversarial system is based. This is the core of the notion of epistemic partisanship articulated in
this dissertation. Suspending one’s role within the system—especially during its most challenging
and consequential moments—is thus a poor way to avoid one’s own professional guilt.
Being more specific, the narrative testimony approach is a substantial offloading—from
the lawyer to the client—of the cognitive work that the lawyer would normally be required to do
in relation to the client’s testimony.194 The client is left with the task of structuring the way in
which s/he presents his/her testimony to the trier of fact. In the terms of virtue epistemology, this
means that s/he must determine how s/he will practice other-regarding virtues for the parts of the
testimony that are true and the other-regarding vice of dishonesty195 for the parts of the testimony
that is untrue. Notably, the onus is placed on the client at one of the most vital moments of the
case. The lawyer, not being permitted to assist the client in preparing this perjurious testimony
because doing so would assist the client in giving false or misleading evidence,196 leaves the client
with the task of deciding which facts to include in the narrative and how to work the perjurious

This is in contrast with responsibility in epistemology, which “can highlight the active nature of knowers/believers”,
discussed above in Section (3.2) at note 34 and accompanying text, citing Code, supra note 112 at 51.
194
As argued in Section (5), the offloading is properly done the other way around, from a layperson to a skilled
professional.
195
In practicing the vice of dishonesty, the client would want to skillfully tell the untrue aspects of his/her story. Thus,
practicing a vice here involves some epistemic capacities, even as they are deployed for vicious ends.
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See ABA Model Rules, supra note 6, r 3.3(a)(3) (prohibiting the lawyer from offering evidence that the lawyer
knows to be false), r 3.4 (prohibition on “counsel[ling] or assist[ing] a witness to testify falsely”); FLSC Model Code,
supra note 11, r 5.1-2(e) (prohibiting the lawyer from offering evidence that the lawyer knows to be false), r 5.4-2
(prohibiting the lawyer from influencing a witness to give false evidence).
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aspect into the testimony. The client, lacking the formal training that would give him/her the
technical skill to structure his/her testimony, may not see how transparent his/her lie is.
I do not lament the fact that the client may do a poor job of concealing his/her perjury.
Technical proficiency at an epistemically vicious behaviour (i.e., the skill needed to be
epistemically vicious) is not a desirable trait to have in a client or in any epistemic agent. Nor am
I promoting sympathy for the client who intends to commit perjury, especially not sympathy for
someone who is facing a difficult task (the difficult task of preparing and delivering perjurious
testimony). However, even when someone bears the blame for his/her own situation and should
not be wished success in their misguided endeavour, it can still be recognized that s/he is not well
equipped to manage the situation or to perform a task that would normally be assigned to someone
who occupies a different role in the situation. It is the lawyer’s responsibility to ensure that the
client is not put in the position of attempting to figure out how to be effective at deceiving the
tribunal. In terms of the lawyer’s function in the adversarial system of adjudication, it is the
lawyer’s responsibility to assist the client in successfully practicing other-regarding epistemic
virtues. Not participating in the client’s exercise of epistemic vice by stepping outside of the
lawyer’s role leaves the adversarial system without the benefit of an actively participating
professional fulfilling his/her designated role and shifts responsibilities in a high-stakes situation
to the layperson. Virtue epistemology counsels lawyers to step into responsibility, not to step out
of responsibility.
Finally, the narrative testimony approach adds a wrinkle to the avoidance of responsibility
that is different from the avoidance of responsibility in selective ignorance. This is because
refusing to assist one’s cause is not equal at all stages of a process. With selective ignorance, not
taking epistemic responsibility undermines the lawyer’s ability to competently represent the client.
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In the narrative testimony approach, avoiding epistemic responsibility—in the sense of not being
actively partisan in advancing the client’s claims and case—may signal to the trier of fact a reason
to distrust the client’s testimony and even overall case. As Freedman says, “[E]xperienced trial
attorneys have often noted that jurors assume that the defendant’s lawyers knows the truth about
the case, and that the jury will frequently judge the defendant by drawing inferences from the
attorney’s conduct in the case”.197 Worse than passive representation, which could be described as
not positively taking action for or against the client (especially during a particular part of the trial,
i.e., during the client’s testimony), a lawyer who communicates to the trier of fact that there is
reason to distrust his/her own client could be better described as momentarily opposing the client
during the heat of the adversarial clash.
The narrative testimony approach to the CP Trilemma attempts to achieve an
accommodation that satisfies the client’s desire to testify along with the lawyer’s duties to the
court. It proposes to arrive its aims, however, by having the lawyer step out of his/her partisan role.
It is doubtful whether the legal system should tolerate a solution that has the lawyer place so much
epistemic responsibility with a client, especially a client who intends to practice epistemic vice by
misleading the court.

Freedman, “Lawyer’s Trilemma”, supra note 1 at 29. See State v Robinson, 224 SE (2d) 174 (NC Sup Ct 1976) at
180, where the Supreme Court of North Carolina said of the narrative testimony approach, “This procedure could
hardly have failed to convey to the jury the impression that the defendant’s counsel attached little significance or
credibility to the testimony of the witness, or that the defendant and his counsel were at odds. Prejudice to the
defendant’s case by this trial tactic was inevitable”. This case is recognized as giving a criticism of the narrative
testimony approach in People v Johnson, supra note 115 at 814. The Court of Appeal of California did not agree that
juries will draw the inference that the client’s testimony is not credible just because the client’s own attorney does not
actively participate in the client’s testimony. The court in People v Johnson says that the jury may simply believe that
the procedure for a defendant’s testimony is different than the procedure for other witness testimony, People v
Johnson, supra note 115 at 817. This possibility is true, though it would not address the negative inference that the
trier of fact would be likely to draw from seeing the attorney not rely on his/her own client’s perjurious testimony at
any later point in the trial.
197
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(7.3.5) Disclosing Perjury to the Court – “I’ll Tell Them What You’re Doing”
The responses to the CP Trilemma considered so far in this dissertation have one element
in common: the maintenance of client confidentiality. Though the extent to which they maintain
client confidentiality exists on a spectrum—with the lawyer keeping confidential information to
himself/herself and even from himself/herself (selective ignorance) to the lawyer engaging in
behaviours that hint at confidential information (withdrawal and the narrative testimony
approach198)—the lawyer never explicitly reveals the client’s anticipated or completed perjury.199
I now turn to disclosure, which breaks the pattern of keeping the client’s confidence. As a response
to the CP Trilemma, disclosure involves the lawyer informing another person (usually another
participant in the legal proceeding, especially the judge) about the client’s anticipated or completed
perjury. Informing this other participant gives preference to the norms requiring candour to the
court and against misleading the court200 (or to avoiding a specific violation of the norms on
candour) over the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality to the client. Susan E. Thrower describes this
trade-off as “the single biggest producer of cognitive dissonance in the entire ethics enterprise”.201
This dissonance is expected as disclosure involves a breach of confidentiality, one of the core
duties that support the partisan role of the lawyer.
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I am referring here to the point that withdrawal (especially at key moments) and using the narrative testimony
approach may be interpreted by other participants in the adjudicative system as a signal that something unethical has
taken place, is taking place, or will take place—or even specifically that the lawyer’s client is lying. Some related
points are mentioned above in Section (7.3.3) at note 165 and accompanying text and in Section (7.3.4) at note 197
and accompanying text.
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Anticipated client perjury and completed client perjury are categories used in Layton & Proulx, supra note 27 at
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and variations of these responses, to anticipated client perjury and completed client perjury, to the extent that the
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above in Section (2.1) at note 15–16 and accompanying text).
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In this section, I will discuss the use of disclosure in a jury trial. I will focus primarily on
situations in which the lawyer anticipates that the client will commit perjury. In this situation, the
lawyer comes to know about the client’s intention in the advising context, having acquired enough
knowledge about the situation that s/he cannot practice selective ignorance about the facts of the
case.202 It should also be understood that the lawyer has repeatedly and unsuccessfully attempted
to dissuade the client from giving false testimony. The question is whether, to fulfill requirements
of candour to the court, the lawyer can or must disclose to the judge that the client intends to
commit perjury.
American and Canadian professional norms differ substantially on the question of
disclosure. This difference exists both in terms of the substance of the rules and in the clarity of
the rules. Whereas the ABA Model Rules offer guidance generally favouring disclosure that is
difficult to parse and difficult to follow in practice, the Canadian rules are much more clearly in
unison against allowing disclosure. The ABA Model Rules have a complicated history of
prohibiting disclosure (thus giving preference to the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality) and requiring
disclosure (thus giving preference to the lawyer’s duty of candour to the court). This history,
documented by Thrower,203 includes changes to ethics codes, conflicts between ethics codes and

There are numerous contexts in which a lawyer would not know that the client’s testimony is perjurious until the
client has given the testimony. On the less than epistemically virtuous side, the lawyer may have practiced selective
ignorance and have discovered, only after the testimony has been given, that the client was not testifying truthfully.
On the more epistemically virtuous side, the lawyer may have made robust efforts to learn the facts of the case well
enough to competently represent the client, put the client on the stand in good faith, and yet discover afterwards that
the client committed perjury. In the second type of case, the lawyer has made reasonable efforts to practice epistemic
partisanship, specifically to practice self-regarding virtues to allow himself/herself to protect the epistemic and legal
interests of the client. S/he has followed the steps that are normally requisite for marshalling evidence and information
that furthers the interest of the client and checking evidence and information that undermines the epistemic and legal
interests of the client. The practice of a virtue is no guarantee, however, that one’s purposes will be perfectly achieved.
Virtuous people sometimes fail. The practice of virtuous behaviour (in this case, proper investigation of the facts and
honesty in dealing with the court) is sometimes impeded by the vicious behaviour of other people (in the case, the
client giving perjurious testimony). In such cases, remedies like disclosure may be helpful.
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ethics opinions given by ABA committees, and court decisions on the topic. The current ABA
Model Rules have settled on what appears (and perhaps only appears) to be a preference for
candour to the court and disclosure of intended and completed client perjury.
The ABA Model Rules speak to disclosure of both anticipated criminal and fraudulent
conduct generally and completed false testimony specifically. About criminal and fraudulent
conduct in general, Rule 3.3(b) says, “A lawyer who represents a client in an adjudicative
proceeding and who knows that a person intends to engage, is engaging or has engaged in criminal
or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding shall take reasonable remedial measures, including,
if necessary, disclosure to the tribunal”.204 This rule speaks to future, present, and past conduct
permitting disclosure in all timeframes if necessary. When a lawyer anticipates that a client will
testify falsely, the lawyer must attempt to dissuade the client and can refuse to allow the client to
offer testimony that the lawyer knows is false.205 Disclosure is an option, but it is not the first
option.
Speaking specifically to completed false testimony, “If a lawyer, the lawyer’s client, or a
witness called by the lawyer, has offered material evidence and the lawyer comes to know of its
falsity, the lawyer shall take reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure to
the tribunal”.206 With respect to completed false testimony, the lawyer must also pursue other
avenues before disclosing the false testimony. The lawyer must “remonstrate with the client
confidentially, advise the client of the lawyer’s duty of candor to the tribunal and seek the client’s
cooperation with respect to the withdrawal or correction of the false statements or evidence”.207
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ABA Model Rules, supra note 6, r 3.3(b).
See ibid, r 3.3, commentary 6. Note though that the criminal defence lawyer is not permitted to refuse to offer
evidence that the lawyerly merely reasonably believes is false, ibid, r 3.3(a)(3), and r 3.3, commentary 9.
206
Ibid, r 3.3(a)(3).
207
Ibid, r 3.3, commentary 10.
205

284

Ultimately, if the lawyer is not permitted to withdraw, or withdrawal will not remedy the offering
of false evidence, the commentary explains that the lawyer must disclose the falsity of the
testimony to the tribunal “even if doing so requires the lawyer to reveal information that otherwise
would be protected by Rule 1.6”.208
This requirement appears to take a strong stance in favour of disclosure to prevent the client
from misleading the court or to prevent the negative effects of a client misleading the court.
Moreover, these rules on disclosure of client perjury appear to be based on a commitment to the
epistemic processes of the adversarial system of adjudication and the trade-offs that might be
required to protect the system’s epistemic processes. Explaining the need for the requirement for
disclosure, the ABA Model Rules say that “the alternative [to the lawyer disclosing the client’s
perjurious testimony] is that the lawyer cooperate in deceiving the court, thereby subverting the
truth-finding process which the adversary system is designed to implement”.209 The fact that the
rule is made with epistemic aims in mind is not to say that the rule is epistemically good, or good
in other ways. However, the stated commitment to the truth-finding process indicates a clear social
epistemic vision (protecting the processes of the court in the adversarial system) and the extent of
the commitment to that vision (requiring lawyers to even breach the duty of confidentiality, a key
aspect of the adjudicative system’s processes).210

Ibid. Rule 1.6 sets out the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality in the ABA Model Rules. See also ibid, r 3.3(c) “The
duties stated in [Rule 3.3] paragraphs (a) and (b) continue to the conclusion of the proceeding, and apply even if
compliance requires disclosure of information otherwise protected by Rule 1.6”. I have cited first to the commentary
and then to the rule because r 3.3, commentary 10 outlines much more of the process for taking remedial measures
than the r 3.3 itself does. Note also that the duty to remedy false statements given by the client is limited in time to
“the conclusion of the proceeding”, ibid, r 3.3(c). The commentary justifies the duration of the obligation on the basis
of a need for a practical time limit, stating that “[t]he conclusion of the proceeding is a reasonably definite point for
the termination of the obligation”, ibid, r 3.3, commentary 13. In setting out this time limit, the legal profession is not
giving endless priority to the duty of candour. Seemingly, the duty of confidentiality would then also reassert itself
after the conclusion of the proceeding. It does appear somewhat incongruous, however, for the lawyer to be newly
obligated to keep information confidential that s/he was obligated to disclose during the proceeding.
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Ibid, r 3.3, commentary 11 [emphasis added].
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With these epistemic commitments to the truth-seeking function of the adversarial system
motivating the rules requiring disclosure of anticipated and completed client perjury, it is
noteworthy that the biggest wrench in the system’s truth-seeking gears is another condition related
to knowledge within Rule 3.3 of the ABA Model Rules. Under Rule 3.3(a)(3), which speaks to
completed client perjury, the lawyer must come to know the falsity of the evidence offered by the
client before any obligation to remedy false testimony (including remedy by disclosure) arises.211
Similarly, the requirement to disclose under Rule 3.3(b) pertains to when a lawyer “knows that a
person intends to engage…in criminal or fraudulent conduct related to the proceeding”.212 As
discussed earlier in this dissertation, knowing in the ABA Model Rules means having
actual/subjective knowledge.213 In the CP Trilemma, this means that the lawyer must have
actual/subjective knowledge of the client’s intention to commit perjury before disclosing the
perjury. Though “a person’s knowledge may be inferred from circumstances”,214 showing that a
lawyer had actual/subjective knowledge of such a client intent is a difficult standard to meet.215
Thus, the ABA requires disclosure in certain scenarios but has established confounding
rules for these scenarios. The existing rules “force lawyers to agonize over whether to disclose
perjury and subject their clients to all manner of bad results, or to maintain their confidentiality
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and suffer professional opprobrium”.216 Reducing tensions between obligations and setting clearer
standards of behaviour may require the ABA to make stronger commitments to specific epistemic
aims. Thrower agrees on the need to make clearer epistemic commitments when she says, “If the
ABA privileges truth to a court above every other consideration—and there can be no doubt now
that it does—then it should simply say so in its rules and launch a new era in lawyer regulation”.217
Whether giving ultimate preference to candour is the correct approach is not as important to me
here as the need for clear epistemic commitments in the regulation of lawyers and their roles in
the adversarial system of adjudication.
Canadian codes of professional conduct take a clearer stance on the question of disclosure
to prevent or remedy client perjury, as outlined by Layton and Proulx in their work on ethics in
criminal law. These codes explicitly put forward withdrawal as the ultimate response if the client
persists in pushing for the lawyer to violate his/her professional duties as an advocate. Earlier in
this dissertation,218 I summarized and analyzed the prescriptions in the FLSC Model Code
requiring and favouring withdrawal when clients “persist in instructing the lawyer to act contrary
to professional ethics”,219 if the client wants the lawyer to take a course of action that would breach
the lawyer’s duty of candour to the court,220 as well as other applicable rules about withdrawal.
Additionally, as Layton and Proulx explain in their discussion of rules pertaining to
disclosure, codes of professional conduct preclude disclosure by the terms that they set: (1) for the
lawyer to prevent breaches of the lawyer’s duties as an advocate, (2) for withdrawal when the
client insists upon asking the lawyer to conduct himself/herself unethically, and (3) to remedy
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errors and omissions. Layton and Proulx cite numerous rules on the topic of the lawyer’s duty to
prevent breaches of the lawyer’s duties as an advocate.221 In Ontario, the relevant section is the
commentary for Rule 5.1-4. This comment says, “If the client desires that a course be taken that
would involve a breach of the rules in Section 5.1, the lawyer must refuse and do everything
reasonably possible to prevent it. If that cannot be done the lawyer should, subject to the rules in
Section 3.7 (Withdrawal from Representation), withdraw or seek leave to do so”.222 With respect
to this rule and similar rules in other jurisdictions, Layton and Proulx point out that the guidelines
ultimately set out “[w]ithdrawal, not disclosure” as the “response of last resort….”223
Layton and Proulx also explain that the rules about withdrawal require the lawyer to
maintain the client’s confidences throughout and after the withdrawal.224 The ongoing protections
of confidential client information during and after withdrawal “make[] sense only if there has been
no prior disclosure of the problem”.225 If the lawyer were to disclose client perjury to the court,
the lawyer would not be able to satisfy the confidentiality rules around withdrawal. To Layton and
Proulx’s example, I would add Rule 3.7-4 of the FLSC Model Code, which governs withdrawal
from criminal proceedings. The commentary to this rule explains that, “A lawyer who has
withdrawn because of conflict with the client should not indicate in the notice addressed to the
court or Crown counsel [i.e., the prosecution] the cause of the conflict or make reference to any
matter that would violate the privilege that exists between lawyer and client”.226 Recall also that
the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality persists during and after withdrawal, even to the extent that
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the withdrawing lawyer can be restricted in terms of what s/he can share with the successor
lawyer.227 The restrictions on what a withdrawing lawyer can disclose to the court, prosecution,
and successor lawyer thus preclude disclosure.
On the topic of disclosure to remedy an error or omission, Layton and Proulx cite Rule 5.14 of the Law Society of Ontario’s Rules of Professional Conduct,228 which states the lawyer’s
responsibility to disclose and rectify errors and omissions in the performance of his/her role as an
advocate. These disclosures are subject to the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality.229 The fact that this
duty to disclose and rectify is subject to the lawyer’s duty of confidentiality precludes disclosure
as a remedy for completed client perjury. Moreover, note that Rule 5.1-4 of the LSO Rules
specifically addresses completed actions (e.g., completed false testimony). As Layton and Proulx
argue, “The fact that disclosure of a completed perjury is prohibited militates strongly against
interpreting the commentary under discussion to countenance disclosure of an anticipated
falsehood, absent a clear expression of intent otherwise”.230 Taking into account all that has just
been said about rules pertaining to disclosure, Canadian codes of conduct contain strong
protections of confidentiality and do not endorse disclosure as a corrective for client perjury.
Moreover, rules about remedying errors and omission, as well as rules about withdrawal, are not
consistent with withdrawal.
None of the foregoing, where I have outlined the clearer and stronger terms in which
Canadian codes of professional conduct prescribe withdrawal and prohibit disclosure, is meant to
be an endorsement of the Canadian approach to the CP Trilemma. Section (7.3.3) of this
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dissertation provides an extended discussion and critique of withdrawal as a response to the CP
Trilemma. Indeed, I hope that one of the enduring contributions of this dissertation will be to shake
the firm foundations on which withdrawal (especially as a response to the CP Trilemma) stands
within Canadian norms of professional conduct. However, it is worthwhile to explain in this
section on disclosure how clearly the Canadian legal profession has chosen withdrawal over
disclosure.
Moving beyond understanding requirements in codes of professional conduct, the main
question from an epistemic perspective is what disclosure is meant to achieve in relation to the CP
Trilemma. Layton and Proulx identify the main functional justification offered for disclosure. This
justification is based on the epistemic aims of the adversarial system of adjudication. As I have
noted numerous times in this dissertation, the adversarial system of adjudication aims to pursue
truth about factual matters by having partisan advocates present competing positions before a
neutral arbiter. The system has some mechanisms for the competing sides to check one another
(e.g., cross-examination of a witness), but fundamentally relies on the idea that the participants in
the process are not actively trying to introduce false information into the dispute resolution process.
Purposely introducing false evidence “skew[s] the truth-finding function of the criminal justice
system”.231 Allowing the lawyer to disclose the client’s perjury to the tribunal is an effort to prevent
specific impairments of the neutral arbiter’s epistemic position—specifically, being misled by
information known by the giver to be false.
From this perspective, there may be justification for allowing the lawyer to disclose to the
judge that the client intends to commit perjury, or has committed perjury, if (1) disclosure would
prevent the client from offering false testimony that would skew the adjudicative process or (2)

231

Ibid at 359–360.

290

disclosure would prevent false testimony that will be presented, or that has been presented, from
skewing the truth-finding function of the adversarial system of adjudication. In the present section
of this dissertation, dealing with a lawyer anticipating that the client will commit perjury, I am
primarily addressing the aim of preventing the client from introducing false testimony, and
secondarily addressing the aim of preventing any false testimony introduced by the client from
skewing the truth-finding function of the adversarial system of adjudication. With respect to the
context of a jury trial in a criminal law case, I am primarily considering the aim of preventing the
client from giving perjurious testimony that would skew the decision-making process that the jury
follows in arriving at a decision about the facts of the case and secondarily considering the aim of
preventing any false testimony introduced by the client from skewing the jury’s decision-making
process.
After presenting the argument about protecting the truth-finding function of the adversarial
system, Layton and Proulx present what they call another “argument in favour of disclosure” based
on the “benefits to be derived from involving a neutral arbiter in the process”.232 The neutral arbiter
in this small slice of the procedure in which the disclosure would happen is the judge standing
between the client who intends to commit perjury and the lawyer who wants to prevent the perjury
or the negative effects of the perjury. The lawyer has unsuccessfully attempted to dissuade the
client from committing perjury. Explaining the benefit of bringing the judge into this situation,
Layton and Proulx say, “Depending on the nature of the procedure governing the act of disclosure,
a judge may be able to examine and assess the disagreement between counsel and the client.
Judicial intervention at this stage might conceivably serve to fashion a resolution to the problem
or even discover that counsel’s fears are unjustified”.233 While there is something to be said for
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the word “argument” as a description here, what Layton and Proulx have more so given is the
mechanism (the “how”) by which disclosure would work to prevent false testimony from being
introduced during trial or from skewing the truth-finding function of the adversarial system of
adjudication. The value of disclosure as a response to the CP Trilemma ultimately lies in the judge
being able to take some action to prevent the untruthful testimony from being given or to prevent
harm to the processes of the adversarial system.
Some questions that arise about disclosure include whether the client is immediately told
about the lawyer’s plan to disclose the anticipated perjury. Not informing the client, Layton and
Proulx argue, is seriously problematic because of the lawyer’s duty to keep the client informed
about the legal matter and proceedings.234 Layton and Proulx also consider whether the prosecutor
should be informed about the anticipated perjury.235 The authors also briefly touch on variations
of disclosure in which the lawyer informs a judge other than the trial judge.236 These and other
possibilities for disclosure would indeed affect the ethics and epistemology of disclosure as a
response to anticipated client perjury. However, two common questions arise in all possible
variations of disclosure: (1) what will the judge be able to do to prevent the client from testifying
falsely or prevent the harms that could arise from false testimony and (2) how would disclosure
affect the epistemology of the lawyer-client relationship?
In dealing with the first of these two questions, Layton and Proulx explain various steps
that a judge might take after being informed by the lawyer that the defendant237 intends to commit
perjury. These steps include:238
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allowing the defendant to testify if the defendant agrees not to offer the testimony
in question;
(if the defendant claims that the testimony in question would not be false) holding
an evidentiary hearing to determine if the defendant intends to give false testimony;
dissuading the accused from offering false testimony if the judge believes that the
testimony would be false;
allowing the accused to give testimony using the narrative form;239
allowing the use of Freedman’s approach;
finding that the information that the lawyer has disclosed about the defendant’s
intended perjury is not confidential or privileged and allowing the prosecution “to
lead evidence of the accused’s plan and/or cross-examine the accused on the matter
if he takes the stand”;240
or declaring a mistrial.
All the while, the judge must also consider whether the lawyer-client relationship has been so
damaged by the disclosure that the lawyer should withdraw from representing the defendant.
One thing that can be observed from this buffet of options is that disclosure is best
understood as the beginning of a response to the CP Trilemma rather than a complete response
itself. Disclosure relieves the lawyer of responsibility for misleading the tribunal but leaves the
tribunal with the task of addressing the trilemma to prevent false testimony or the negative effects
of the false testimony. Even after the disclosure from the lawyer to the judge, the judge has options
that involve similar choices that the lawyer faced in terms of giving preference to one of the
conflicting IKP norms (or IKP duties when considered in light of the lawyer’s role in the
adversarial system). For example, in considering whether to allow the defendant to give testimony
in the narrative form, the judge is again weighing the question of how to balance the defendant’s

239

Layton & Proulx note that allowing the use of narrative testimony is the normal approach in the United States when
a disclosure is made and that disclosure is usually one of the steps involved in the narrative testimony approach in
jurisdictions that allow narrative testimony, ibid at 364, n 166.
240
Ibid at 364.

293

right to confidentiality and to have his/her case presented against the concern about allowing the
tribunal to be misled by the defendant and the lawyer to take a passive role. The judge does not
escape the need to deal with those considerations; s/he is instead put in the position of making the
ultimate decision about balancing those IKP considerations. Even in attempting to dissuade the
defendant, the judge should be mindful of dissuading the defendant in an epistemically virtuous
way, a consideration that the lawyer shares.241
The difference between the judge’s epistemic relationship to the defendant as compared to
the epistemic relationship of the defence lawyer to the defendant does introduce some new
epistemic dynamics. The judge has different responsibilities than the lawyer and the defendant
may respond differently to admonition from the judge than to admonition from the lawyer.
However, these differences do not eliminate the idea of virtue and vice and the need for the judge
to find the virtuous mean between two vices. Recognizing the difficult decisions that are passed to
the judge after a disclosure, Layton and Proulx correctly say, “The judge will in effect face many
of the options that initially bedevilled defence counsel”.242 In this sense, disclosure can represent
a recycling through of the replies already considered in this dissertation but done by the neutral
arbiter (a participant with a different epistemic function in the adversarial system).
With respect to the question of how disclosure would affect the epistemology of the lawyerclient relationship, Layton and Proulx recognize the deep harm that disclosure can cause to the
relationship as they refer to the violation of the client’s confidence243 and the possibility that the
professional relationship may have been “destroyed by the disclosure”.244 If disclosure undermines
the client’s trust in the lawyer, then the lawyer’s ability to obtain information and even instruction
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from the client could be undermined or severely impaired. If the relationship has broken down
sufficiently that the lawyer must withdraw, the successor lawyer may also have difficulty building
the trust that allows the lawyer to be an effective epistemic partisan for the client because the client
has already experienced a breach of confidentiality. Avoiding guilt for assisting the client in
misleading the court is by no means the end of the virtue epistemic considerations relevant to the
lawyer.
What I have presented in the disclosure option is a fundamental break with the responses
considered beforehand in this dissertation. Up to this point, the lawyer would have never directly
breached confidentiality (one of the most basic protections of the lawyer-client relationship). If a
lawyer is to take an action that can undermine his/her partisan role and relationship to the client so
profoundly, the judge (the neutral arbiter) should be in at least as good of a position to prevent
perjury or the harm caused by perjury as the lawyer was. Otherwise, the lawyer is allowed to avoid
responsibility (as in guilt) with the result of harm to the client as well as harm to the mechanisms
and relationships that support the epistemic functions of the adversarial system.245
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(8) Testifying as Usual in the CP Trilemma – “I’ll Help You Lie”
Bradley Wendel describes non-ideal situations as those in which it is “impossible to do the
right thing without, at the same time, engaging in some kind of wrongdoing”.1 He argues,
“Dilemmas in political life, of which…the practice of law is a part, are sometimes incapable of
resolution without a sense that there is something disagreeable, even wrongful, about the
resolution, even though the conclusion may be justified”.2 In such situations, a lawyer should
“reason to the best resolution of the competing values at stake…and act on that resolution, but
should also be aware of the remainder or residue of competing values”.3 None of the responses to
the CP Trilemma considered so far in this dissertation deal as directly with the impossibility of
resolution as the answer given by Monroe Freedman.4 The approach that Freedman advocates for
responding to the CP Trilemma is so direct and controversial that Warren Burger, then the Chief
Judge of the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals in the United States, sought to have Freedman disbarred
for giving the proposal.5
When a lawyer is faced with the CP Trilemma, Freedman says that “[T]he attorney’s
obligation in such a situation would be to advise the client that the proposed testimony is unlawful
[i.e., dissuasion], but to proceed in the normal fashion in presenting the testimony and arguing the
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case to the jury if the client makes the decision to go forward”. 6 Freedman does not pretend to
supply a neat solution to the trilemma. He does not purport to resolve a merely apparent trilemma.
Directly addressing the conflict of IKP duties, he argues that, if the lawyer cannot dissuade the
client from giving perjurious testimony, the lawyer must give preference to the duty of competence
(i.e., becoming fully informed about the facts of the case) and to the duty of confidentiality (i.e.,
not informing anyone about the untruthfulness of the testimony). The lawyer is to satisfy the duties
of competence and confidentiality as s/he puts forward the client’s cause and facilitates the
testimony in the normal way.
Freedman’s recommendation for the CP Trilemma constitutes a violation of the following
rules of professional conduct:7
ABA Model Rules, Rule 3.3—Candor Toward the Tribunal
(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly:
(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal or fail to correct a false
statement of material fact or law previously made to the tribunal by the
lawyer;
…
(3) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false.8
FLSC Model Code, Rule 5.1-1—Advocacy
When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must represent the client resolutely and
honourably within the limits of the law, while treating the tribunal with candour,
fairness, courtesy and respect.9
FLSC Model Code, Rule 5.1-2—Advocacy
When acting as an advocate, a lawyer must not:
Monroe H Freedman, “Perjury: The Lawyer’s Trilemma” (1975) 1:1 Litigation 26 at 28.
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…
(b) knowingly assist or permit a client to do anything that the lawyer considers to
be dishonest or dishonourable;
…
(e) knowingly attempt to deceive a tribunal or influence the course of justice by
offering false evidence, misstating facts or law, presenting or relying upon a false
or deceptive affidavit, suppressing what ought to be disclosed or otherwise assisting
in any fraud, crime or illegal conduct.10
By knowingly presenting the client’s perjurious testimony, the lawyer facilitates and makes false
and misleading statements to the court. The lawyer facilitates the deception of the court, rather
than acting with candour.
I will give a hearing to Freedman’s arguments from the virtue epistemic perspective that I
have cultivated throughout this dissertation. As I proceed, it is vital to recall that, in response to
the CP Trilemma, Freedman advocates for a course of action—a choice—that involves trade-offs,
not a resolution that could vindicate all values fully. Instead of focusing exclusively on the
satisfaction of abstract principles, Freedman’s proposal invites lawyers to approach the problem
from his expression of a way of being—a way of living as—a legal professional.
(8.1) Volition in the Non-Ideal
I have explored the issue of volition on multiple occasions in this dissertation. In particular,
the question that I have considered is whether people who are involved in some sort of deception
are epistemically malevolent. I explained Jason Baehr’s definition of epistemic malevolence in
Section (4.1) and revisited epistemic malevolence in Section (7.2) to consider the intentions of the
client in the CP Trilemma. With respect to the client, I concluded that there are too many
possibilities about client intentions to make blanket statements about the epistemic intention of the
client. The issue of malevolence is relevant again as I consider a reply to the CP Trilemma in which
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the lawyer breaches his/her duty of candour and facilitates the client’s deception of the court. My
conclusion about clients is not replicate for lawyers.
Epistemic malevolence is broadly about opposition to the epistemic good. A person can
oppose the epistemic good in a way that is impersonal or personal,11 as well as in a way that is
intrinsic or instrumental.12 Additionally, the epistemic agent’s opposition to the epistemic good
must be “robustly volitional, active, and ‘personally deep’”.13 Impersonal epistemic malevolence
is a type of malevolence in which a person opposes the abstract notion of the epistemic good. By
contrast, personal epistemic malevolence is a type of malevolence in which a person opposes
someone’s participation in the epistemic good.14 The CP Trilemma is compatible with opposing
the abstract notion of the epistemic good but does not necessarily involve any sort of opposition
to the abstract notion of the epistemic good. Nor, importantly, does the CP Trilemma contain any
elements that prompt consideration of impersonal epistemic malevolence. My emphasis will be
on drawing insights about personal epistemic malevolence in the lawyer who responds to the CP
Trilemma by facilitating the client’s testimony in the normal way.
I argued above15 that it is not completely clear whether the client in the CP Trilemma is
personally epistemically malevolent. The client may not want the trier of fact to participate in the
whole truth or in some smaller aspect of the truth about the facts of the case. Such a position would
fall under the heading of personal epistemic malevolence if other conditions of epistemic
malevolence are met. As somewhat of a contrast to the idea of opposing the participation of the
trier of fact in the epistemic good, in the specific example of the CP Trilemma presented earlier,16
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the client may have a misguided idea about keeping the trier of fact from making a mistake about
the facts of the case. The client may thus want to prevent the trier of fact from doing something
epistemically bad (reaching an incorrect conclusion about the facts of the case) by himself/herself
doing something epistemically wrong (giving untruthful testimony).17 It is a dishonest way of
preventing a false overall view about the facts of the case. This appears to not involve any sort of
opposition to the epistemic good, especially not opposition to having the trier of fact achieve
knowledge about the facts of the case.
With respect to personal epistemic malevolence, the lawyer in Freedman’s reply to the CP
Trilemma is in a less ambiguous position. In the first place, the lawyer who gives Freedman’s
response gives strong indications that s/he is not opposed to other participants in the legal
proceeding sharing in the epistemic good and, in fact, actively supports their participation in the
epistemic good. Before Freedman allows the lawyer to assist the witness to testify in the normal
way, Freedman requires the lawyer to repeatedly attempt to dissuade the client out of committing
perjury.18 Sincerely wanting, and repeatedly trying, to dissuade the client out of giving untruthful
testimony is a strong indication that the lawyer following Freedman’s advice is not being
epistemically malevolent. A person who is behaving in an epistemically malevolent way, who has
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enemized the good (especially the participation of the trier of fact in the epistemic good), is
unlikely to attempt to dissuade the client from giving untruthful statements to the court.19
When Freedman notes the importance of sustained efforts at dissuading the client from
committing perjury, he is suggesting that the lawyer engage in an act of epistemic benevolence
towards the court. As the lawyer does something like exhorting the client to give honest testimony
to the court, the lawyer is suggesting that the client practice the other-regarding epistemic virtue
of honesty and benefit the court (especially the trier of fact) epistemically. The client’s honest
testimony would even provide an epistemic benefit to the client’s legal adversary—the
prosecution—a consequence that is highly unlikely to align with personal epistemic malevolence.
Discouraging the client from misleading participants in the legal process and encouraging the
client to give truthful testimony indicates, at the very least, a desire to avoid misleading the trier
of fact in ways that are prohibited by the legal process.
In addition to the indications given by dissuasion, the lawyer has a noteworthy avenue
available in numerous situations for avoiding the classification of his/her volitions as malevolent:
the lawyer’s volitions must be understood in relation to his/her role in the adversarial system. The
lawyer’s volition may be shaped in ways that can only be understood by exploring the effects of
various options for dealing with a scenario in the adversarial system of adjudication. At a basic
level, the lawyer’s epistemic volitions can be primarily understood through his/her role in being a
champion for his/her client in the adversarial system of adjudication. The adversarial system
pursues truth by having competing parties and their partisans argue their position before a neutral
arbiter. Lawyers have the role of supporting the adversarial system’s truth-seeking function by
being champions for the litigants. This function justifies the lawyer’s role-differentiation, thus

I say “unlikely” because scenarios can always be imagined in which intentions and plans do not align with the more
mundane expectations that I have about intentions here.
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determining when the lawyer’s role is differentiated and the shape of the differentiated standards
of behaviour.20 To the extent that the lawyer seeks to fulfill this function, the lawyer’s broad
epistemic volitions are to support the adjudicative system’s truth-seeking function, even when the
partisan way in which the lawyer supports this function would not be justified outside of the
context of the adjudicative system. With respect to evidence, the lawyer’s intention is to present
evidence that is favourable to his/her client’s case and to undermine confidence in evidence that is
unfavourable to his/her client’s case to the extent that treating evidence in this way is consistent
with the lawyer’s epistemic role as an officer of the court.
In the CP Trilemma, the lawyer is faced with the impossibility of abiding by all three of
the IKP duties. No answer will involve perfect satisfaction of all three IKP duties that structure
and support the lawyer-client relationship and the lawyer’s ability to be an effective partisan in the
adversarial system of adjudication. Yet, the lawyer must perform the role of partisan advocate on
behalf of his/her client (i.e., must find some balance of the IKP duties to apply) or simply cease to
function in the adversarial system on this case. In Freedman’s response, the lawyer chooses
strongly in favour of the duties to investigate and keep the client’s information (i.e., choosing to
satisfy the requirements of competence and confidentiality while failing to fulfill the duty of
candour to the court). Choosing against abiding by the duty of candour to the court may indicate
opposition to the epistemic benefit of the court. However, another more plausible reading would
be that the lawyer is simply making a choice that the adversarial system leaves with the lawyer
when the CP Trilemma arises and when the lawyer cannot dissuade the client or withdraw from
representing the client.
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The lawyer who applies Freedman’s response, will be making a decision between
conflicting duties of his/her role in the adversarial system, and will be deciding that s/he will not
compromise on fulfilling the duty of competence and the duty of confidentiality (by which lawyers
and clients are able to be open in sharing information). On such a reading, using Freedman’s
response no more indicates the client’s opposition to the court’s (especially the jury’s) participation
in the epistemic good than disclosing the client’s intention to give untruthful testimony indicates
that the lawyer deeply opposes client confidentiality. Apart from properly executed dissuasion, all
responses to the CP Trilemma have downsides. It is inappropriate to ascribe to the lawyer any sort
of personal epistemic malevolence just because the lawyer does not choose in favour of a particular
duty (candour) in the face of a genuine conflict of duties. Given his/her role in the adversarial
system, s/he must choose between conflicting duties. When duties genuinely conflict, the mere act
of choosing between those duties (including when candour is duty that the lawyer breaches) does
not evince malevolent volitions.
Between (1) indications about intention that lawyers give by attempting to dissuade the
client from misleading the court and (2) the leeway that should be given to lawyers because their
role in the adversarial system assigns lawyers a particularly difficult epistemic task and choice,
lawyers in adversarial litigation dealing with the CP Trilemma can readily push back against the
claim that they are epistemically malevolent. However, lawyers who assist the client in testifying
normally are not out of the woods yet. Pushing back against claims of epistemic malevolence does
not mean that lawyers are properly playing their epistemic role in the adversarial system of
adjudication.
(8.2) Partisanship in the Non-Ideal
The ultimate question in this dissertation when it comes to Freedman’s response to the CP
Trilemma is whether, and how, his response works with the epistemology of the adversarial system
303

of adjudication (i.e., with the context in which the lawyer is practicing). Freedman’s reply to the
CP Trilemma could work positively with adversarial system. His response centres the lawyer’s
partisan role within the adversarial system of adjudication. The adversarial system seeks truth
about the facts of a case via a clash of positions between litigants—who (ideally) are represented
by lawyers acting as epistemic partisans—before a neutral arbiter. Epistemic partisanship is
required and justified by the epistemic needs of the adversarial system of adjudication. As I defined
earlier, epistemic partisanship is:
a disposition to (a) desire the epistemic and legal success of the client, which leads
to (b) taking action to support the advancement of the client’s cause, (c) in service
of the adversarial system of adjudication, especially its truth-seeking function.21
The two vices between which epistemic partisanship stands are epistemic neutrality and epistemic
hyper-partisanship.
In the CP Trilemma, being an epistemic partisan would not be a complete and perfect
response to the situation that the lawyer faces. In this dissertation, I am dealing with actual, rather
than apparent, instances of the CP Trilemma. Thus, epistemic partisanship will not resolve the
conflict of duties and even the types of behaviour that normally fulfill the role of an epistemic
partisan may need to shift in the CP Trilemma. However, the CP Trilemma does not eliminate the
basic need that the adversarial system of adjudication has for epistemic partisanship from lawyers.
If a lawyer following Freedman’s response satisfies the adversarial system’s need for epistemic
partisanship and avoids falling under the heading of epistemic vices, then Freedman’s response
could be an acceptable way of dealing with a negative situation.
A surprisingly strong case can be made for the position that Freedman’s reply to the CP
Trilemma satisfies the requirements of, or supports, epistemic partisanship. His arguments connect
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deeply with the needs of the adversarial system of adjudication and with the justifications that the
adversarial system gives for the role-differentiation of the lawyer. In the early stages after a lawyer
realizes that the client intends to give false testimony, Freedman’s recommendations address a
situation in which “a lawyer’s zeal on behalf of a client is to be exercised only within the law and
the disciplinary rules”.22 After finding out that the client intends to give untruthful testimony, the
lawyer is required to maintain the client’s confidence and attempt to dissuade the client from
testifying perjuriously. Dissuading clients out of taking a wide array of actions (legal and illegal),
not limited to committing perjury, is part of the core of the advising context in the lawyer-client
relationship; it is a key part of taking the client’s side and protecting the client’s interests.23
Freedman’s response to these early stages of the CP Trilemma supports epistemic partisanship in
a way that is no different from what any other commentator would suggest and violates no rules
of professional conduct.
As efforts at dissuasion fail, the lawyer moves outside of an ordinary lawyering context
and into a context that Freedman thinks permits a level of zeal beyond what the law and
disciplinary rules prescribe. “Zealous representation”, he explains, “may sometimes require the

Monroe H Freedman, “In Praise of Overzealous Representation – Lying to Judges, Deceiving Third Parties, and
Other Ethical Conduct” (2006) 34:3 Hofstra L Rev 771 [Freedman, “Overzealous Representation”] at 772.
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Here, I am referring both to the lawyer’s responsibility to encourage clients to abide by the law and to the non-legal
knowledge that lawyers might have and by which they can dissuade clients from taking courses of action that would
harm the client’s non-legal interests. Codes of professional conduct recognize this non-legal knowledge and its place
in the lawyer-client relationship too. ABA Model Rules, supra note 8, r 2.1, “In rendering advice, a lawyer may refer
not only to law but to other considerations such as moral, economic, social and political factors, that may be relevant
to the client’s situation”; ibid, r 2.1, commentary 2, “Advice couched in narrow legal terms may be of little value to a
client, especially where practical considerations, such as cost or effects on other people, are predominant. Purely
technical legal advice, therefore, can sometimes be inadequate…. It is proper for a lawyer to refer to relevant moral
and ethical considerations in giving advice. Although a lawyer is not a moral advisor as such, moral and ethical
considerations impinge upon most legal questions and may decisively influence how the law will be applied”; FLSC
Model Code, supra note 9, r 3.1-2, commentary 10, “In addition to opinions on legal questions, a lawyer may be asked
for or may be expected to give advice on non-legal matters such as the business, economic, policy or social
complications involved in the question or the course the client should choose. In many instances the lawyer’s
experience will be such that the lawyer’s views on non-legal matters will be of real benefit to the client”.
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lawyer to violate other disciplinary rules”.24 Freedman describes such behaviour as
“overzealousness”.25 His support of overzealousness in some situations (even in some regular
lawyering situations) is informed by the idea of zealous representation requiring the lawyer’s
“entire devotion to the interests of the client”.26 This level of devotion to the client’s cause,
Freedman argues, in informed by his reading of “the larger legal context of the lawyers’ role”,
inconsistencies between ethical rules, “the purposes of legal representation, and…moral
philosophy”.27
As a straightforward example of his thinking, Freedman explains that participants in
settlement negotiations have certain expectations of behaviour and that, for the lawyer to perform
his/her function of being a zealous advocate for the client, the lawyer must apply his/her
professional duties with an understanding of the participants’ situational expectations and the way
in which the social system functions.28 Given the dynamics of settlement negotiations, Freedman
says that lawyers should be able to “properly give an inflated or deflated settlement figure to an
adversary” and even to a judge in a pretrial settlement conference.29 The lawyer should be allowed
to do this, Freedman says,30 even though ABA Model Rule 4.1(a) prohibits the lawyer from
“mak[ing] a false statement of material fact or law to a third person”31 and even though ABA

Freedman, “Overzealous Representation”, supra note 22 at 772.
Ibid.
26
Ibid at 771. Note that Freedman does not address the CP Trilemma directly in this article. Instead, he discusses
examples of lawyer giving untruthful statements to judges and third parties in-between formal court proceedings, in
negotiations, and in sting operations done by activists to catch breaches of human rights laws. The same reasoning
applies to the CP Trilemma, however.
27
Ibid at 782.
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See ibid at 778–780 (Freedman explaining ethical expectations in negotiations).
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Ibid at 779. Freedman was arguing against Standing Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Formal
Opinion 93-370, Judicial Participation in Pretrial Settlement Negotiations (American Bar Association, 1993), which
permitted lawyers to refuse to answer judges’ questions about settlement figures but did not permit lawyers to give an
inaccurate settlement figure to a judge; see Freedman, “Overzealous Representation”, supra note 22 at 779–780, nn
47–48. See also Hutchinson, supra note 20 at 116 (discussing the idea of bluffing in negotiations).
30
See Freedman, “Overzealous Representation”, supra note 22 at 778.
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Model Rule 8.4(c) prohibits the lawyer from “engag[ing] in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud,
deceit or misrepresentation”.32 The lawyer, Freedman is saying, should not be restricted by the
black letter rules when the black letter rules present the lawyer with conflicting duties that do not
support the functioning of the social system in which the lawyer operates. Working with the
social/legal practice of negotiation requires the lawyer to reinterpret and apply existing
professional duties in a way that allows the social system to function.
Freedman’s reasoning—justifying overzealousness on the basis of a contextual
understanding of the lawyer’s role in a social system—could apply to the CP Trilemma as well.
When the client intends to give untruthful testimony, the lawyer has not left of the role of the
client’s partisan advocate. The client maintains his/her right to a lawyer even when the client
intends to give, or has given, untruthful testimony. The legal system is not built around
expectations that the client will lose the advocate in such situations. “A defendant”, Freedman
argues, “must testify truthfully or suffer the consequences. The consequences, however, are not
forfeiture of the right to counsel or of confidentiality of communications with counsel”.33 Instead,
the adversarial system has mechanisms by which the person committing perjury can be checked
and the trier of fact’s confidence in the person giving the testimony can be undermined. In
particular, “the defendant faces ‘the risk of confrontation with prior inconsistent utterances,’ which
is the ‘traditional truth-testing device[] of the adversary system.’”34 This risk of being confronted
during testimony is a built-in mechanism of the adversarial system to deal with behaviour that is
not desired but that is expected to be part of the adjudicative system at least some of the time.
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From the beginning of the client forming an intention to commit perjury all the way to a
lawyer scrutinizing the client’s testimony during cross-examination, the client still requires a
partisan champion. That is to say that the client still depends on his/her lawyer being his/her expert
legal partisan and the legal system still depends on the lawyer advocating the client’s position
before the neutral arbiter. In the CP Trilemma, however, partisan advocacy on behalf of this
particular client (perhaps the central demand of the lawyer’s role) can no longer be achieved by
abiding by all of the lawyer’s usual professional duties. Fulfilling the role of the client’s partisan
now means giving preference to competence and confidentiality, somewhat sacrificing abidance
of the duty of candour to the court by facilitating the client’s testimony in the normal way.35
Though proposing a stark choice made against fulfilling the duty of candour to the court,
Freedman’s response is deeply rooted in the ethics of the legal profession and can be expanded to
the epistemology of the legal profession. His response to the CP Trilemma is grounded in the
lawyer’s role/function within the legal system. Lawyers must fulfill numerous duties, but those
duties can only be explained and justified (as role-differentiated morality and epistemology can
only be explained and justified) by the lawyer’s role within the legal system. In Freedman’s view,
lawyers are first and foremost to be partisan representatives for their clients and their duties are to
be understood and applied (or not) in relation to that function. Performing that partisan function is
more basic than duties of candour to the court. In service of that partisan function, Freedman would
allow lawyers to breach other professional duties and to be so partisan that they cross over into the
vice of hyper-partisanship because there are contexts that call for hyper-partisanship. From an
epistemological perspective, Freedman is arguing against strict adherence to duties in favour of
dispositions to perform a role that serves a system of knowledge production. In his view, the lawyer

I say “somewhat” here because Freedman by no means says that the lawyer in the CP Trilemma is given a pass to
introduce any falsehoods that s/he likes into the proceeding.
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can perform that role by living out the virtue of epistemic partisanship and even by living out the
vice of epistemic hyper-partisanship.
This is a difficult stance for a scholar in the epistemology of lawyering to accept, and all
the more so for a virtue epistemologist. Freedman is arguing that the performance of a vice may
be needed to perform the lawyer’s role in some situations. The difficulty of the conclusion should
not impede an appreciation for the way that it speaks to the deepest interests of social epistemology
and virtue epistemology. With this level of foundational engagement, if Freedman’s response to
the CP Trilemma is indeed preferrable to other responses, then he is not merely addressing a
specific moral or epistemic problem. In his view, the role of the lawyer as a partisan representative
is a normative lodestar in the ethics and epistemology of law. Duties and dispositions are all guided
by the partisan role.
Even Freedman himself understates the centrality that he gives to partisan representation,
its importance over other lawyering responsibilities (i.e., its ability to override other professional
duties) and its ability to shape the lawyer-client relationship. Freedman claims that “zealous
representation…may sometimes require the lawyer to violate other disciplinary rules”,36 but he
actually makes a great deal of space for overzealousness in legal practice. Overzealousness is not
something that Freedman proposes the lawyer should briefly do during the client’s untruthful
testimony in the CP Trilemma. Quite the contrary, in Freedman’s approach, overzealousness in
service of the lawyer’s role in the adversarial system exists in the background of the lawyer-client
relationship and is suggested to support the functioning of normal partisan zeal in the adversarial
system and even dissuasion as a reply to the CP Trilemma. Consequently, Freedman’s response to
the CP Trilemma, perhaps more so than any other response to the trilemma considered in this
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dissertation, is a conscious decision in favour of a way of being as a lawyer; it is a broad normative
choice to be a lawyer who pushes the boundaries of permitted practice, regularly arranging the
practice context to be able to push these boundaries, especially in favour of partisan service to the
client.
Freedman proposes that, at the beginning of the lawyer-client relationship, the lawyer can
steadfastly state what could easily be described as an overzealous commitment to client
confidentiality. When the lawyer is explaining to the client how confidentiality protects lawyerclient communications, the lawyer could promise to never disclose confidential client information,
even when required by law to disclose (such as to prevent or remedy a fraud on the court).37 This
promise would be meant to encourage the client to trust that his/her information will be safe and
that s/he can thus be open in communicating with the lawyer about the case. In making this
promise, the lawyer would commit to risking civil and criminal sanctions to protect the client’s
information.38
A significant upside of Freedman’s robust guarantee of confidentiality is that his
commitment is a renunciation of the selective ignorance approach to criminal defence lawyering.39
Such a strong (or overzealous) guarantee of confidentiality may indeed inspire in the client more
openness with the lawyer than the selective ignorance approach can tolerate. Selective ignorance
aims to keep the lawyer from acquiring information that would close off strategic options for the

See Elisia M Klinka & Russell G Pearce, “Confidentiality Explained: The Dialogue Approach to Discussing
Confidentiality with Clients” (2011) 48:1 San Diego L Rev 157 at 186, n 138, citing Monroe H Freedman & Abbe
Smith, Understanding Lawyers’ Ethics, 3rd ed (Newark, NJ: LexisNexis, 2004), s 6.09 at 172. Promising
nondisclosure also typically includes a promise to not disclose confidential information when the disclosure is optional
(such as to prevent harm, defend against malpractice, and collect unpaid fees), see generally Klinka, supra at 184–
185.
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See Klinka, supra note 37 at 186, n 139 and accompanying text.
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Freedman’s commitment to confidentiality, beyond even what the law allows, could be read as a political stance to
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defence in a criminal case. Achieving exactly the opposite purpose of the aims of selective
ignorance, the client might be encouraged by Freedman’s guarantee of nondisclosure to give
information to the lawyer that would diminish the range of options that the lawyer can use in
defence of the client. Moreover, the lawyer is seeking all information, rather than attempting to
only find specific pieces of information.
More ambiguous in terms of its desirability, Freedman’s guarantee of nondisclosure also
locks the lawyer out of using disclosure as a response to the CP Trilemma. In Canada, locking
oneself out of disclosure is not a problem, since disclosure is not a permissible response to the CP
Trilemma.40 However, in jurisdictions of the United States that follow the ABA’s guidance for the
CP Trilemma,41 the lawyer would be committing to not disclose anticipated or completed client
perjury. Furthermore, since disclosure to the court is often part of engaging the narrative testimony
approach,42 a lawyer who makes Freedman’s commitment is impeding himself/herself from using
the narrative testimony approach. Where the narrative testimony approach is required by the courts
as the response to the CP Trilemma, the lawyer would be pledging to breach his/her jurisdiction’s
ethical norms.
Thinking about the benefits that overzealousness in the CP Trilemma can have in lawyerclient relationships, Freedman argues that his proposal for the CP Trilemma is vital to dissuasion—
the ideal resolution to the CP Trilemma. His argument is based on the idea that other responses to
the CP Trilemma would signal to clients generally that they cannot trust their lawyers to keep their
confidential information. Clients would thus enter lawyer-client relationships with their guard up,
not freely sharing information with their lawyers and thus keeping from their lawyers the
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information that the lawyers could use to dissuade clients from committing perjury. Freedman
argues:
In the rare case in which the client persists [with the intention to give false
testimony after the lawyer’s attempts at dissuasion], the lawyer must present the
client’s testimony in the ordinary way and remain true to the lawyer’s pledge of
confidentiality. If lawyers were to follow any other course, it would soon become
common knowledge that clients cannot trust their lawyers with confidential
information. The result would not be less perjury, but more, because lawyers would
cease to have either the knowledge or the trust that enables them to dissuade clients
from wrongful conduct in general and from perjury in particular.43
When a client does not share all relevant information with the lawyer, the lawyer is
incompetent in the advisory context, not to mention the advocacy context. When the client trusts
the lawyer enough to freely offer information to the lawyer in the advising context, the lawyer may
also gain information that is vital to dissuading the client from committing perjury. This
information might simply be enough knowledge about the facts of a case to be able to present the
client with a strong strategy for the case as an alternative to the client committing perjury. In a
strong relationship of trust with the client, the lawyer may also acquire information that will allow
the lawyer to more effectively present the client with the risks and harms that will be caused by
the client committing perjury.44 Since the lawyer’s ability to acquire information about a case is
vital to the lawyer’s ability to dissuade the client from illegal action, and if presenting testimony
in the normal way in some cases builds trust in lawyer-client relationships generally,
overzealousness/hyper-partisanship in a small number of cases may reduce perjury overall.
What we have seen from Freedman are principled arguments for expanding the scope given
to zealousness, citing the need to go beyond the normal ideal of zealousness to respond to certain
problems (especially those in which duties conflict) and suggesting that it can even be beneficial
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for a lawyer to structure some aspects of his/her approach to practice (e.g., guaranteeing
nondisclosure) around these (hopefully) rare instances that Freedman says call for
overzealousness. Freedman is not arguing for an abandonment of lawyerly duties and dispositions,
but for understanding lawyerly duties and dispositions in the context of a social system that has
moral and epistemic purposes. Lawyers, in his view, should most centrally carry out their partisan
function in the social system, even when carrying out that central function means sacrificing other
responsibilities and turning the virtue into the vice (zeal into overzealousness and partisanship into
hyper-partisanship).
A significant part of understanding Freedman’s proposal is realizing how it approaches the
lawyer’s role in a situation that is far from the best function of the adversarial system of litigation.
Some recent insights given by Wendel about the process of moral deliberation help with this
understanding. Wendel’s arguments explicitly consider Freedman’s approach to reasoning through
the CP Trilemma. Wendel approaches Freedman’s ethical thought from a perspective that is
heavily influenced by Christopher Gowans’ definition of a “moral remainder” as “something that
remains of a moral conflict after the process of moral deliberation and that thereby explains the
presence of wrongdoing even when the correct conclusion of deliberation has been followed”.45
Such a result should especially be expected in the case of a genuine trilemma, rather than a merely
apparent dilemma.
These mixed moral feelings and results are what Freedman suggests come about for the
lawyer who follows his advice about dealing with the CP Trilemma. The lawyer has taken all steps
to abide by his/her professional role, including especially becoming competent about the client’s
case (and not engaging in a selective ignorance strategy), maintaining the client’s confidence, and
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dealing honestly with the court. The lawyer has also undertaken repeated attempts to dissuade the
client from giving perjurious testimony. Under Freedman’s account, the lawyer has acted in
accordance with the demands that the legal profession places on him/her up to the point of assisting
the client to testify untruthfully46 but otherwise in the normal way that testimony is given in a trial.
In response to the context—and supported by a consideration of the lawyer’s purpose in
the lawyer-client relationship, the adversarial system of adjudication, and the broader legal
system—the lawyer who follows Freedman’s line of thought determines that the best response is
to continue being a zealous representative and sacrifice the duty of candour to the court. The lawyer
believes that this is the best thing to do for the sake of the legal system in this situation but can
also recognize that failing to abide by the duty of candour is an element of wrongdoing that
accompanies the best course of action that the lawyer thinks is available to him/her.
With the explanation just given, Freedman’s response to the CP Trilemma looks highly
compatible with the epistemology of lawyering that I have developed here, paying central attention
to the virtue of epistemic partisanship within the adversarial system of adjudication. Freedman’s
view is a theory of ethics, but it can easily be articulated in epistemic terms. I have already
summarized his view in language that could fit into either moral or epistemic discussions. Putting
his theory in terms closest to my theory of the epistemology of lawyering, it would take few steps
to describe Freedman’s response to the CP Trilemma as a stance about how to locate the virtuous
mean of epistemic partisanship between the epistemic vices of epistemic neutrality and epistemic
hyper-partisanship. With the lawyer’s function in the adversarial system as basis for identifying
virtuous behaviour, a virtue epistemic articulation of Freedman’s response to the CP Trilemma
would essentially be the claim that the virtuous mean of epistemic partisanship falls closer to the
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extreme of hyper-partisanship in the CP Trilemma, when the lawyer cannot completely fulfill all
three of the IKP duties and the adversarial system of adjudication still needs the benefit of having
an epistemic partisan for the client. In some cases, even epistemic hyper-partisanship would be
permitted.
Read in this light, Freedman’s response to the CP Trilemma is fundamentally different
from selective ignorance, withdrawal, the narrative testimony approach, and disclosure.47 Whereas
all of the responses just given are somehow failures by the lawyer to be an epistemic partisan, or
are cessations of epistemic partisanship, the way that I have presented Freedman’s view is as
contesting the way in which to be an epistemic partisan. To advocate that the lawyer should
continue to play his/her role as a champion for the client in the CP Trilemma on the basis that the
adversarial system and the client benefit from, and depend on, this work is to contest and stretch
the meaning of my own theory of epistemology and epistemic partisanship. Such contestation is
welcome and would be an expected debate in virtue epistemology.
However, as the rash person shares commonalities with the courageous person but takes
his/her behaviour to a vicious excess, so too does Freedman’s (more than occasionally)48
overzealous lawyer share some things in common with the epistemic partisan. Freedman’s
overzealous lawyer shares with the epistemic partisan the reasoning that grounds epistemic
partisanship within the adversarial system of adjudication—all the while advocating for behaviours
that reach an epistemically vicious extreme49 and developing a disposition other than epistemic
partisanship. The motivations that push Freedman to advocate even for behaviour that reaches the
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vicious extreme can be understood in virtue epistemology but evince a virtue epistemic approach
that is far different from mine.
Throughout this dissertation, I have been developing the epistemology of lawyering around
the idea of a way of being—a way of living as—a legal professional. Lawyers can adopt broad
approaches to knowledge in the legal system. As with any way of life, it will be rare for any
individual to perfectly adhere to that way of life, but every individual can develop dispositions that
are more or less inclined to living out particular ways of life. I hesitate to immediately apply firm
labels to these ways of professional life. My hesitation comes not from an opposition to labels or
categories,50 but because explaining an ethical or epistemic way of life and comparing that way of
life to an actual person’s life requires an understanding of a large set of dispositions, volitions,
practice contexts, systems of social organization, and other normative factors that require more
exploration and explication than I can give here.
Nonetheless, what I can describe are clusters of concepts and norms that are part of an
epistemic way of life or that indicate different tracks for one’s life as an epistemic agent.
Freedman’s writing indicates a conscious decision in favour of a way of being as a lawyer. As I
said earlier in this section, he made a broad normative choice to be a lawyer who pushes the
boundaries of permitted practice, regularly adjusting his approach to practice and even the practice
context to be able to push these boundaries in favour of the client. The risk in this way of
professional life is that Freedman’s model (which explicitly makes room for overzealousness)
encourages the lawyer to develop vicious dispositions.
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As part of evaluating people epistemically,51 virtue epistemology is deeply interested in the
types of dispositions that people develop. “Virtues”, as Ayers explains “are dispositions to promote
intrinsic values well”.52 In virtue epistemology, there are two main schools of thought about
virtues: (1) reliabilism, which treats virtues as competences (“disposition[s] to succeed reliably
enough at some type of performance”53) and (2) responsibilism, which treats virtues as character
traits (“disposition[s] to form beliefs and/or desires of a certain sort and…to act in a certain way,
when in conditions relevant to that disposition”).54
Pursuing a way of being in which the lawyer pushes the boundaries of permitted practice
in favour of the client raises the question of whether a lawyer following Freedman’s broad
approach to lawyering is likely to develop dispositions (whether epistemic capacities or epistemic
character traits) that are different from epistemic partisanship. In particular, does Freedman’s way
of being as a lawyer encourage the lawyer to develop vicious dispositions? As I described earlier
in this section, overzealousness in Freedman’s approach to lawyering is supposed to contribute to
the lawyer’s partisan role for the client, exist in the background of the lawyer-client relationship,
and support the functioning of normal partisan zeal in the adversarial system. If overzealousness
has such an important place in the lawyer-client relationship and in the legal system, then the
lawyer must have dispositions (competences and character traits) that will allow him/her to
recognize the need to be overzealous and to actually behave in an overzealous way. Even if such

See John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco, “Virtue Epistemology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Fall
2019), Edward N Zalta, ed, online: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University
<plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/> [perma.cc/JJ3T-4YUJ], s 1.
52
Ayers, supra note 3 at 38 [emphasis in original].
53
Will Fleisher, “Virtuous Distinctions: New Distinctions for Reliabilism and Responsibilism” (2017) 194:8 Synthese
2973 at 2977.
54
Christian B Miller & Angela Knobel, “Some Foundational Questions in Philosophy about Character” in Christian
B Miller et al, eds, Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015) 19 at 21.
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dispositions are rarely put into practice, the lawyer must have them to follow the way of being that
Freedman proposes.
Freedman believes that the CP Trilemma is an instance in which it is appropriate for a
lawyer to be overzealous by assisting the client to testify in the normal way. Taking this path would
require the lawyer to exercise relevant capacities and character traits to facilitate the testimony.
Many of these capacities and character traits are the same unproblematic dispositions that allow
all lawyers to assist any client in litigation. This includes reliabilist capacities like the ability to
reading technical material and reason logically about principles and facts, as well as responsibilist
character traits, such as diligence with one’s work. However, the capacities would also include the
ability to lie (or participate in a lie) convincingly and the character trait of dishonesty (at least some
inclination to be dishonest).55
There may be some instances in which the capacity to lie (or participate in a lie)
convincingly would be helpful to a lawyer and be appropriate for the lawyer to apply. Some
examples of situations in which the capacity to lie convincingly might be helpful include bluffing
in negotiations56 and keeping a client’s confidential information (such as when answering a
question truthfully, or not giving an answer at all, will communicate information that the lawyer
has a duty to keep confidential).57 The character trait of dishonesty is different, however. It is a
disposition to choose to mislead other people.
Lawyers are not called to lead all people to all knowledge that they have. However,
dishonesty actively places impediments (that are not part of the intended design of the legal
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Other capacities and character traits—virtuous and vicious—that I cannot explore here would also be helpful to the
lawyer while practicing the kind of overzealousness for which Freedman calls in the CP Trilemma.
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See Hutchinson, supra note 20 at 116.
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Any appropriate application of the ability to lie convincingly is, however, not usually imagined to involve
misleading the tribunal in any way.
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system) upon the ability of other participants in legal processes to discover truth. The legal system
expects some level of dishonesty from participants, but that dishonesty is undesired, especially in
testimony given under oath. Thus, whereas the capacity to lie convincingly has some minimal
utility to lawyer-client relationships and the functioning of the legal system, the character trait of
dishonesty appears to have no such utility. To develop the capacity to lie convincingly is to develop
a skill that can sometimes be used virtuously and that can often be used viciously. The ability to
lie is a dangerous skill that should be treated with the greatest caution. To develop the character
trait of dishonesty is to develop a disposition that can only be used viciously within the legal
system.
From a virtue epistemic perspective that emphasizes the importance of developing
dispositions that are oriented towards the truth and that values the practice of other-regarding
virtues in relation to the trier of fact, it is difficult to endorse a response to the CP Trilemma and
way of being that encourages lawyers to develop vicious dispositions. Endorsing such an approach
would be to endorse a cultivation of concept (epistemic vice) against which my epistemology is
fundamentally positioned. Choosing a way of life as a lawyer in which the lawyer pushes the
permissible boundaries of practice in favour of the client does not necessarily involve the
development of epistemic vice. Freedman’s response to the CP Trilemma and the particular way
that he has made space for overzealousness does, however, involve the cultivation of epistemic
vice, including a vicious character trait.
Worse yet, Freedman’s response involves the application of cultivated vice to the neutral
arbiter—the main participant who is supposed to benefit from the lawyer’s practice of otherregarding virtues in the adversarial system of adjudication.58 I part with Freedman in his
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The neutral arbiter is a professionally sophisticated participant in the case of the judge. However, the jury is a neutral
arbiter that may be particularly vulnerable to be misled by a professional’s application of a cultivated vice.
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endorsement of a way of being as a professional that involves such cultivation of epistemic vice.
Role-differentiation can justify behaviours, and the cultivation of dispositions, in specific roles
that would be impermissible or vicious outside of those roles. However, it is a dangerous
endeavour to cultivate dispositions (i.e., dishonesty) that are vicious outside of the system and
within the system in hopes that the disposition and behaviours produced by the disposition can be
justified by giving a benefit to part of the system (i.e., to partisan representation). Admitting that
the ideal cannot be achieved in a scenario does not need to involve such a surrender to the vices
and snares of the non-ideal.
In the final section of this dissertation, I have considered the position of the scholar who
has most prominently discussed the CP Trilemma. His prominence on this topic is for good reason,
as he offered an approach that controversially faced the problem directly—recognizing the conflict
of duties, outlining desirable responses like dissuasion, but ultimately realizing that the lawyer
would need to make a choice between conflicting values. His proposal of facilitating the client’s
testimony in the normal way, prioritizes the lawyer’s duties of competence and confidentiality
above the lawyer’s duty of candour to the court. Unlike other responses to the CP Trilemma,
Freedman’s response is supported by argumentation that delves deep into the function of the
adversarial system of adjudication and the lawyer’s role in that system. Freedman’s particular
reasoning about the lawyer’s role in the adversarial system states a broad commitment to pushing
the boundaries of permitted practice. Pushing boundaries is one of the basic roles of a lawyer,
especially a lawyer defending a client in a criminal case against charges brought by the state. From
my virtue epistemic theory of lawyering, the depth of Freedman’s normative reasoning is to be
praised and repeated, but his conclusions about the lawyer’s role and the space that he makes for
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vice (overzealousness/hyper-partisanship) sacrifice too much of what a normative epistemology
values.
There may be a best approach to the CP Trilemma, a question that I have not addressed in
this dissertation other than with respect to dissuasion. Except for dissuasion (which eliminates the
conflict of duties), every response to the CP Trilemma considered here prioritizes some IKP duties,
values, and/or virtues over others. These approaches (ideal and imperfect) can be stated (though
have often not actually been previously stated) from viewpoints about the proper functioning of:
the legal system and the lawyer’s role in that system; the parts of the legal system that would be
affected by certain responses to the trilemma, political stances about the participants involved in
the legal system; and other considerations based on differing approaches to ethics and knowledge.
Numerous views can be articulated for judging the merits of different approaches to the CP
Trilemma and the sacrifices (of duty or virtue) that each approach requires. Deciding on the best
answer is a difficult task, even with the new evaluative epistemic resources that I have brought
forward in this dissertation. In facing this difficult scenario, however, I hope to have demonstrated
numerous conceptual resources that can be derived from the epistemic study of lawyering.
Distinctly, these resources are not mostly principles to be applied to different scenarios, but choices
to make about how to live the intellectual life of a lawyer—both when that life is rote and when
that life is wrought.
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Conclusion
Recapitulation
The philosophy of lawyering has taken a laser-like focus on a worthy field of study: ethics
(under which I include politically informed theories and theories based on the philosophy of law).
As scholars have pursued this project, they have largely omitted discussion of other branches of
philosophy. I have no intention to turn away from the ethics of lawyering, nor am I calling for
other scholars to do so. What I am calling for philosophical scholars of lawyering to do is to take
in the broader panorama of concepts that their focus on ethics has overlooked.
Topics in epistemology are some of the least discussed theoretical questions in the
philosophy of lawyering, yet they have wide-ranging theoretical and practical implications.
Moreover, scholars working with different domains of knowledge pertaining to cognition have
developed elements of an emerging network of approaches to lawyering that centre the cognition
of participants in legal proceedings. This network includes behavioural legal ethics, metacognition
in legal education, and the epistemology of lawyering, i.e., cognitive science, pedagogy, and
philosophy.
I have made the case in this dissertation that developments in epistemology, especially the
rise of social epistemology and virtue epistemology, provide insightful frameworks for studying
the lawyer’s role in knowledge production. Social epistemology and virtue epistemology can be
the foundations of an integrated approach to the epistemology of law. Social epistemology
involves the broadening of epistemology from the study of one cognizer to the study of
communities of cognizers (including the community as a whole and relationships between the
cognizers). Virtue epistemology brings a normative approach to the study of knowledge, applying
concepts from Aristotelian ethics to develop accounts of dispositions and behaviours that lead
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individuals and communities to knowledge.1 In these theories of epistemology, the philosophy of
lawyering takes important steps to becoming the subject of the full range of philosophical inquiry
(i.e., of all branches of philosophy).
In this dissertation, I began my calls for a broader philosophical inquiry of the legal
profession by presenting the history of the philosophy of lawyering, one that has so far been
dominated by waves of philosophical legal ethics. These theories include those that apply concepts
from the philosophical study of ethics, legal philosophy, and political philosophy to the study of
lawyering. I have made my own contributions to this branch of the philosophy of lawyering with
my Fullerian theory of legal ethics. The ethical branch of the philosophy of lawyering will continue
to be relevant and timely. As ethics benefits from (and contributes to) development in other
branches of philosophy generally, so too will the ethics branch of the philosophy of lawyering
benefit from (and contribute to) the development of other branches in the philosophy of lawyering.
However, ethics does not contain all philosophical discursive resources that can be applied to study
the legal system and the role of lawyers in the legal system.
The study of knowledge brings significant discursive resources as well. Alvin Goldman
has already demonstrated the resources of social epistemology, studying the legal system and the
work that lawyers do in the legal system through his veritistic social epistemology, which sets the
production of true beliefs as the standard for evaluating social institutions and practices.2 Goldman
identifies five epistemic standards—(1) reliability, (2) power, (3) fecundity, (4) speed, and (5)
efficiency3—according to which social systems can be evaluated epistemically. Perhaps more than

See generally John Turri, Mark Alfano & John Greco, “Virtue Epistemology”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of
Philosophy (Fall 2019), Edward N Zalta, ed, online: Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford
University <plato.stanford.edu/entries/epistemology-virtue/> [perma.cc/JJ3T-4YUJ], s 1 (explaining varying
approaches to treating virtue epistemology as a normative discipline).
2
Above in Section (2.1), note 12 and accompanying text.
3
Above in Section (2.1), notes 14–16 and accompanying text.
1
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any other epistemologist, Goldman has turned his attention to the legal system and lawyers,
covering topics such as rules for the disclosure of evidence before trials 4 and the assessment of
legal evidence in trials.5 He was an early, and is a continuing, leader in applying a normative social
epistemic lens to the legal system and to the work that lawyers do.
Lawyers, however, cannot be put under normative epistemic scrutiny only from the grand
overview perspective that social epistemology takes. A normative epistemology of the legal
profession requires a deep understanding of the lawyer as an intellectual being—of his/her
dispositions6 to promote the intrinsic value of knowledge production well.7 Virtue epistemology
stands ready to offer this understanding, in a theory that, rather than asking whether cognizers meet
abstract conditions for having knowledge, focuses on the epistemic excellences of cognizers. The
key question in virtue epistemology is not whether a cognizer has something like justified true
belief, but whether that cognizer is practicing epistemic virtues, especially those virtues relevant
to the context.
Virtue epistemology is a multifaceted approach to knowledge. Two schools of thought set
out different types of virtues. Reliabilism focuses on skills and capacities as “disposition[s] to
succeed reliably enough at some type of performance”.8 By contrast, responsibilism deals with
“disposition[s] to form beliefs and/or desires of a certain sort and (in many cases) to act in a certain

See William J Talbott & Alvin I Goldman, “Games Lawyers Play: Legal Discovery and Social Epistemology” (1998)
4:2 Legal Theory 93.
5
See Alvin I Goldman, “Simple Heuristics and Legal Evidence” (2003) 2:3 Law, Prob & Risk 215; Alvin I Goldman,
“Quasi-Objective Bayesianism and Legal Evidence” (2002) 42:3 Jurimetrics 237.
6
Skills (reliabilism) and traits (responsibilism).
7
I am borrowing Ayers’ formulation, in which he says, “Virtues are dispositions to promote intrinsic values well”,
Andrew B Ayers, “What if Legal Ethics Can’t be Reduced to a Maxim?” (2013) 26 Geo J Legal Ethics 1 at 38
[emphasis in original].
8
Will Fleisher, “Virtuous Distinctions: New Distinctions for Reliabilism and Responsibilism” (2017) 194:8 Synthese
2973 at 2977.
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way, when in conditions relevant to that disposition”.9 These two approaches to virtue
epistemology both have significant merits. I took the responsibilist perspective in this dissertation
to emphasize normativity and the epistemic accountability of lawyers. Other helpful concepts in
virtue epistemology include the notion of virtue orientation, which explains the direction of benefit
of virtues. Jason Kawall distinguishes between self-regarding epistemic virtues and otherregarding epistemic virtues. These two categories are not meant to be overly strict, as the benefits
given by the practice of virtues often spills onto people other than the main beneficiaries of those
epistemic virtues.
Having recognized the deep insights about cognizers and knowledge being achieved in
virtue epistemology, I developed a virtue epistemic approach to the philosophy of lawyering.
Understanding the context of the lawyer’s work was vital to this task. Responsibilist virtue
epistemology looks at dispositions relevant to specific conditions. Lawyers’ roles in systems of
social organization determine the relevant epistemic dispositions for lawyers to practice. Put
differently, the system of social organization in which the lawyer works determines the extent, and
shape, of the differentiation between the norms (ethical and epistemic) that apply to all people and
norms (ethical and epistemic) that apply to lawyers (i.e., people in highly specific and specialized
roles).
Lawyers work in various systems of social organizations and various practices contexts. I
chose to focus on the context of the adversarial system of adjudication, which has long been the
central focus of much philosophizing about lawyering. The adversarial system of adjudication has
inspired a great deal of scholarly literature with which I interacted. Helpfully, selecting this specific

Christian B Miller & Angela Knobel, “Some Foundational Questions in Philosophy about Character” in Christian B
Miller et al, eds, Character: New Directions from Philosophy, Psychology, and Theology (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015) 19 at 21.
9
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practice context allowed me to paint the lawyer’s role and the normative distinctions between
lawyers and non-lawyers with cleaner lines.10 Finally, the adversarial system has been the site of
stark normative debates that even arise out of conflicting professional duties for lawyers within its
context. Having chosen to focus on the adversarial system of adjudication, I have left much work
to be done in terms of giving a complete responsibilist epistemology of lawyering. Doing that
additional work would require exploring the lawyer’s epistemic role in other practice contexts such
as: transactional lawyering, collaborative lawyering, less adversarial forms of dispute resolution
(such as mediation and negotiation), and even cause lawyering and political activities (including
political activities that are outside of the bounds of what qualifies as providing legal services).11
Such tasks require a lifetime of scholarly work and the contributions of a scholarly community
researching from virtue epistemic perspectives.
I based the virtue epistemology of lawyering in this dissertation on the epistemic needs that
the adversarial system of adjudication has of lawyers. On an epistemic level, the adversarial system
of adjudication pursues truth through the process of having partisans argue their client’s case
before a neutral arbiter. This clash of arguments itself is thought to have epistemic value. In this
system, lawyers are tasked with being the partisans who put forward their client’s position. Within
this system, it is appropriate for lawyer to practice what I have called the epistemic virtue of
epistemic partisanship, which I defined as:
a disposition to (a) desire the epistemic and legal success of the client, which leads
to (b) taking action to support the advancement of the client’s cause, (c) in service
of the adversarial system of adjudication, especially its truth-seeking function.12
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That is to say that I can draw cleaner distinctions between the norms that lawyers must follow and the norms that
apply to people generally, i.e., people as they act outside of a normatively differentiated role.
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Law Society Act, RSO 1990, c. L.8, s 1(5) (definition of the provision of legal services).
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Above in Section (4.5), note 90 and accompanying text.
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Being an epistemic virtue, epistemic partisanship is a mean between two epistemic vices:
epistemic neutrality and epistemic hyper-partisanship. Crucially, partisanship is a virtue for the
lawyer to practice within the adversarial system of adjudication. The system is designed to function
through partisan argumentation and lawyers are expert partisans who help laypeople put forward
their positions. When the same person steps outside of the role of the lawyer who serves the
adversarial system of adjudication, it may no longer be epistemically virtuous for him/her to be an
epistemic partisan. The suitability of epistemic partisanship, epistemic neutrality, and even
possibly epistemic hyper-partisanship is determined by the context in which the epistemic agent is
acting.
Significantly, I recognize that lawyers’ abidance of their epistemic role within the
adversarial system does not produce perfect results (i.e., perfect truth-seeking practices) and is not
any sort of ultimate epistemic value. Partisanship, even practiced properly, does not guarantee
impeccable service of the adversarial system of adjudication nor is the adversarial system of
adjudication a perfect system for discovering factual truth. Even properly practiced partisanship
can reduce the speed at which true beliefs are acquired and can make it more costly to acquire true
belief, for example, as lawyers legitimately battle over procedural issues that can shift the
advantage for or against their client.13 Additionally, there are other values besides discovering
factual truths—especially legal and moral values—that constrain the legal system’s pursuit of
epistemic goals. These values include examples such as respect for individual rights (e.g., rights
against unreasonable search and seizure) and the protection of specific relationships (e.g., the
relationship between spouses). Epistemic partisanship must therefore be understood as having its
own internal limitations and must be practiced in a way that respects external constraints.
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Above in Section (4.5), notes 100–102 and accompanying text.
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As I have mentioned on multiple occasions in this dissertation, there is an emerging
network of approaches to lawyering that centre the cognition of participants in legal proceedings.
This network could be overwhelming to explore without the benefit of focus. Proposing a virtue
epistemology of lawyering focused on the lawyer’s partisan role within the adversarial system of
adjudication allowed me to similarly zero in on specific aspects of adjacent theories of cognition
in the legal system. Thus, as I discussed the educational theory of metacognition, I addressed the
topic of the metacognitive benefits that legal representation provides to a client, especially in the
context of adversarial litigation. This allowed me to develop the idea of legal representation being
a sort of offloading of metacognition from the client to the lawyer. Lawyers thus take on epistemic
responsibility from the client and must facilitate this passing of responsibility from the client to
the lawyer. These notions (taking epistemic responsibility14 and metacognitive offloading15),
which I began articulating as I defined epistemic partisanship and continued in my discussion of
metacognition, formed the basis of a critique that I gave of multiple responses to the CP Trilemma,
including selective ignorance, withdrawal (in some instances), and the narrative testimony
approach.
The network of cognitive theories also includes behavioural legal ethics, in which scholars
have applied insight from cognitive science, especially psychology, to study the legal profession
and the norms of lawyering. My epistemology of lawyering, based on philosophical reasoning, can
both contribute, and be responsive, to the insights that come out of behavioural legal ethics.
Philosophy can interact critically with, and push back against, the deterministic tendencies that
sometimes arise in cognitive science. My responsibilist virtue epistemology thus asserts the
normativity that applies to lawyers, including in relation to epistemology and knowledge
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production. This is to say that lawyers cannot use determinism to escape responsibility for
practicing the cognitive virtues that the adversarial system of adjudication requires of them.
At the same time, it is a great benefit for my epistemology of lawyering to face challenges
that have been understood thanks to behavioural legal ethics. Perhaps central among these
challenges is one posed by Andrew Perlman in his account of the objective-partisan assumption.
Perlman’s arguments about the assumption were directed towards ethical theories in the
philosophy of lawyering, but they also apply to the epistemology of lawyering. His arguments
apply perhaps especially to the idea of epistemic partisanship as an epistemic virtue. Thankfully,
as I argued above, a virtue epistemology of lawyering stands open and eager to receive knowledge
from the complementary discipline of psychology. Illustrating this point, I look favourably towards
the content and form of Perlman’s strategies for dealing with the biasing effects of partisanship.
Perlman’s insights can be an aid to finding the epistemically virtuous mean that serves the
adversarial system in between two opposing epistemic vices that undermine the adversarial system.
After forging a path for the epistemology of lawyering and putting forward my own virtue
epistemic approach, I came to the task of applying my theory to a challenging case study: the Client
Perjury Trilemma. I selected this case study to see how my theory performs under stress, dealing
with a scenario that raises conflicting duties of professionalism and even conflicting epistemic
responsibilities in relation to the lawyer’s service of the adversarial system. Happily, virtue
epistemology has provided significant advances in understanding the CP Trilemma and the
responses to the trilemma. The trilemma is not resolved, but that was never the aim. Instead, the
aim was to gain a different vantagepoint on the case study and better understand the trade-offs
being made by different proposed responses.

329

I began my consideration of the case study by mapping the CP Trilemma using concepts
in virtue epistemology. This involved understanding the epistemic roles that various participants
play in the legal system and how the CP Trilemma affects those roles. Beyond pointing out that
the CP Trilemma involves conflicting professional duties, I was able to achieve a deeper
explanation of the mechanics of what is wrong in the CP Trilemma. This includes an explanation
of the expectations brought to the situation by participants in the process, the responsibilities of
these same participants, the direction of epistemic benefit (especially as it relates to virtue
orientation) given by the various participants, and the client’s volition in the scenario. Giving this
explanation required understanding how processes function normally in the adversarial system and
the way in which the CP Trilemma affects these processes.
Finally, I came to an extended application of my virtue epistemic theory to various
responses that lawyers may have to the CP Trilemma (i.e., to situations in which the lawyer expects
his/her client to commit perjury). These varied responses included everything from officially
permitted responses for lawyer to take (the most widely accepted of which are dissuasion and
withdrawal) to responses in which the lawyer would be violating professional norms (selective
ignorance) and violating legal norms (Freedman’s response of preferring the client’s
confidentiality so that the lawyer facilitates the client’s testimony in the normal way). I also
considered the narrative testimony approach, which has some support in certain jurisdictions of
the United States, and disclosure of the client’s anticipated or completed perjury. Each of the
responses to the CP Trilemma evince different professional and epistemic priorities. They protect
different participants’ epistemic interests, different epistemic relationships, and different epistemic
strategies within adversarial litigation. Through my virtue epistemology of lawyering, especially
in the ideas of epistemic partisanship and “taking epistemic responsibility”, I provided new
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descriptions and evaluations that were not previously available to the philosophy of lawyering
under a framework purely within the ethics branch of philosophy.
Most notable are my treatment of selective ignorance, withdrawal, and Freedman’s
response to the trilemma. Epistemology is uniquely suited to explaining and critiquing selective
ignorance, a response to the CP Trilemma in which a lawyer deliberately avoids acquiring
knowledge in order to maintain a wide array of strategic options. Theories of knowledge have
robust conceptual resources to explain the purpose of knowledge acquisition by various
participants in legal processes and the downsides of professionals evading the acquisition of
knowledge. Applying these concepts to withdrawal allowed me to achieve critical insights about
an under-scrutinized and often default answer to difficult professional situations, including the CP
Trilemma. Theories of legal professionalism based in ethics have provided critiques of withdrawal,
but the epistemology of lawyering allowed me to develop that line of thought in a deeper way than
can be done with conceptual resources from ethics alone. Casting doubt on the appropriateness of
an under-scrutinized default is a significant advancement in the field of legal professionalism.
Finally, epistemology allowed me to deal with Freedman’s proposed reply to the CP Trilemma
with fresh and fair eyes, and to develop a critique of his proposal from a perspective that centres
the lawyer’s role in the adjudicative system as much (or perhaps more so) than Freedman himself
does.
The overall value of this dissertation is twofold. First, I made room for ideas in the
philosophy of lawyering besides those grounded in ethics. Ethics is an understandable starting
point for the philosophy of lawyering and should continue to be pursued widely by scholars.
However, ethics should not crowd out other branches of philosophical thought. Second, I proposed
a theory on epistemology, another branch of philosophy. My theory is based on more recent
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developments in epistemology that centre the intellectual life of the thinking being. In treating
one’s relationship to knowledge as a matter of character, virtue epistemology brings a powerful
normative perspective to the study of knowledge and the lawyer’s role in social structures that use
and produce knowledge. With this perspective, we can see that the title of this dissertation asks for
more than a descriptive answer. It asks for a commitment to a way of being in furtherance of
knowledge. “How Will I Know?” becomes “Who will I be?”

Looking Forward
I came to this doctoral research in pursuit of a broad research agenda. It began with my
work on philosophical legal ethics. Therein, I developed my own Fullerian theory of lawyering in
which I proposed an approach to fidelity to law that is based on the moral conditions for the
existence of law. In doing this, I recognized that fully understanding the concepts that I was
addressing would require attention to foundational philosophical concepts in metaphysics and
epistemology.16 This is to say that working on the ethics of lawyering ultimately requires attention
to the other branches of philosophy.
In an effort to better understand the systems of social organization in which lawyers work,
I have dedicated this doctoral research to the epistemology of lawyering. I identified the need for
this research in my LLM thesis, wanting to “explore the question of how it is that the lawyer has
the epistemic capacities to do the things that are required of him/her under my principles of
Fullerian lawyering”17 and “the way in which lawyers’ use of such methodologies of moral
epistemology, play into the larger epistemic structures of legal systems”18. These broad aims that
were intended to serve the purposes of my Fullerian theory of lawyering also had epistemic sub-
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See Emanuel Tucsa, Legal Ethics as a Moral Idea: A Theory of Philosophical Legal Ethics Based on the Work of
Lon Fuller (LLM Thesis, Osgoode Hall Law School, York University, 2014) [unpublished], Looking Forward.
17
Ibid at 172.
18
Ibid at 173.
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goals that evolved into the themes of this dissertation and that can stand within the epistemic
branch of the philosophy of lawyering independent of my own Fullerian commitments. These
epistemic aims included exploring “the way in which these legal systems make use of various
actors to arrive at the knowledge (such as about the material facts of cases) that the legal systems
seek to obtain”19 and “the epistemic role of the lawyer” as the “core ethical actor in the social
epistemology of the internal morality of law”20. I have pursued exactly these aims, discussing the
epistemic role of the lawyer within the adversarial system of adjudication.
Proposing a virtue epistemic theory of lawyering has allowed me to focus on the character
of the lawyer in his/her professional life. As I deepened my research into the knowledge producing
role of the lawyer, I benefitted from a network of scholarship about cognition that I had not
anticipated would be so robust when I began thinking about the epistemology of lawyering. The
way forward in this line of research involves continuing to develop the virtue epistemology of
lawyering itself while collaborating with the emerging network of scholars studying cognition in
the legal system and in the work of lawyers.
Through the theoretical resources of each approach to epistemology, including social
conditions of epistemic excellence and virtue analysis that is suited to a highly personalized
analysis of the epistemic life of the lawyer, we can provide a rich framework that allows us to
understand both the epistemic context in which the lawyer works and the individual qualities that
can be used to achieve epistemic success. Undertaking this type of analysis has allowed me to
suggest new insights into the adversarial system of adjudication and to explore the way in which
different models of lawyering conceptualize the lawyer’s role in that system. This project requires
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continuation, with even greater focus on providing a deeper account of the virtues that allow
lawyers to be discoverers and stewards of knowledge in the legal system.
Forming links between research agendas focused on the cognition of lawyers and other
participants in the legal system should be a priority for scholars in these fields. As scholars in this
emerging cognitive approach to studying the legal system and lawyers establish their own niches
in legal scholarship, it is vital for these scholars to know about research that is complementary to
their own work, especially from the perspective of a different discipline. This is both for the
practical support that scholars working on these topics can offer to one another and because it will
be beneficial for our theories and research to evolve together—sharing concepts, projects, and
values—rather than in isolation. Developing in isolation, the cognitive approaches to lawyering
that I have mentioned—(1) epistemological, (2) teaching with metacognition, and (3) behavioural
theory based in cognitive science—could, in the worst case, hamper the ability of these approaches
to say meaningful things to one another if they develop in ways that are closed to the possibilities
that each of the others raise. Thus, advancing the cognitive study of the legal system and the legal
profession requires recognizing overlaps in research and fostering this emerging intellectual
community of scholars who study the cognition of participants in the legal system.
A wide network of collaboration between scholars focused on cognition has the potential
to make a meaningful contribution to the legal system and to legal education. By this, I do not
mean that practicing lawyers will rush out, read works in the field, and be inspired to change their
approach to practice. Some practitioners may do that but expecting that to be widespread shows a
misunderstanding of the resources brought forward by the network of legal cognition scholars and
by many legal scholars in other fields. Research within this network of scholarship about cognition
and the law should be done with aims that are similar to basic research in the sciences. The study
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of cognition in the legal system, like basic science, is a “quest for new knowledge”, which exists
in an interdependent relationship with efforts at application and innovation in the field of law.21
“Without a specifically envisaged or immediately practical application”, it nonetheless is often the
basis of innovation as the knowledge that it produces is integrated into applied research and
projects.22 The conceptual tools created by the network of legal cognition scholars may be taken
up by legal educators, practitioners, institutions, participants in legal processes, etc. My key
concerns are that the tools and knowledge come into being—available to be taken up—and are
thereafter refined for their purpose.
Making such contributions depends on a boldness of vision and a collaborative spirit.
Turning the lens on contributors to the network of legal cognition scholars, the development of
resources and knowledge originating from the study of cognition in the legal system depends on
scholars’ own practice of intellectual virtues. We have the epistemic responsibility for our projects’
shared success.
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